 Welcome, everyone. Another episode of Let's Talk About Politics and Governance. In this episode, we explore the world of chip and critical ICT infrastructure policy, both in the US and the European Union, exploring how geopolitical security threats drive industrial policy, export controls, self-sufficiency. I've invited Sean Donnelly to examine the different debates, the different approaches to chip and to 5G industrial policy. Sean, welcome to our episode. Well, thank you for having me. It's a pleasure to be here. Sean, when it comes to, and you write this in your article, when it comes to the security of supply chains for critical technologies, such as chips or 5G infrastructure, of course, that disruption in these supply chains could have significant economic and political consequences for both the EU and the US in your study. So is this why you decided to study this topic? Well, partly. And there are two main drivers of public policy, which are focused on self-sufficiency of some sort. One was the pandemic and the other is geopolitical. And they both lead governments to go down the same path if they do so. And one of the goals was to find out how much are they doing? And what are the effects? What was specifically missing in the research out there that you wanted to explore? Well, this was a really new development, right? So there was also really new legislation and budget money behind it to develop semiconductors in the United States and Europe. There was also a huge controversy about 5G. And because this was so new, that was a perfect opportunity to take a look at it. If I can add one more thing, it's that for a couple of years now, we've been talking about the prospect of deglobalization, decoupling, and this has been a good test of whether that was happening or not. Well, and you run your test, so let us know. Okay. Most important findings. Well, the biggest shift is in the United States. So they have a very clear and pretty early transition to looking at China as a security threat that could disrupt 5G's and semiconductors. And it starts with the Trump administration, but it's the Biden administration that puts this on steroids and really ramps it up with export controls, with manufacturing at home. These are elements of the Biden administration's policy. And what I argue here is that it really is the policy framework, the ideas, the way that the two administrations see semiconductors and 5G. With the Trump administration, you see them generally concerned about America's place in the world, but they're not really looking at China as a national security threat. The Biden administration does, right? And then if you look to the other side of the pond, the European Union is quite divided on this. The European Commission itself is a very recent convert to the idea of an economic security state. And there are divisions between major member states about what to do. The French are very much in favor of having European semiconductor capacity and having full European production and control of their 5G networks. The Germans not so much. And that is a big dividing line within the European Union. You also see that with regard to ramping up production of semiconductors. The French want to do it themselves. The Germans, the Spanish, the Italians, the Poles, they're bringing Intel, a US company into the European Union to manufacture chips at home. But those are not, that's not a European company. That's not bad, but it is what it is. So comparing the two sides, we have Trump who started and Biden that had the policy on chips on steroids and a European Union divided in countries and within its own bodies. So from these findings, let us know what potential lessons for public policy or for companies' policies or even for society in general. Okay, well, public policies, company policies in society is general. Well, for public policy, we're going to see a greater emphasis in the United States on semiconductors in particular as a national security policy and expect this to become stronger over time. They will also put more pressure on the Europeans to choose sides between China and America when it comes to exporting critical technology. This has one more big public policy implication, which is that artificial intelligence depends upon these semiconductors. That's part of the reason why the Biden administration imposed enhanced export controls and why they leaned on the Dutch government and ASML as well as Japanese and Korean companies that produced semiconductors to do the same thing. In terms of companies, yeah, companies are also going to have to choose. They can't just say it's just business anymore. Sorry, this is national security, get used to it. And for the broader public, it won't change a lot except that you will see more manufacturing facilities being produced, more jobs, more research connections to universities crop up. And that is something that will be different than in the past. Of course. And let's turn to academia now. What should be the focus from now on? I think the question will be, there will be folks who do analysis of how much the world is fragmenting. And that's one thing. That's a more general economic interest, but it does affect our economic trade. And where academia advises the European Parliament or Congress, they can help give them some perspective about that. When it comes to the specifics, the implications of what we're doing here, we need to focus more on the interactions between high tech and national security. We have lived in a world of global supply chains, and it's clear now that that age is dead. It's over. The question is, are we going to fragment that would also mean the United States and Europe going their own ways, but I don't see that this. And it wouldn't make sense to do that. As long as the United States and Europe are allies, along with a selection of other countries, then it is fine in the absence of a security threat to have interdependence and trade and supply chains. But now we need to be selective. And that does make sense. Sean, great episode, but give us a punchline if you wanted one or two sentences to sum up this episode for people to read before the episode. What would it be? First of all, in semiconductors, it's a critical technology of national security that breaks down the barriers between the economy and the state. The second is know who your friends are. The idea that global supply chains and interdependence is going to drive things is over and dead. And it's only going to get more so artificial intelligence is the battle of the future and semiconductors are the key input into that battle. Well, Sean, straight to the point. Thank you very much. You're very welcome. So for all of those who are watching us on YouTube, all the resources, all the materials of this conversation with Sean are available on the let's talk about politics and governance website. Okay. This conversation with Sean can also be listened in wherever you get your podcast. You can subscribe to our newsletter for future episodes and follow us on Twitter.