 Well, good morning, everyone. It's a delight to welcome all of you here this morning to a very special event at the Carnegie Endowment. The first visit of Ambassador Harshwal Bin Sringla, India's ambassador to the United States. I'm actually tell us I'm a senior fellow at the Endowment who works on issues relating to South Asia and Asian security at large. And I want to take the opportunity to welcome you, Ambassador. Of course, first to Washington, even though we are six months late in the process, but certainly to the Carnegie Endowment. And I hope that this will be the first of many visits to this institution. I'm going to say a few words about the ambassador before we get into the business of why we're here this morning. Ambassador Sringla is, as you can imagine, one of the stars of the Indian Foreign Service. You don't get to come to Washington unless you are a star. That applies to all the members of this team here at the embassy as well. He's been in the Foreign Service for 35 years and has come to Washington from a posting in Bangladesh. And for those of you who follow subcontinental politics, India's neighborhood is obviously the most important relationship to India. And the relationship with Bangladesh has been as good as it has ever been in Bangladesh's history, and that's really a tribute to Ambassador Sringla's work in Dhaka. Prior to that, he served as India's ambassador to Thailand and has also served at headquarters, looking after India's neighborhood. He's not new to the United States because he has served in the United States before, but at the UN in New York. And so I can go on and on about Ambassador Sringla. We have his biography on the seats in front of you. Welcome to take a look at that. But I just want to, on your behalf, extend a very special welcome to you, Ambassador, to this conversation. Thank you very much. Thank you for coming. What we want to talk about today is the current state of the US-India relationship. But I want to talk about that in a broader context, in the context of developments that are occurring in the world and in the context of a range of other issues that impact on the US-India relationship. I would be remiss, however, given that India is going through an enormous and exciting exercise of democracy right now. If I did not start with, obviously, the one event that has captured attention in the US, a gigantic exercise of popular voting. And so I wanted to start by asking you, where do you see Indian democracy today? And what are the aspirations of the Indian people as they go to the polls for the 17th time in India's history? Well, Dr. Ashley, let me start by saying how delighted I am to be here at the venerable Carnegie Endowment on my first think tank interaction since I arrived from three to four months ago. But more important is the opportunity to have this conversation with someone I consider to be one of the foremost experts on Asia, in general, and India in particular. Someone who's had a window seat to India-US relations for decades now. Thank you for taking the time, Dr. Ashley, for being here this morning. Now, you spoke about democracy in India, and it is true that we are today in the process of undergoing what is our 17th general elections. One of the factors of Indian democracy is that we have had, since our independence in 1947, every five years, an election which determines which government will be at the helm of affairs in our country with a very minor aberration of 21 months in 1975, 76. And I think if you look at the erections that are taking place now, it is an exercise which is unparalleled in democracy in terms of scale and magnitude. We have 897 million registered voters, of which about 10% are first-time voters between the ages of 18 and 23. We have over a million polling booths. We have 4 million electronic voting machines in place. We have 11 million people who work for the election commission for the elections. And we have polling booths which are in the remotest of areas. The highest polling booth is at a height of over 15,000 feet, Tashi Gang in Himachal Pradesh, which is about 4,500 meters. And it's not just the scale, but also the commitment to democracy. I don't know if some of us saw the article in The Washington Post, I think it was a few days ago, which spoke about a team of election commission officials who traveled 300 miles on foot over four days to reach one voter in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. And that is a commitment to democracy, which, again, is unparalleled anywhere in the world. So you talked about what do we expect out of the elections. I think the decision as to who would run the country for the next five years will largely be made by the younger generations in India. Because today, 70% of the country is below 35 years of age. And as I said, good 80 to 90 million voters, first-time voters, who have no ideological commitment to either side. What they're going to see is that which is the dispensation, which party or group of parties, and which person can lead the country for the next five years. We have to keep in mind that this is an aspirational generation, a generation that is looking forward, that has a lot of hopes and dreams. And I would like to see which is the best person and party suited to realize those, let's say, ambitions. And I think that is really what is the crux of Indian democracy today and how this will play out in the next couple of weeks is extremely important to the way India and, of course, its principal interlocutors will see this exercise in the years to come. I ask that question also in part. I mean, the scale of the exercise and the issues at stake are obviously very important for India. But they're also very important for the United States, because from the beginning of the US-India relationship after India's independence, the attractions of India as a liberal democracy were very important for the United States in its effort to build this new relationship. And so we have a stake in the success of Indian democracy. And so everything that you say is really sort of good news for years out here. Let me use that as a segue to asking a different question, which is India's democracy has done well so far in large part because it has grown and thrived in an international environment that was very orderly. And we are at a moment in our own international transitions where there are enormous challenges, questions about the future of rules and institutions in the post-war period, the transitions that are taking place in the global economy, and what that implies for India, and also institutions of governance. How does India see today the global environment, and how conducive is that to the success of the Indian experiment? Well, let me start by saying that India has always had a very great commitment to multilateralism and the use of an adherence to rules-based international order that would be the mode of not just international governance, but also cooperation among states. And in that context, of course, our contribution, whether it's in the United Nations, whether it's in the Bettenwoods institutions, whether it's in the World Trade Organization, or other organizations to which we subscribe at an international level, has always been very significant. And if there is some sense of a challenge with the existing international order, it's also because there is a need to continue to reform these institutions, to bring them in line with changing realities. Many of these institutions have existed in almost the same form since the end of the Second World War. So I think India and a lot of other countries believe that these institutions need to make the adjustments necessary in order to make them more effective, make them more acceptable. And also to make them more cohesive instruments of international cooperation. If they were to adhere and to be, let's say, in line with the realities that exist in today's world, countries that were, in some senses, let's say, those that lost out in the Second World War are countries today that are contributing greatly to the international system. Many developing countries have emerged as important centers, both politically, economically, socially, and in terms of contributors to international peace and security, international cooperation on economic issues. And I think these institutions do need to change as they go along. But that's not the only thing. I think when there is a challenge to the multilateral order, I think states need to really realize that that's the only way you can have a cohesive, let's say, interface. The moment there is a breakdown in that order, then clearly you have serious issues when states deal with each other. And I do agree that bilateralism is important. Lurielateralism is also an important way of dealing with each other. We are members of many Lurielateral organizations, whether it is BRICS, whether it is the Shanghai Cooperation. There are many, but so are other countries. And at the same time, of course, multilateral institutions are absolutely critical when you deal with countries across the globe in a manner that is collective. And how do you deal with the new threats and challenges that have emerged in recent years? Terrorism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Global pandemics and epidemics, for example, needs cooperation across countries and across borders. Humanitarian disasters, national disasters, all of this needs cooperation which go beyond states or groups of states. Can I ask if there is an implicit question in your remarks, which is, can this order on which India depends for creating a favorable environment for its own success survive if countries like the United States, which have built this order, cease to make the investments in preserving it? What would you like to see of the United States in this regard? Because our country at this moment is undergoing a tremendous debate about how resilient our commitment to this order should be. What are India's hopes? How would you like to see us come out of there? Well, I believe that you're right in saying that the United States is actually one of the main initiators and creators of this multi-national global order. And certainly, any second thoughts about how this should be run, which emanate from the US, is something that people sit up and listen to. But the fact of the matter is that every state, whether they're larger states or smaller states, have the right to introspect on what this order should be like. And again, come back to the same point is that each of us really need to think, and what is the best way that these institutions will run. And I do recall, even when my time in the UN in the turn of the century, that's around 2002 to 2006, this debate about whether the UN is the run the way it should be, whether it should be more streamlined, more efficient, the money that states are contributing. And the US contributes a very, very major share of the way these institutions are run. Whether that is being spent in the way that it should. I think these questions need to be asked. And it is correct that there should be some level of introspection and thought given to how these institutions are run. And we are definitely among those who believe that reform of the UN, reform the Benton Woods institutions, reform the WTO, is something that should be routinely and regularly carried out. I also want to come back to the second question you posed earlier about the global economic order. Well, as a major emerging economy and one that is today having very high rates of growth of 7% to 8%, we believe that we have the responsibility to contribute towards inducing stability in the global order. India's growth today contributes to 17% of global growth, which I think is also a very positive contribution. And we believe that we need to work with states, particularly states that can play a greater role, including the G20 of which we are members, in supporting that global order, in trying to make sure that dramatic increases, rises in prices, fluctuations in supply and demand, and challenges to, again, a global order which, in terms of trading or in the economic sense, are kept to levels that are manageable. So certainly, when it comes to the economy, we have a strong interest in keeping that level of stability. Greater trade, greater investments, greater flow of services in what is an increasingly integrated global order is in our interest and the interest of every country in the world, including, I might say, of course, and especially in the United States. Yes, the US, the current US administration seems to have taken a somewhat different view of that, which is it has maintained the institutions of the order more or less intact, but it has emphasized very much rewriting or renegotiating the character of its bilateral economic engagements with a variety of players, including our closest partners, of which India has won. How do you see India's ability to cope with what seems to me a somewhat schizophrenic view of the administration? On one hand, very strong support for India's role in the global political system and in the strategic environment while pressing very hard for greater market access on the economic side. How does one balance these competing pressures from the perspective of New Delhi? Well, our Prime Minister has said that the concept of America first does not necessarily contradict our very good relations with the United States. And we certainly support the concept that every country needs to, first and foremost, look into itself and see what are the improvements, what are the changes, what, again, what adjustments you need to give yourself the best possible circumstances to develop and to grow. And certainly, the concept of foreign policy between nation states, what we call rastra hit sarvapuri, which is basically, nation comes first, is something that we can understand. And other countries also understand. When it comes to trading relations and going into those, of course, we have, at this point of time, trade negotiations with the US. We've also had a situation where GSP privileges for India have been notified of withdrawal. We do believe that it is important for countries to recalibrate where their trade lies. We today have the United States largest trading partner with $142 billion of trade, of which there is an adverse trade balance, or a trade balance which is in India's favor. We are conscious of this trade balance which is in our favor. And we are trying to address that situation by buying more American goods. In the last two years, the trade balance has come down from $25 billion to $21 billion. As a result of our conscious efforts to buy more American goods, last year, in 2018, US exports to India increased by close to 30%. Now, that's a very significant jump. And one of the reasons for that is that we bought $4.5 billion of oil and gas from the US. We placed orders for 300 commercial aircraft for $39 billion. We have opened new lines of import, such as poultry. And in the area of defense equipment, we have gone from buying almost nothing from the United States 10 years ago to $18 billion of defense equipment today. So I think there is a conscious effort to address what the administration would see as an imbalance in the trade, as a need to address this issue. And we are working with the administration and with the USDR's office in trying to reach a solution that can represent a win-win situation. Any unilateral measures that would close the door to these negotiations actually would be a loss for both our countries. And particularly for those American companies that have invested so much and looked to India as such an important potential, an important market and a potentially important market in the US to come. I hope that effort bears fruit, because it would be unfortunate for a variety of reasons if we ended up being on the opposite sides of the question in economics, especially because we have such great convergence on the strategic. So let me ask you about the strategic for a minute. The administration has made India the centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific policy. Prime Minister made a remarkable speech at Shangri-La, laying out India's vision of what an Indo-Pacific strategy or an Indo-Pacific vision should be. What is India's view of the administration's Indo-Pacific strategy? How does India see the Indo-Pacific strategy as serving its own interests? And what role would it like to play in the context of this larger vision for the Indo-Pacific? Well, actually, you're right in saying that the administration led by President Trump has attached a lot of significance to the strategic partnership. Very strong cooperation on counterterrorism, the initiation of the two-plus-two dialogue at the levels of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. And of course, as you say, the Indo-Pacific partnership, which is also, I think, a relatively new concept, but one in which I think our two countries work working closely together and seeing how we can strengthen the concept of introducing a more open, free, transparent, inclusive Indo-Pacific region that involves cooperation between nations based on an adherence to international law, the rule of law. Clearly, we are looking at an Indo-Pacific region that can provide connectivity based on principles of transparency. And of course, adherence to the norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, these are very important. So we are working closely with the United States, with countries like Japan, Australia, but also Southeast Asian nations, the ASEAN countries, many of our own neighbors who have taken a very strong, let us say, interest in the Indo-Pacific concept, which is, as I said, still in the process of really being fleshed out and developed. But the manifestation of that, that we have seen greater exchanges on what the Indo-Pacific should be like, some levels of cooperation with countries like Japan on the way that we are running projects in third countries, including countries that are in our neighborhood. Japan is also a country with whom we have cooperated in the northeastern part of India. And they have contributed both in terms of investments and financing to develop the northeast part of India for tourism, but also environmentally, ecologically, the forests and the biodiversity that exists there. So what I'm saying is that this cooperation can take many forms. But at the end of the day, I think it is to preserve our concept of what I just spoke about, a global order, which is based on certain international rules that all of us can adhere to. So it's there to bring it to firmly anchor this so that the subversion of this order is not something that we will like to sit back and watch. So let me ask you a more delicate question. It's made easier for me by the fact that the administration has quite transparently said that the Indo-Pacific strategy is aimed, at least in some degree, to managing the challenges posed by a rising China to this rules-based order. Now, it seems to me that India is in a somewhat awkward position, where while we have the luxury of a tough policy towards China, because we are thousands of miles away physically from China, India lives next door. So how do you think of India-China relations in the context of both bilateral engagement that they change? And of course, India's commitment now to maintaining a rule-based order, where the principal threat to that order seems to be, at least in the perception of the administration and many in Asia. China's rise and China's unwillingness to live by the rules that seem to be expected in the international community. Well, you're right in saying that China is an immediate neighbor. We have a long land border with China. We've had historical links with that country, even civilization links. Today, we enjoy a fairly high trade relationship of about $85 billion of bilateral trade. And of course, there is a good understanding that we have even at political levels, that even though we have a border that is not fully demarcated, around which we have differences, the two countries have agreed to isolate that and to continue to discuss that, but not allow that to come in the way of normal trade relations, cooperation in science and technology, people-to-people exchanges. We have significant investments from China in India and vice versa. There's some 100 Chinese companies that have offices in India. And of course, we have had regular exchanges at the political level. Our prime minister visited China five times in the last five years. So it is a relationship that is important for us. But at the same time, I think we do understand that we have our differences, as I said. And these need to be very carefully managed. It is, as we call it, a mature relationship. We don't allow differences to get the better of us. As far as the Indo-Pacific is concerned, our prime minister in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2017 stated that we believe that the Indo-Pacific is not directed against any country or group of countries. As far as we are concerned, it is a concept that is open to all concerned. We'd like all countries to adhere to this concept to join us and to see how we can work together for the betterment of the region, how we can cooperate to utilize common spaces, how we can work together in the international arena. And of course, in terms of connectivity, in terms of all of that, that is envisaged under the Indo-Pacific concept. So we don't see a contradiction in that. And we, as I said, the concept is a relatively new one. And we're speaking to our partners and friends on how we can develop it in a manner that is, let's say, suits all of our different partners. Let me ask a different question about the Indo-Pacific. And that connects to India's relationship with Japan, because Japan has an analogous view of the Indo-Pacific to India's, where it looks at the region as essentially a region that should be open to all countries that play by certain rules. And yet, Japan is simultaneously deepening its security relationship with the United States as a hedge that that vision may not be realized. And most interestingly, deepening its relationship with India, which I find fascinating. I was in Japan just about a month ago. And it was remarkable to hear Japanese across the political spectrum, talking of the next most important relationship among partners after the United States being India and Asia. Now, I know Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi have met on several occasions. What explains this development of an Indo-Japanese bilateral relationship after many years of sort of a fallow, a fallow partnership, something that has really taken off in the last decade and a half? Well, I think India and Japan are two countries that offer a great deal to each other. Japan has invested very heavily in India's development in some of our flagship schemes, the make-in-India scheme, digital India, smart cities. Japan has been a major partner in the Delhi-Mumbai economic corridor, in the freight corridor that has been opened between Punjab and Bihar, that means the northeast corridor. They have invested also in the high-speed train project between Mumbai and Amdabad, which is the Japanese Shinkansen. They have given us some very, very soft loans in order to bring in technology, which is essentially Japanese, but also more expensive technology, cutting-edge technologies for India. Japanese companies have invested very heavily in India and have also, in many senses, brought in technology, which is, as I said, state-of-the-art. At the same time, I think there is a recognition that with a young population in two years' time, our average age in India would be 28.2 years. So it would be a very demographically a young country. We offer a great deal to Japan in terms of growing, and increasingly, I would say, economically upward, upward the mobile market. We offer the potential for human resource development. You have schemes under which Indian youth are being trained in Japan, being brought in as guest workers in several areas, which are in represent areas that require some skills and some level of technological application. All of these, I think, are a win-win situation for both countries. Underpinning this is the very good relationship that both the Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Abe enjoy with each other. And I think that is what also gives very, very important guidance and momentum to this very important and relatively recent close relationship between India and Japan. And Japan is a very important partner also in the Indo-Pacific. And we are working closely with Japan in many areas which go beyond just trade and investments. I find it fascinating that a significant element of the India-Japan relationship has actually been working in third countries. And part of that has been packaged, at least in the popular reading, as an alternative to China's BRI. So when India and Japan commit to building quality infrastructure to providing third countries as an alternative to the Chinese model, the perceptions of greater competition in Asia between China on one hand and a variety of liberal democratic states only increases. What is your, how do you read India's collaboration with Japan in these areas? Well, you're right in saying that our cooperation with Japan in areas in places like Africa, but also in our own immediate neighborhood in Bangladesh where I was a master, is again something that is new, but provides an interesting sort of potential for far greater outreach. Japanese, the Japanese have been major donors in many of these countries traditionally. I know that in Bangladesh, they are a highly respected country because they have always been assisting Bangladesh in many areas. And the JICA is extremely, let's say, active there. So combined with our own potentials for providing, again, the basis for heavy lifting in terms of easy access of materials, technology, equipment, and also consultancy and design aspects, I think we have been able to cooperate closely with Japanese financial power to access projects and markets that we have not been able to do in the past. And at the private sector, also, there's cooperation. We have worked closely, some of our major companies have worked closely with Japanese companies to secure third-party contracts under tenders that we would have found it difficult to do otherwise. So it's an interesting paradigm and one that we have to see how that progresses. But as I said, we are looking at such instances of cooperation that could provide us with a win-win situation. And it's the same with the United States, with the Build Act and OPIC coming up. I think there's a lot more that we can do with US companies, with the US private sector, in going out and securing contracts on a joint basis, working in third countries, seeing how we can collaborate to our mutual benefit and interest. And also, I may add, for the benefit of the countries where we're operating, because we give them the best value for money. We give them a transparent, open system under which we, and the rules of the game under which we operate, are not opaque. So the countries that receive that money and receive the assistance that we provide will know that in whichever way they're being benefited is the best possible use. And in many cases, you have to keep in mind that projects that are carried out in these third countries are through soft loans extended by the countries themselves. Now, at the end of the day, it is still a loan. So that money that you borrow for projects in your own country is money that is well-served. If that is under a transparent system in which the lowest bidder receives a contract, the best companies come forward. And I think that is something that countries are increasingly realizing that it is important that you avoid a debt trap. It is important that you don't get drawn into very large projects just because the assistance is available. I mean, larger than your requirements. You don't go into areas that are infrastructures. But at the same time, whatever money that you spend is the greatest value for your taxpayers. And that's important. You don't institutionalize corruption. You don't allow your assistance to be subverted. So there are many ways under which countries like the United States, Japan, ourselves, many other countries that believe in a transparent rules-based order can really work with countries across the globe. Let me come back to the geopolitics for a moment and ask you a question about the Quad. In part because this administration has put a lot of emphasis on building a partnership among democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific. And as best as I can see it, India still seems to have a certain anxieties about the Quad. What explains, just tell us, how does India look at the Quad? Is this a challenge to India's quest for maintaining omnidirectional relations with different powers, including China? Does India worry that this might be proto-containment of China years to come? What explains the Indian immigrants about the Quad? Well, let's start with what is the trilateral process. We have had, at the summit level, a trilateral meeting at the margins of the G-20 in Buenos Aires. This is something that we hope to continue in terms of trilateral meetings. And the trilateral is the United States, Japan and India. Japan and India, yes. At the same time, the concept of the Quad is relatively new. So we are very still working on it. But we've had several meetings at the DG level, which is at the official level, even in the Quad. And we look at how to cooperate with Australia as an added partner. And it doesn't preclude other countries from joining. As I said, the concept is really now developing, and we have to take it forward. But we do believe that none of this is directed against any country, including our other partner countries. So we don't look at it as mutually exclusive. We look at it as, as I said, open, transparent, inclusive order. I guess we'll have to engage in a negotiation with the United States about that, because I think there may be a somewhat different view here. But let me come further west. If you look at the geopolitics of US-India relations in the east, it's generally a good picture because there is a convergence in our mutual visions of where we want to go. That does not seem to be the case when we come further west. So for example, US policy towards Iran at the moment has put India in an awkward position where the United States is demanding that India cut off all its access to Iranian energy as part of the effort to bring Iran back to some sort of a negotiation about its nuclear program, its regime, and so on and so forth. US policy towards Afghanistan is moving in a direction where the administration is committed to reconciliation as part of the process of an exit. How do you see US policy west of India affecting India's strategic fortunes? Well, let's start with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a neighboring country of India. It's always been an important partner. We have been one of the partners of the United States in the process of stabilizing and developing Afghanistan over the last 18 years. We have spent $3 billion in Afghanistan. We have built their parliament. We have built hydroelectric power stations. We have built a port that gives Afghanistan access to the sea. We have built transmission lines. We are today undertaking 150 projects in different parts of Afghanistan. Our aid workers have been kidnapped. Some have been killed. So we have suffered as well in this process. So what I'm trying to say is that we have also a very important stake in that country and its future. Now, when you talk about the fact that the US is now looking for an exit policy, I think we tend to understand that after 18 years of contribution by way of resources and in that country, you want to find a solution that could enable you to withdraw. And we fully are supportive of that. What we are saying is that that solution should be one that does not, in many senses, is a very considered one and does not impact adversity on the gains that you've made in the last 18 years. And those gains are very important, whereas whether it's the Constitution of Afghanistan, whether it's the establishment of democracy in Afghanistan, whether it is the role that women play in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era, or the integrity of the Afghan security and defense forces which you have trained and brought up. So we have to be careful that when you withdraw from Afghanistan, it is a withdrawal that preserves these gains that Afghanistan continues to be a stable, peaceful running enterprise. It does not disintegrate into what was a pre-911 situation. And I think that is very important. And we are happy to work with you in that endeavor. We have had regular meetings with special representative Master Khalilzad. We have been in close contact with the US administration on this. We are happy to lend our shoulder to that effort, as we have lent to your efforts in the last 18 years in Afghanistan. We would continue to work with you in ensuring that. But certainly precipitate withdrawal without taking into account some of these factors, I think, would in many senses put at risk all the efforts that have been put in the last 18 years. So that has to be seen in context. Of course, Iran is also a neighbor of Afghanistan and an extended neighbor of ours, a country with whom we have had, again, nothing short of civilizational links, because Persian literature, Persian writing influences have permeated through our culture in historic terms. And of course, ideally, we would like to maintain good relations with that country. At the same time, we do understand that the US has some issues. And those are manifested in some of the actions that have been taken. Some of those actions, including the decision to use sanctions as an instrument of state policy to ensure that exports of oil from Iran has stopped impact on us directly, because we are large importers of oil from Iran. Our refineries are dependent on that sort of fruit that we get from Iran. It is not possible to suddenly convert those refineries into some other form of fruit, besides which is a question of long-term pricing, supply, grade, and so on and so forth. So there is a direct impact. And we are apprehensive that that impact can translate into inflation, higher oil prices, inflation in India, affects the common man. And we have to understand that sanctions as an instrument can be, well, can affect friend and forelike, can impact on humanitarian situations and cases. When I was in the U.N., a lot of work had been done on targeted sanctions, smart sanctions, sanctions that tend to affect specifically regimes that it's directed against, but not the people that it involves, not others who are collateral damage in this issue. So the excessive use of sanctions as an instrument of policy, whether it's in Iran, whether it's in Venezuela, whether it applies to Russia, impacts on others. And I think at a certain stage, it becomes counterproductive. I'm talking in theoretical terms. And I think this is something that has to be kept in mind when you use those instruments, particularly if they're unilateral in their use and application. Are you optimistic about the United States' ability to find common ground with India on these issues? Or is this going to be a challenge that we simply have to manage? Because it will be difficult to sort of find breakthroughs that are equally satisfying to both. Well, as a... The issues of Afghanistan handle that. No, as I said, as a partner and a friend of the United States, I think we have multiple channels of communication at the highest levels, at senior levels, at official levels. We are talking with each other all the time. And I think that is an important thing that we know two countries have the same view on anything. And countries which enjoy a very multifaceted relationship across the board, like India and the United States, who are bound to have differences, whether it's in trade, whether it's in the way you look at third countries, look at various situations, there are bound to be differences. But no one issue is greater than the sum of the relationship. And I think that is what is important is that we need to work together to at least understand where we are coming from and take it forward from there. So I don't think any of these issues are insurmountable. They may be minor road bumps, speed bumps, they may be minor irritants, but they're not larger than the relationship itself. And I do believe that leadership of both our countries is capable of overcoming some of these issues and looking at the larger picture of taking that relationship forward. Let me ask you two last questions before I open it to the floor. The first is about Pakistan. India has had a difficult relationship with Pakistan in the last, in the recent past. It's also coincided with a shift in US policy towards Pakistan. One hopes that after the election, there will be an opportunity for both sides to reevaluate the character of their relationship because the alienation that exists currently that persists obviously is not something that is good for either country. And certainly India has been a victim of many instances of terrorist attacks coming from Pakistani soil, sometimes with the support of the Pakistani state. How do you see the India-Pakistan relationship over the next three to four years? What are the opportunities there for some sort of an approach? Well, when you talk about engaging each other rapprochement, it is not that this has not been attempted in the past. As you know, Prime Minister Vajpayee, who led previous BJP government, had undertaken this famous Lahore-Bras diplomacy. He had opened his, kept an open mind on the relationship, invited President Musharraf to India. There were some very good optics and dynamics. We had also talked about soft borders in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, naming people to travel freely, bus services. So the blueprint of what could be better and friendlier cooperation within the two countries was on the table. But that was followed by the Kargil attacks in which Indian Territory was seriously encroached upon and it led to a conflict which costs a loss of lives on both sides. More recently, Prime Minister Modi had invited Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at his inauguration. In 2014, it was unprecedented, historic. But he had all the leaders of the Sark countries in New Delhi for the inauguration. Subsequently, I think Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif invited him almost spontaneously to come for his granddaughter's wedding. And Prime Minister Modi took it up. He went to Lahore and attended Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's event and immediately that was followed by the attacks at the Bhattankot air base. Now, each of these cases, including the Mumbai attacks, which cost lives of so many people, we had given provided actionable intelligence that was asked for by Pakistan. But nothing has emerged from all of that. I mean, nothing has come out in the case of a single, let's say result of those efforts to take some action against the perpetrators of terrorism from across the border. And in today's context, I think there is a sense that unless the issue of terrorism emanating out of Pakistan is addressed and there is a serious change of heart and action in that sense, that is verifiable sustainable action, I think the time would not be propitious or a conversation with Pakistan and other issues. I think the core issue of terrorism on which there was international support across the globe, led by the United States. And the United States, of course, very strong message from the White House that support for terrorism and safe havens for terrorism in Pakistan will not be tolerated. The support for greater counter-terrorism cooperation with India was not only, as I said, not just from the White House, but also came from 67 senators and congressmen in separate statements across the country. And similar messages were there across the globe. So there is no place for terrorism. And I think most people, even in Pakistan, I think would agree that terrorism is something that has to be dealt with before we get down to issues that are important to both countries. I mean, our focus is on development. We want to move forward economically, want to give our citizens a better life. We have no interest in hostility and conflict because that detracts and takes away from the core focus of development within our country. And the sooner we settle these issues with our neighbors, the better it is. But it is very clear that we cannot have any more incidents of terrorism from across the border because that is a serious threat to our, let's say, integrity, development, and our economic efforts, ultimately. So I think only history will tell us how this thing goes. But what is important, I think, is that the international community has to put adequate pressure on Pakistan to stop terrorism as an instrumental state policy, after which I think there will be automatic conditions for a much closer cooperative relationship on the lines that we have attempted in the past. I hope that comes to pass because more than anything is for Pakistan's own sake. Let me end by just asking you a question about US-India relationship to sort of sum it up. I was very privileged to be present when President Bush was in office and the pieces of the relationship were being put together. And today I see a blossoming of the relationship in ways that were simply impossible to imagine 20 years ago. Having said that, what do you see as the greatest opportunities that lie before us? And what do you see as our biggest challenges over the next two to three years? Well, as I said, as someone who's been in the driver's seat, I think you have a good reason to look at the relationship with the level of optimism. I, myself, in the three or four months that I've been here, very amazed at the extent to which the relationship has come forward at every level, political levels, economic levels, at levels of technology and people-to-people contracts, which is very important. And I think clearly the potentials are there to take this even higher. What trade is at $140 billion, but we have ambitions to take it to $500 billion. We have a great interest in technology. America has cutting-edge technologies. Many of these are being developed jointly with Indian and US companies. Some have developed, of course, a lot of it is clearly a technology that we have an interest in, whether it's artificial intelligence, whether it's robotics, whether it is nanotechnology, biotechnology. There's a lot of interest in the technologies that are emerging out of Silicon Valley and other tech centers of the United States. How can we get venture capitalists to invest in India? How can we get this technology to be used in India? How can we use the startups that are emerging in India in a way that is beneficial to both our countries are important objectives for both our countries? The US contribution to the United States to India's development also cannot be underestimated. I think the US has been a part of every of our flagship initiatives, as I said, right from Make in India to the Smart Cities program, to the Metro projects, which have been undertaken in 14 different cities all over India, to the skills development, what is called Skill India, a program where we have... One of the advantages of a young population is that we have a larger workforce, supporting a smaller aging population. But at the same time, you have a challenge of being able to absorb a million people every month into the workforce. And to do that, meaningfully, you have to make sure that they are skilled, that they are trained properly, that they are equipped to take on those responsibilities that will bring them into an era of working in this current age. And here, I think the US has also contributed significantly. And the contribution is there, but it can be taken much, much further. I mean, I think there is scope, not just for public sector, but private sector involvement in the areas of skills development, opening institutes that can provide basic training of people who will be able to work in an auto parts factory or able to work on computers or able to work as foremen or supervisors or technically trained and qualified people in joint ventures between the US and India. We're very happy to see that so many US companies are looking at India as an important manufacturing base, looking at India which has the human resources and the skills to be able to contribute to the manufacturing that can be used, not only for the Indian market, but it exports to different parts of the world. So I think some of these offer tremendous potential and we have to see how we can work together. But then, as I said, this is not a relationship which is focused in a few areas, it is across the board. There are areas that go beyond business aspects of the relationship. You have, for example, a huge exchange of tourists, 1.3 million tourists from the United States visit India. What a million Indian tourists come to the US. So that's an important exchange that our two countries enjoy. A very large, vibrant, successful Indian American community in the US is also, for me and my colleagues in the Indian embassy, a very important source of support and a leverage for a stronger US-India relationship. And this is something which is quite unique and which we really very much appreciate that this element of our relationship exists. So I think the scope is enormous, the challenges are enormous and there is enough work cut out for those who are working on this relationship in the months and years to come. As I know all the way, thank you so very much. I want to thank you for your candor and for the directness with which you answered every question. One of the challenges for anyone doing a conversation like this is actually getting the guest to answer the question you asked as opposed to answering the question the guest wanted to answer. Particularly if it's live-streamed. But yes, I guess so. Yes, you will be scored instantaneously on your performance. But thank you so very much for doing this. I want to open the questions to the floor and in the interests of both brevity and giving the ambassador a chance to answer the maximum number, I'll take two at a time. Keep your interventions brief. Please identify yourself, get to the point so that I can get the ambassador to answer as many questions as possible. Yes, sir. Is there a microphone? Yes, just wait for the microphone. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, I'm Sufi Lagari with the Sindhi Foundation. Sindhi and Balochistan are facing Pakistani military repression. One reason because of Pakistan and China's strategic alliance. And also the threat to the India's security, by terrorism and nuclear threats. I don't know what is the US plan or what is the US and India's plan together to counter it. In the region, in the South Asia and also in the Pacific Rim. Thank you. Yes, sir, right there. Just wait for the microphone, please. Thank you, Ashley. Ambassador, thank you for your comments and your observations on the international rules-based liberal order. I have a question for you. When it comes to great powers and the US is one, India certainly is one as well. How does one, as a great power, strike a balance between protecting and nurturing the order and pursuing one's core national interests? Because the order where it offers many opportunities can also serve as a constraint if you are a great power. Because you have a very deep agenda, global agenda to fulfill, which is sometimes not possible given the constraints that consensus-based decision-making sort of offers and imposes. Thank you. Thank you. Well, on your question, one of our concerns on the Belt and Road Initiative has been that this project encompasses territory that is in, which is Indian territory and which is clearly impinges on our territorial integrity and sovereignty. And this is something that we have fairly openly stated, that we have an issue with the fact that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor goes through parts of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. And that is clearly not something that we believe should happen in any international cooperation project that is undertaken between states. Of course, we have always maintained that the territorial integrity of states is important, we continue to maintain it for any state. So I don't want to comment on the second part of your question, but I would simply like to state that when there is an undue focus on certain parts of India, then we have to keep in mind that this is not something that really should be attempted for countries that themselves have vulnerabilities on sectarian lines, on lines of ethnicity and also areas where there are serious concerns of human rights and various violations of communities that live in those areas. So this sentiment I think is something that has to be kept in the back of mind. Coming to the other order of the other question regarding the international global order and great powers that have to deal with these, and it is correct that great powers create these global constructs, institutions that enable us to cooperate and collaborate, but sometimes they do come up also to find these as constrictive, particularly when you want an agenda that goes beyond it. There are many examples of this, including in 2003, when the UN was debating on the issue of the Iraq intervention and the Iraq issue. And so it can be both an area of great convenience, facilitation and also expediency for some of the great powers. It can also be sometimes obstructive and be seen as impediments in the way of very, very quick, let's say, when you want to secure certain objectives that don't always match the process of international consensus and decision-making. And I would say that's always been the case. It's not new and it's always happened and I think great powers learn to live with it at some stage and I think we would certainly say that this is something that is, it also I think brings on the fact that the necessity of a collective decision-making apparatus, otherwise there'd been completely no checks and balances in the global order. Countries would do anything that they would want to do. And certainly I think that would seriously undermine the way states function with each other and this sort of order that is maintained at a global level which comes out of every state having a certain stake in that global order. The moment you break that down, the moment you challenge it, I think there are issues that come up which impinge on your own security and your own national interests at the end of the day. And the only point I want to bring is that the same point that I brought out in the beginning is that perhaps it would become easier if these institutions were to be reformed in a manner that is in keeping with the requirements of the 21st century. And this is something that has to be considered if we are to avoid further challenges to the global international order, as you know. Yes, sir. Thank you. Ambassador, I wanted to ask about technology. Just identify yourself. Yeah, you're sorry. Aman Thakur, I work at CSIS on the India program. I wanted to ask about technology. One of the very public areas of tension between the United States and China is about 5G and the role of Huawei and ZTE companies like that. That's been a concern I think now with India as well. Should we invite them into 5G trials and what the role that these companies are going to play? Obviously a lot of partners of the United States have taken steps to limit the role of those companies. So what is India's consideration and perception of these companies and the role in 5G development? And this gentleman here, please. Thank you. Hello, I'm Eric Stimson. While you touch on this a little bit in an earlier question, I'm curious what India's stance is on the burgeoning alliance between Pakistan and China? Well, let's go down. Let's start with the 5G. You know, this is obviously new technology. While we have stated our intention to take our telecommunications level to 5G, at some stage, we are still some way away from it. Some distance away from reaching that level. And we need to take some decisions on how we go about it, how we prepare our infrastructure to allow for a 5G technology or update from 4G to 5G. And in that context, we will take into account all the different elements that exist on the advisability and suitability of whom we work with, whom we partner with, and what is in our best interest when we go in for that. At this stage, that's all I can say. And as far as the relationship between China and Pakistan is concerned, I think we have no problem when countries have good relations. I think that's in everybody's interest. It matters when it impinges on us. One of the areas that it has impinged on us, as I mentioned just now, is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which really cuts through part of our territory in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. That, for us, is a serious issue that I think brings us into some sort of major area of difference between the countries involved on this particular issue. Besides that, of course, we also have seen that on some of the endeavors, including the UN actions on the listing of individuals in the 2016-17 Committee, there have been some levels of reluctance on the part of China to list Masood Azhar, who is the head of the Jarshey movement, who's also the person who claims he's behind the Pulbama terrorist attacks, and several other terrorist attacks in the past. And this to us is something also which is somewhat incomprehensible, as China clearly is a part of countries that are committed against terrorism, has a strong counter-terrorism profile, and is something on which I'm sure we are also speaking to all concerned on. So I'm saying that while we have no problems in relations, good relations, friendly relations that are positive, it should not have an adverse or negative consequence in other states. That's all I can say. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I'm at Pandya. You spoke to India's perspective on US policy in Afghanistan. Would you say a little about the Indian perspective on the roles and interests of Afghanistan's contiguous neighbors, and also the roles and interests of powers that have had a long-standing interest in Afghanistan, such as Russia, and the governments of the Arabian Peninsula? And the young lady there, please. Thank you so much for your comments, Mr. Ambassador. My name is Akriti Vasudeva. I'm a research associate at the Stimson Center. You spoke about Japan-India cooperation in third countries. I was wondering if you can talk about US-India cooperation in third countries, especially as part of the Indo-Pacific Partnership. So I'm aware that some cooperation has existed in areas such as health care or clean energy. But what about strategic investments or connectivity? Thank you. I'll start with your question. With the US, we've been talking about cooperation in third countries on areas, like you mentioned, clean energy, technologies, areas that could be beneficial for the country's concern. At the same time, we can pool in our resources, technology, capital, et cetera, to access some of these things. But I think it's in the initial stages. And the US itself is in the process of building its own institutions and infrastructure that would contribute to this effort. And I mentioned the Build Act. OPIC is also something that is coming up now. It would be an empowered institution with a budget of, I believe, some $80 billion. So it would give the US the sort of heft that it needs to cooperate in a new area of cooperation in which the US has not been. US approach has been private sector driven. The private sector goes there and does what it. But we have a new paradigm today. And you need to adjust to that new paradigm. And this is what we have been saying all along, that there's a new game in town. And you have to be up to that game. So let's see what is possible. We are already active in several countries. We have a $30 billion budget for assistance, lines of credit, grants in aid. We are undertaking projects from Africa all the way to Southeast Asia, from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar to countries across Africa. And many of these projects are projects that have directly benefited people in these countries. There is a direct impact. When our prime minister talks about SABCA, SAAT, SABCA, VIKAS, which means development for all, it doesn't mean just in India. It also means in our neighborhood, in our extended neighborhood, a country like Bangladesh we understand, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka. But unless these countries develop along with us, we cannot have prosperity. We cannot have peace unless there is a similar condition in the countries immediately around us. So we need to contribute to that development. And I can see it in a country like Bangladesh, which today has close to 8% growth, that peace dividend has been very significant for us because it has given us enormous opportunities for trade and economic cooperation. It has stabilized Bangladesh in ways that has prevented radicalism and fundamentalism from coming up. At the same time, it has impacted on illegal immigration, which has been an issue between our countries. And today, with the sort of employment in Bangladesh itself, there are less people going out. So what I'm trying to say is that there is a direct correlation between development assistance and your own interests as a country. And US as a global power has to see it in that context. But it also opens up doors for your companies, for your investments, for your technology. And I think that is a secondary but important part of that aspect. Coming to the question in Afghanistan and its neighbors, clearly Iran has a long land border with Afghanistan. Iran has important interests in that country. Gulf states, as you mentioned, are also those for finance and who have also provided the way with or for any peace efforts in that direction. You've seen in the recent instance also Qatar has been a base for efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. And of course, Russia has always had great interest in Afghanistan and has also taken some initiatives on its part to facilitate a sort of a peace process. You need to work with all countries in the neighborhood in order to ensure that the peace that you have, that you secure is sustainable and lasting. And I think the role of neighbors cannot be underestimated in that regard. And I think that question was in that context and I endorse that point of view that neighbors are important. And if you don't have the neighbors on board, it could unravel faster than you think. I'll take one last round of questions. Yes, ma'am and gentlemen here please. Thank you, Ambassador. My name's Angel Sharma. I'm a senior governance specialist at IRI. I understand that there is obviously great interest for India to have US economic investment within the country. With that, I would be interested to learn about how India has established or is promoting accountability and transparency for the investment that is coming in and any mechanisms to actually ensure that the funds reach where they're meant to and have the impact that they're intended to. My name is Krishan Matreja. I am with the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation in the US Department of Energy. My question is your thoughts on how US and India can cooperate more effectively to prevent theft and sabotage of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Oh, that's an important question. Let me start with that. I think nuclear proliferation has been the reason for a lot of the problems that we face today. The nuclear arsenal of number of countries have been built on the basis of such illegal proliferation. Much of it is emanated from some of the countries in our neighborhood, but also from the DPRK, North Korea. And I think this is something that is of concern, because if you have nuclear weapons and you have access to nuclear technologies, then you're responsible for those, what you have. And there has to be a very, very strict regime that governs the safeguards, safekeeping, and the integrity of those weapons of technology and the materials that are part of that. And I think countries have developed various, I think, mechanisms, both multilaterally and unilaterally. One of them is the PSI proliferation security initiative that allows countries the right to search vessels, which are suspected of being involved in proliferation. And we ourselves had apprehended a North Korean vessel on similar suspicions and doubts, which was borne out by the fact that there was such material. So I think all countries have to be very vigilant and part of that effort to ensure that proliferation does not take place. You don't become a supermarket of nuclear materials, which contribute to instability, not just in the region, but at a global level. Non-state actors are a new phenomenon in this game. There is the greatest set is that of a dirty bomb that could be made of materials that go from some of these states that are actually have nuclear capabilities, have the ability to make the bomb, have a nuclear arsenal, have the material technology. And I think safeguarding that is very, very important. So the international community needs to work together on that. But I think India and the United States have a strong interest in promoting that. Dr. Ashley was the architect of the India-US civil nuclear energy agreement. And I think that is an agreement that has secured a watertight basis for our civil nuclear cooperation to go forward for us to get both technology, materials, et cetera, in a way that there is a full transparency and a full accountability of the materials we utilize. And I think that is the sort of thing that should be there for all countries. And that is the reason why today we are part of the Wasanar Agreement, the Australia Group, and many other MTCR and many other international regimes that provide for cooperation in the nuclear field. Coming to the issue of accountability of investments, I'm not really sure what you mean. Of course, in US investments in India, US is one of the largest investor countries in India. The investments are made by private sector firms. In many of the cases, I think 90% of cases, these go through what is called the automatic route, which means that government is not involved in the approvals. You simply register your investment proposed online, and that approval is granted online. And you start whatever you have to do. If it's manufacturing or it's opening an office or investing in a certain area, you do that. Accountability comes under the institutions that are prevalent in India. You have the tax structures. You have the regulatory bodies. You have government policy, which is in place. It has to be within that framework. And I think the two countries have a fairly good double taxation avoidance agreement. We have fairly good structures that enable us to cooperate on investments in each other's countries. And many of this has become much easier. For example, the so-called angel tax on startups has become much easier and much more liberal for companies to deal with and to invest in India and vice versa. And I think there are safeguards in place that provide full accountability and transparency of the use of those funds. I think that is undoubtedly there. But it's not a regime that is very hell-bent and scrutinizing that. I think the important thing is that you bring your money in, you invest in a country, and you follow the rules and procedures of that country. And I think as long as that is done, I think that is fine with us. Well, on that note, I want to, on behalf of all of you, thank Ambassador Shingla for spending a couple of hours with us this morning. I want to see you back again here, sir. And so I look forward for every opportunity that your time will allow. I think they've had enough of me for the time. I'm not quite sure about that. I think we could have gone out for another hour. But I also want to thank all of you for coming this morning, for those who are watching this through the streaming or whatever technology we use to communicate these events beyond this room. I want to thank all of you for joining in. I look forward to seeing you back again at the Conagate endowment at some point in the not-too-distant futures. Thank you, and have a good day. Thank you.