 It was early morning when the meeting took place on one of the bridges connecting West and East Berlin. Within hours, the news flashed throughout the world. The exchange of a Soviet spy for our U-2 pilot underscored one of the realities of our present day. There is an espionage war, fought on a dark and secretive battleground by trained professionals. As the Russian who we returned across the bridge in Berlin, Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. During his period in the United States as an active agent for the communist conspiracy, Colonel Abel operated under the cover of Emil Goldfuss, artist. And artist he was, at spying, at furthering the directives set out by Lenin, bring about world revolution and eliminate its adversary. But skilled as the Colonel Abel's are, countering them would be less of a problem if not for those who aid the professional agents. For the Colonel Abel's do not work alone. Riot in Tokyo, inflamed by local communists. How quick the Colonel Abel's are to make use of those who always see the world through red-colored glasses. In a quiet corner of a European city, a Soviet agent has met a contact who is not assisting him because of communist conviction, but because he has been bribed. Money is often the lubricant on which the Soviet spy machine rolls. So too is the weakness of people who act in an intemperate fashion. A hand caressing another hand. The focus of a hidden camera and later on the subject of the picture may be the target of blackmail attempts on behalf of Soviet interests. A plane flying between two American cities. How tempting it is to talk too much to a stranger, especially when one is involved in some way with important technological and production secrets. The kind of information most of you people work with every day. Now gentlemen, I want to emphasize again that the purpose of the security briefing which the DOD provides is not that you start seeing spies behind every bush these next few weeks. All of you are cleared. And all of you in one way or another hold in your minds all will be handling classified information. Information the operatives of the other side want to get their hands on. Now should you by mistake or any other reason become involved in something that could be interpreted by the enemy as exploitable, report it at once to your nearest United States security officer. He'll be discreet. He's not interested in blackening your name or in ruining your career. Thank you for your time, gentlemen. I was glad it was over. The Department of Defense briefing foregoing overseas for my company. A large outfit in the aerospace field. Oh, not that the briefing was dull, no far from it. After all, what's more exciting than a spy thriller? Hearing about all those cloaks and daggers and Mata Harays awaiting us on the other side of the ocean. But one thing I was sure. I knew how to handle classified information. And I also knew that leaving behind the United States meant leaving behind certain built-in protections. Local police to contact quickly. Talk to in my own language. The immediate protection of United States agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Close at hand, properly maintained security files and safes for classified documents would not always be available on my overseas trip. All these thoughts were running through my mind as I arrived home. Frankly, I had mixed emotions about the approaching trip to Europe. I had the travel bug just like anybody else. But I would be separated from my wife and kids for almost a month. The mark of that separation had just arrived in the mail. My passport. And a few days later, that same passport was checked at the overseas airlines counter. Today, more and more business and industrial executives and technical people need to go abroad on company or organizational matters. Many military and civilian employees in the Department of Defense must go overseas in the performance of their duties. It was time to say goodbye to family and home and America for the next few weeks. I'd be a liar if I said security was on my mind during these moments. But I had taken the proper actions. In my bags were papers and blueprints, yes. But nothing classified. These I'd arranged for the company's security office to mail on ahead to United States military installation close to my destination. Overseas I had no intentions of letting down on security. As my plane took off, I made this silent vow. Yes, from the moment of my arrival in the foreign country, I was determined to be careful every step of the way. But what I would later come to realize was, in security as in everything else, good intentions alone are not enough. Things went smoothly at the start. Sure, things were not much like our suburban town back home, but I settled into the routine of the assignment fast enough. Early morning, a car would pick me up and take me to a plant on the outskirts of the city where I worked very closely with a Colonel Carr, a man who had apparently never heard of the eight-hour day. So you can understand, come the end of the working day, I was a mighty bushed man. But not too tired to react at what greeted me when I returned to my hotel room one night. My hotel room had been ransacked. I was about to call the local police when I decided to phone somebody else first. Then as far as you know, nothing was taken. Not that I know of. You left no classified documents in the room. No, I know better than that. Well, I know you do, but maybe whoever did all this was hoping you didn't. You think they were after classified documents? Could be. Why else would a thief take such a chance? Try so hard. Seems to me this is a case not just for the local police, but for the American authorities in the area. Well, there's no question about it. You did the right thing to come in and report the incident. Under the circumstances, we had no choice. Well, frankly, it was the Colonel who insisted. I find it hard to believe that someone would go to all that trouble, just on the chance that there might be some classified documents lying around. It's amazing how they will go to all that trouble. Do you remember a few years ago when it was revealed at the United Nations that the Russians actually placed a sophisticated bugging device inside the Great Seal of the United States? And so began another orientation. This time, believe me, I listened. I was all eyes and ears. Watching and listening to the Consulate official, the whole thing seemed to come alive. At the UN, it was revealed for all to see. The wireless microphone device hidden by the Russians inside the Great Seal in the American Ambassador's study in the Moscow Embassy. I learned that a wireless microphone, such as the one placed in the seal's hidden cavity, can be smaller than an eraser on a pencil. These miniaturized devices are self-contained radio transmitters. Everything said in a bugged room can be tape-recorded as far as a mile away without using any telltale wires. An enemy agent can be wired for sound with concealed microphones and recorders. Technological breakthroughs in miniaturization have made possible the development of these hard-to-detect devices. But quite possibly, the best of all is the simplest, the one at hand almost everywhere, the telephone. A trained hand can adjust the wiring inside the telephone in a matter of seconds, and your room is left with an effective bugging apparatus. It does not matter if the receiver is off the hook or on the hook. The listening device is operating, and only a telephone company technician or trained counterintelligence specialist can tell that the instrument has been bugged. In much the same way, a radio loudspeaker can be converted into a giant ear, passing along your conversations to hostile listeners. I soon found out that in the optical field, there has been a similar technical breakthrough. Newly developed telescopic lenses make it possible to make a readable photograph of a newspaper page from a sizable distance away. Miniaturized cameras can easily be hidden while taking incriminating photographs. He explained that more sensitive film and new developing procedures require much less light for the taking of a recognizable photograph. Even if there is no light in a room, infrared photography can do the job. Then he stood up and brought back a large mirror. It was really a mirror window. One moment, a window I could see through, then a mirror, transparent again, then opaque as the agent wishes. All I could now see was myself. Agents make use of these mirror window devices when they want to see or photograph without being seen. And a good strong lock on a door or safe makes little difference either. Can open a complicated lock with his pick faster than you or I can do it with a key. That's a grim picture you paint. Well, potentially it is grim. Especially when you add the human factor to the technological potential of espionage today. The human factor? Weakness, susceptibility to temptation, lack of more fiber. Call it what you want. But the enemy searches it out. And when he finds it, let me show you what I mean by giving you a little background in this article in today's newspaper. It's been officially reported as a resignation. It's nothing of the sort, of course. As it happened, he stayed in the same hotel as you, arriving a few months ago. He'd been working on his assignment for about three weeks when it happened. He didn't speak the language of the country and a disagreement developed about the taxi fare. Neither could make the other understand. Just then a young woman came out of a hotel. The driver seemed to know it. Her talents as an interpreter were more than adequate. And so were her other talents. Whatever she said to the driver, it did the trick. Anybody who can accomplish all this in the space of a few moments is worth some curiosity. Which the official expressed. Her name was Maria, the driver said. She was a dancer in a local cabaret. Often when a man is separated from his family and familiar surroundings, feelings of depression and loneliness may set in. Writing a letter back home is no substitute for being home. Waking up in a strange room, he felt a mixture of hangover and conscience. The first thing he wanted to do was to get out of there. But his hand was a little unsteady. Even in a not very alert condition, he knew what it was immediately. A device for picking up conversations such as his. Now he thought it couldn't have happened to him. Not to him. So he didn't report the incident. Not till a few months later, that is, when he was contacted by a Russian espionage agent in his home country. The agent was very polite. He played him some tapes, showed the official some photographs and said bygones would be bygones. If certain NATO production defense information was made available. That's about all I can tell you. Except that this man's career has been ruined. These people, those who want the kind of classified information that people like Colonel Carr and I carry around or know, they don't stop at anything, do they? That's it exactly. You show them any weakness, and they'll exploit it for their own ends. Well, what can we do about it? Not much more I can tell you than you know already. Above all, it's a matter of common sense and tact. There aren't enemy spies and agents everywhere you go at every turn, of course not. But because espionage directed against you is a valid possibility. You have to be a security conscious overseas as much or more than you are at home. And that goes beyond observing all the regulations affecting the proper handling of classified papers and materials. It means security consciousness every day, 24 hours a day. Use common sense. Suppose you're an American serviceman or civilian meeting an associate for the first time. Don't be embarrassed about asking for proper identification. Be cautious with all new acquaintances, especially if they seem to come into your life out of unexplained circumstances. Never discuss classified information with unauthorized persons or over a telephone or in an area that has not been checked out by security technicians. A foreign national appears at your drawing board. He may have clearance for a certain category of information, but he's not entitled to knowledge of everything in that category. He is only authorized to have access to information he needs to know in order to perform his duties. Avoid any kind of public or private conduct that enemy agents might use as a blackmail weapon against you. Be especially wary of being lured into illegal currency dealings. These are to be avoided if security compromises are to be avoided. Remember, too, that the enemy agent uses legitimate international conventions to make friendly social contacts. These conventions are for exchanging information, but you must know in advance clearly what is and what is not classified. Today, for one reason or another, large numbers of American citizens are going behind the Sino-Soviet curtains for varying periods. Behind these curtains, further precautions must be kept in mind. You should always carry the address and telephone numbers of the United States Embassy or allegation on your personal. If you become involved in any difficulty, no matter how slight, contact the Embassy or allegation as soon as possible for assistance. Always carry identification documents. Do not misrepresent yourself under any circumstances. Do not at any time take pictures of military parades, military personnel, or military installations. Taking photographs and making sketches can lead to complications for the traveler. Notes and diaries should not contain any military information or any statements that could be to the detriment of the United States. In general, note-taking should be avoided in public. It is an action that often draws a suspicion and hostility of Iron Curtain citizens. It may lead to an incident which the Soviet government will use for its own purposes. Always be alert for attempts to place documents or pictures in your hotel room or your automobile. Do not accept letters or any other objects for safekeeping or for delivery. To an address either inside or outside Iron Curtain countries. Just about all mail is censored. Since usually you will not be able to read the contents, you may be giving Soviet or satellite authorities an opportunity to make embarrassing and compromising charges. That was our contact with the local police. They caught the man and went through your room. A bellboy the hotel fired yesterday. Land security wasn't involved at all? Who can be sure? Anyway, I want to thank you for coming in with us, Mr. Andrews. No. I want to thank you. I walked back to my hotel all the way from the consulate. I needed time to clear my head. A lot of thoughts were clanging through it. I couldn't help thinking of the officials who'd gotten into trouble. From any point of view it was not an amusing story. But the real question for me was how many men, lonely and away from home and family might have fallen into the same trap. There was a lot of mail waiting for me. Some welcome letters and a tape recording. I breathed easier when I saw who'd sent it. My two kids, a little family newscast they'd sent me. And again, I couldn't help thinking how different it would be if I somehow had fallen into the same trap as the man whose picture was in the paper. Every time the mail would come, there would be fear. Every time I would come face to face with a stranger, there would be fear. A hand would reach out with a photograph, a recording, along with a softly voiced threat to let others see and hear them. What would I do then? What would you do then? It's a question I hope none of us ever has to answer. Later on, while I walk the streets of the foreign city, enjoying the sight and sound of something new and different, I worked out the answer for myself, and maybe for you. Overseas I'd come to learn the best thing to do is act as at home with a moral code. Keep your mouth shut, walk the straight path, and you'll stay out of trouble. It has to be that way. Let's face it. Injustice to ourselves, injustice to our families, and injustice to our country.