 Good morning everyone. My name is Bill Burns. I'm the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and I'm delighted to welcome all of you today. And especially delighted to welcome to Carnegie my friend and former colleague Ambassador Gerardo Rowe, Francis Ambassador to the United States. One of the great myths about diplomacy, at least in my experience, is that there's no such thing as permanent friends, only permanent interests. I've had the good fortune over the course of my career to make a number of enduring friendships with diplomatic counterparts whom I respected and admired and whose company I've enjoyed. And one of them is Gerardo Rowe. Gerard's biography is impressive, as all of you know. Ambassador to Israel before his service in the United States and before his service as Francis Ambassador to the United Nations, political director in the French Foreign Ministry, amongst many other significant positions. Even more impressive, though, I think, is the rare combination of wisdom, wit, and honesty, which Gerard always brings to bear. In my experience, he's always been a straight shooter, especially in dealing with American diplomatic colleagues, even if his weapon of choice is sometimes a bazooka. I've been on the receiving end of his target practice, whether in defending questionable American policy choices or the equally questionable culinary choices in the seventh floor dining rooms of the State Department. But most impressive of all has been Ambassador Rowe's deep commitment to the Transatlantic Alliance. The partnership, which has played such an essential role in our shared success over many years, the partnership which has been at the core, I think, of the success of international order over the course of the last 70 years. And a partnership which is under unprecedented challenge today in the wake of the American decision to pull out of the Paris climate treaty out of the Iran nuclear agreement in the wake of this past weekend's G7 summit. So even as so many eyes are focused quite understandably on the promise of the Singapore summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, I think it's critical to focus on the even more fundamental structural challenges before us. And in particular, the future of the Transatlantic Alliance, which as I said before has been so essential to the 70 years of international order that we've tried to build together and so essential to the task before us of trying to adapt that international order to fit changing international circumstances. So I look forward very much to Ambassador Rowe's opening reflections and then I'll join him for a discussion and open up to all of your questions. So thanks again for coming and please join me in a very warm welcome for Ambassador Jirard Rowe. Good morning and thank you Bill for this introduction. First it's a great pleasure to be here. Actually it's a very relevant meeting and I was telling Bill that it's maybe too relevant so it's a bit dangerous for me. No, I wanted to say a few words before having a discussion with you because I know that in this city right now everything which is happening is more or less analyzed, read through the domestic politics, the American domestic politics. In a sense when you analyze what is happening in the Transatlantic relations or what is happening in Singapore, what is less important for most of the commentators is the substance rather than really basically criticizing or supporting the president. You know really and we see it right now after the meeting in Singapore. What I want to say in the beginning is that for a lot of people the impression is that if we have a crisis in the transatlantic relationship it's because of one person, the president. And at the end of his mandate or his mandates actually everything will come back to a sort of happy normalcy in the transatlantic relations. And it's something that actually I don't believe to be true. I do believe that we have an underlying, I don't know if it's a crisis but at least a question mode about the transatlantic relations. Why? First a lot of people forget that the transatlantic relations, a strong transatlantic relationship is actually a recent, is recent. Until 1945 the American diplomacy was very keen on avoiding actually any involvement into the European affairs. It was a sort of a basic tenet of the American foreign policy stemming from the very famous speech Last Address by President George Washington in 1797. You know that the Americans have been involved into the world wars not because of their own decisions but actually under late first it was 1917 and 1941 and it was against their will. In a sense the Americans in 1914 and 1939 had taken the decision to remain neutral and they couldn't because of the First World War, you know the famous Zimmermann Telegram and the submarine war and in 1941 because of Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war of Germany on December 1941. In 1945 you could expect the Americans to withdraw from Europe the way they did in 1919 or 1920 but they didn't do it first because the British and the French were totally enabled in a sense to ensure the security of the continent especially facing the global Soviet threat. So the transatlantic relationship is rooted in a very particular context which was the Cold War and the shape of our relationship was basically a military alliance under American leadership. I was telling Bill that I was at NATO in the late 90s and I do remember that a question that we were raising with my boss I was the DCM at the time was what is the future of NATO considering that actually we don't have any common enemy anymore. And you know usually the human being really avoids to raise difficult questions and I think we were very good at it. There was also the Balkan crisis in the late 90s, there was Afghanistan afterwards and now there is Mr. Putin really which all these elements have allowed us not to raise really not to raise the difficult issue. You know why an alliance without an enemy which is to be frank a very, very, very new concept in foreign relationship. So my conclusion after I don't want to be too long because it will be a long conversation and of course I will have to bring a lot of qualifications and nuances to what I have said. But my basic point is that today that our transatlantic relationship has been for some time now fragile, that its foundation really is not here anymore and that we need to define a common agenda. We don't have a common threat anymore to face. Russia is not USSR. It's a geopolitical problem, I agree, but it's not USSR. So we have a real question which is why a strong really transatlantic relationship and how and to do what. And our very basic questions and I don't believe that we are really able to answer to these questions. But I'm ready of course to answer to all your questions. Well, thanks for very much for provocative way of opening up this conversation. And as you mentioned you and I were speaking a little bit beforehand a little bit about the reality that there are huge changes on the international landscape as we enter into this new era with the rise of new global powers like China, the information revolution or technology revolution changes in the global economic system as well that all of this would have to come to grips with in the transatlantic alliance would have to come to grips with. But it seems to me there's an equally significant set of changes going on in terms of the domestic moods in the United States and in trans and you travel a lot in this country as well. So I wanted to ask you to draw you out a little bit more on your sense of the domestic mood in this country outside of the Beltway outside of Washington because it's pretty obvious that there's a disconnect between those of us in the Washington establishment and lots of people around the country who don't take as a given in the way that was true for decades before the significance of disciplined American leadership in the world in part because they haven't always seen disciplined leadership. So what's your sense of that mood in both our countries and how do you come to grips with the question you ended on which is, you know, how do you sell the significance of the transatlantic partnership to the public's in both of our countries, not just the question of the NATO alliance but the wider question of shared values and interests that binds the transatlantic partnership together. I am a big believer in the common sense of our of our citizens, you know, really, and what is and based on this common belief in the common sense of our citizens. I am really simply raising the question is an alliance and I'm talking about NATO. The credibility and alliances, of course, is based on the commitment of the public opinion to fight if necessary. And I do believe that the city of Washington DC is not asking, you know, itself the question are our citizens ready to fight for Europe. And if you ask this question, I think, you know, the answer is not so obvious. It was the case during the Cold War because fighting for Europe was really fighting USSR fighting an existential threat, which was not only a threat to Europe but to all our international community. But today, you know, what would happen, you know, if the real the question is was really raising real in real real terms. And I do think that President Obama and President Trump, I remember I remind you that the two presidents really in a very different manner, of course, because they were very different. But the two presidents were raising more or less are raising and we're raising more or less this question because I think they were sensitive to the mood of this country in terms of foreign involvement, in terms of fatigue, you know, really after what happened, especially under George W. Bush. So I think it's one of the worries that I'm expressing about the transatlantic relationship is the doubts that I have about the commitment of, on one side, the commitments of the Americans, you know, really for the security of Europe. And the other side, in Europe, we don't have any more unifying threat. I do understand that for the Baltic States and for Poland, for instance, Russia maybe analyze as a real security threat. But to be frank, in Western Europe, it's we are not living with the full gap, you know, really basically. So in Paris, in Madrid, in Rome, certainly you can consider that Russia is a geopolitical problem, but you don't see it anymore as unifying threat. So we have all these elements, which I think are undermining our, or may undermine on the long run, our alliance. What do you think of the wider argument, though, that given all the changes on the international landscape, including China's rise, and looking at the broader basis for the transatlantic partnership, of which NATO is an essential part, but not the only future. What do you think of the argument that, you know, in that kind of a world, transatlantic partnership matters in a way as much as ever. You know, whether it's in dealing with, you know, the challenges posed by China's trade and investment regime, or challenges that emanate, you know, across the other side of the Mediterranean, whether it's insecurity in the Middle East and the refugee flow that, you know, has been produced by that. Is there an argument for a different kind of transatlantic partnership in these changed international circumstances? Of course. You know, really, I am actually, you know, really, I do believe in transatlantic relationship. I'm simply expressing my worry about the present status of them, but I do believe that we have a lot of common policies, common interests to defend. You know, really, but in a sense, beyond the usual spectrum of, I guess, of transatlantic policies, for instance, you know, really trade. You know, a real issue, the President Trump is raising a real issue with trade. What does it mean, fair trade, compared to free trade? You know, we simply, for the last decades, we have simply believed that free trade in itself was good, was globally good. We forgot that globally means that you have pluses, but you have also minuses. So our citizens are sending the message that enough is enough. We are really with these global pluses. They're also minuses. So what does it mean, free trade? What does it mean in terms of protection of intellectual property and market access and so on? So we could really have a discussion about fair trade, because the same question is raised all over our societies throughout the western world. You have ITEC. You know, these ITEC are raising, the ITEC companies at ITEC really are raising a lot, a lot of questions in all our countries. For instance, taxation. You know, basically, you know that it's very difficult to tax an ITEC company, because all the taxation systems that we have are based on brick and mortar installations. The result is that we all have to discuss what does it mean to tax these very strange monsters. But it's also, for instance, access to data, to personal data. We have a real problem in terms of law enforcement. You know, really, I think right now there is a case at the Supreme Court where the Department of Justice is asking access to data to Microsoft, and Microsoft is answering the data are in Ireland. You know, we have the same problem when fighting terrorism. We ask to access to some data to Twitter and they say, sorry, it's in California. You know, and that's an issue. We have also privacy. What does it mean? You know, the European Union has addicted, you know, really very stringent rules about the defense, defending the privacy. That's an issue that we have also to handle together. The cyberspace, for instance. What are the standards, the security? What is the law of the cyberspace? If we don't do it together, it will come from other countries. You know, it really, and China will be able to impose its own rules. Environment. You know, the oceans, for instance. You know, that's, you know, here we are beyond the theological debate about climate change, the defense of the oceans. You know, really, and, you know, the French diplomats are always smiling when I say that because I've been repeating it for the last six months. So they're a bit bored to hear that. But really, I do believe that the question of the plastics in the oceans could be a mobilizing endeavor for the West. The protection of strategic sectors. You know, you have, on the hill, negotiation of a very stringent rule, the sifus. You know, really, but why don't we do it together, the Europeans and the Americans? You know, really to defend our industrial and also technological basis. So I really do believe, you know, I do believe that we have in front of us a positive agenda is possible. But it's necessary. We need a positive agenda. We need to look at what is the future of our societies. What does it mean? And of course, the Europeans and the Americans, we have common interests, common vision, common values in a sense. And we are democracies facing the same challenges. So it's a powerful argument for adapting the transatlantic alliance to fit changing international circumstances and to do it in a way which connects with the public's on both sides of the Atlantic. But their linger, you know, a number of more traditional threats. So Russia is not the Soviet Union, as you said, but you know, especially as the Ukraine crisis has reminded us. There's still a significant threat, a significant challenge that's posed by at least Vladimir Putin's particular form of aggressiveness. So you've got differences sometimes, not just between the United States and some of our principle European allies, which we were reminded of when President Trump called for the readmission of Russia to the G7, formerly known as the G8. But you've also got differences as you were hinting at before amongst, you know, European countries. So what do you think is the right approach to Russia in that context? And how do you bridge, you know, some of those differences of view? Well, the... Nice, easy question. Yes, nice, nice, nice, easy question. Because you can fall very quickly on one, on all the other side. And as a diplomat, I prefer to stay on the wall. And the problem is, in a sense, and here, you know, that I've been a permanent representative to the United Nations for four years. And it's a great place because it's a place to see the world from another angle than from the West, the Western side, you know, really. And I do love when in this city people talk about the liberal order, you know, really the liberal order. Actually, we are the only one to call it the liberal order, you know, really the other countries are calling it the Western order. And the reality is that this Western-dominated world is not anymore. That's a fact. The balance of power has really dramatically changed, shifted. And the U.S. remains and will remain by far the most powerful country. But in a sort of more balanced way, the U.S. is not anymore the hyper-power that the French minister of Foreign Affairs was referring to. So we have a world based on the power politics, on the balance of power. So, like it or not like it, we have to take into account their vision of their interest. And to try to accommodate them, to see if we can accommodate them, we find a compromise. So the Russians have a vision of their national interest. It's not to us to say we like it or we don't like it. It's their vision. So we have on each topic, we have to find whether, to see whether there is a compromise, that we can find a compromise between our interest and their interest. And which means that we have to be firm and we have not to accept what they are doing, for instance in the Donbass and in Crimea and the Donbass. But we have also really to draw the conclusion, for instance, about Ukraine membership of NATO. Really to say, obviously it's not acceptable by Russia. So what does it mean? What should we do in these terms? And looking at the situation in a very frank way, really it's easy on one side to say every country has the right to choose its alliance. But what do you do if Russia is reacting brutally to this prospect? So it's not, again, it's a question of realism. You have to find the right balance between firmness but also realism. Really. And you have also to understand that for a lot of countries, the western dominated world was not the perfect world. And that on our side we have been, there are moments where we have forgotten the order and we have ourselves created this order. Nobody is forgetting what happened in Iraq in 2003. Which was a brutal violation of international law with very difficult, very bloody consequences in the Middle East. I'm referring to not only because I'm French but also because when I was at the UN, it was something which was coming all the time. You know, I remember also one day we had a very difficult debate about human rights. We made Cuban counterpart. We were really shouting at each other. And as good diplomats, when leaving the room we went to have a coffee together after having insulted each other. And he told me, he said, you know, really Gira, you know, really about the situation of human rights in Cuba is not perfect. But I didn't hear you talking about another country. And he gave me the name, I'm not going to give you the name, where the situation of human rights is worse than in Cuba. And he was right. I think we have to leave a bit our good, really, this high moral ground that which is so comfortable and to look at the world as it is. It's not a perfect world but we are not perfect either. Let me turn it. One other question for me and then I want to open it up to all of your questions as well. And I have to ask you about sort of the topic of the day which isn't about the transatlantic alliance but the Singapore summit meeting and, you know, an opening at least to a serious negotiation over an extremely thorny problem, one that you worked with when you were at the UN quite a bit on North Korea's nuclear and missile program. So first I just want to ask what are your impressions about, you know, the diplomatic possibilities that have been opened up as someone has looked at a variety of diplomatic challenges and especially nuclear challenges over the year. And second, do you see any logic between the enthusiastic opening on the part of the US administration on the North Korean nuclear problem and the equally enthusiastic closing of the door on another significant nuclear challenge on the Iranian nuclear agreement? You know, on the second question, you know, which is really, I always, I'm not very French because I'm always against any idea of coherence or logic in foreign policy. I think it's really overrated. Exactly, it's largely overrated to be coherent, you know, really on the opposite, you know, you have to treat each topic on its own merit, really, and we are living in a real world so it means on its own merit there is also domestic politics and so on. So really, I think when people say, oh, if you do that on Iran, you can't do that on North Korea, the real answer is say, why not? Why not? You know, really. So I really, again, it's a way, of course, of avoiding to answer your tricky question. But to be really, but I think I don't like coherence. I think it's much overrated and the French are too much prisoners of that. On North Korea, first, we have always supported our American allies and our Japanese and South Korean friends. We are not on the front line for obvious geographic reasons, but we are really behind our friends and allies and we have supported the policy of maximum pressure against North Korea. And we do believe that, you know, President Trump has launched this initiative, so let's wait and see. Really, there is, to be frank, previous policies have not been very effective to handle this issue, so why not to try to find a new approach? And again, going back to what I was saying in the beginning, really, for the people now, the way they're commenting what happened in Singapore is much more a comment about their vision of Donald Trump that really a comment about what really happened. It's really domestic politics is a bit toxic in Washington DC right now. We don't know what really happened. We have to wait to have more information to see what will be the follow-up, what are the plans, I think, and on this basis we'll be able, I think, to draw a conclusion. But in principle, really, I think, France, we are supporting the American March. Setting aside the connection or lack of connection between the two issues, and the Iran nuclear agreement, I know France is working with the sort of remaining parties to the agreement to try to hold it together. What do you think the prospects are for sustaining the agreement in the face of the American administration's declared intent to apply secondary sanctions? We are doing our best. We do believe that the GCPOA is a good agreement. You know, it's not perfect, of course. We on purpose, I think you remember, you were yourself a negotiator on the American side, on purpose we have treated the nuclear issue in isolation from the other because it was such a complicated issue, such a critical issue. We didn't want to exchange Yemen against 1,000 intracent refuges. It didn't make any sense. So it was in isolation and we did it without any naive assumption, as for the French, about the behavior of Iran. Actually, we're expecting the behavior of Iran actually to worsen because we did believe that the Iranian regime would be obliged to show that they didn't cave into the Americans, you know, really. So we were absolutely not surprised and we had been advocating to give the previous administration, with this administration, a policy of balancing against Iran in the Middle East. So that was our policy, so that's why we were ready and we discussed it with this administration, the question of ballistic missiles, the question of what will happen at the end of the agreement, also in terms of the regional activities of Iran. So we do regret that this administration has decided to get out of the agreement. We are trying our best to preserve the agreement but it's difficult and because, as you said, the sanctions, the American sanctions, are more or less leading most of the European companies to leave the Iranian market and which means that for the Iranian regime, it will become very complicated, very difficult to assess that they get any advantage by staying in the agreement. You know, really, the quid pro quo was more or less, you know, really monitoring and limitation, limiting and monitoring the program in exchange to have, you know, really the reopening of trade, of normal trade relationship with Iran. If the Iranians are not getting anything on the trade front, why do they stay in the nuclear agreement? They have also their domestic politics. So there is a risk and, again, we have a lot of consultations with the Iranians, with the Russians, the Chinese, the Europeans, but there is a strong risk that, at the end, the radicals will tell, will tell Iran, will say, let's get out of this agreement. They can do it in very different manners. They can do it in an incremental way or they can do it in a very dramatic way. We'll see. As for our relationship with the United States, we are still waiting for, because we have the speech of Secretary Pompeo, but it was a speech basically saying the objectives, you know, really. So we are still expecting from our American friends a sort of a roadmap what they intend to do in the coming weeks, you know, really, what does it mean in diplomatic terms. And so I do hope that we will have in the future, in the coming weeks, a meeting between the Secretary of State and the free Europeans, which will allow us to have an answer about the next steps. Well, thanks, Sherrod. I don't want to monopolize the conversation any further, so I'm going to open it up to your question. So please raise your hand, wait for the microphone, identify yourself, and please remember to end with a question mark. So, yes, ma'am. The mic's right behind you. Hello, my name is Sonam, and I'm actually a student at Sciences Po. And my question, something that wasn't discussed here, was the G7 summit and the ending of that. What repercussions do you think that will have for the future of the transatlantic relationship and the ensuing criticism from Trump towards its European allies? Thank you. You know, the president, the American president, it's a bit unusual way of managing or of conducting foreign policy. There was, you know, we had this communique, the G7 communique. There was an agreement in principle. What matters now will be whether the Americans are going to stay or to follow the broad lines, you know, the lines of the communique. It will be a mistake, and I'm not sure that we have avoided this mistake on the European side. It will be a mistake to enter into a sort of tweet against tweet, you know, tweet against that, you know, really, what matters at the end of the day is the substance of foreign relations. Thanks. Marvin, come. Mike's right behind you. I was fascinated, sir, by the use of a phrase during your formal talk about what is it that the United States would use its military force for? What would be the purpose? And I'm curious about whether you believe that the United States government today is prepared to use its force, military might, to protect the interests of all of the governments that are part of NATO? Could you answer that, please? Oh, I think, yes, I think I have no reason to believe to doubt about the commitment of the US government to the security of Europe. What I was really, I was raising the question, we are democracies, you know, really. So at the end of the day, there is no policy which holds if there is not behind it a strong commitment of our public opinion. And I was raising the question, but it was a question, really whether we can understand during the Cold War that for the Americans, really defending Europe was part of defending America because it was a global. So now it's not the case anymore. And so I was raising the question, saying whether the little guy in Wisconsin is ready to fight really for Europe right now. How can you explain him that he has to do it? You know, really it was more a question about I was referring to the common sense of our voters. And I was, again, thinking that it was instilling into the NATO system a fragility. But I got the impression, sir, that you're suggesting that what was after World War II is not now. And if it is not now, what is the fundamental difference? The fundamental difference is that we had, at 1945, we were united by a threat. Because people really, people really love to say we are united by values. But I'm really sorry, we had common values in 1939 and you were not here. You know, I'm sorry. And there is countries which are very close to you with which you don't have common values at all. So what is important is common interest. Of course the common values, common friendship really is giving a stronger foundation. You know, really it makes the relationship easier, deeper and more solid. But at the basis, it's the common interest. In 1945, the Americans could consider, the American citizens, because we are democracies, could consider that the security of the U.S. was depending on the security of Western Europe. Today, I'm not sure it's still the case. And so I really, so I said, I don't doubt about the commitment of the U.S. administration, but I said, we have this problem. And it's also a problem in Europe. As I was saying, there is no full DAG app anymore. So really our vision of Russia is certainly not the same between really Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Thanks. Yes, sir. My name is Roger Coachetti and I work with private equity in the technology sector. And I want to first thank you for your insights and sort of the American attitudes because for a lot of reasons I wind up talking with a number of people who are part of the 60 million Americans who voted for Donald Trump. And I think it would be helpful, not only for the video viewers, but for those of us who are talking with other Americans, for you to speak not to a group here in Dupont Circle, but speak to an audience in Allentown or Cleveland. And what would you say to them, or what could we say to them? And I'll give three data points which often come up in these conversations first. American students graduate with $37,000 a year in student debt. European students graduate with no student debt or a couple thousand at most. The number one cause of bankruptcy in the United States is medical bankruptcy. Europeans don't understand what that means. And Americans take one week of your vacation. Europeans take two or three months of your vacation or whatever it is. And all of that gives rise to what I think the president has really focused on, which is not that the Soviet threat is gone, but rather we've been ripped off. But rather these Europeans have outsmarted us and we're paying for their defense and they get two months of vacation and we get a week. So speak to that resentment because it will help us and the video viewers deal with what's really why at least, my guess is at least 40 million of the 60 million people who voted for Trump felt exactly that way. It wasn't that the Soviet Union is gone or something, but it was resentment, not independence. I really do share your point of view 100%. I'm convinced that when people say the President Trump has imposed tariffs on Europeans, really I'm convinced that for a large part of the Americans they don't care or even they approve it. Or the idea of saying why do we keep our troops in rich countries which could defend themselves. Really I'm totally, and I think that's also a very important point, really to try to understand really of course the Americans, but not only Americans, the Europeans also be on the Beltway or the Paris Beltway. When I'm traveling for this country, which is striking its first, nobody is talking about President Trump, really, but in the universities as you can guess, everybody is talking about basically the economic euphoria, really this country, the growth, that really the economic situation is really great. So suddenly you realize that the front page of the Washington Post that you're reading every morning saying that so and so I'd say so and so, basically most of the Americans don't care, really. So I'm totally aware of the system and that's also the reason of what I'm trying to say as a message that after a President through the end of the mandate or mandates of President Trump, really I don't believe a moment that the transatlantic relationship will come back to a sort of abnormalcy. Really it's very easy to impose tariffs, it's very difficult to leave tariffs, you know, really because you have to explain it really when you are lifting tariffs and so on. So no, no, it's a real crisis which is also stemming from the discontent of our citizens and especially the Americans. We get to as many questions as we can. Yes. Thank you, Ambassador, for your comments. Lisa Lino with Northrop Grumman. You mentioned, you termed the relationship as fragile between the U.S. and Europe. Would you apply the same term to the E.U. first? Secondly, second question if I may, with regard to, if I could take you back to NATO, you discussed cyber, you discussed other things which are modern threats. Would you put China in that category? China, which has been so active economically in the world with one belt, one road, it's been very active in Africa, other parts of the world, do you see it as a potential future military threat for NATO? You know, on the second question, to be frank I was a bit, I remember one day I think it was coming from the Department of Defense. I don't remember whether it was under this administration where basically it was the description of the situation in terms of threats, really saying Chinese threat. And I'm very reluctant to enter into this vocabulary. You know, really it's international relationship is based on competition. Every country is defending its interests. And there are some moments where the interests are really bumping into each other. That's normal. And so maybe also because of the geography of Europe but I wouldn't qualify, certainly not China as a threat. Like Russia, for me Russia, you know again, there are really raising a lot of questions, problems but that's foreign policy is for. Really every country is defending its interests and you have to balance, you have to find friends, allies, you have to pass the buck to somebody else if you can. You know, that's the normal game. So obviously China is the new big boy on the block. So there are some issues, for instance intellectual property and that's a very good issue where we could work with the Americans how to defend our intellectual property which is a topic on which the behavior of China is certainly raising problems, really substantial problems. But talking in terms of threats, no. I saw the European Union. The European Union is facing a lot of challenges. It's very clear we had Brexit which is really a lose-lose situation which is really a very sad waste of energy and loss for Europe. We have of course the questions raised by our eastern partners. Now we have Italy and more largely we have throughout Europe exactly the same political situation that you have. Here the targets are Wall Street and Washington DC and in Europe the target is Brussels as the horse of Troy of globalism. And so really if you are revolting against free trade you are attacking Brussels because our trade policy is managed, the European trade policy is managed by Brussels. So there are a lot of challenges. President Macron, as you know, has been elected on a very pro-European platform and wants really to respond to these challenges and is working with Germany especially trying to convince our German friends to move forward to improve the sustainability of the eurozone because the basic problem is certainly the sustainability of the eurozone. He has made a lot of proposals on the table. Chancellor Merkel has started to answer to some of these proposals for instance in terms of the management of our external borders. So it's a process. The question is of course on the table is whether what President Macron and the other European countries will do in the coming months will be enough to convince our voters and that's really of course I don't have the answer. No, the European Union is not fragile but it's certainly facing really right now tough challenges. Again, in a sense, the same challenges that in this country that you are facing, really the rebellion of part of our voters, rebellion against the elites because they consider that the elites have not delivered for them. And as I said, here is Washington Wall Street in our European Union. Thanks. Yes, sir. Thank you. Bob Holly retired U.S. Foreign Service. I'd like to go back to your Russia issue again and ask you a kind of philosophical question which I realize doesn't really have an answer but I think deserves thinking about some more at least in the context of the 20th century's history. How do we determine whether or not we're really accommodating legitimate strategic interests of a potential adversary? Or are we appeasing aggressive ambitions when we come to making policy in organizations like NATO? That's a political decision. Really, it's the red line, the famous red line. Really, it's a decision that our political leaders have to take. There is no place where to take it. Really, it's... So what looks... I had this discussion with Senator McCain who at some moment really treated me as Daladier. You remember maybe Daladier was the Prime Minister in Munich on the French, so I didn't take it as entirely a compliment. Really. But again, really, there is no answer. It's really a political decision to say, for instance, if you say, okay Ukraine shouldn't be a member of NATO, there are some people who say it's appeasement. I do believe it's realism. So that's again, that's to our political leaders to tell us how far they're ready to go. But it has to be based on a realistic assessment of what we can or what we are ready to do if we are ready to put our actions behind our words. Really, the problem was really... I read a book which was defending Munich, by the way, in a very lot of arguments, saying really in 1938, the British were not ready to send more than two divisions to France. And so on, nobody was ready, and so it was a way of getting time. So answers are really not easy there, of course. Any time for just two more quick questions, Bob. I feel the need to come to the defense of my fellow countryman. You talked about your travels around the country and basically said the only thing that matters is the economy. And that's all you're hearing about and what's in the Washington Post is not particularly important for most Americans. I think you used the word most Americans. I think all of us in this room, to a certain extent, travel around the country as well. I come from Pittsburgh, where we just had a congressional election that had a very different result than it might have had a couple of years ago. I've just been in western Kentucky where I was talking to a woman who's, I would say, a fundamentalist religious person who is disturbed by some of the behavior she sees on the part of the president. You look at the opinion polls more broadly, and you see this president is deeply unpopular. So I wonder whether you want to reconsider your comment that most Americans don't care and whether you feel that this is something that is going to be evident in the next election that's coming up in a short period of time. Thank you. That domestic politics, so I'm not going to enter into it. You are certainly right, saying when I was going to say most of them don't care. I simply wanted to convey the message that this city is the opposite. It's the obsession. It's obsessional. Really, to be frank for an outsider, because I am an outsider, really you can't have a seminar about nuclear physics without 15 minutes after the beginning people starting to talk about President Trump. Really, it's unbearable. So it's simply that when you cross the Beltway, it's not 15 minutes, it's one hour. Really, seriously, there is a big difference. Really, again, I give up most or not most, but it's true that I have a lot of discussions and the political issues in Washington D.C. are very, very rarely raised with me, maybe because I'm a foreign ambassador, but the economic issues are the real issues that most of the people are referring to. Last question. Yes, sir. You've got to wait longest for the microphone. Hello, Ambassador. My name is Krishnamari. I'm a junior at Center Grove High School in Indianapolis, but I'm interning this summer with Benjamin Haddad at the Hudson Institute. At his maiden speech in the European Parliament, President Macron talked about a greater assertion being necessary of European sovereignty as he describes it. So my question to you is, does European sovereignty equate to greater European protectionism, especially against countries like China who are really pioneering foreign direct investment in Europe? Among the questions which are raised by, which are raised in a direct or indirect way by this administration, there is a legitimate one which is about, after all, the Europeans have to take care of themselves. And it's true. And especially when you look at the southern problems that we are facing in terms of migrations and terrorism, it's to the Europeans to handle that. So that's what the message of the president has been also to say, we, the Europeans, we have to act by ourselves. It's not possible anymore to rush to Washington D.C. as soon as there is a shotgun in our environment which was a bit too much the case in the previous decades. What does it mean, European sovereignty? Really, does it mean protectionism? The European Union is the most open market in the world. So really it's the largest market in the world. It's one of the most open markets in the world. We really do know that protectionism is leading to nowhere. We have the experience of the 30s where it led to a disaster. But two things. The first thing is the idea of fair trade. As I've said in the beginning, our citizens are really more and more and everywhere hostile to free trade agreements. Really, we had negotiated a free trade agreement with Canada. Canada is the closest society that the European Union, the closest country that the European Union can have in terms of social and environmental norms. So the agreement for the negotiators was a sort of example of social friendly, citizen friendly, gender friendly agreement. And actually it's raising a lot of upstake or a lot of opposition in all the European parliaments. So in Europe, like here, free trade agreements are not really frankly the meal of the day. So we have to try to figure out what does it mean fair trade? They're asking fair trade. And that's the conversation that we should have with our American friends. And one of the elements of fair trade is obviously the relationship with China. You know, when President Macron was here, he really told President Trump we should work together on some issues. And one of two that I referred already twice is intellectual property. But you have also market access. You have also public procurement. And that will be much more effective and powerful if we go together to Beijing saying, really, you have, really here, we have a problem and we don't accept it anymore. So again, the President said it publicly and we are saying it. We have to work, but again, it will be much better instead of squabbling together to be Europeans and Americans together in our dialogue with Beijing. I hate to bring this conversation to a close, but you are, thank you so much for your thoughtfulness and your candor. Thank you all for coming. Please join me in thanking you all the way. Thanks. It was okay? It was very good. Especially the first part, because I think that's what people do. Thanks for coming.