 Hello and good morning. Welcome to our briefing. Climate change, loss and damage. I'm Dan Brasette, Executive Director of the Environmental and Energy Study Institute. The Environmental and Energy Study Institute was founded in 1984 on a bipartisan basis by members of Congress to provide science-based information about environmental energy and climate change topics to policymakers. More recently, we have also developed a program that provides technical assistance to utilities in rural areas interested in on-bill financing and beneficial electrification programs for their customers. ESI provides informative, objective, nonpartisan coverage of climate change topics in briefings, written materials and on social media. And all of our educational resources, including briefing recordings, fact sheets, issue briefs, articles, newsletters and podcasts are always available for free online at www.esi.org. If you would like to make sure you always receive our latest educational resources, just take a moment to subscribe to our excellent bi-weekly newsletter, Climate Change Solutions. Our briefing today is the second in our series, What Congress Needs to Know About COP 27. Last week, we began our briefing series with a discussion about climate science and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's most recent findings as presented in the sixth assessment report. If you missed it, you can watch the archived webcast by visiting us online at www.esi.org. Today, we will focus on loss and damage, one of the issues expected to be a key topic of discussion at the 27th conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP 27 for short, and Charm Elshake, Egypt. Next week, we will partner with US Nature for Climate for a briefing about natural climate solutions. And then just a few days before we leave for Egypt, we will take a step back and look over the issues that we expect to be on the table for the negotiations and how the international community could proceed toward meeting the challenge of global climate change. If you are not subscribed to ESI's biweekly newsletter, Climate Change Solutions, or our special daily newsletter during COP, COP 27 dispatch, please take a moment to visit us online and subscribe at www.esi.org forward slash subscribe. You won't want to miss it. The issue of loss and damage refers to climate impacts that cannot be adapted to climate impacts are already being felt all across the globe, including here in the United States. But loss and damage afflicted by those impacts is not evenly distributed, and the abilities of different countries to deploy resources to respond varies greatly. So there is really no way to talk about loss and damage without acknowledging the disparities of wealth and resources between developed and less developed countries. Systemic inequities mean less developed and vulnerable countries will be hit first and worse by climate impacts. And as you can imagine, this can be a very difficult issue for negotiations. That is why we've brought together four panelists with deep expertise and experience in loss and damage and how it affects people in different parts of the world. Let me remind everyone that we will have some time for questions today during the after our panelists present, and we will do our best to incorporate questions from our online audience. If you have a question, you can send it to us via email and the email address to use is ask at esi.org that's a sk at esi.org, or even better follow us on Twitter at ESI online and send it to us that way. It is my privilege to introduce the first of our four panelists today. Thomas is a senior fellow at climate analytics and University of the Bahamas, her research, her particular research in policy focus is on aspects of social vulnerability, adaptation strategies and loss and damage. Adele was a lead author on the IPCC sixth assessment report, and the special report on 1.5 degrees Celsius, and has provided scientific and policy advisory services to a number of multilateral organizations and national institutions in the United States and throughout the Caribbean. Welcome to our briefing today. And Ritu, would you mind turning your video off while Adele, thank you so much Adele, I'll turn it over to you. I can't wait for your presentation. Thanks for the introduction and hi everyone. In my presentation this morning, I'm really going to be setting the scene on the scientific findings on loss and damage. I will be drawing from the latest assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change the IPCC where I was one of the lead authors. Okay, so the IPCC is working group to report on impacts adaptation and vulnerability was published earlier this year, and it was the culmination of over five years of work assessing thousands of scientific articles. This report provides the most robust assessment of research on loss and damage that the IPCC has provided to date. And so I'll be getting into some of the findings from the IPCC on loss and damage. But before that I just like to clarify the terminology and the definition that we used in the report. We refer to losses and damages as harm from observed impacts and projected risks due to climate change. And these losses and damages can be either economic or non economic. Or harms where a monetary value can be assigned. So for example, the cost of repairing a building or rebuilding a road, or the cost of economic losses to a particular sector due to a climate impact, such as the loss of agricultural crops due to drought. Then there are non economic losses and damages. And these are things that are not traded in markets. And so they are difficult to assign a monetary value to non economic losses and damages include health impacts such as trauma changes to biodiversity loss of sense of community and And so in our working group to report, we conducted a broad assessment of losses and damages across all world regions. And I'll highlight the three top messages from our assessment on losses and damages. The first key message is that losses and damages are already happening. Our current levels of global warming at 1.1 degrees Celsius have already caused dangerous and widespread losses and damages to nature and to billions of people. And this is despite our efforts to adapt to climate change. We see that there's an increase in human mortality due to extreme heat. So heat waves, we find bleaching of warm water coral increases in areas burned by wildfires at first impacts from hurricanes and all of this can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change. We are also seeing the widespread deterioration of ecosystems across world regions, as well as millions of people, particularly those in the global south being exposed to acute food insecurity and reduced water security. This figure further illustrates some of the losses and damages already being experienced from climate change. And so this is an assessment of observed impacts of climate change on ecosystems. The darker the circle, the higher the level of confidence that we have in attributing these impacts to climate change. So across this global assessment, you can see that there is high confidence that we are seeing observed and attributed impacts in ecosystem structure and species range shifts and in changes in timing for terrestrial freshwater and ocean systems. We have also provided an assessment for different regions and particularly vulnerable areas, and you can see that there are varying levels of confidence, depending on the available literature. But overall, we show that there are negative impacts and losses and damages being experienced in ecosystems around the world. We have also carried out this assessment for human systems. So again here the darker the circle, the higher the confidence we have in attributing impacts to climate change. A negative symbol means that there are increasing adverse effects. So this would be loss and damage. A positive and negative sign means that there are both increasing adverse and positive impacts of both positive and negative benefits. At the global scale, you can see that there is medium confidence for mixed impacts for water scarcity, medium confidence in increasing adverse impacts in agriculture and crop production and for fisheries yields. We have high confidence of increasing adverse impacts, so losses and damages at the global scale for heat and malnutrition, for mental health, for displacement, for flooding, for damages to infrastructure. And again we've carried this out for different world regions, and you can see that the majority of impacts that are being experienced are negative. So these are losses and damages, and there are varying levels of confidence, again based on the scientific literature that is available. We have also assessed non-economic loss and damage, and we show where there is scientific documentation of non-economic loss and damage already occurring. And so this map isn't exhaustive. It's meant to show examples of different types of non-economic losses and damages, which are associated with climate hazards that have been attributed to climate change. And we can see that these are being experienced across the globe. So there are examples of loss of agency, loss of biodiversity, loss of culturally meaningful places, and all of this is happening in different world regions. The scientific literature on non-economic loss and damage is not as advanced, and so we largely have to rely on examples to show that these are already occurring. The second key message coming from the report is that future losses and damages are projected to rise with increased global warming. So as global average temperatures increase, losses and damages will become more difficult to avoid, and they will remain strongly concentrated among the poorest vulnerable populations. We find that the risks of future losses and damages are highest in areas that already have high temperatures, such as tropical regions, and places along coastlines and rivers and in frozen parts of the world. Coastal cities and settlements in particular face greater flood risks, and low-lying coastal ecosystems such as mangroves will be submerged and lost. We also project increases in loss of biodiversity as well as the ecosystem services that they provide. And importantly, the 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold is the point at which we can expect more irreversible losses to happen. Limiting global warming to one and a half degrees would substantially reduce projected losses and damages, but it will not completely eliminate them. So following the findings of the IPCC's earlier special reports, which was focused on 1.5 degrees, we also find that 1.5 degrees is a critical threshold for losses and damages above which we will see escalating impacts. And the last key message is that losses and damages are unavoidable and are unequally distributed. We find that adaptation does not prevent all losses and damages. So despite climate action on adaptation, losses and damages are already being experienced and will continue to rise with global warming. We find that losses and damages are unequally distributed. So developing countries and vulnerable populations within all countries, and these vulnerable populations include people of low socioeconomic class, migrant groups, the elderly, women and children are experiencing higher levels of losses and damages currently and are projected to also experience them in the future. We find that losses and damages are not comprehensively addressed by current financial governance and institutional arrangements. And this is particularly the case in vulnerable developing countries. And these arrangements are from the international scale, so what's happening at the UNFCC will see down to national and subnational levels. The finance policies, strategies and other solutions to address loss and damage are simply not enough currently. And to illustrate this point, small islands are one of the regions that are already facing disproportionate losses and damages and where the projected losses and damages so what's coming up in the future are particularly high. For small islands in particular, one and a half degrees is a critical threshold beyond which these islands may actually be unable to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Sea level rise poses an existential threat, particularly for low lying areas that are already at or below current sea levels. We find that there is a risk of permanent and irreversible loss of terrestrial marine and coastal biodiversity, as well as the services that these ecosystems provide such as coastal protection from storms or supporting livelihoods such as fisheries. There is the risk of economic decline due to losses and damages and failure of sectors that these islands are dependent on economically such as agriculture and tourism. Losses and damages in small islands may actually lead to reduced habitability, meaning that there will be displacement or permanent migration of people away from their homes, along with non economic losses such as loss of sense of place community and culture. And while small islands face these disproportionate levels of losses and damages, they currently lack the financial support as well as governance policy and institutional capacities to address these risks. So in closing, the scientific evidence that we have from the IPCC report is very clear that losses and damages are already being experienced, that they will rise with global warming, and that they are unavoidable and unequally distributed with disproportionate effects on developing countries and vulnerable groups. Losses and damages are a reality now, and there is a clear need for financial governance and institutional arrangements at multiple levels to address these issues, and that is in addition to adaptation and mitigation efforts. And thanks and with that I'll turn it back to you Dan. Thank you Adele for getting us started with that excellent presentation. Adele had great slides, our following panelists will also have great slides. All of the presentation materials are available at www.eeside.org. So if you'd like to go back and revisit Adele's slides or rewatch her portion of the presentation or rewatch any of the briefing or review any of the presentation materials, we have that available for you online. Our second panelist is Ritu Baribwaj. She is a principal researcher at the International Institute for Environment and Development. With more than 18 years of senior policy development, research and management experience in government funding agencies and international NGOs. Ritu has worked extensively on social protection, climate resilience policy, planning and finance, forest and watershed management, resource conservation and livelihood and gender issues. Ritu, welcome to our briefing today, I'll turn it over to you. Thanks, Danielle. So, you know, what a great start for my presentation because Adele has already prepared the background for it. And so one of the most important issues that developing countries will be raising at loss at COP 27 will be loss and damage. So while loss and damage has been within the climate change agenda for a very long time, in fact, right since 1990, relatively very little progress has been made on tackling this issue. And the debate on loss and damage has always remained politically contentious, which has also meant that there hasn't been much progress on trying to develop solutions or trying to address some of the issues that was presented in the previous presentation. Now, can I go to the next slide please? So while, you know, while we are still carrying out these discussions around loss and damage in the international negotiation space, countries and communities are already facing loss and damage and these are unprecedented scale. Now, you know, most recently, the media reports that we saw about the floods in Pakistan or the floods in Nigeria, these are unprecedented scale. And they are not just the scale which matters, it's also the frequency that matters because if you look at 2017 data of Caribbean, they faced three category five hurricane. And you are hardly able to recover from one event and you're faced with another, which means that you are in a constant rebuilding phase. So you're perpetually, you are always recovering from one event and you're faced with another. And what it has meant is for many countries this is completely wiped out their GDP. And so what can you go to the next slide please? So what is really needed right now is to understand as to what, like, because loss and damage is not occurring in isolation. It occurs on top of the development deficit that the countries and communities are already facing. So if you look at that slide here, we actually undertook regression analysis on the kind of multi-dimensional risks that countries and communities are facing and to what extent the loss and damage risks, to what extent they're prone to loss and damage risks. And you can clearly see that the least developed countries are the ones which are the most prone to these damaging impacts of loss and damage. And there are a range of factors which govern this. So they are institutional issues. So if countries are weak institutions, they're weak governance arrangement, they don't have a good social protection mechanism. Their social dimensions are weak. Then the impact of loss and damage is felt much higher. So while we are trying to understand or address loss and damage, you have to take all these factors into considerations, not just climate risks that we need to consider. We have to understand it from a multi-dimensional risk perspective. And next slide please. So while countries like Germany also faced flood last year, they were able to rebuild and not just recover, they recovered better from their previous situation. But you can't expect the same from countries like Nigeria or Pakistan. And that's the reason why when we started work on this issue, we took a more practical approach to understanding what these issues are, what are the realities of loss and damage, and how it can be addressed. And as you saw in the previous slide, much of these issues are very contextual in nature. And therefore the solutions or the practical approaches to dealing with them will also have to be very tailored and take into consideration all the other issues that are compounding the impacts of climate risks. And that's why we undertook a very bottom-up approach to how we deal with it. Because if you go out and just type loss and damage in Google, you will get thousands of papers on loss and damage. But most of them are, they are about trying to conceptualize loss and damage. Or they talk about how do we undertake the landscape of risk analysis and so on. But not many of them talk about what are the realities of loss and damage? How are countries and communities actually facing loss and damage? How are they actually trying to deal with them? Next slide please. So that's why we undertook this effort last year, where we try to generate these evidences very, very bottom-up, particularly in terms of understanding what are the... And for this we engaged all the authors from the Global South. So we understood what are their sufferings and how it's compounding their existing risks such as around poverty, health, marginalization, conflict in some cases in 12 different geographies. And these were from Asia, from Africa and Pacific. And in my next slide, I will show you the regions where we covered. But most of these... So what we did as a result of, as part of this analysis, and we did this co-generated this evidence base with them, was to understand what are the issues that they're currently facing in terms of climate risk? How it is compounding? How are they dealing with it? Because some of the countries and communities are already, they are taking some good measures and they need to be acknowledged, understood and seen whether they can be scaled up in other contexts or not. But also trying to understand what are the gaps in terms of their technology, infrastructure, finance, knowledge base, capacity, and so that it can then be addressed through either technical assistance or through financing support and so on. So what you can see, so I'll just quickly highlight some of the key findings. So you look at all those case study locations, and one thing which was common across these 12 locations, irrespective because some of these areas face glacial lake outbursts, some of them face drought, some desertification, sea level rise, floods and cyclone. But irrespective of the type of climate impacts that we're facing, one thing was common, and that was post displacement and distrust migration. And we also found that among those who are displaced and who are marginalized, they were becoming victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. And we have some, and beyond this case study assessment, we also undertook a much more detailed quantitative assessment of to the extent to which migration is happening because of climate impacts, and the extent to which those who are forced to undertake distrust migration or displacement becomes subjected to trafficking and modern slavery. Next slide please. And we also like, and this was again highlighted in adults presentation as well, that loss and damage is creating a lot of physical health, mental health and other well being issues. And it is true for both people who are pushed into distrust migration and displacement, and even those who are not able to migrate or who don't have the means to migrate, because migration in many places are acting as a resilience approach to deal or cope with those impacts. So what we found out from the ground was these recurring, because as I said, these climatic impacts are not occurring, it's not like one of incidents. The frequency of many of these climatic impacts are increasing. So because it's occurring one after the other, it's leading to a constant feeling of worry, a sadness and anger and tiredness, and something that we found out very strongly from the case study from the Cook Island, from the Lake Chad basin and so on. Similarly, we saw that as people's resource base starts diminishing. For example, in Bangladesh, every household had been displaced at least three to seven times, which means and they said every time they got displaced, their resource base started deteriorating. So even if even a person was well off, over the period of third or fourth displacement, their resource base have put them below the poverty line. And when that happens, it increases domestic violence, women are subjected to more emotional distress. Many young girls get forced into early marriages because when people see their land eroding, they rush to marry off their daughters and so on. And even when displacements are happening, something that we saw in Lake Chad basin, and their climate impacts are being compounded by conflict issues, it's leading to overcrowding of camps and that's leading to outbreak of hygiene related issues because obviously the sanitation facilities in these locations are not very good. Even if people are not living in camps, they are pushed into staying in informal settlements outside cities. And there again, they are subjected to poor sanitary conditions. And we saw that many of them, as I mentioned earlier, they're subjected to exploitative working conditions because obviously they move in despair. They don't have a good bargaining power and therefore they do not have any support system, any accidental insurance. And I talked to one of the migrants and he said, when we move, sometimes we come back, sometimes other bodies come back because they know that when they are moving and when they are working in these mines and dangerous working conditions, they might die, but that's the only option that's left for them. Then again, there is increased impact on women who are left behind and something that we saw in Chitrakoot in India where it was leading to sanitation hygiene issues, especially menstrual hygiene because water availability had become an issue. Children both staying back as well as migrating were facing mental and emotional trauma and so on. Next slide please. So while these issues are there, we also try to find out what are the practical solutions or how do we deal with them. And for that we organize a series of deliberative dialogue because and in this we know that loss and damage has been a contentious issue, a sick issue and they are like whenever you go to a country, the first people you talk about loss and damage and the people who typically go and sit in negotiations are the ones who come and talk to you, but they are not the ones who actually deal with the issue on the ground level. So in this deliberative dialogue process, we wanted to make sure that we bring together all those people who are dealing with this on the frontline. People who are from the development sector, people who are from the humanitarian sector for them to come in and then come out with what are the practical ways in which we can address some of this. And for that we organize a series of four deliberative dialogue process. Next slide please. Where we try to understand responses to some of these burning questions that we had. Firstly, what are the realities of loss and damage and what we should be considering when we are trying to respond to it. So firstly, the first thing that came up was we need to understand the nature of loss and damage. And for that we need a proper operational framework. We need to integrate like typically as you saw in the presentation, we try to categorize them as economic and non-economic loss and damage. But what they said was we need to understand it from secondary and tertiary impacts. For example, when people are forced into distress migration and that leads to trafficking or that leads to anxiety and mental health and other issues. So they wanted that framing to be from that context. Then they also wanted to say that climate impacts are very dynamic. So there are some risks that we might feel can be dealt with adaptation, but suddenly the frequency of that risk increases and then it moves in the category of loss and damage. So they said that these impacts are very dynamic and therefore responses need to be dynamic. Early action is the key. The second was what are the critical elements we should be considering in terms of managing loss and damage risks. So there was a huge focus on creating institutional capacity, having risk management tools, integrating risks in the planning process and considering gender and intersectionality. And also look at some of the existing measures. For example, there are pathways, of course, there are social protection programs. How can we layer them? How can we bring them together so that we can respond to loss and damage risks in a more holistic way. And one thing that really came out very strongly was how do we engage that citizen engagement, a community engagement in decision making process was really highlighted as a very strong action, especially because a lot of loss and damage response requires anticipatory movement or movement of people or livelihood shifts. And they said that to take such big decisions, it's always important to engage community and society in all this decision making process. So there's a bind and a mutual trust created. Next slide please. Then we try to understand that what are the type of action and support needed to tackle loss and damage. So firstly was around the use and misuse of climate science because we typically use a lot of, we bring together a lot of outputs of different climate models and then try to average it. But one thing that came out was around the fact tail event like we typically we tend to not take consideration of climate impact that might be created, but has low low probability of occurring. So what they suggested was that we should be considering climate response, response to climate risks for the complete range of risks rather than only taking into consideration those risks which have high probability. Then again the issues around proper communication of climate information so that that can be integrated into planning and so on. Then again dynamic interaction between adaptation and loss and damage that's something which I talked about in my previous slide as well. But again, the need for risk informed planning process early warning system, equipping communities with adequate tools to undertake risk assessment and also responding to them was something which was really highlighted. Then again they said why only look at long term events they also wanted the responses to look into small and medium events as well, because they said that's the one that then gradually start eroding their limits of managing existing adaptation options. Again, a lot of focus was given on institutional and governance mechanism, focus around longer term thinking, strengthening governance arrangements. So, for example, a lot of issue was raised around the transparency around existing humanitarian action and participation and inclusion of the most vulnerable whenever we are trying to create such institutional governance mechanism around managing loss and damage. Next slide please. Thirdly, we try to understand how those solutions can be delivered more effectively and for that localized delivery capacity was really emphasized in a big way, engaging civil society organizations. For example, SLUM and SLAC, SDIS, SLUM and SHAC developers, international representatives were there and they shared a lot of their experience and they explained how engaging community in this whole process really helped in getting a better buying, having a faster response mechanism to any humanitarian issues that were created. Then also enabling agile and flexible action, so we need cross sectoral coordination, a whole of a government and a whole of a society approach, longer term asset management needs to be incorporated. And then again, they said, you know, risk information should not just remain within the domain of policymakers, it should be provided to the communities and it should be, communities should be engaged into how they respond to those different types of risk because the type of risk that we think are important may not be relevant for them, communities might prioritize some other risk that may be more important to them than the policymakers. Then flexibility around planning because they said, going back to my previous slide is it impacts are very dynamic and the responses have to be dynamic too. And then also enabling mobility and livelihood chips, something that came out from previous presentation and, you know, even from a case study assessment that mobility was a big factor. So, you know, even right now we have a lot of these social protection programs that provide safety net, but they're not portable. So the moment the communities are forced to move those safety nets are not available around them. So how do we create enable mobility patterns, which are safe, which are pre planned, and they are moved towards opportunity rather than towards greater risks. Next slide please. And this is the last question that we try to understand from them as to how like we understood what action and support is needed, how it can be delivered. The final questions of response question from them was to understand how we can deliver finances to addressing some of these action and support that was identified with them. So one thing that clearly came out was it, it you know that loss and damage finance has to be separate it cannot be covered with adaptation finance because the responses to loss and damage will have to be much different from the way adaptation measures that we can. It has to be most more agile, there has to be a more agile and responsive window for immediate humanitarian response but also medium short term and the long term responses around effective infrastructure effective. Migratory migration movement around livelihood ships that people might have to undertake and so on. And then there was also very clearly highlighted that we need to take the finances to the most vulnerable communities and also countries and how do we like they have to be certain principles that should be guiding how the finances delivered to distributed amongst the least countries and other developing countries and so on. And in terms of sources of finance, you know, we did identify some of the existing sources of finance for example around social protection around insurance mechanism. But what was what really came out that no one mechanism would be sufficient so we'll have to probably layer a lot of these finance financing mechanisms in order to respond to loss and damage in a more holistic way. So I'll stop there. And I'll be happy because I probably rushed through much of these responses. But if you look at, yeah, if you look at some of these publications that I've listed here, you'll get more details. And I really feel, I thought that these four deliberative dialogue process that we did, it really helped in coming out with practical responses, things that community and countries at the frontline who are actually dealing with loss and damage on a daily basis. They are the ones who understand the solutions best. So back to you Daniel. Thank you so much for that great presentation covered lots of really interesting questions. Speaking of questions. There are still opportunities of course to ask questions to our panelists you can do that two ways. The first is by sending us an email and the email address to use is ask at esi.org can also follow us on Twitter at ESI online, which reminded me, as we were talking as she was talking about international climate finance. One year ago today, October 20 of 2021 we held a briefing in our COP 26 briefing series and it was called the role of international climate finance and we had five panelists join us that day to talk about the importance of international climate finance, not just the quantity of the finance but also the quality of the finance. So if anyone would like to learn a little bit more about that issue actually a lot more about that issue. Thank you to check out our briefing from last year, a year ago today coincidentally, so really, really good one. Our third panelist is Kave Gillen poor colleague Kave is the vice president for international strategies at the Center for climate and energy solutions overseeing the international aspects of their work, including the work that relates to the UN negotiations process. Prior to see to us Kave held various positions including legal advisor on the United Kingdom and European Union's international climate negotiating teams. The United Kingdom's head of UNF triple C negotiations co lead negotiator on climate change for the European Union co lead negotiator on climate change for the Alliance of small island states, head of the Secretariat of the high ambition coalition and principal advisor on climate change to the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Kave recently served as a senior member of the UN Secretary General's climate action team. Kave welcome to our briefing today. I'll turn it over to you. So Daniel, it's a real privilege and an honor to be invited and also to to speak to congressional staffers and others. So thank you very much for inviting me. You've already introduced me better than I could have done so I think we can just say that we're running a major project at CTS that's going to be looking ever more deeply at this issue of loss and damage. I've heard from both Adele and Ritu. This is a serious issue that's only just going to get more and more prominent both internationally but also domestically around the world as the impacts of climate change get worse and more visible which they unfortunately will do. If we could go to the next slide please. I've been asked essentially to speak about three issues so the expectations for COP 27 in terms of what the outcomes might be there. And also to to explore possible landing zones as to what we might expect in a little over four weeks time when we get to Sharma shake and also to reflect on the position of the United States in the international negotiations on loss and damage, both in the past but also now. So next slide please. I think before we get on to what we can expect from COP 27 on the issue of loss and damage it's important to recall what countries agreed to in Glasgow around 11 months ago now. So there's two main deliverables that were mandated from Glasgow that are relevant for this COP. First of all, it was agreed that COP 27 should essentially operationalize something called the Santiago Network and that is a network that is meant to move actors together and respond through a more structured and demand driven system to assess the needs and identify technical assistance and availability of that assistance and to essentially connect various stakeholders around the world on the issue of loss and damage that's due to be operationalized at COP 27 through a formal decision which will need the consensus of all parties there. And while some technical issues are still open on that issue the on that topic. The signs are good that the that the COP will agree and operationalize that and it's important that the COP does that because it needs to follow through on tasks that have been set for it. But we need to understand clearly that agreeing to that alone won't be enough to satisfy the growing demands of developing countries on loss and damage and it doesn't address fundamental issues around climate finance for loss and damage, which I'll come to. The second mandated deliverable or process coming out of the out of Glasgow dialogue out of Glasgow was something called the Glasgow dialogue which was established at COP 26. And this is a process that will culminate in 2024 and brings together parties that's countries relevant organizations and stakeholders to discuss the arrangements for funding of activities to avert minimize and address loss and damage. The first Glasgow dialogue was held in June of this year. And it's important to remind ourselves that one of the main drivers that led to the Glasgow dialogue being established was the call by developing countries for the establishment of a loss and damage finance facility. And also to remember that the Glasgow did not reach consensus on whether or not a facility should should be established so essentially the Glasgow dialogue which is a discussion forum on this topic was the compromise that was reached on that. However, subsequent concerns that the Glasgow dialogue is is a talk shop with no real political oversight or accountability or clear mandate for deliverable has led developing country parties to come forward as a united block of some 140 countries to propose a new agenda item for COP 27. That looks at this issue of establishing a finance facility. Now this is likely to be the most contentious issue at content is suddenly from the negotiations perspective. And it's particularly contentious and opposed by developed country parties for a number of reasons. First of all, they argue that it's not what was agreed to in Glasgow by consensus, and that it prejudges the outcome of the Glasgow dialogue which was a discussion forum to essentially address this issue over over a two year period. So agreeing upon a facility already would prejudge that outcome and accelerate the timeline and also developed countries have a concern that it's not really clear how establishing a new finance facility would be effective or efficient. For example, exploration needs to be made of whether existing funds and facilities could be used. And there are also some concerns potentially over legal implications of establishing a fund. So the reason why this is important is that it could impact the wider negotiations and the mood and also divert attention and an effort away from other matters that are also important. And the cops traditionally open with an open plenary where the agenda for the meeting is adopted and because this has not yet been agreed as an agenda item. It's possible that this could dominate the opening phase of the COP. But of course we're coming into the COP in the context of increasing impacts of climate change. And the devastating impacts on Pakistan but that's one of a number of countries. So we're going into COP 27 with that context but also, frankly with a failure to develop country parties yet to deliver on their promise of 100 billion per year in climate by 2020. So that that sort of mood is not very helpful going into the cops and all of that makes this issue of loss and damage a contentious issue. Having said that I think there is a potential landing zone, whilst I don't think that the conditions are right for consensus to establish a new facility at COP 27. There is increasing recognition of the need for increased finance for loss and damage. I think there is scope to agree on a gender item on this issue at COP 27 that is wider in scope that looks beyond only the issue of addressing loss and damage from a perspective but also at minimizing and averting loss and damage. And as a result to strengthen the mandate of the Glasgow dialogue to show to ensure that it does have political oversight and also to ensure that it does result in a clear deliverable when it concludes in 2024. But that's far from the foregone conclusion that's just my sense of where we could land on this. If we could go to the next slide please. Thank you very much. So I've been asked to to speak a little bit about the US position and many in the audience will know more about this than I do so I'm, I'm treading carefully here and being a little bit cautious but from the perspective. The US has in the past had particular concerns over ensuring that no legal basis for compensation or liabilities established through the work on loss and damage and it was instrumental in securing clarity at the time of adoption of the Paris Agreement that the Paris Agreement would not establish such a liability. Another number of developed countries also hold that position. So there'll be a lot of concern to ensure that any work or establishment of a new facility on loss and damage doesn't go back on that agreement in Paris. And this issue has been a red line one for the US but also other developed countries because there's no political support for this in their countries really. There's legal concerns about this there's policy concerns in that it's not clear that the issue of compensation liability would really take forward loss and damage. But also there's questions about who ultimately would be in the frame if there if there was to be a regime of compensation liability. So essentially that is that the notion of compensation liability is not on the agenda. But there are concerns that any establishment of a fund would be within that understanding. The developing country proposal for a new agenda item is made both under the Paris Agreement and the convention and it's important to note that the while the Paris Agreement was clear on the issue of compensation liability and also moved away from a blunt division of obligations between developed and developing countries on issues such as finance. The convention does not have those assurances or that a new on seeing of division of responsibilities between developed and developing countries. The fact that this agenda item has been proposed both under the Paris Agreement and the convention raises concerns about the legal implications and I don't see how it will be possible to agree this agenda item under the convention because it doesn't have those assurances that we refer to and it's very blunt on the issue of finance. And then, finally, the US position sort of historically and more recently traditionally the US has been viewed as a bit of an outlier on the question of compensation and liability and loss and damage in particular but I don't think that that's really a fair representation. I think the US is very prominent on this issue given its geopolitical strength, but also because it's been very vocal on the question of loss and damage. But many countries developed countries in particular share that view and you also have to ask if this issue of finance for loss and damage was broadened in beyond just the donor base of developed countries, whether for example emerging economies would still be in favor of establishing this fund, and also given that the emerging economies will be increasingly responsible in the future for the loss and damage that occurs around the world because of the proportion of emissions that they have. I think the notion that the US is on its own on this issue is not really one that I think is correct. Having said that as well, the US has been increasingly constructive on engaging on the substance of loss and damage. The US was very vocal and very clear that loss and damage had to be taken forward as an issue at COP26. And also when you hear the interventions and the speeches of Secretary Kerry, the special envoy on climate change for the president, it's clear that the US is engaging on this issue and does want to find a way forward. And it needs to, because in conclusion is countries fail to do what's necessary to limit global temperature increases to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. As we see global impacts becoming more frequent and severe, the demands for loss and damage around the globe will only increase. And this is going to be an issue that not only dominates the climate negotiations but in my view clearly is going to become a top geopolitical issue that will shape foreign policy of the US and many other countries around the world. So with that back to you Daniel thank you very much. Thank you for your presentation and for your perspective and thoughts about how things will go or could go at COP 27. Our fourth panelist is Taylor Dinsdale. Taylor is the director of E3G's risk and resilience program. He works with governments, public institutions in the private sector to ensure their decision making is informed by a better understanding of climate risk. He works with a broad based and diverse coalition of organizations to build economic, social and climate resilience. Taylor's areas of expertise include risk assessment and management, the geopolitics of decarbonization, and the implications of climate change for national and international security. He also has experience in sustainable finance and energy policy. And all of that adds up to making Taylor an excellent panelist for today. So Taylor, thank you for joining us. I'm looking forward to your presentation. Thank you very much, Daniel. And thank you also to Anna and the whole team at ESI for organizing this panel discussion. It's really a pleasure to be here with you and I'm grateful for the opportunity to speak. I think the other panelists have made my job much easier and Kave had a great segue into my presentation. So I'm really grateful, you know, we've covered sort of the scientific basis around loss and damage, you know, action and responses on the ground, the context around COP 27. I really just wanted to talk briefly about sort of the broader geopolitics of this as an issue and how that might relate in particular to US national interests. So think about that from three angles, if we move to the next slide please. So first on on the geopolitics and thinking in particular about how other countries see this issue. Second on national and international security implications, and finally around essentially potential lessons for the US from stronger engagement and international cooperation on loss and damage. So if we go to the next slide, firstly on on geopolitics and Kave again set this up very well I think, I think it's becoming very clear that climate change, including the physical risks of climate impacts is now geopolitical issue it's discussed bilateral diplomacy and G7 the G 20 UN Security Council UN General Assembly, you know, most multilateral venues and bilateral negotiations. And I've pulled out some of the recent sort of headlines that I think help illustrate this so. So as we've already heard, you know, part of the, the disappointments around COP 26 was based on the lack of progress on this agenda, loss and damage and adaptation in particular. But also you know countries are increasingly facing high levels of debt distress. Now that's for a lot of different reasons but it's in part because, as we've already heard, they're spending a significant share of their GDP, often well above 100% on disaster recovery. And again as we as we've heard previously, climate is one of the drivers of the second and third order effects like food insecurity, water scarcity, other systems and resources that we all really rely on for for global stability. You know, a key point here for me is that, you know, regardless of the state of the debate and understanding in the US, you know this urgent need to address impacts both in terms of those immediate physical effects but also some of the longer lasting, and third order impacts around of hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc. And something that's very quickly rising up the agenda and the list of political priorities, you know, for many developing countries, including some that are that are key strategic US allies. So you have these countries that are looking for progress on this agenda for support. And I think, you know, at least in many cases, you know, just looking at some of the public statements that are made climate. They're not seeing climate change as somehow divorced from other foreign policy or diplomatic issues so it's in the same arena as as trade as security relationships on technology cooperation. So that's just to say I think you could see implications. As I think have I was starting to say, they go well beyond the sort of immediate and more obvious context of the UNFCCC, if there is a failure to make some progress in this in this area. Secondly, if we go to the next slide on the sort of implications for for national and international security. I just want to start by saying there was a survey done by the American Security Project several years ago that showed that about almost three quarters of countries around the world have recognized climate change as a national security issue and one farmer or another. So again, I think that's just that's an interesting sort of bit of evidence and thinking about how other countries are viewing this issue. But I've also pulled out some excerpts from the US National Intelligence Estimate, which was released last year. This was the first sort of comprehensive in IE on climate change that the National Intelligence Council has has done. And I just want to take a minute to read a few of the quotes because I think they're fairly stark. So first of all, we assess that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risk to US national security interest, as the physical impacts increase in geopolitical tensions mount. Secondly, elsewhere as temperatures rise and more extreme effects manifest there's a growing risk of conflict over water and migration, particularly after 2030. And finally, intensifying physical effects of climate change will be most acutely felt in developing countries, which we assess are also least able to adapt to such changes. These effects will increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict. In some cases creating additional demands on US diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military resources. Again, you know, this is not sort of decades and decades into the future. This is this is essentially right around the corner. And, you know, this can be seen in tandem with evidence that's also been released fairly recently about the overlap between countries that are at a high risk of conflict and those that are highly vulnerable for the climate change impacts again some of which are in strategically different regions for the US. So, you know, I want to clarify, you know, loss and damage as it's understood and discussed within the UNFCCC is not a security issue. And nor should it be. However, I think, you know, security and defense foreign policy analysts. I've been clear that a failure to address climate impacts is very much a matter of international national human security. And clearly, I think some of the measures that are being discussed in terms of a loss and damage response are part of that sort of toolkit for for responding to to climate impacts. And then finally, if we move to the next slide on the sort of issue of broader international cooperation and maybe lessons domestically, you know, as it's already been mentioned, I'm sure everyone is very aware of here. The US is not immune to climate impacts. You can see pretty clearly from this, this chart, the cost has been rising very consistently, just looking at the past five years disasters have cost us about three quarters of a trillion dollars, with an average annual cost of 150 billion, which is much higher than the 42 year inflation adjusted annual cost. The US is spending so much money, in fact, on disasters that state and local governments have already been warned by credit rating agencies that their credit rating is at risk. I don't think it's too big of a leap to say that at some point, given the increasing risk of climate change, the sovereign credit of the US could be under threat, which is of course is what allows the US to borrow money so cheaply so this is a very material risk. And yet, you know, there is no comprehensive, you know, US response to loss and damage, either now it has the benefit of course of being able to spend the money to recover and to build back. But there's not sort of a comprehensive approach to to L and D. Meanwhile, you have many low and middle income countries who have built up vast experience at this point with, you know, low cost efficient approaches to to climate impacts to disaster response and recovery without the benefit of large public budget so I mean as we've heard part of the conversation around loss and damages about finance. It's also about technical assistance, broader international cooperation. I don't think it's strange. Prejudity to say that there could be useful lessons for developed countries as well that choose to engage more constructively in this space. Well obviously recognizing that the priority really is to provide support to those countries that are on the front lines and have the lowest capacity to adapt. So I, I will stop there. But thanks very much for your, for your time and looking forward to the discussion. Taylor I'm looking forward to the discussion to and while our other three panelists turned their videos back on let me just remind everyone once again that the archived webcast, as well as presentation materials will be available online at www.easi.org. And when you visit, it would be a real shame if you didn't sign up for our biweekly newsletter climate change solutions, our daily COP newsletter that will start at the beginning of COP 27, COP 27 Dispatch. And pretty much just check out all of our other resources because they're all really good. So we are going to engage in our questions and answers, a little bit of a moderated discussion and can they understand that you will be departing us a little bit early today which is entirely fine. I totally understand. So I'm actually going to start with you. And obviously we'll allow other panelists to respond as well but we'll start the Q&A with you. You talked a little bit about what happened at COP 26 you talked a little bit about broader where loss and damage fits in countries are building up to the first global stock take under the Paris agreement. And I would like, first of all, if you could help our audience understand what the global stock take is and then also how could loss and damage potentially be built into the process of the global stock take. And what would that mean for future efforts to address loss and damage. Thank you for the question, Daniel. I appreciate it. We at CTS, we're doing a major project looking at the issue of the global stock take. So thanks for asking that question. I should start by saying that the Paris agreement has an inbuilt ambition mechanism in it, and that operates on a five year cycle. The stock take is at the height, heart of that five year cycle you could say that it's the sort of beating heart of the Paris agreement. And every five years parties, countries, and other stakeholders will come together to basically see where we are in terms of delivering on the long long term objectives of the Paris agreement, including limiting temperatures to 1.5 or below, and also to identify opportunities to enhance ambition, and to go further faster, and so inform the updating of future climate targets in line with those overarching objectives that the US was very much at the heart of agreeing that five year cycle. So COP26 launched the first of those five year cycles with the global stock take. It's currently in a sort of technical information gathering an assessment phase in what are known as three years cycle dialogues the first happened in June the second will happen at COP 27 in November and the third will happen in June next year and all of that information will be compiled and then it will go be handed over to ministers at COP28 to decide essentially what will be the imperatives and signals coming out as countries look to the next phase of raising their climate targets so that's why it's important. You also mentioned and it's, it's been a little bit forgotten but the mandate for the global stock take in the Paris agreement does mention loss and damage is a cross cutting issue. So it's definitely there. The difficulty is that it's still not clear how that will intersect with the global stock take on an operational basis. Certainly it has been raised in the context of the technical dialogues and parties and other stakeholders are free to do that. But much of this first global stock take is essentially building the airplane while we're trying to fly it in the sense that some aspects are still not entirely clear about how that will intersect but we still have over a year to go. And as I say loss and damage is being raised in the context of the technical dialogues and no doubt the parties will also raise that when it goes into the political phase but it's very much a context and cross cutting issue that will need to be taken into account. So thanks Daniel. Thanks. And Adele and Ritu and Taylor please feel free if you have anything you'd like to build on what Kave said about the global stock take and and where loss and damage could potentially fit in. Yeah, just sorry I'll read you to all go first. Just building on what Kave said with the technical dialogue phase. It's currently broken down into three areas adaptation mitigation and then means of implementation and support. And what we've been seeing at the first technical dialogue is that countries developing countries in particular are really bringing up loss and damage and all three of those spaces. So it is, you know, being cross cutting, but what countries are also pushing for is there to be a dedicated space to discuss loss and damage so that it's not lost amongst the shuffle. So as the global stock take progresses and as the plane is being built then perhaps having a dedicated space for loss and damage as a key topic. And I think that kind of being, you know, under and across all of them may help, particularly as we start seeing loss and damage escalate. So maybe there will be four key topics adaptation mitigation loss and damage and means of implementation and support. Thanks. I just wanted to come in more from a practical approach. So, you know, how do you do global stock take and is only if countries are, you know, least developed country or developing countries mentioned loss and damage in their climate action families which is called nationally determined contributions. And recently almost a month back we did an assessment of 46 indices of the least developed countries. And one thing that clearly came out only 12 of them mentioned loss and damage in any form. And even so we even try to understand whether, whether countries were not men using the term loss and damage but they were using residual risk or other risk to talk about loss and damage but, you know, even considering all those factors, this could only find that all the least developed countries, only 11 of them mentioned it any in any way, and only countries, for example, one or two Cambodia, Myanmar, and Nepal mentioned it in some details, which means that unless and until they mentioned loss and damage in their, like, I think, NDCs are the formal document through which least developed countries or developing countries, you know, put forth their demand for what what their need is in terms of finance what their need is in terms of technology infrastructure and so on. And that's not very clear. So that's something that I would really urge least developed countries to do it so that it comes into a formal mechanism and then global stock take could take note of that. The second is around Santiago network for loss and damage so it's not just finance so it's also technical support that countries are demanding. And while Santiago network was established in 2019 it's remained defunct for a very long time. So right now we have the functions agreed in the last pop, but what we don't have still and this is still remain a contentious issue between develop and developing country is where it will be housed, how its functions would be who's going to control the whole way in which the demands are requisitioned and it's met. So these developed countries have a lot of issues around that as to whether it's going to remain another GCF kind of a mechanism where there is fun, but it's very hard to get access to those funds. So in the same way they understand the Santiago network but they want to understand whether that would be accessible by them or not. And I think we work very closely with these developed country group LDC group. And one thing that they don't want to wait for is the Glasgow Dialogue process to culminate for them to understand what kind of financing support would be available to them. And that's the reason why they have raised that you know G77 plus China has raised this issue to be considered within the within the agenda of COP 27 so we'll have to see you know how it progresses. Thank you so much. And Kavi before you take off big thanks to you for joining us today and making your presentation and perhaps we'll see each other in Egypt in a couple weeks and thanks again. Thank you so much. So we'll continue with our Q&A we have about 20 minutes left which is great with our remaining panelists. And Adele I'm going to direct this one to you first and then we'll hear from Ritu and Taylor in response. And I'm going to go back and revisit Taylor's presentation a little bit, which was sort of focused on sort of, you know, teeing up this idea of why this issue is so important for a US federal policymaker audience to understand. And, you know, our audience a congressional audience a federal policymaker audience. How is this important, why is this important for a congressional audience to understand and what should our congressional audience know about how and why the issues we're talking about today are different, different, or maybe complimentary to other forms of foreign that the United States might provide whether it's humanitarian aid or disaster recovery or development assistance or climate finance could you help put some of these loss and damage issues in into that context for us. Yeah, sure. So I think from the Glasgow dialogue developed countries and the US have highlighted that they already provide some form of assistance to address loss and damage largely through humanitarian aid and overseas development aid. But there are clear studies that show that this assistance is not enough to support the levels of loss and damage that are being experienced now, and that will be experienced in the future it's simply not enough. So, for example, in Fiji in 2020 there was a cyclone the assa economic losses of over 54 million in the agricultural sector alone, humanitarian aid was approximately half a million dollars, or the Bahamas, which is where I'm from. We had Hurricane Dorian in 2019 economic losses of over $3 billion. Humanitarian aid was just a fraction of that. And so developing countries are left holding the holding the bag of responding to these impacts while at the same time trying to develop. Humanitarian assistance also doesn't address longer term needs, such as rebuilding homes vital infrastructure, humanitarian assistance normally, you know covers that immediate response right after disaster happens. It also doesn't address loss and damage coming from slow onset events for ecosystem such as loss of biodiversity, those non economic losses and damages that we've talked about. So, while humanitarian aid is very much needed and appreciated, it really just focuses on that immediate aftermath and it doesn't address the full spectrum of loss and damage needs in terms of overseas development aid. One of the big issues is that there are some countries that are not eligible for that. So small islands in particular, some of them have higher levels of income that preclude them for being eligible for aid. Although they are facing this proportional loss and damage due to their vulnerabilities. So the overall picture of loss and damage and finance and its relationship to existing sources of support is that those existing sources of support are not enough now, and they will not be enough in the future. And this is why there's a push for sort of, you know, a global approach under the UNFCCC to come up with the levels of support that are needed for developing countries. Thanks. Ritu and Taylor, please feel free to chime in as well. So, you know, just adding on to what Adele said, so it's, I would also add anticipate reaction. That's something we need, along with the immediate humanitarian response and also helping communities build back better. So if you talk about Bangladesh, everyone talked about the recent cyclones where they said, you know, Bangladesh did a great, great job with great cyclone early warning system, not a single life was lost. But what happened after that there was no support to build back their lives. All the land was all the agriculture land was salinated, casted by sand and everything. That was a permanent loss and for that they had no support. So how do they build back their lives and that's a big issue and that leads to a whole lot of secondary and tertiary and other ripple effect that happens as a result of that. You know, just by developing because we, you know, in our deliberative dialogue process and even the recent interactions that we had, one thing that developing countries do not want is another process or a mechanism like GCF, because they know, you know, the gestation period in itself, while they request the demand and by the time they receive it, it's like a two to three year long process. That's not the kind of waiting period that developing countries facing muscle damage can wait for. What they really need is something like a national mechanism, a national platform, where they are allowed the funds are provided to them and allow them to blend in other sources of finance, development aid, ODA, private sector finance, insurance finance to build on that and then devolve it to subnational and local level. So that's the kind of mechanism they're talking of right now. So I'll just let Taylor come in. Thanks. Yeah, I would I think Adele and Ritu have covered this very well and far better than I could but maybe just to echo those points I think all of the numbers and evidence we have show that the existing support through humanitarian assistance or disaster response or whatever it is are falling short of the needs and far short at that. And then there also, as Adele said, you know, those are not sort of comprehensive responses to what loss and damage is intending to cover, doesn't cover non economic loss and damage to slow onset events there's clearly a gap between that immediate humanitarian response and longer term development and I think that's one of the, one of the gaps that that loss and damage can fill. Thank you so much for that. Can I just come in quickly. So, you know, I don't know whether everyone has been following that news, the recent announcement of global shield. And that again has been fitted as oh, this is a very good global process by which you know this will be a good response to loss and damage financing. But then again, that's not sufficient, because what it would cover is probably insurance support but what about the anticipate reaction to move people to safety, or providing other humanitarian support that that's something. So, what I'm saying is, while a lot of these global mechanisms have been developed, we 20s announced and, you know, this global sheets being announced, but is the very nature of loss and damage is such that it needs a very, very comprehensive response, a range of response, they cannot be just one solution, and it has to be very, very tailored, very nuanced to different types of needs. So that requirement has to be left to the local level for them to decide how they want to use that finance, what kind of infrastructure support technology, capacity building on knowledge support that would need to deal with those loss and damage in their context. That's a great point. It's, you know, thinking about it as, you know, sort of allowing the recipient to define what's required, not the provider to define what's required. So thank you for that. Ritu, I think we're going to come back to you and ask you this next one and then we'll hear from Taylor and Adele as well. And I'll start with you because you've mentioned Bangladesh a few times. And I'm curious if you could provide some additional examples of when a country or a community or a region experiences loss and damage. What are the ripple effects? Like, what are the economic migration, human rights, geopolitical effects that can result when there isn't the type of resource to help these communities, countries or regions cope with loss and damage? Yes, one thing, two things that came out very strongly from all our research since last year was forced displacement, distrust migration and all the mental health anxiety and well-being issues that it creates. But the problem with the way some of our evidence was collected, it was very case study driven. So when you take that to policymakers, it doesn't cut ice with them. They want numbers. They want to understand what percentage got impacted. We want some numbers around that. So I was fascinated by the way Adele explained from IPCC report, medium confidence, high confidence and so on. But, you know, so then we started to understand, you know, try to understand as to what extent. For example, if you just look at climate migration and modern slavery or trafficking issue. And we had to really come out with a lot of innovative approach to capture some of that. Because how do you go and ask a migrant whether have you been trafficked? Are you suffering modern slavery? So you have to come up with a lot of methodological innovation in the way you capture some of that data. But what really came out from our study and we picked up two areas in India. One was Palamu, which is a drought affected area. And second was in Kendra Pada, which is a cyclone and flood affected area. It's a coastal area. And while the percentage of migrant population was almost same both areas, but in slow onset event area, the trafficking percentage was as high as 42%. So 42% of the migrant were subjected to trafficking. And only 16% were subjected to trafficking in rapid onset area. And initially when the data started coming, I thought there's something wrong with this data. So I actually went inside. So one thing was clear is slow onset as, you know, other panelists have also mentioned slow onset events, they almost like a act like a slow poison, nobody notices them. There is a heat wave, there's a cyclone, there's a flood, media is flashed with their news. Nobody ever reports like you'll hardly find a reporting on drought, sea level rise, desertification, salination, whereas they create far greater impact on community. And because there is no, like it's not hyped in the media, nobody cares for them. There's no humanitarian response. There is no support for them. And that's why in the absence of that, they are left to fend for themselves. And that's the reason why it left. And the other issue in India also is there is a lot of political economy around drought declaration because drought affects much bigger area. So they never come out with drought declaration. Whereas they have a cyclone early warning system, they have a, so I'm just saying there are a lot of other factors that contribute to people becoming vulnerable to some of these secondary and tertiary impacts of loss and damage. While migration was inevitable, but trafficking could have been avoided, that modern slavery could have been avoided, that anxiety and that could have been avoided by providing them a safety net, by providing them a decent migration or a safe migration pathway. So these are some of the issues and then I'll just touch upon something that Adele also mentioned was around displacement and internal migration. You know, this is an issue which I've faced both from World Bank and IAM police is they only recognize internal migration, internal displacement and cross border migration, something which has not been recognized by them. They say that's still not an issue. Whereas from our research, it has come out very strongly. It's not just immediate country that they migrate to, they're migrating much further area. And typically when they're migrating much further area, they are subjected to more trafficking in those areas. So I'll stop there and I'll let the analyst to comment. Thank you. Taylor, from your perspective, what are some other ripple effects from when loss and damage is experienced? Sure. Well, as I was trying to set out in the presentation to some extent, you know, I mean climate change is such a wicked problem because it is a systemic. It's a systemic risk. You know, it's it's transboundary. It's it's non stationary. You know, the word that often is used is that it cascades across a society in, you know, sometimes predictable but often unpredictable and complex ways. So as Richard says, it's not just that immediate direct effect of when the hurricane hits and you can see the infrastructure damage, which is what of course, you know, most people tend to think of. Right away. It's, it brings lots of indirect secondary third order effects around financial instability, either at an individual or macroeconomic level, loss of livelihoods, displacement. And as we've as we've already heard, you know, potentially as one one driver of conflict and instability. So, you know, so that it clearly does sort of cascade. across society and in complex ways. Beyond just those those initial impacts, which again is another reason I think it speaks to meeting a new and sort of dedicated approach to loss and damage that goes beyond some of those existing resources that we already have like humanitarian assistance or insurance for example. Adele please feel free to give you the last word on this question. Yeah, just what we're saying in terms of loss and damage affecting sustainable development. So you have an event that occurs, developing countries get some aid as we've discussed which is not enough and then they have to go to their limited national budgets to make up that shortfall. And this diverts money away from other sustainable development priorities such as health education such as good governance and capacity building. And this in turn then makes those countries more vulnerable to the next set of climate impacts when they happen. So we sort of see this on virtuous cycle of loss and damage being experienced eroding sustainable development capacities, and then leading to greater possibilities to the next event that happens. So sort of looking at it from the picture, you know, loss and damage also related to levels of debt that these countries face their access to foreign capital. It has much more, we're pulling effects on sustainable development and economic development. Thanks. Thanks for that. We are getting close on time, but we've had a couple people email us questions around sort of metrics, the type of data that we might need to do additional qualitative or quantitative analysis of loss and damage how data might be used by countries versus insurance companies to, you know, help communities build back so I think they'll maybe we'll start with you, and we'll go around the panel and let everyone have a chance to chime in but what are some of the efforts underway to help, what are some efforts underway to figure out how to measure loss and damage and what are some metrics, what are some key metrics that you would propose that might help us better sort of understand but also address the problem without, you know, leading to inadvertent or unintended consequences. Sure. That's a great question. So, loss and damage, you know, not being a big topic in the UNFCCC has led to sort of this gap in approaches to measure and assess loss and damage. So we have guidelines on how to measure your greenhouse gas emissions. We have guidelines on adaptation, even though that's challenging to try and measure adaptation, but there aren't any guidelines that are on how to address, assess loss and damage. And so what we had to do in the IPCC reports is to rely on separate scientific studies that have been done on impacts of climate change and to pull that together into a broad assessment of what's happening in terms of loss and damage across the world. There is a clear need for better approaches and metrics outside of the scientific community to assess these losses and damages. We know that countries do have some methodologies in place to sort of capture those immediate damages that happen right after an extreme event, but there aren't many methodologies that are available or that are used to capture non-economic losses or to capture the actual costs of rebuilding recovery that come after those immediate damages that are experienced. And so this relates, we see the V-20 has asked for the IPCC to do a special report on loss and damage that would maybe come up with some methodologies that countries could actually use. But overall, it's clearly an area that needs more focus. So as we're seeing more focus on this within the UNFCCC and the scientific community, then hopefully they will be development of some metrics that countries themselves will be able to use to document the loss and damage that they are experiencing. Thanks. Taylor, please feel free and very curious to hear some of your ideas for how we might develop metrics that help us analyze, but also hopefully solve this issue. So one thing I agree with whatever Adel said, there is a gap and especially there's a gap around how do you quantify non-economic losses and damage? How do you measure cultural loss or loss of biodiversity is still possible, but loss of language, how do you assign a value to that? So there are definitely those issues, but at the same time, when we were doing these analysis of NDC and you're trying to suggest to the least developed countries as to how they should be reporting their risks on the loss and damage, we asked them to use a multi-dimensional risk parameter. So Kira is the same vicious cycle that Adel was mentioning that because they are pushed into debt because of loss and damage, they divert money from the development issues. And because they've diverted money from the development issue, when they have the next cycle of climate impact, that loss and damage is much higher. So what we asked them to do is to do a multi-dimensional risk assessment where they quantify not just the climate risks, but because they look at the state of the institution, they look at the state of gender, dimension, human development index, a range of other parameters. And then on the basis of that, they quantify what their risks are and then work out what kind of technological support, institutional strengthening support, capacity building support that would be needed. But having said that, there's still that issue around how do you quantify non-economic losses and damages and we really be looking forward to some advice from IPCC around that. So, yes. Thanks. And Taylor, that gives you the last word on the briefing today. We're running out, but we wouldn't want to end without hearing from you on this question. Sure. I appreciate that. And I'll be brief. I mean, there's a lot of things underway in terms of, you know, mapping of existing resources in the gaps, you know, insurance companies I know are assessing their models against different temperature thresholds, attribution, science is improving. And I know there was a study by Dartmouth several months ago that was putting in sort of economic cost on historical emissions at an individual country level. So, you know, the data and the science continues to improve and get fairly precise. There is clearly a gap, I fully, fully agree. You know, I would just say, you know, I think it's also important not to let that distract from the fact that we can see very clearly the impacts that are already here and the needs. And we know that there is a gap certainly in terms of the resources that are available. So I think while that, you know, discussion continues to improve and the metrics are developed and the science, the science continues to get better. You know, there's a lot that can be done in the meantime based on what we, what we're seeing every day in terms of impacts and particularly in most vulnerable countries. Well, thank you very much, Rita. You said something that kind of made me smile. You said you agree with whatever Adele said. And I think that goes for me too, but it also goes for what our other panelists had to say today too. This was a really, really informative panel. So thank you Adele and Rita and Taylor, and in absentia Kave as well for helping us understand this extremely complicated issue and I think we'll all approach COP 27, a lot better informed but also more aware of what's at stake on this issue. And it seems like we're coming up to a really important time for for delivering the kinds of solutions that developing countries in particular needs. So thank you so much for lending your expertise and your perspectives to our briefing today. I'd also like to say thank you to everyone at ESI who makes these briefings possible. Dan O'Brien, Omri, Emma, Allison, Anna, Savannah and Molly. Anna and I will actually be a COP 27 for the first week. So if anyone in our audience would like to meet up, please just send us a note. You can send us an email. Our email addresses are all online. We'd love to hear from you actually heard from a bunch of people after last week's briefing and I don't even think I mentioned I was going so please feel free to do that. I'd also like to say thank you very much to our three awesome fall interns Alina Shreya and Nick for helping us put all of the social media together and briefing notes and things like that. So thank you so much. My colleague Dan O'Brien is going to put up a slide with some information about our upcoming briefings. This is the second of four of our COP 27 briefings. We have another one next week that we will be producing in partnership with our friends at US Nature for Climate, Natural Climate Solutions. That's October 28th, which I think is next Friday. And then we also have one the following week just before we leave for Egypt what's on the table for the negotiations. You won't want to miss that one. We'll be covering I'm sure we'll mention loss and damage quite a lot in that briefing as well because it's very much on the table for negotiations. We'll also have a climate summit recap after COP 27 probably that last week of November slash first week of December, where we look back on COP 27, try to interpret the events for a congressional audience and think ahead from what might be happening in the months between COP 27 and COP 28. The best way to follow all of our work is to sign up for our newsletter. We'll have a daily newsletter COP 27 dispatch. You can see those email addresses there and if you haven't already RSVP for the other two briefings, you wouldn't want to miss out they're both going to be great conversations. My colleague will next put up a slide with a link to a survey. If you have a few moments to take our survey to help us understand how the briefing went did you have any audio problems video problems. We, I know we didn't get to all the questions I did try to weave a bunch of them in together around the metrics and account accounting for all of this but we read every response and it means a lot when people in our audience take a few minutes to tell us how we did today. And I really appreciate that we will go ahead and wrap it up there were a few minutes over but I think it was well worth it. Thank you again to our four fabulous panelists and we will see you next week. For our briefing about natural climate solutions with our friends at us nature for climate. Thanks so much. Have a great day.