 Today we are going to discuss Sol's notion of language and meaning. Language according to Sol is a biological phenomenon. It has evolved in this sense that as you all know, Sol presupposes two scientific theories, one is the evolutionary biology. And another is the atomic theory of matter. Now, following this scientific presuppositions, Sol argues that intentionality is a pre-linguistic feature, whereas language is a later evolved. Language is not prior to intentionality. In this sense, Sol tries to talk about the concept of language and linguistic activities. He tries to show that the language-world relationship between language-world and language-world is not a pre-linguistic feature. Language-world relationship is an intentional relationship. It is governed by the principle of intentionality. The intentional attitude of language use which is seen as a kind of a social phenomenon, language use is a kind of a social activity. Now, this social activity presupposes that there is a mind and this mind is intentional and the intentional feature of mind not only articulates the linguistic expressions but also tries to show that how meaning is embedded in the intentional structure of mental states. Now, it is in this connection Sol tries to tell us that the language-world relationship, the sense-reference relationship, the content and the reference relationship is intentionally defined. Sol, of course, tells us that this intentional connection between language and the world is a causal connection. So, in this case, one did not understand that the causal connection that Sol talking about is like the causal connection that Fordor and Chomsky would talk about. Since Sol talks about mental causation and this mental causation is intentionalized in the case of biological naturalism, we need to see how does Sol explain to us the language-world relationship. So, in this context, I would like to talk about Sol s notion of language. Now, from evolutionary point of view, there is an order of priority. It is this priority that I was talking about how intentionality evolves and then we find the evolution of language. So, intentionality is prior to language. So, priority in the development of biological processes. So, there is an order of priority in the development of intentional phenomena. If language is embedded in the structure of mental states, then what happens? Then, this structuring looks for a kind of a logical priority in the development of biological processes. So, there is an order of priority in the development of intentional phenomena. If language is embedded in the structure of mental states or intentional states, then this structuring looks for a kind of a logical priority or the structuring demands a kind of a logical priority in order to show that how intentionality helps in explaining the structure. In the development of language and meaning comes very late. So, according to Sol, human being is a linguistic being. Human beings is a conscious being, a biological being. Now, all these features of the individual human beings are something which is a biological being. Now, intentionality is not unique in the case of a biological human being. The biological system produces intentional features. If that is the hypothesis, then all biological entities would have intentionality. So, intentionality as an intrinsic feature of consciousness or as an intrinsic feature of human mind is a common feature to all biological beings. But human intentionality is different from animal intentionality, from human intentionality of the plants and insects. You would see that in our later lectures. So, what is important today is to talk about that when we say that language world are intentionally connected, we just like to tell us that this relationship presupposes intentionality. So, in that sense, we need to see how intentionality helps us explaining the structure of mental states and its relationship, its linguistic features and relationship with the world. Now, since meaning is a part of the mind, according to Sol, this relationship, that the relationship between meaning and mind has to be understood very carefully, precisely because for him language is one of the basic institutions that human intentionality has formed and it is through the language or the linguistic content, the intentional content, we relate how it is part of experience and understanding. Meaning is not there in the mind. I said meaning is related to experience and understanding and therefore, it is related to the mental life. There is an internal relationship found in the case of Sol's analysis of the meaning. So, in that context when we talk about linguistic �とかWelcome very many in this very you make climate of sir don't you I don't of the interface , conflict are characterized as a mental activities . What we try to show is this, that linguistic activities . For example, thinking, desiring, intending, etcetera are part of experience and understanding. So in that sense, there is an internal connection. mixed as we have discussed which is a feature of directed gas we have also pointed out in that xal talks about two different kinds of representations the mental representation were the one hand and the linguistic representation pero trae su te h Part of the connection to say that what kind of representation happens when we talk about langviz hües Thinking there is a linguistic representation when we say that the structure of linguistic representation and the structure of mental states are connected and the structures are connected, and these structures are in some sense symmetrical in nature and that is precisely because the intentional contents of these structures are same. So, when we say, I am thinking or people at a particular thought or a mental states like desire, I ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස ස  if the contents are different then what I think and what I say will not match so the mismatch between the thinking and saying or expressing the desire there will be chaos so in that sense shall try to tell us that the content is expressed in language and this intentional content is pre-linguistic phenomenon and it is expressed in language so language for sharl is institutions it is one of the institutions there are several other institutions like family is an institution governance is another institutions now all these institutions are formed by certain rules and sharl says that these are constitutive rules now the constitutive rules has a kind of a logical form that is x is defined as y in the context c in other words we try to see x as y in a particular context I will come back to that point when sharl talks about two different kinds of rules that governs our linguistic activities one is the constitutive rules and another is the regulative rules but before that we need to be very clear that the realm of the mental and the realm of the linguistic are two different realms so sharl therefore talks about the communicative intention the intention to share the meaning that is what is being intended by the speaker is different form the mere intention of expression so there are two things one is in the case of a linguistic representation a mere linguistic representation minus communicative intention is something very insignificant when it talks about language use say for example when I am working on the street and there is nobody around I just say something if I say that I want a glass of water very loudly it make no sense because I am not intending to communicate to somebody that I want a glass of water or rather I am just loudly speaking out my thought but if there is somebody there is a hearer around me or there is a possibility that somebody would hear my desire and I am feeling very thirsty and I also expect that he would respond to my expression then that kind of state of affairs will talk about what sharl calls a communicative intention so the communicative intention or the representational intention are two different kinds of intention so the embedded in the structure of thoughts the intentionality which is embedded in the structure of thought or mind is a kind of intentionality which only has a what you call a representational intention it has representational intention whereas in the case of intention to communicate the things would talk about communicative intention so the intentionality operates in two different realms so two aspects of meaning intention communicating according to sharl is a matter of producing effect on one's hearers but one can intend to represent something without caring at all about the effects of the hearer now this is a very significant remark where sharl tries to tell us that the desire to communicate something is significant and it is significant in this sense that it shows that how I must behave in a social in a public space whereas if I say that I am just thinking I need not express my thought a mere thinking would talk about a kind of intention what sharl calls the representation intention where I am not really thinking of the possibility of saying certain things to others I am ruling out that possibility I am just thinking so there that is also possible but the moment I try to speak out my thoughts I am very much consciously involved in saying what I am thinking and I must mean what I say so that connection between saying and meaning it is a very important intentional connection that sharl is referring to sharl further says that when we define speakers meaning in terms of forms of intentionality that are not intrinsically linguistic if for example we can define meaning in terms of intentions we will be defined as a linguistic notion even though many perhaps the most human intentions are linguistically realized so all human intentions are linguistically realized they are linguistically realized in this sense when you talk about realizations we must understand what is a mental state and what are other mental states that it is connected to say for example if I have a desire now this desire is connected to various other desire it is desire say desire 1 and desire 3 or it is related to some kind of a belief no no this is a kind of a criss crossing relationship and that kind of network what sharl means is this that you might have seen in his book intentionality an essay in philosophy of mind the book that I am referring to is this talks about network of mental states now sharl makes a distinction between network and background now background is a non representational power or ability a non representational mental ability where is the mind or the mental life includes various mental states where is kinds of mental states though we mostly refer to desire, beliefs, intentions etcetera but there are several other kinds of mental states which are intentionally connected to one another now this intentional connection or what I call there is a conceptual connection now in this network of mental states I have already mentioned in my previous lectures that some mental states are unconscious mental states and some are conscious say for example I am conscious of this desire desire to have a glass of water now if I am conscious of this and I am at present not conscious of there is other kinds of desires that I have what sharl says is this that the all other desires that I am not conscious of now are potentially conscious mental states so this idea that to have desire and to express that desire and also believe that somebody would bring a glass of water there is a possibility that somebody would bring me a glass of water so I believe that I believe that there is a hearer who would hear and there is a hearer and who would listen to my expression and bring a glass of water to me so I believe the speaker believes certain things that is why he is intended to speak or express his desire so the intention of expressing the desire is something which talks about beliefs there are several beliefs I believe that there is a glass or there is a pot and the hearer would go rust to the pot or there is a pond the hearer would rust to the pond feel the pot feel the glass and bring it to me so there is a helps of lot of no possibilities possible beliefs are connected so there is a network of mental states and one mental states is realized with relation to various other mental states so in that sense the linguistic realizability is connected to the mental as you remember sals basic hypothesis is that mental states are caused by brain processes and realized in brain processes so whenever something is being caused so that is where it has also creates a kind of a possibility for realizing that so sals is very particular about this so sals is very explicitly mentioning this to us now on this approach the philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind now this is one segment one we need to little clear about in the when sals wrote speech acts in late sixties he made it very clear that philosophy of action is a branch of philosophy of language and speech act is a special kind of act is a special kind of action to say something is to perform an action so now we need to look at this now he is saying that philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind so he is connecting three things action language mind then one can read further this quotation and in its most general form it amounts to the view that certain fundamental notions such as meaning are analyzable in terms of more psychological notions such as beliefs, desires and intentions so meaning is not exclusively a kind of a social phenomenon it is also related to the mind hence there are many psychological states are involved in this and they are involved in producing the expression and realizing that now I did not talk about the importance of the mind the background is an ability is a power to cause the representation it is through the ground the mind is able to represent things so mental states are representational in this way because there is a non representational ability background is not itself representational but it makes representation possible according to sir this background capacity or ability is there in our head he does not characterize it as a mental he said it is a kind of a biological ability it is a kind of a dispositional ability but I must tell you this that he is not a behaviorist saying that mental states can be defined in terms of dispositions but he says it is there in every biological being the very power to represent certain things the power to do certain things it is that biological power for some is a kind of a non representational power which makes the representation possible so the possibility of forming the network of mental states or representational states is possible due to a background condition then sir of course says that background is not only physical but it is a cultural background particularly in the intentionality book so now let us further talk about the structure of intention and expressions intentional states expressed in the performance that is the intention to perform that so what is important for us today that there is the speaker intent to speak so the intention to speak something or express that is intention to express something talks about how the structure is formed so there is an intentional structure formed here when you talk about the intentionality of saying and meaning it or performing a kind of a speech act when you talk about speech act or expressions we must say that how these expressions are intentionally structured the intentional states are representational states and these representational states p is an intentional state and p will have some content in it being an intentional state must have a content the content which expresses that it is about something if p has an intentional content it is that content which refers to the reference or which signifies that a reference or establish a connection with the reference so in that sense there is a structure involved I have already talked about the symmetry in the structure let me read out to you one of the quotations from sol's intentionality he says the fact that condition of satisfaction of the expression intentional states and the condition of speech act are identical suggests that the key of the problem meaning is to see that in the performance of speech act the mind intentionally imposes the condition of satisfaction of the mental states as the production of physical phenomena so speaking is a physical activity but the intention to speak the very desire to express when I say the desire has a intentionality I must tell you this that when I use this term intentionality which is very technical term I have already expressed earlier that intention desire believes all these mental states have intentionality intentionality is a feature intentionality means directedness so the desire to have water has a kind of a directedness now when it is expressed it is expressed is a kind of a physical action but there is a mode in which a particular statement is being made and sol calls is the psychological mode the psychological mode talks about the condition of satisfaction so that is not only a physical action but there is a mode in which a particular statement is being made and sol calls is the psychological mode psychological mode talks about the the psychological mode, the psychological mode talks about the condition of satisfaction. So, there is not only a kind of a directedness involved between an expression or a proposition, having a content. But there is also a kind of a psychological mode, in which a particular statement is formulate something that night there is .  ern త్స్ ఇతిక్ పానంవ్ బిలు ఆరియ్న్లా పిసఆండ్బ. పిన్పలు చాన్రంచి మార్్వని సమరాక౏వస్ పికిక్రస్ పిసిలి గాదాక్ దిర్పా రంవిక్ స important importance to analize the concept of mean because there is a hearer who would respond to this statements who is connected to what you are expecting. If I feel that if I give an order the hearer would not listen and such point , though you covered time to what you are expecting that, if I give order here a not listen then I need to . be polite and make kind rehearsal please . But even given order dinner on and grande d time , think I with the other is enough to suggest that silence is to be maintained, no it is that kind of authority, so the speaker demands some kind of status or maintains some kind of status and the authority is imposed in the expression or performing a kind of an action, just making hummering the table, it is enough, he not just say order order, just too hummering or enough for a judge to express that silence to be maintained in the court room, so in that sense we are imposing a kind of a condition of satisfaction, it is not only having just directedness but there is a condition of satisfaction involved in it, so we need to look at that, now there is another notion which has been very typical to language use particularly the notion of meaning is that the notion of self referentiality, when you say certain things saying would tell us how there is a kind of a direction of fit, how there is a kind of a direction of fit from mind to the world, because the mind to the world direction of fit and when it is a self referential kind of thing, then there will be world to the mind, so mind to the world and world to the mind, bring a glass of water or please bring me a glass of water would reach to the hearer and there is a kind of a thing happening, it brings out some kind of scenes in the existing state of affairs, somebody rush to the pot and get me a glass of water, so when the hearer faces a glass of water for me, there is a world to mind direction, there is an intentional connection between world to the mind, this what shall calls a kind of self referential connection, so the direction fit is in two ways, one mind to the world and world to the mind, so once that kind of intentional connections are possible, then we talk about self referentiality, self referentiality of intentional linguistic activities are conscious activities in this sense, because it is been consciously realized, when you say you expect, now when this expectations are fulfilled, you have what you call satisfaction, you experience the satisfaction by consuming the glass of water when somebody is thirsty, so that is what is being case where linguistic activities are conscious activities, because you not only say something but also mean it and realize what you are being said, but there is also a kind of a, as I pointed out earlier, there is also kind of a social structure in which meaning is placed, the social meaning structure signifies the social institution of intentionality, so for example, how a request is to be made, so when you talk about request or order, all this request has to be made in a particular way, there is a manner in which request is to be pointed out, there is a manner in which request is to be expressed, so this art of expression or expressing something according to to sir is a rule governed activities, now how these rules are formed, sir talks about constitutive rules and regulative rules, so when we talk about a rule governed activities, what is the rule governed activities, rules, now how the rules are formed, the basic thing is that shall says a rule is formed with the help of intentionality, what kind of intentionality, a rule is not formed by only one individual's intentionality, whether it is formed by a kind of a collective intentionality, so every conditions, request or promise, how a promise statement has to be made, so this this tells us that human intentionality is very fundamental and basic to the formation of constitutive rules, which says x where we understand x as x as y in the context c, so particular expression has to be understood in the form of say request or order in a particular context. And that is the speciality and that can happen at the kind of a in the social realm, the the normative condition, it is that normative condition that makes an expression request that makes an expression order, so the form of request, the form of order is the way the request has been articulated, the way the form is has been articulated, the way the form is has been articulated, are they articulated in three different ways, the form of these expressions are decided with the help of a collective intentionality, I will speak about collective intentionality and what kind of ontology the social will have, if language is a kind of a social institutions, what kind of ontology this language use is having, that we will discuss soon as very profound things to tell us about the notion of social ontology, but so far as language is concerned, he says that social meaning structure signifies the social institution of intentionality, that is how intentionality is operating in the social realm, that is important, so the pre-linguistic form of intentionality refers to the background of the social background, that is how the background is making things possible. Now, when you talk about rules and following the rules, once the rules are made, then the rules are having certain powers, that is the regulative power of the rules, all rules have certain regulative powers, when an individual follows a rule, he follows this unconsciously, meaning thereby, Searle is very much would understand in this sense, that I just follow the rule, that is to say this is how I use language, this is how a promise is made, this is how the request is made, so I have been being part of the social, I know that this is how things are, so that is the kind of unconsciously following the rule, it is natural that we express promise in the social realm, that is to say this is how I use language, this is how a promise is made, this is how the request is made, so I have been being part of the social, I know that this is how things are, so that is the kind of an unconsciously following the rule, it is natural that we express promise in this way or request in this way, it is natural that we express promise in a particular manner and a request in another manner, so in that sense Searle says rules are unconsciously followed, one need not assume or interpret that the rules are there are rules in the mind and these rules are in unconscious mind and one is following the rules, now Searle's thesis does not make that kind of claim, rather he would tell you this, that we have learned the social etiquettes and so many varieties of language use being part of the linguistic community, so this very fact that human beings have a linguistic form of life shows how these rules are formed, so that is how these rules are formed, the very fact that human beings have a linguistic form of life and they participate in various linguistic forms of life shows it tells us that how these rules are formed, now when we explain this, Searle says this question can be answered with reference to the notion of collective intentionality, how the individuals together have formed culture, how this individual together have formed many normative principles that make the culture possible, so in that sense he is talking about possibility of formulating, a logical possibility of formulating various constitutive rules, it is logically possible precisely because the human consciousness tries to see things as something, x has x can be viewed as something in a particular context, this very possibility of imagining certain things in a particular context as something in a particular context. So, in that sense Searle talks about how the constitutive rules are formed and languages expressed and used in a social context, we will talk more about it in the next session, thank you.