 Good morning. My name is Marwan Ma'shar. I'm the vice president at Carnegie for studies and I want to welcome you all to the Syria conference before we start I want to offer our deepest condolences for To the Syrian people for the horrific massacre that took place Two days ago, and I would like to ask all of you to observe a moment of silence in honor of the dead Excellencies ladies and gentlemen dear friends This Syria conference to which I have the pleasure and privilege to welcome you all Marks the entry of this bloody and almost unextractable conflict into its seventh year The appraisal is appalling more than five hundred thousand dead Among which more than seventy percent are civilians Probably three to four times that figure are deeply wounded and handicapped More than one hundred fifty thousand have disappeared are missing or captive for political reasons 11 million half of Syria are internally or externally displaced an Economy that has shrunk by 65 percent since the start of the war and a GDP brought back to the level of the 1980s Internal international financial organizations estimate the minimal figure to set back Serious structure to the point it reached at the eve of this period at around a hundred and eighty billion dollars. I Can go on and on and we will probably go through these dark aspects All along this day But this the situation is more dramatic than even that This last sixth year of conflict in Syria was declared by UNICEF as the worst one for children and Indeed in this long litany of horrors The latest chemical attack on sleeping children in Khan Shaikhun in the province of Idlib Shows us once more What the regime will go to? Stay in power over the last six years The Syrian conflict has swallowed hundreds of hours of international meetings and conferences It has consumed three high-level and experienced UN special envoys Without so much without any tangible results so far and It has exhausted and discouraged a large set of regional and international actors More gravely, it has brought Syrians themselves to the point of extreme desperation and despair Is there still a solution possible for this country Would its continuous dismemberment ultimately have in leave intact the regional architecture surrounding it and More basically what will become of all the lost Syrian bodies and souls that this tragedy has resulted in What has started by mid-March? 2011 as a peaceful mainly reformist movement of protest and revolt Has quickly turned out into one of the ugliest butcheries in the nascent history of this 21st century We can delve at length As to the reasons that went wrong and why Why while Tunisia was taking the road to a bumpy but promising Transition why Syria was spiraling into a war that has today become the generator of many other conflicts and scenarios This conference will attempt to look at these issues closely and attempt to answer some of the questions I raised There is first the Syrian component as such the one that triggered all of this We have a regime one of the most ruthless and brutal in an already fierce Middle East That chose since day one the option of survival against all odds and against all pressures Resorting without any hesitation to the most extreme forms of collective intimidation and punishment We have an opposition that was not organized the day before March 2011 and that had to cope quickly with international indifference and abandonment with upscaled violent repression but also With its disparate composition and nature as well as with its nascent experiment in politics We have a society That had to quickly organize and mobilize out of almost nothing to address the most basic needs of local population in Terms of sheltering schooling healthcare and also hope-keeping and Mushrooming on the ground we have a myriad of fighting factions and rebel brigades and battalions whose mere numbers contours orientation and ultimate affiliation is Today one of the most difficult challenge to any experienced analyst in the world to understand and decrypt With such a reality is a Syrian solution to Syria still possible Is Syria as such still possible and under which conditions? This is what the second panel of this conference will examine through the eyes of Syrians Moreover the Syrian conflict today is not merely an internal one and its crisis became one of the most entangled and Interpenetrated with regional and international players This is the curse of location and Syria was at the crossroads of too many conflicts The Arab-Israeli one of course, but many Latin Arab Arab ones between pro-western moderates and hardliners and Amongst these as well It was in the middle of the crosshair between an affirmative and rising Turkey and its Arab foes As well as in the middle of a cold war between Arab Gulf States and Iran and This is the curse of timing as well Syria happened after Libya and it's chaotic descent after Russia's wake up and Desire to stop its decline in regional affairs and at a moment where the American system was eager to move away From the swamps of the region and at a time when the West was trying to seek new directions with rising actors Iran to mention but one In the middle of all this is any solution anymore a Syrian one Isn't Syria today a hellish miniature of a world order in flux and If so will an international grand game type of solution be enough To extinguish Syrian fires and accumulated hatred This is the focus of the first panel Because ultimately and even though serious crisis is today the theater of a titanic struggle between all It will be once the dust settles the land and homes of Syrians individuals of all shades and allegiances of all classes and segments of all regions and sects and Who will have with enormous pain and difficulty to live again and live hopefully together if one of the first victims of wars is truth Usually another main one are innocent people civilians human beings The humanitarian aspect of Syria's war is probably the most heartbreaking since the end of World War two with its cohorts of displaced people refugees destruction and atomization of the social fabric This is not only a matter of suffering alleviation as Important and drastically urgent it may be But it is also a matter of future collective security for all in the region and in the world Europe and the West are already being reshaped by the flows of migrants neighboring countries are seeing their sociological DNA deeply altered by the refugee phenomenon and its many fallbacks and While conflicts are the cause of humanitarian disasters Badly addressed humanitarian problems will in turn undoubtedly be the cause of new wars and conflicts How do we approach this disaster How do we assign figures to the gigantic human social and economic destruction? Is something to be expected from the international community in terms of economic and financial duress Can these aspects be de-coupled from the political trajectory? That is to that day far from reaching an end These are the questions that the third panel will touch upon Ladies and gentlemen, we convene around Syria once again Of course with a sad outlook And with a thought of sorrow for the people who are at this very moment being killed under the fire of shelling Seeking a piece of bread in the rubbles to feed their family Or looking for a sheltering torn tent On the hills of Lebanon or in the desert of Jordan To save their loved ones But we also meet With our analytical will and tools At least because this is the nature of our activity With the prospect that the conflict itself Has maybe started to consume itself And with the hope Of finding a glimmer of light At the long of this long tunnel This conference has been hard to assemble partly because of that Because of the many unknowns And because sometimes in this town there is a kind of Syria fatigue We hope this day long of discussions and debates Will help us emerge from here With a more optimistic outlook I want to thank the Asfari Foundation for making this conference possible I want to thank Two of our staff, Joe Bahout and John Pokari who did a great job in organizing this conference And I hope that you all will have a very fruitful day of discussion Thank you very much Good morning everyone Thank you all for being here in this very dark moment And a very great day also Which is maybe a coincidence I'm happy and we are all happy of course on behalf of Carnegie To welcome you today to discuss this very Untractable situation that Dr. Mahasir has just described As he always as he also said This first panel will try to address Or mainly address the international and regional ramifications of the syrian crisis But of course the many levels are intertwined the internal one the domestic internal one the economic one the humanitarian one and of course The international one in this panel will try to focus on the external dimension. Of course This is one of the moments where With what happened two days ago and yesterday's statements by the Trump administration Where at the moment probably where the international dimension is again on the forefront We'll try in this panel Of course, we will of course integrate this last Episode this last sequence the chemical attack and what could happen But I would also like To keep a kind of distance From that event in order to keep the perspective more global, of course, we will integrate What's happening today and we'll try to put it in a larger and Wider framework to do that We have of course, we could have assembled a much larger panel because the ramifications of syria are Really international you could have had a european Perspective we could have had a gulfy perspective an arab perspective a chinese perspective, but we had to make choices So on this panel, we will have four very distinguished speakers Without any order of priority, of course I would say that more or less the american perspective will be presented by our dear friend Frederick hopp who's the director of the hariri center At the atlantic council and a long time practitioner of syria because he was a special envoy To syria for a while Then the russian perspective, of course, although he's never been an official although you were a diplomat for a while Nikolai kozanov Who is Who is today? The inner poor program professor at st. Petersburg university and just for a notice Nikolai was based as a diplomat in tehran a few years ago. So he has an experience of Something very touchy by the way, which we will talk about the iranian russian relation Then we have ambassador musavian who has been an iranian official for for a while. He was an ambassador To germany i think and who is now he has also played a crucial part And role in the nuclear negotiation at some points and today he is a visiting scholar at princeton university Last but of course, not least a good friend also ghalib dalei Who is a turkish? Who has Good outreach to i think the turkish decision-making process and he is the director of the shark forum in istanbul So without further ado the way i will organize this panel is to address our panelists Each one of our panelists a question for a quick round of Let's say a perspective on the syrian crisis and then a second one and then we'll have i hope a fluid and open discussion Let me start by you Fred if you allow I mean regardless of what happened yesterday and before yesterday, of course you will say a word about that But the big question that we all have in mind for the three last months is To what extent the trump administration policy on syria Is or will be a real departure? Compared to to the one that was in place under the the obama administration And in that respect what you do of these latest statement by president trump yesterday And would it be a game changer one of these many game changer that were proven in fact illusory all along the syrian crisis Okay, well good morning. Good morning to all Joe thanks to you. Thanks to you marwan the asprey foundation for for convening this To my to my syrian colleagues and friends my deepest condolences over what's happened And please also accept my my sense of sincere regret over the failure of the west over the past six years To offer really anything meaningful in protection in in in the sense of civilian protection In the Assad side of syria Joe I I think frankly I think the jury is still out Not withstanding the words of the president yesterday not withstanding the words of of the united nations ambassador Haley The jury is still out as to whether or not we're at a we're at a true policy turning point The president's words and those of the un ambassador Struck me as very heartfelt Uh, very direct But how this how this translates into actual policy Is still not known I mean in that sense You know rather than having me sit here pontificating We all would have been better off perhaps If there were an actual serving u.s official Up here to explain all of this, but I think the I think the fact of the matter Right now is is that there may be no one Short of the commander in chief himself Who would actually be Playing what the actual policy is? What the strategy is My sense Is that president trump's top priority in syria will continue to be the military defeat of dash The so-called islamic state But any inclination may have had To work with the Assad regime to that end is now dead I cannot imagine anything more dead Than that proposition And that possibility There will be no collaboration with the Assad regime Uh, I suspect that the president now sees very clearly If he did not before the connection between Assad's strategy of mass homicide And the ability of other violent extremists To recruit Live long and to prosper But strong words aside from the president and from ambassador hailey the jury's still out The chemical attack Two days ago presents president trump and his administration With a very clear choice React forcefully Perhaps including military strikes or Adopt the action-free Rhetoric rich policy of his predecessor That choice strikes me in the wake of the president's words yesterday as very very stark very clear Assad's chemical attack In my view Reflects his sense of total and absolute impunity Recent administration statements to the effect that the fate of Assad himself Is not a central concern May have I emphasize may have Fed that sense of impunity Assad may have concluded That the obama administration's blind eye To civilian protection in syria had continued seamlessly Into the trump administration Still in my view it is not fair to blame newly minted senior administration officials For having underestimated the sheer cynicism And bloody-mindedness Of bashar al-Assad if a mistake was made In terms of those statements a few days ago in my view it's a mistake Not likely to be I think it's occurred to the administration that this battle against violent extremism focused on dash in syria and elsewhere Is not going to be won if bashar al-Assad is permitted in effect to recruit For isis and al-qaeda By conducting mass Homicide mass casualty operations against defenseless civilians I suspect the administration will be looking in the near term At ways and means to complicate Assad's free ride for civilian mass terror To complicate obstruct and if possible end the free ride Not only does the regime methodology recruit for dash and al-qaeda There is in my view absolutely no possibility of sustainable And productive peace talks in syria So long as syrian civilians are on the bull's eye day in and day out It simply will not happen and I wonder If mr. Assad may have had this very much in mind When he decided to launch this operation My sense is that no one in the trump administration Uh wants to invade And occupy mr. Assad's piece of syria No one in this administration to the best of my knowledge is planning violent regime change in syria But asad kills With absolute confidence supported by an absolute sense Unity No doubt An american president who has said he's deeply offended By what happens by what has happened asks himself A couple of questions Where is it written That pilots Dropping weapons of mass terror on children Not opposed Who has decided that the air base from which This operation was launched From suffering the consequences of having launched uh that operation Is exacting a price Ending the free ride for mass homicide Is this something that is actually beyond the width Of the west and the united states The risk of doing something so huge As to justify the horrific costs associated with doing nothing Does never again Actually mean well maybe Just this once I imagine that there will be high level discussions with mosco On what's happened What needs to be done I strongly suspect i'll i'll certainly defer to my russian colleague on this but i strongly suspect That russia knows what happened I'd like to think that mosco regards the behavior of its client As gratuitously stupid And perhaps even hostile Russian attempts to support peace talks Uh perhaps the trump administration Will offer mosco the chance to get its client Out of the mass casualty business out of the mass casualty business not just chemicals But mass casualty across the board get him out of that business once and for all I don't know Whether mosco has the intent Or the leverage That happened A clear indication of of intent however will be how russia characterizes the facts Of this chemical attack in private high-level discussions With american counterparts So joe to sum up President trump Will either adopt his predecessor's syria policy as his own Or he will act to end the asad regime's free ride from mass murder Letting that ride proceed unopposed would suggest That the battle against violent extremism In syria and beyond Is something less Serious undertaking Asad has communicated his defiance and his attempt To reply to defiance contempt and mass murder Will in my view help to define Thank you fred I'll get back probably to this aspect of of the struggle against Dice and and the war in eastern syria But since you I mean you mentioned russia and you gave me the proper transition to to nicolai The question I mean to to put this chemical issue in perspective This chemical attack and I agree with with what fred said could be read as a kind of Cornering to russia because in fact it puts russia in in in a kind of embarrassing situation And also at the same time we could think that like in 2013 after the ruta attack it would be an occasion to Let's say densify the american russian linkage on syria and work on something like like the chemical issue This leads me to the to the core question. I mean the more global question What is the state exactly today of the dialogue between russia And the us on syria Of course a bit before the trump administration But mainly after the trump administration fred mentioned that what would be crucial would be to know What is the character the way the russians characterize the incident of before yesterday in private? What is the state of these private folks are the I mean the relations between russia and and and the us on syria Resuming is there a hotline on that? We have noticed that there's no american high level envoy in astana or even in geneva last time So what is how would you characterize this relation today? And is there the beginning the slightest beginning of understanding on a end game for syria between the two big powers Well, thank you very much for these questions. But by asking them you are challenging me with a very Difficult task to fit in the answer of several hours in just eight minutes Person for most, I would like to say that when describing russia as an almighty or Well, a very important player in the middle is sometimes we're deceiving ourselves because The situation in which russia is now is very tricky for moscow On the one hand it got involved in the conflict without actually clear vision of how to get out of it or at least After several months of the military attack of the military campaign. It's realized that actually The the calculations about the possibility to finish this war quick They appeared to be wrong and now it needs to somehow to muddle the situation in a way to be able to get out of This conflict and secondly, uh, it's too Again, I'm a little bit concerned confused with using the word allies. I would say occasional partners The moscow's and taekran they not always follow the general line The most people would like them to follow and they I would say Sometimes make actions that that that goes Against the russian interest in terms of the settlement of the of the code on the of the conflict and I'm afraid that these Incidents with the use of the chemical weapon which has clearly demonstrated that moscow ability to control us out and While put him in the line of the russian vision the line of russian strategy They are extremely limited From this point of view, it's definitely important for moscow to develop the further dialogue on Syria with the international community And while we see in the russian Diplomats and senior officials in the recent recent month prior to the new year's elections Stating that we can try to do it on our own by launching the astana process It became quite clear when they invited still the u.s Representatives that it was rather a political game Allowing russians to show At the international arena, but as a matter of fact, moscow would like to have this channel open So far the progress in russian us dialogue on syria after tram selection. They are not that much Flossomating We will see in some occasional situation like the discussion of the de-confliction issues Like still you mentioned astana saying that this process Well, still on the question to what extent is successful, but I would like to emphasize that during this second astana meeting We had the low level american representation there So we still could say that the channels are open and that that was quite important And finally, we're also allegedly seen certain Dialogue on the situation around manbij in syria But that's basically it The question is whether this cooperation will go further on or stop at the current level Again, it doesn't have one answer. And by the way, today we have not only one russian in this Panel, but we have Four really good experts on russian syria sitting just in the third row. So I would appreciate if we can drag them in discussion as well Um, uh, because they a vision of the situation may be different from mine I'm mostly playing the role of an pessimist Because while definitely there is an understanding that it is necessary As it is incapable of basically to grab the control of the syria and reach the military solution of the syrian contact And it's important to talk to to the to the u.s. And patria I've In my talks with some russian Policy makers and government analysts. I heard certain hints that they would Like to have more active and effective dialogue on syria But from my point of view, there are a lot of obstacles on For this dialogue Nowadays first and foremost is definitely the huge luggage of mistrust That we have at the different levels of the decision-making courses in moscow and uh, correct me if i'm wrong I'm not an specialist in the u.s. But in the u.s. As well Secondly, uh, it's uh still russia and the us and the international community they may probably see actually the very concept of the Main issue of this conflict in a different way From moscow It is what it calls the destabilization of the government institutions that push at n syria and compels the russians To struggle to the survival of these institutions, but ultimately for the survival of the regime To the west for the u.s. It's still the islamic state the radical islam that that that matters more But for the russians, it's only just the protocol of the program and they would like to address to the source of that So these differences also make Quite a lot of troubles and finally um Thirdly, uh, there is also Even if we're speaking about the products of this context, uh, the vision of this products is different for moscow. It's much more important The numbers of the russian-speaking jihadists uh in syria rather than the existence of daesh itself It still believes that that the islamic state or the jihadist is something that's bound to the region And they wouldn't like to fight with them believing that it's much more a problem for the regional states for the europe For europe for the u.s. Rather than for for russia itself that also makes a whole difference And finally, uh, moscow is trapped By its uh broad regional strategy on the middle east Which is based on the principle of balancing between regional different regional powers and whatever decision it makes In dialogue with the west it should take into account The opinion of tehran, which is quite important for moscow on a number of other issues as well Which are not related. I'm not always related to um syria It needs to keep in mind its interest in the development of the dialogue with the gall states Especially in russian interests related to the financial capitals And it also needs to keep in mind the interests of egypt and israel So and this necessity of balancing between different players it also Foods and natural limits on those concessions and agreements and can make with the relations with the west of syria To sum up I still I managed to make it To sum up, um, I would say that we will definitely see russian attempts to continue the dialogue But this dialogue will be extremely limited It will be extremely long before we reach results because again, I would like to emphasize moscow is not under the pressure of time Um, and any results achieved, uh, we should not expect, uh, the big results. I guess the progress will be very strong Thank you, nicola. In fact on this issue of the time pressure I'll get back to you on the second round of question, but you gave me also once again a transition to ambassador, uh, misalvian and to iran A few days ago, I don't know if you have seen that wall street journal had a very important article Saying in a kind of blunt manner Iran is the winner of syria. Iran has won in syria My question is, uh, to what extent the feeling in tehran Is that in fact syria was a victory for iran? I know that you will tell me that that it's not exactly the case and etc But if you look at the statement of even some very consequential Past that on leaders they boast on that. I mean they they really go very far saying that this is Historical victory and it will be followed by others in the region to what extent, uh, the iranian Leadership is perceiving that it has won in in syria and the the corollary question It has to do with what nicola was saying To what extent or how Is tehran perceiving the way of sharing this victory with the other? Victor in syria who is today russia In what is the state also the russian iranian that say dialogue over syria? Good morning, everyone. Uh, first of all, we had three very hard breaking and Issued during last four or five days Which everyone should regret and if there is any action to protect civilians it should be Beyond one issue One definitely was the chemical weapons syrians seven people syrians innocent civilians. They were king Yesterday we had 33 young syrians beheaded by isis Two days before we had 12 Syrians civilians beheaded by isis 45 people in three four five days Which no one is talking about Uh, four five six days ago. We had 200 civilians killed innocent civilians by us military strike at musil And they are civilians. It doesn't matter whether this is The us strike or isis Or chemical weapon by opposition or by assa. Therefore If we are really worried about civilians, we should be more serious This is one second Uh, iranians they believe Syrian Crisis till now is completely lose lose game for everyone for syrian nation for Assad government For the us for iran for russia for Saudi Arabia. There is no winner If anyone makes such a statement in Tehran giving you such a feeling they say the notion of regime change by the use of military force in syria has failed This is different with feeling A winning situation in syria However, joe If you are in washington Uh in such a panels reading the the papers If you go to Tehran You would see 100 different narratives Perceptions understanding First of all iranians they really never believe the us and the west is serious about chemical weapon And this is just a political instrument Because they say during Saddam invasion of iran Saddam used chemical weapons 100 000 iranians not 70 or 100 100 000 iranians They were either killed or injured And the us and europe both provided Saddam with material and technology to use chemical weapon Therefore You really cannot convince them they they are they they hate chemical weapons They can any chemical weapon Incidents of chemical weapon using syria Immediately minute one The us and europe immediately blames Assad Without before any investigation Any you know immediately It means The the us and the europe they trust isis and al-qaeda and terrorist groups Sorry, please Okay, you can leave the room, but please. Sorry. Yes Okay second they say The us used the excuse of weapons of mass destruction attack Iraq to bring regime change and everyone understood It was a lie The NATO used the excuse of weapons of mass destruction attack Libya to bring regime change in Libya And then everybody understood this is a lie Therefore, there is a big gap Whether we like it or not. This is a fact Between Iranian understanding and the us and the western understanding from the use of weapons of mass destruction Iranians are the biggest victim of the chemical weapons after the second world war Therefore, they should never and they would never support the use of chemical weapons second On syrian crisis or the regional issues joe if you go to tehran to talk to everyone And tell them Assad is dictator And that's why the us and the west is fighting Assad Assad is a very nasty dictator They would say this is 40 50 60 years of u.s policy supporting dictators in the region From Shah Mubarak all corrupted dictator regimes supported by the us therefore democracy Or dictatorship is not an issue for the us and should not be an issue because they have been supporting dictators for Decades it is not If you say this is humanitarian issue or democracy They would tell you the us is supporting their allies in the region with zero democracy And providing with the most sophisticated arms killing every day thousands or hundreds of yemenis And and they are human. This is us or european arms It doesn't matter. This is in syria and by those regimes with zero human right and democracy therefore Iranians they see the syrian issue a part of brand strategy of the us in the region related to iraq afghanistan The invasion of afghanistan the invasion of iraq supporting yemen supporting their terrorist groups in in in syria They believe the us is after hegemonic in the region That's why there is a really a big big gap Coming to one case to discuss whether Assad is dictator or not or chemical weapons or Or good or bad at the end I think it was for the first time after the nuclear deal In october 2015 iran was invited by the world powers to syrian international dialogue or meeting in janeva And there was nine eight ten principles agreed and iran fully supported including peaceful transition Including a free election by syrian nation supervised by united nation security concern Including the unity and integrity of syria And I think if if if there is going an international Move to support the same principles iran would accommodate So, okay, you we we left aside the second part of my question which at least for me was important I mean, how would you share this victory or the situation with russia? I suggest that we we transfer it to the second round of question Since no, I would agree with him that iran and russia They have More common interests. Okay terminologies in the region Confronting the west Can we transfer that? I mean keep your remarks for the second round of question because I'm straight Since we are approaching the issue in terms of quote-unquote winners and losers really The perception from outside specially lately is that in fact Since at least the coup d'etat and the aftermath of the coup d'etat in turkey Turkey has really made a new turn on syria. It has completely shifted policy And this is partly or mainly led by the fact that turkey perceived itself as being On the losing side once for a while and then it it it is looking for ways to cut the losses Is this perception true first? and second if this is true What are the second best? For turkey in syria. I mean is today turkey only concerned about the northern part about Let's say immunizing the border on the northern part Is there any view on on damascus on the change of of political system in damascus? Or is it only now a matter of even more defensive Approach a completely domestic turkish affair having to do with the survival quote-unquote of the of the erdogan political system How can we see that? Well, thank you very much joe for the invitation I will start actually by Making a bit of comparison of what Federica said Frederick had said and what turkey is right now experiencing Turkey in a sense that despite the tension between the turkey and the us made from to syria Actually, the approach to syrian policies start to resemble each other quite significantly and that's why actually turkey has changed a track in syria first As it is the case right now with the us at least from the outside that the syrian issue has been reduced to the war on Isis in a sense like the syrian issue has been syrian policy has been reduced to a Factor to us's isis policy or a component of the us isis policy Now you see also turkey reducing the syrian crisis to again another war on terror and the turkey syrian policy Has been reduced through the effective to its pkk pyd policy as the us has been, you know using quite Significantly, I like also the words the vocabulary that Frederick has said has used the action-free and the rhetoric reach Putting aside the euphrates shield operation turkey's recent syrian policy has been also Quite action-free and rhetoric reach and the only exception in this case I think was relatively successes euphrates shield operation and the thirdly as the us has effectively Given up on the regime change at least practically And actually The tillers and has said even the fate of the assault is something that the syrian syrians should themselves should Decide and the fallout question then why on earth? What are you doing on syria? One should ask him probably turkey also has effectively despite the rhetoric Has transition from the regime change agenda To some kind of regime reform agenda and given the fact that regime reform agenda is not a likely scenario Is not the likely option to work what we see turkey? Turn this into a counter-terrorism strategy or a border protection strategy Right now what you see effectively a policy that tries to Minimize the negative security external place of the syrian crisis on turkey. So in this regard the turkey syrian crisis has very much Is domestically driven and it's driven by turkeys national security and national nation security threats perception or Challenges so in this regard. Yes, unfortunately What We have seen In the last in the last one year actually a bit more than this Turkey has transitioned the policy in syria effectively and will turkey reverse its idea of this policy It's very much dependent whether the u.s. Will be willing to reverse its idea of its syrian policy whether the u.s. Will once again go into the business of the regime change if the u.s Is not going to go into the business of the regime change and given the fact that the gulf is this are not as Sanguine as they were like, you know a couple years ago I think turkey alone feels that it is beyond its capacity to effectively go for the regime change and then Turkey will be willing to go for the regime change agenda if once again It says this its allies particularly u.s. Is in this business. So unless and until we have this I don't see how it is going to happen. So what is the policy then? Well, the policy is very much when you look at turkish policy towards the syria Treatings is very clearly a turkey has downsides in ambitions B. Turkey doesn't have a syria policy anymore. Turkey has a northern syria policy And actually turkey's regional policies when you look at the geographic space of turkish regional policy It takes up from northern syria and northern ira and there is two three things that it is grappling The you know the Kurdish issue or the pkk pyd belt and Reducing the negative security externalities of the syrian crisis or the regional collapse and the third day basically Trying to curtail the Iranian influence as much as possible. So when you look at these three things This is three major things that define the current turkish turkish regional policy today's and turkish Syrian policies watch out So what turkey is going to do it is kind of Implementing some kind of stabilization holdings with the euphrates seals operation Particularly from the areas that it has cleared the ice is it is trying to put some kind of governor's structure It has actually quite successful done in jarafus area from police training to put in like education institution to train some Some other structure of governance It will expand on this policy all the way to the Above and hoping and it will play to the turn to see how the situation on the ground is changing And what are the options that? That the opposition Realistically has And the thirdly turkey will continue its this policy of Trying to prevent the formation of a pkk pyd belt extending from shingal all the way to offering so But previously turkey did this through quite military options with the euphrates seal operation But after the above turkey had to make decisions and this decision to be honest had only two components After the above turkey would have either targeted the pyd pkk Or halt the operation because in the end getting rid of the Isis in the whole of the city. I was not the priority the priority was Getting an icis three borders and down the road the war on ices would was a factor of turkish war on pkk pyd If turkey saw benefits of fighting ices also in raka would help turkey to Would help turkey to Gain some leverage because of is that pkk pyd then turkey would be interested in this deal But feeling that there is a decoupling and the u.s. Is not interested in giving up on the pyd and pkk At this stage turkey is not also in the mood of Continuing the fight against the ices Towards raka unless it is a tangible results because of the pkk pyd and particularly with the u.s. us forces in manbij area the regime forces coming to manbij area the russian forces in manbij area the russian forces in also Afrin Basically the military options of the euphrates seals operation was no longer there because of the pkk pyd And that's why you see the turkey has terminated it and at this stage you will see a much more Stabilization policies that look turkey will be undertaking in syria Thank you. Really, but these are very candid remarks for some of them interesting Fred i'll go back to you and and this in this second round of question Please i would require you to have short answers because really we would like to have a dialogue with the audience but One or two things first of all, it's not noticeable that from at least i mean nicole and rally It's very different of course in the case of of ambassadu musavia. There's a lot of let's say Waiting or expectation on what will be the decision of the us in order to design the policy for the next period rally was very candid and saying Since the u.s. Has stopped the regime change business as we called it we stopped it if you resume it We will resume it which is a way of i mean addressing something to the u.s It's not it's not exactly what i would like to To launch you on but you said before you mentioned the isis component the daesh component Let's agree that this is the priority of washington for the years to come the questions that are looming in dc and elsewhere Are first of all on the rocker and other Daesh provinces what will be the efficient and available I mean realistically available mix of forces that would take and then govern these Spaces and second corollary How will this be designed? I mean the eastern part of syria. How will it be managed design and etc? With the russian in the coming years according to what you know about The state of let's say of of of thinking in the u.s administration Yeah, joe. I think this is uh, you know, this is this is one area where there there is an advanced state of thinking In the executive branch of the u.s. Government with respect to syria And you've you've outlined very well the the key issues That the u.s. Department of Defense the office of the secretary of defense and the and the joint staff Are are struggling with right now? Uh since 2014 the defense department has been faced uh with with the reality Uh that it's uh that it's only It's only effective ground force combat components Is a is what is now a Kurdish dominated? militia This obviously presents problems uh with uh with respect uh with respect to turkey uh Speaking personally i've been i've been calling for the better part of two years for uh for the united states to take the diplomatic initiative Informing a professional ground force coalition of the willing To work with coalition air forces to finish Dash in eastern syria Uh and to execute a professional sensible post combat stabilization plan for the area Point one of which would have to be The exclusion of the Assad regime from eastern syria It it would make absolutely no sense to expend blood and treasure Closing with and killing dash And then and then permit This regime To reestablish itself in the area There are from a professional point of view and i you know, and i say this as a as a former Long ago military professional There there are some there are some real Dilemmas as the u.s. Department of Defense looks at how to take Raqqa As far as i understand it right now There will be militiamen albeit with some american advisors walking point Being up front When the actual operation to take the city Commences in my view This is extraordinarily dangerous Fighting in built up areas fighting in urban areas Is a is a highly refined art form That is resident in very few professional Militaries right now we we run the risk here quite frankly Of inadvertently creating a real humanitarian disaster in Raqqa i believe this is the wrong wrong way to go about it But but again For over two years now the department of defense has been stuck with one kind Of a ground force component a ground force component which incidentally has performed well In many instances, but now when you're facing the very specific task Of taking a city that may have well over 200 000 people in a place that's thoroughly booby trapped against an enemy Uh that will resort literally to anything In terms of victimizing civilians and you don't want to put american and coalition air forces in the position of Of hitting inadvertently civilian targets based On uh, you know on poor target acquisition And i'll conclude by saying uh, you know, I appreciate our iranian colleagues A depiction of attitudes in tehran. I believe it's perfectly accurate I think he's uh, I think he's done a real service in what he's What he's uh, what he's portrayed here. It tracks 100 percent with with track two discussions. I've had with iranians For about two and a half years My only my only comment would be There is a world of difference It is inevitable In fighting in urban areas in particular There are going to be civilian casualties. It is absolutely Inevitable it is unavoidable It makes a big difference though Whether or not one is operating on the basis of military doctrine and training That seeks to avoid civilian casualties as opposed To a political strategy that has the creation of civilian casualties As it's centerpiece There's a massive difference Thank you fred uh, I will follow up on that with with ghalib because you I mean this raka issue or the eastern part of syria You mentioned a lot that in fact our the dilemma of of western Let's say the coalition. Let's say is that it is stuck with the only batting force, which is today PYD or sdf or I mean something with a strong Kurdish component And this leads us to a real question for for ankara. I think you concluded by saying that in fact today Mainly the concern of Turkey is that aspect If if we project ourselves a bit further down the road And just try to envisage a kind of future syria. How how far and what is really the red line to use unfortunate expression What is acceptable for turkey in terms of quote unquote Kurdish? Let's say existence in the north of syria autonomy existence Compton and what is what is the ultimate limit that you could that ankara could accept on that Why I think like the concept of Acceptable no longer is valid because so many things that Turkey previously said it's not acceptable to To itself, but it has become acceptable in one way or another. I mean unfortunate asset regime was not acceptable But in recently when the regime forces came to around the manbij the prime minister said well It is the lesser evil So that means as the war progressed as the war evolves the actors within the war also evolving their strategy as well too I mean, uh, the talab that was not acceptable to turkey, but now it's a fact The further expansion of the pyg along church border was not acceptable to turkey, but it has become a reality the crucial question here is What is turkey and the pkk? Like what will be the next stage for turkey and pkk because the question of the pyg The question of pyg is very much related to the question of the pkk And let's not forget until 2015 the salaf muslim was in ankara visiting and coming to ankara meeting the Undersecretary of the uh, undersecretary of the foreign minister and other high officials So there was some kind of a functioning dialogue between the turkey and the pyg as well too When the turkish the Kurdish peace process in turkey broke broke down particularly with the urban warfare prevailing prevailing in the second half of 2015 then what was Practical what was pro-sana acceptable in syria became Uh unacceptable from turkish perspective perspective here I think one thing that the u.s could have done But for one way or another hasn't done so us could Could make it support for the pyg conditional And in that way it could create some kind of dialogue between the us turk and the pyg When I say conditional is this one. I think The pyg eastern or the pkk eastern is regarded as unacceptable But I think some kind of some form of Kurdistan could be relatively more acceptable And in order to turn this from pkk eastern or pyg eastern to krudistan That would have required the us Pression the pyg to let other the Kurdish component to be present and to freely operate in syria and to be integrated into the administrative and the security structure Of the see the Kurdish part of the syria And now you have like, you know, couple thousands of the rosh peshmerge in Iraq for instance, this could be one of the first step to bring this rosh peshmerge Into the Into the governance or the security structure of the syria. I think that could have been one of the first step that That would have started a process Because right now the fact that it is not the krudistan because of all the Kurdish Leadership in the region the barzani is the most nationalist and the most pro independent Figure in the whole region Kurdish context and it is the one also has the best relation with Turkey Today when you put aside Qatar, Turkey has the best relation with Iraqi Kurdistan. So in this regard, I think bringing like putting Making military eight conditional or down the road the reconstruction eight conditional on the good behavior of the pyd and the first one to start with the letting other Kurdish parties starting with the Kurdistan democratic part of syria to operate and be integrated into syria would have created a Dialogue between Turkey u.s. And Syrian Kurds and I think still there is a chance for this And I think like after the referendum there might be new dynamics Yeah, exactly. I think I mean the sense is that there's also a domestic turkish component A lot of that relies on the future state of dialogue or peace talks between Alain and Ankara at one point and syria policy is a domestic policy for Turkey period Often a domestic policy for a lot of people Mainly for also maybe for Iran in a way as you said it the ambassador musavi and I'll get back to you The part of the question that was not answered before I mean the relation with russia and how if let's assume if there is a kind of condominium Between russia and Iran over syria for at least this was the case until now. How is it divided? How is it shared and what are the the spheres are very strong? Let's say complicity between the two and the spheres of friction and there are frictions between the two The second part of the question to put it also in that in that respect With the new stance of the american administration that is now much bolder against iran in the region and maybe in syria What are Tehran's let's say plan these in case the new american administration takes the decision to really I mean fight or curb iran In syria and not to mention of course the israeli factor that we have seen appearing lately Yesterday evening for example the strong strikes by israeli air force on some hezbollah positions In terra and elsewhere. So how how will iran let's say manage its quote-unquote victory over syria with these partners with russia the americans and mainly tomorrow the israelis I think there is a clear understanding in tehran that there cannot be A winner in syria if The notion of winning In the criteria either for iran or saudi arabia or russia or The u.s. They are looking for a collective cooperation to resolve the syrian crisis peacefully on some basis One base definitely would be Preserving the integrity and unity of syria Because the collapse disintegration of syria Would have many consequences in the region iraq jordan and many other countries I think here russia and iran. They are in the same page And even syrian opposition. I talked to everyone. They they are in the same page But I think the most important issues which Caused iran russia cooperation on syria or two folks One is terrorism Isis al-qaeda It is a great threat to russia in low central asia chichinia and we have seen the san petersburg explosion and Many many terror activities in russia before And this is exactly the same big national threat to iranian security specifically About the fact isis capital nusra al-qaeda buko haram ahrar or sham All of them. They are coming from one source of ideology And iranians believe they are funded ideologically Weapon money from one source To disestablish iran And this is the same understanding in russia That's why I would say a real fighting against isis Al-qaeda is the main target not not only in syria. The iranians are doing in iraq also They are at the forefront fighting isis Hems of iranian military. They have been killed in iraq or in syria fighting isis The second is about um As I said before which musko and tehran they shared my understanding Is to prevent the us policy Of bringing regime change in the region By force or by supporting the terrorists Because they have the experience of us invasion of iraq us invasion of Libya or nato invasion They have now they see the us support for saudi arabia astride and yemen And they have been struggling with us for 38 years On iranian issue because it is known to everyone the us has been For regime change in iran Therefore they have a bigger Grand strategy in the in the region Regardless of what is happening in syria Okay, so you don't want to address the issue of the us and maybe No, no israeli very quickly. No, no very quickly There is if if you read the papers. I was this morning early morning. I woke up And I I read three articles in three iranian papers. They saying This is a grand strategy by us and israel Because the us is going to depart the region. They don't need anymore the the the persian wolf or middle east oil And they want to bring the the Superiority the the the dominance of israel to the region. That's why the the big rivalries of israel like iraq like syria like yemen all of them are collapsing And they are saying in this way that this and also they say I We can read it today They say Assad was at the forefront fighting israel occupation and supporting This is all about supporting israel weakening the muslim countries fighting israeli palestinian issue And also the us however I I already said about the us grand strategy how iranians they view the region. It is not about in syria about the whole region And this is about israel. Is it enough? It's okay. So in fact, what I understand is that the narrative in Tehran is still the one Uh of the moumana. I mean the the resistance Yes, okay Nikolai, uh before, uh, I mean giving the floor to the audience. Let's get back a little bit to The russian internal situation you said something very important before which is for me paradoxical a little bit That russia has time. I mean it's not under pressure That time is not a aggressive factor But in fact the sense that we can have Analyst some of us is that on the contrary because russia feels today that it has a need to translate quite quickly It's military. Let's say might over syria or at least over the airspace of syria into some kind of political architecture That would allow it to not withdraw but at least Minimize the cost of managing the day-to-day issue so first of all How long can russia play the game in syria without getting Sunk into the muds of syria and getting into a kind of new attrition war afghanistan style and etc And second if russia has a design for syria tomorrow And this would be a transition to the second panel about the political solution in syria What is the perception of russia for today's syria if it has to Preserve its own national interests Uh, well, uh, thank you very much Joseph for your questions Although i'm really tempted to comment what my Iranian colleague has said just About the common vision of the goals. Uh, it's not common. I'm afraid It's it's not the the united Vision of the ghosty the ghost. I'm afraid they're pursuing our at least From long-term perspective. They're different, but that that's a separate story. Um Speaking about your question. First of all It's not the reality, but I would say our perception of this reality that determines our strategy and tactics It could be applied both to taqran to the to the united states to russia I would definitely agree with you that there is a pressure of time in reality And mosco is getting more and more soaked in this complex And while the russian authorities are officially saying that it's just an operation of russian air forces it was It has been long For for quite a long period of time that it started to be something more than than than just an operation of russian air forces and the losses Are getting higher and higher, but the perception of Moscow of the kremlin is a little bit different. They still believe that the Prophets they get from their involvement in syria are higher than the cost Uh, they uh, especially after the aleppo operation when they they see themselves Changing the situation in the in the in their favor. They became extremely confident and the very fact that We started hearing from Ankara from washington that Replacing us that is not a priority Is also add the self-confidence to mosco that it is having enough I still do have hopes that that the chemical attack of the this disaster chemical attack that that we will see in Yesterday, it will change the narrative about us in this manner and that might affect mosco and start And you can tell it's thinking about whether it's have upper hand or not But the general perception there is that yes, we have troubles But our positions are strong and we are able to to to model to shape the the public opinion not only domestically Because domestically again this campaign is portrayed as a pure success but also On the international arena as well and from this point of view mosco is interested in talking with the united states and it knows that without waking with the international kind of Opinion or sorry with international players and especially with the regional players It will be difficult to settle this issue. That's why we have asthma But uh somewhere in the back of their mind They do believe that uh, if this the current attempt to launch this Political process in syria to launch the dialogue with the supporters of the syrian opposition Fails They still can continue pursuing the two track approach when they put a military pressure on the On the ground and they offering the relaunch of the negotiations At the diplomatic level so far. I haven't seen the change of this strategy and I have doubts that it has changed It will change anything Thank you very much We have now around 30 minutes for a dialogue with with all of you I would I would ask you first to uh, when you take the floor to present yourself very quickly and say What's your affiliation and name and then second please try to be brief and mainly Put the question forward to the audience to the panel and Ask one of them. I mean or address your question to one of them many hands are raised. I think the first one was here Thank you. My name. Mohammed Samman. I'm the director of syria advice center base here in washington dc I'm syrian-american my question to mr. Huff Regarding iranis invasion in syria. It seems that president trump is very serious about kicking out iranis from syria My question, sir, what would what do you think would be the consequences of the iranis regime internally? Some says that this is going to be very serious It's good lead to the collapse of this regime. Do you see do you see this happening? Thank you I uh, I think what I I think what I can say on the on the basis of Two and a half years of periodic very very very intensive track to Dialogue with uh with very senior former iranian officials people still connected Uh to the government in uh in tehran I think what I can say accurately is something that perhaps we haven't really mentioned this morning That that what is what is important for iran in syria? really Hezbollah And and the willingness of president Assad and his regime to subordinate Themselves and the part of syria they control to iran For the sake of hezbollah One of my one of my iranian counterparts Incidentally a person educated in the united states a personal and a personal level Very well disposed toward the united states Made made the statement Fred you've got to understand Hezbollah Is more important to us than the province of kuzestan I mean it was just just very very very point blank so You know if there is some uh, you know if there is some diminution Of iranian influence in syria over time I don't I don't know that it goes directly To the survivability of the the islamic revolution Back in back in tehran But it would go directly To the ability of iran to use syria in support of hezbollah Hezbollah being the point of iran's Spear penetrating the arab world David pollock in the back. I'm trying to be a bit So graphically just Thank you very much. I'm dav pollock from the washington institute for newries policy Thank you for a very interesting discussion and my question is to professor musavi and i you presented an iranian view As you called it, which is that there's one source of jihadi terrorism That it's one goal is to destabilize iran And that iranians believe That this is The goal of the united states regime change in tehran But i don't think you were very clear at least i didn't quite understand whether you think This is the view of the iranian government In its entirety of the iranian people In their entirety or is this also your own personal assessment of the realities In the region and when you said That jihadi terrorism Has one source Who do you mean south arabia the us israel all three or is there something else going on here Is there a sectarian? Aspect to this that you didn't mention Thank you I think on the on the second part you don't need to hear from me I'm sure uh, you read new york times op-ed written by Freedmen saying revealing A confidential report 2010 Hillary clinton saying south arabia is the main source of funding and supporting Isis and terrorism I'm sure you read already President obama interview with atlantic Who said saudis have been supporting? Wahhabism the extreme ideology for decades with uh huge money I'm sure you have it's more or less that But but i'm sure you read the statement by uh Vice president biden at harward 2014 Who said our main problem is with our own allies Which they are supporting terrorist group to bring regime change in uh, syria even president trump During election publicly officially said saudia arabia is the source number one supporting the The terrorist it is the us either republicans or or democrats And this is the general view also in iran. I mean at least if there is one communality Between iran and the us. This is the communality on your first question Uh It is uh about the the the thought the understanding Uh of the decision makers in iran People you would find many many different ideas in iranian the streets if you go to tehran the streets That would be very different about about many many issues. It is not only about syria But it is about the the uh understanding or the belief of the decision makers No, no, no, no the gentleman with the I'm gonna sit down. He's very quickly. Um, how you doing? My name is hamidi mama. I'm a syrian american I'm from raqqa myself and um, I just want to convey the outcries that's coming from inside There are two concerns. There are security concerns And there are military concerns the military concerns are they are trapped inside. They're unable to leave so and now with the uh the exclusion of the rules of engagement So they are unable to flee and also there is the existence of demographics that SDF the campaign that they don't have any arab faction part of it So there are serious concerns of of real demographic change. So what can we do to minimize that? and second question quickly is Has the iranian people seen the horrific pictures of cesar where over a hundred thousand people are mutilated and tortured to death and how would they feel about that? Thank you Thank you. Um, my i'm james kefford. I'm with the public international law and policy group. My question is for you, sir Um There's been reports about the new administration contemplating some kind of intervention. It's been aired. It's not clear You yourself used the phrase coalition of the willing Uh, which has reminiscence of iraq in 2003 What sort of uh idea would you have that wouldn't lead to a similar outcome? Given that that seems to be kind of what's been contemplated My Should I go ahead with that joke is there they're they're related they're related questions on the On the sdf syrian democratic forces to the best of to the best of my knowledge. There is a rather sizable non-kurdish element To this force Largely largely arab My sense of my sense of what is planned Is that the arab elements of the sdf Will be playing a major role in the actual attempt to take raka This this highlights it just highlights my concern and I just I just say this is somebody You know not trying not trying to micro manage the affairs of the of the u.s. Department of defense That's not my interest at all. In fact, I have a professional aversion to that But I also have a real professional concern About how this operation is going to be executed And it's and its potential impact on on civilians Living in in raka in terms of the coalition of the willing What I was calling for Very soon as a matter of fact after the atrocities in paris in late in late 2015 that the united states Mount the kind of diplomatic initiative that secretary of state jim baker did Concerning the liberation of kuwait and that we put together a professional ground force Put an end dash in eastern syria and Obviously a very important and a very complex component of doing that Is going beyond the combat operations to post combat? Stabilization and again as a as a one-time u.s. Army civil affairs officer I have a I have some very detailed knowledge about how difficult this is Nothing nothing I've proposed in terms of alternatives at least At least I've tried not to suggest that there are silver bullets and and easy answers to any Of this, but I still believe very firmly That taking down isis with professional military forces particularly in densely populated built-up areas Is far preferable To relying on molestation Thank you, Fred. I would like to use my my privilege if you allow me to Also take benefit of the presence in the room like as as nicolai has mentioned of three very High-level russian experts that are here visiting washington by coincidence to try to get their Their sense on on this issue, but you have the task to choose one of you Okay, please Thank you. I actually wanted to ask a question, but I'll I'll probably uh, my name is erie barman. I'm a middlers analyst from moscow. Um I'll probably first ask to questions to you mr. Half. Um, do you have um, what's what's the filling in washington about? how to engage moscow in in the middle specifically on syria because it feels like You know niki hailey she came in and she got the talking points Samantha power's talking points and she you know, she pursues the same line while um Rex Tillerson and as well as mr. Trump are very soft on russia including in their comments recent comments about the You know the the chemical attack. So is there like a coherent policy already now in the I know And uh Question to god if I think also, what's the What's the feeling in ankara now following the you know, the failure of the astana talks person around and All different various conflicts between moscow and ankara over like agriculture and stuff like that Clearly, you know that happened after some disagreements between turkine Moscow, so what's the feeling in ankara about Working with moscow on the ran on on syria Um, I don't know if I mean if you would like me to comment on russia's Yeah, syria policy. I I feel like Domestically syria policy is very important and Just like in in turkine just like in iran. I think it's part of the domestic policy Ahead of the presidential elections in 2018. That's a very important element of what my boots rhetoric and Saying that look we're being attacked by terrorists and we need to deal with them We need to deal with that externally before they come back and start attacking us So in that sense syria is playing into into russia's hand But I would I would say that presently russia does not have a coherent policy on syria as well It's very opportunistic. It's you know, they see an opening and they go in and they do what they can But I would say that there's also no preferred outcome I think there's uh, there's a there's there are red lines and there are best case scenarios and there's an equilibrium that is You know going up and down between these these two. So I'm afraid. Yeah, and most which is not at this point have any Thank you very much. Yuri. I think there's a question for you fred and the question for alib and then we'll get back Yeah, basically in terms of uh, what you know, whether or not there is a coherent fully formed idea of how to Of how to deal with russia in the context of of a broader national security strategy towards syria No, I mean all all kidding aside that that does not Exist and I and I think that's uh, you know, that's one of the reasons you have The likes of me up here trying to wing it Try to represent as best I can The state of thinking in the in the administration as opposed to having a real live Senior official of the u.s. Government Up here speaking believe me Definitely Yeah, no, no and I I fully I fully understand why it would be difficult For any for any serving professional To be doing this obviously, you know during the during the presidential campaign candidate trump expressed at times a strong predisposition To work with russia In the case of syria focusing on counterterrorism operations He also he also at the time expressed openness to uh, to working with the working with the asa The asa element of that as I indicated in my opening remarks is gone finished dead Never to come back Many many miracles in in the middle east, but there will be no resurrection of that one. I can I can guarantee it I think I think the administration is probably Probably or let's just say the president. I think the president is probably open to the idea of having some some very senior level discussions with mosco About what has happened most recently in syria And what if anything can be done to put an end at long last to these mass casualty events Whether they're chemical or something else. It doesn't matter. This is not just about chemicals Because because unless that ends unless Syrian civilians come off the bull's eye There are no political prospects and I think president trump is willing to assume That russia is interested in some kind of a Sustainable process for toward an agreed Resolution politically in syria. I think he's willing to assume that and we'll see now if it's tested Yeah Well working with russia and iran was not what turkey primarily preferred it was turkey saw this as practical And as you just mentioned with the recent chemical attack, the asana process has failed on its the cardinal Goal of enforcing ceasefire as well, too So asana process actually was never a turkish agenda It was a more of a washington agenda and turkey just went went along with with the asana process and asana process has Actually served the purpose of like it served a good podium for russia projecting not being As the decisive power in the world But also the peacemaker the primary peacemaker in the syria and what I saw is like, you know, it tried also To redesign the parameter of the political process and also the opposition itself as well, too It's brought the question of constitution even before the political transition as well So in these regard, I'm not sure when turkey has actually much expectation from the asana process It was asana process was meant to be providing some kind of like breathing and Space and time for the opposition and until we see what can be done as next But I was surprised actually to say that you saying that russia doesn't have a Preferred outcome in syria giving all this investment Russia seems to be like, you know choosing its partner in a much better strategic way than the US or turkey does russia besides from regime russia has been investing is trying to like literally Okay, russia is investing You know into pa the pyd it is cultivating the so-called like musko or the gyro opposition as well. So in a sense, it's not only It's not only like, you know, deciding what's the option the regime will have but it is also very much We're designing the opposition camp as well, too Thanks, joe and all panels for this fascinating discussion brahimoosly middle east institute And my question to to you ambassador hop can you raise your voice? Yeah, sure, uh, brahimoosly middle east institute and my question to ambassador hop We've heard a lot from candidate trump and president trump about Uh, the importance of fighting or or confronting the iranian behavior In syria and other countries and especially the iranian backed militias What would you recommend for the u.s administration if they want to deal with that problem in particular Hezbollah and other militias since they will be big destabilizers in the future for any scenario or possible solutions So do you have any particular recommendations that you encourage the u.s administration to do? No, frankly, I frankly I don't on the on that score I I believe I believe the the entirety the entirety Of the of the current effort Has to focus on civilian protection And putting an end to the free ride for mass casualties Obviously, you know focusing on on iranian behavior inside syria is a is a very very important Longer term issue Uh, my sense is that for the sake of supporting Hezbollah Iran is a very important catalyst In the de-establishment Of a unitary syrian state I believe that very strongly. I believe the iranians are very active in in establishing parallel Institutions if you will very similar To what was done in lebanon And and we can see we can see the results there So obviously this is going this is going to be something the administration Is going to have to focus on it's going to have to be a very very important part of whatever national strategy emerges For syria I have no I have no near-term recommendations. I think unless we can stop the mass casualty events There's no room For any kind of diplomacy We'll have 10 minutes. I'll try to take as many questions as I can. There's already one basma Thank you That's my cut money syrian opposition um My points are in relation with the ambassador musavians comments and ambassador hoff First I think we need to look at What iran really wants in syria from the perspective of the syrian opposition and quite broadly actually Way beyond the opposition even inside the regime's constituency. Let's say Uh, there is no reconcilable agenda on which we can work with iran because of The sectarian nature of the presence on the ground and a sectarian agenda The issue of fighting uh jihadis Is a priority of the syrian opposition an absolute priority For which actually the syrian opposition is already fighting has been fighting has been the first to fight and is to fight The best way of Evicting Daesh as well as muslim Is to push backwards in the first place and then withdraw sectarian-based militias Supported by iran I think the worst player who can fight jihadis is Those militias they are fueling jihadism And our main request today is can we have these militias? Withdraw geographically pull away from the front lines so that we start having a context in which The moderates can fight the jihadis, but certainly not with these militias So we have a real problem here, which in fact is the fight the successful eviction of the jihadis Is directly linked with the presence or the withdrawal of these Of these shia led militias. That is a key a key aspect of the strategy of the moderate opposition now on on ambassador hoff's comments The either or it may not be the proposition the either military intervention or some form of arrangement with russia Uh may could be the two options, but if it's not an either or proposition And if musko only understands and takes seriously american propositions If there is military action on the ground, would that be what you see a combination of military intervention? necessarily leading to some form of of discussion serious discussion with musko I guess fred's answer would be a yes, so he won't have the chance to answer you Basma we need to be realistic about the syrian opposition The most powerful syrian opposition on the ground Isis who is holding 40 percent of syrian land And then is a lot of the jeopardon nosa, which they have about 20 percent The peaceful syrian opposition like you and like every other opposition here They they their strength and power and influence Is really compared to the the power and the strength of isis And i'll go ahead in syria. You cannot really compare it Because most of the syrian peaceful oppositions they are outside In such a conferences and they are there Therefore when we say opposition we have to distinct opposition one My personal belief We discussed already together Is that they're the peaceful respected respectful opposition like all syrian friends we have here They need to come to cooperate with Assad government To keep their security and military establishment From a total collapse To fight isis To clean syria from terrorism 50 60 percent of your land is at the end of terrorists And then to cooperate for a peaceful election And led to syrian nation To decide about the future the next president the constitution And bring this United nation security concern to supervise And to support this process otherwise The peaceful syrian opposition is in weak position practically on the ground And Assad with military and security Is one side isis al qaeda. They are on the other side. This is the reality of syria on the ground This is my personal understanding I think you need to go You cannot fight isis al qaeda. Jebed al-Nusra Assad Security establishment. You cannot fight all of them You fight more you would lose more land This is the result of what you have been doing during since 2011 You have been more weakened your country in more problem And the terrorists with more funds with more weapons with more land your government in less strength weaker and weaker and weaker And is not far from a total and syria is not far from a total collapse Okay, this is this is a a narrative or a perception just to maybe clarify what basma was trying to say You were talking about the peaceful civilian Based opposition, but she was mentioning I think the huge number of fsa Fighters who are neither kaida nor musra nor isis nor etc And who are fighting effectively what you are saying it is impossible to fight namely both the regime its backers isis al qaeda And the others and doing it effectively on the ground. So just a factual factual correction I have five minutes left And if you want to have more than one question, please be very brief and on the panel be very brief So there was yes, so sorry. Uh, thank you. I'll be very brief. Um, I'm philip walker I work with a stabilization project based in gaziantep funded by a consortium of western governments And I'd like to return to the subject of the u.s. Turkish dynamic Um Us and turkey have not been on the same page for some time now And that has undermined efforts both of stabilization of north syria and also to push back isis So my question Is what tangible steps could be taken to get turkey and the united states back on the same page? Thank you Who would like to take this question? But please be brief because Well, as I mentioned in my speech, uh, I think the Major focus of the u.s policy after the rocker will be stabilization And the turkey is already undertaken the stabilization politics In the u-phrase shields area But the tone in this issue as we have just spoken is a pure idea. I think The maximalists we can go beyond these maximalist demands both of the us and turkey and the What I said that the the third option is creating some kind of conditionality That will elevate some, uh, kind of concerns of turkey and that will provide the ground for cooperation because in the end practically if if turkey wants opposition or the one system opposition to have Any kind of the future this stabilization politics that will us be implementing and that is turkey already implementing Is very essential. So in this regard, there is a point of conversion But the number one issue I think now is the address the question of pyd. It doesn't have to be between eradication and All putting all the basket within the Within the basket of the stv. I think the conditionality conditionality and conditionality of the military aid And reconstruction aid and also making sure the pyd like pushing it for the good Uh behavior is essential Unfortunately, us hasn't done it like a very simple fact that right now the syrian curse the arm syrian curse was also willing to fight Isis cannot come to syria and the us despite all its alliance with the pyd cannot You know provide the foundation cannot provide the passage for these forces to come to syria Shows that she us has not actually tried in a serious manner Something to add on that. Okay. The last question I'm former congressman flanagan, uh, and I want to talk about the russian american dynamic here, which is Fascinating for more americans than almost anything else that could be happening here The russians have reached out enormously to the united states in various diplomatic efforts at low and high level To try and gain the attention of the trump administration particularly on syria I work with some of those groups which you referred to as the secondary or tertiary groups And that's what they are at the val day conference and the current discussions in florida that are going on You're to be congratulated Amazing event. They have the russians reaching out to the united states period I make it off to very quickly that My question is very quickly. What do the ambassador hoff can and usur see as a future of Co-equal russian american cooperation in syria as almost godfathers or godmothers is the case may be Of the country ensuring its borders and its future well Thank you for a question But i'm afraid i need to join urie in answering and unfortunately The russians so far they do not have a clear actually a vision strategy What the end game should be it will largely depends on actually on how the developments on the ground will go on How the original players will playing how actually what the the u.s. Perspectives on deteriorating will with ratio will there So far, I would say i mean even the the current realities. I won't see These catteration going beyond the conflict demand Let's say of regional catterations in the areas like mannedi where Because of different reasons both sides appeared to be interested in certain interaction But what would be probably the the preferred situation for Moscow It is the definitely the launching of the political process and this political process is important again to give answers to the all questions that Moscow and the u.s. Were asking each other on During the the the previous administration, but still failed to reach them like the Exactly so the terrorist group like how to put pressure on darson and how to engage The regional players as well So so so so so far. I would say that most is just waiting what the the the u.s. Or more will be so from this point of view to a certain extent the ball is on your side Ali if you wanted to add the very quick very small Edition, I think one of the trouble is that u.s. Thus far has asked its allies and particularly like you know in the context of turkey In operation It has conveyed its vision for certain operation. It has never conveyed its vision for syria a political vision I think that's the u.s. Not conveying a political vision For syria or at least for instance like in post rock operation vision Create so many suspicions and So many unhappiness with between the u.s. And it's allies So one of the first step I think the turkey for the u.s. And turkey dynamic will be the u.s. Conveying a political vision what it won the syria to go from now and from here From here and for instance the first step will be what is actually u.s. Political vision once the isis is liberated because the concern in turkey is that Well, will u.s. Let the regime take it will u.s. Let the sdp take it or You know what is going to be in place So you are asking your allies to join an operation in which You don't convey them a clear political vision that they can associate or dissociate from So much the best one of the best way to make enemies is to be the moderator of a panel I apologize from all the people who I couldn't take the questions from but some of you who raised your hands Will be panelists and the subsequent panel. So please don't hesitate to Put the remarks or the question I mean to answer the questions you wanted to ask During your panel we could have gone on and on this is an endless subject But I think we have to stop there. I would really like you to join me and thanks Our very very fantastic