 Good morning and welcome the United States Institute of Pieces delighted to welcome you to an important conversation on the National Intelligence Council's most recent global trends report. As many of you may know every four years since 1997 the Council releases this report, which looks at the forces that will shape the world in 20 years and what we can do about them. Issued during the worst global pandemic in 100 years, the report this year is particularly eye-opening. It looks at four big forces and projects the demographic, environmental, economic and technological changes that are likely to happen in the next 20 years and what they will mean to a world order that is already under stress and as COVID has shown fragile in ways that we might not have expected. The report examines the way these drivers will impact society, the state and the international system. Very provocatively the argue the authors argue that citizens are likely to be better informed across the world, but they also warn that in many countries as economic growth slows and the remarkable decades long progress we've seen across the globe and education, health and well being start to level off. We should expect that people will become more pessimistic, more disillusioned and maybe more divided. The authors also warn us that states will face more internal tensions and turbulence and the international system will be contested in ways it has not been before. The authors present five possible scenarios, some like the Renaissance of democracies are inspiring. Others, like the possibility the world will be more volatile in a drift in 20 years as international institutions fall aside or fail, are frankly much more sobering. Some, including the possibility of multiple global catastrophes including food shortages, rising ocean temperatures and mass social rest are frightening. This report reminds us that which scenario becomes reality depends on the choices that we make along the way. The USIP is pleased to lead a conversation on these issues in partnership with the National Intelligence Council. And we are delighted to have with us the reports lead author Maria Langev-Rikov, who's going to provide an overview of his key findings, followed by a distinguished panel of experts to discuss the reports implications. Please allow us to thank Ambassador George Moose, the Vice Chair of USIP's Board of Directors for moderating today's discussion. We invite everyone to engage with us during the conversation on Twitter with hashtag G22040. Before we turn to our panel, we're pleased to share with you a brief video message from the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines. Good morning. I cannot tell you how much I wish I were with you in person today, but I'm so pleased and honored to be able to help keep things off for this very special event. First of all, I'd like to thank President Lise Grande and USIP for hosting this conversation on our Global Trends Report with Maria, who was the lead author this year for the Intelligence Community. And as you may already know, the Intelligence Community has been publishing a Global Trends Report every four years since 1997. These reports are focused on assessing the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment for the United States during the next two decades. And as a standard practice in preparing these reports, Maria and her colleagues at the National Intelligence Council talked to students and scholars, to business leaders and activists, and to government leaders as they prepared this report, drawing from expertise around the globe. And we recognize the importance of getting such outside perspectives, the kind of perspectives that are represented on the panel today. And whether you agree with every aspect of the report or not, perhaps the most important benefit of these reports is that they spark a discussion and debate regarding our future. Moreover, they give us a rare opportunity to converse publicly about our work, which is fairly unusual, and learn from others about what it is that we may not be thinking about, but should be. And in my experience and the government both as a policymaker and as part of the Intelligence Community, I've seen how these reports can impact the policymaking process by helping policymakers look beyond the urgent crises to longer-term strategic trends that may require a shift in our national security strategy, the implementation of our policy, or how we organize ourselves. Even within the Intelligence Community, these reports help us to evaluate how we should be approaching the coming years. And this year's report was no different. In the context of the annual threat assessment and other public report we issue, we have taken pains to note that the Global Trends Report, which assesses that the world will face more intense and cascading global challenges ranging from disease to climate change to disruptions from new technologies and financial crises, compels us to recognize that we must broaden our definition of national security, integrate new and emerging expertise into our work, expand our partnerships and strengthen our institutions, and a diverse and talented workforce to meet the challenges of the future. And in fact, that doing so may be more important than anything else we do to promote the security of the country on a particular threat. In some respects, this is one of the few opportunities we have to reflect on the strength of the institutional frameworks that surround our work, which tend to be longer-term investments that are not well suited to the constant churn in Washington, but nevertheless are crucial to our capacity to promote resilience and innovation in the United States. I remember turning to USIP's board chair, Steve Hadley, for advice when I took on the job as Deputy National Security Advisor, and he told me that one of the key challenges of that job was figuring out how to focus on critically important longer-term trends that impact our national security while still managing the urgent crises that come every day. And he described his own efforts to address that challenge. That conversation comes to mind today, as that is in some respects the very definition of what we're trying to do with this report. And in doing so, we know how essential it is to talk to experts from diverse backgrounds and perspective. That's why I'm so pleased you will hear from such a terrific panel today, which I hope we can draw on from insights into future global trends that shape our future. Thank you so much for participating in this discussion. Good morning. It is great to be here with you this morning. I am Maria Langen-Rieckhoff, the director of the Strategic Futures Group of the National Intelligence Council. So to kick off our panel discussion and build on the introductory remarks by Director Haynes, I will provide some additional background on the global trends project. Then I'll describe how we approach this addition and finally give an overview of some of our key themes and findings. To start, what is this thing global trends? As mentioned, every four years since 1997, the National Intelligence Council has published a report called Global Trends. This is an unclassified assessment of those key trends and the uncertainties that are likely to shape our strategic environment over the coming years as well as decades. This report is always timed for the presidential election and is designed to provide a new or returning administration with an analytic foundation as they craft the national security strategy, the national defense strategy, as well as the national intelligence strategy. The goal is not to predict the future. We know we can't do that. Instead, it is to help policymakers see beyond the horizon and prepare for an array of possible futures. One of the challenges of a project like this is the magnitude. And we struggle with how to organize the analysis into a coherent, integrated, useful, and forward-looking story. We constructed this report around two organizing principles. First, identifying the broad forces that are setting the contours of the future. And then second, exploring how populations and leaders within countries around the world are likely to respond to and interact with these forces. With those ordering principles in mind, we built the analysis into three large sections. First, as already mentioned, we looked at the structural forces in four broad areas, demographics, environment and climate, economics and technology. We selected these four areas because they are foundational in shaping dynamics, relatively universal in scope, and we can make projections about them with available data as well as modeling. Second, we examined how these and other factors will intersect and interact with human choices to affect emerging dynamics at three levels of analysis. Individuals and societies, states and the international system. And third, we envisioned alternative scenarios for the world of 2040 to explore a range of possible futures. And to understand, again, how these structural forces and emerging dynamics begin to interact. As we constructed the analysis into these three sections, certain characteristics or themes kept reappearing. These formed the basis of our central argument, which is reflected in our title, A More Contested World. Over the next 20 years, we envision a future world that is more contested at every level, for more heated debates about the foundations of our societies, to greater political volatility in states of all types and in every region, to increasing US-China rivalry, greater challenges to our international order, and a growing risk of interstate conflict. So let me unpack these a little bit and show you how a number of themes really combine to the central thesis. First, as Director Haynes has noted, shared global challenges, including climate changes, disease, financial crises, disruptions from technologies, are likely to manifest more quickly, with greater intensity, and in almost every region and country. Often these challenges will be without a direct human agent or perpetrator, and could produce significant strains on our communities, our institutions, and our governments. Second, these challenges will be more difficult to address because of increasing fragmentation within societies, within our states, and the international system. Those very systems and processes that bring us together, including our communication technologies, trade, supply chains, the movement of people through travel, are simultaneously dividing us. Third, the scale of transnational challenges and the emerging implications of fragmentation are exceeding the capacity of institutions and systems, leading to the next characteristic, which we've called disequilibrium. In other words, we're seeing a mismatch at every level between the needs and challenges and the systems, institutions, and rules that we've designed to manage them. The fourth theme, contestation, returns us to the title and our core argument. We decided to elevate this one because we see all these conditions combining to produce greater contestation again at every level. When we raise contestation, many immediately think of geopolitics and the international system. And indeed, we do argue that the intensity of competition for global influence is likely to reach its highest level since the Cold War, and the risk of major power war are increasing. But contestation also extends to within our states and within our societies, where tensions are rising between populations, between populations and governments, between different elements of societies. And finally, in this more contested world, adaptation will be both an imperative and an advantage, a premium and a source of power and influence. This morning, I have only scratched the surface of this very long report. But if you're interested in learning more, you could find the full report on dni.gov. On the dni site, we have the full 20 year forecast, which I've described here, as well as a number of supporting pieces of analysis, including five year forecast for each region, and some deeper looks at individual topics we assessed as we built this bigger paper, including things such as the future of work, the future of international norms, and even a look at the future of the battlefield. With this very brief overview of global trends 2040, I will turn the conversation back to Ambassador Moose and our esteemed panel to offer their perspectives on some of these trends and themes. Ambassador Moose. Good morning. I have the distinct privilege of serving as the Vice Chair of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace. But I also have the pleasure of moderating today's panel on the National Intelligence Council's report. Global Trends 2040, a more contested world. But let me first begin by thanking Maria Langen-Repof for elegantly setting the table for us with a recogent summary of the report's key findings. I now turn to three distinguished international affairs experts and practitioners who have agreed to try to help us understand what the trends identified in the report, promise or portend for the world as we know it. Kamara served as both Foreign Minister and as Minister of Planning and Economy in the government of Mali before joining USIP this year as visiting senior expert for the Sahel region of Africa. Carter Ham is a retired four star general who was now the President and CEO of the Association of the United States Army. From 2011 to 2013, he was the Commander of US Africa Command. And David Miliband is President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee. He is a former member of the British Parliament who served as UK Foreign Secretary and as Environment Secretary. Our audience can learn more about each of our panelists by accessing their biographies on USIP's event website. I'd like to start us off with a kind of a top line question which I invite each of our panelists to address. And the question is this. What most struck or surprised or indeed frightened you about the constellation of global forces described in the global trends 2040 report and the implications for the world as we know it. David, might I start with you? Thanks very much, Ambassador. It's a real privilege to be on this panel and to be commenting on the report. Just by way of introduction, I want to say, first of all, that I do think we should understand the significance of the report that's being published. It's significant in this way. The claim of those who advocate autocracy as a means of government is that democracies can't do 20 year strategies. So it seems to me that we all of us in the democratic world owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Maria and Avril Haines as colleagues for their determination to disprove that claim. But we also have a responsibility to show that open debate can lead to strategy, not just confusion. So first of all, I think the stakes are quite high. Secondly, I do want to congratulate Maria on her and her colleagues on her work. I mean, this is a landmark report that she's produced and I think it's really well done. I want to pick out one line of the report that seems to me to be the most important of all. It's on page 101. And I don't just pick that out to prove that I've read the whole document and done my homework for this panel. But I do think it's the most important. And the reason why what they say on page 101, and unfortunately it's not any of the headlines, but I think it underlines a significant part of this report's conclusions. Page 101 says that the rule of law is going to be a contested concept in 2014, the international rule of law. I think it's impossible to overstate the significance of that claim. I think it's correct. I think it's significant because for all that we've suffered through the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and now what Ian Bremer calls the period of a leaderless world, a G0 world. The rule of law has been a uniting factor. We don't need to invent new laws. We need to live up to laws that have been promulgated after the Second World War on the basis of lessons of the interwar period and previously. And in that context, I think it's significant that my friend Rana Mitter, who's an expert on China, should be reporting and writing a book about the fact that the Chinese government wants to claim credit for the post-Second World War construction. They want to affirm, even though it was in pre-1949, that they've been affirming from the leadership down that the post-Second World War creation is something that the Chinese government wants to claim credit for and believe in. Now my point is that we're in a period where we're moving away from that rule of law. We don't have to look to 2040 for the erosion of the rule of law. It's happening now. It's what I call the age of impunity. And it's most evident the tip of the iceberg is in the war zones where the International Rescue Committee works. And I say the tip of the iceberg because we know that international law is absolutely clear about the rights that are meant to accord to civilians caught up in conflict. It couldn't be clearer. We're meeting in the week when finally the Red Comrade has had his sentence confirmed. But in the places where the International Rescue Committee works, the rule of law as it applies to the protection of civilians is less and less adhered to. We're meeting on the day of the report of 10 Afghan aid workers for the Halo Trust being killed in an encampment in the north of Afghanistan. And that experience is not atypical. It's increasingly typical. Civilians represent 70% of the victims in conflict today. And in the places where the International Rescue Committee works, adherence to the rule of law, the age of impunity is upon us. And so in my comments throughout the next 40 minutes or so, I want to come back to this, I think, most important finding prediction warning that comes out of this. Because without the rule of law, we're all lost. And it will be my thesis in the next 40 minutes in my various contributions that building countervailing power against the abuse of the rule of law is the central concern should be the central concern for those of us concerned with a more equal, more stable and more secure world. David, thank you for that. And thank you for reminding us that when we talk about the rule of law, it is not just applicable to the way states behave that in effect, those who are most affected by this erosion of the concept of the rule of law are ordinary people, ordinary citizens who are losing the protections that we have created over the years for their health and their welfare and their safety. But let me turn next to to commissar and tell us please what what struck you most about the global trends report. Well, thank you so much for for having me and I would like to echo David when he says that this report is very well done. I was surprised shop sometimes even scared as some some paragraphs that I read in the report. Again, it was very well done. And, you know, Africa is really my my region of expertise and what actually struck me is that over 150 some pages of the report Africa was only mentioned about 40 times. I was hoping to see a whole chapter about Africa being an untapped market as Africa being the next game changer within the next 20 years. As you know, investors are going into the continent and are looking at the demographic explosion and the young population as an opportunity for goods and services to be provided to the rest of the world. And so I did not see that. And so I'm thinking now while it was that, you know, wishful thinking is this not happening is Africa emerging a legend is Africa recording a legend. So, you know, I was asking myself that that question as I was going through the report. The second aspect that actually struck me and scared me because I work on specifically on the Sahel region and when we talk about the Sahel. We often mentioned the security challenges of the region, the jihadist threat of the region, and one paragraph in the in the report does say that global jihadist groups are likely to be the largest, more persistent transnational groups as well as a threat in the home regions. And it is also the report also says that these jihadist groups benefit from a coherent ideology that promises to deliver a million million Marion future from strong organizational structures and from the ability to exploit large areas of ungoverned and poorly governed territory, notably in Africa. The question is, are we ever going to be able to get rid of those terrorist groups that we have been talking about for the past 15 years in the Sahel region. Are we saying that they are going to be stronger and stronger and that government in that region and even the international community are not going to be able to face their sophistication. So these are the main thoughts that I have going through the report again it was excellent, but I would love for us to talk about the opportunities or the missing opportunities that the African continent offers. Thank you. And hopefully, we were hoping that that final question would be an opportunity for us to talk about the possibilities and the opportunities that exist in and as we read this report. But your comment also said to me something else which is that the trends and the forces and the drivers that are identified described in this report are layered on top of problems we already have. Which is the globalization of terror. And one of the questions therefore is how are these trends going to complicate and complexify the trends that we've already seen and perhaps that's a good sec wage set way to Carter Ham to tell us about Carter your your principal takeaways from from the report. Thanks, thanks George it's great to see you and thanks for the invitation to be a bit of a use an American baseball term a bit of a last minute pinch hitter for today's, today's presentation I very much appreciate that, and as David and as I said I congratulate Maria and the team for really an intriguing and insightful report and I appreciate the opportunity to, to review and comment that David I will say I did take a bit of validation from your comments, because just like you I have page 101 tag as a key part of the of the documents over those who have not read the report, go to page 101 first it's a good place to start. I think it's very, very interesting. So, as so I am who I am and I look at things through a military lens having been a soldier for for most of my adult life and, and during that time, spending most of that time during the cold war where global security global issues were were essentially framed, almost entirely by the Cold War by the by the bipolar nature, nature of things so I'm reading this report. I've seen that I don't think I read a report that that so coherently describes how significantly our world has changed from that admittedly dangerous, but frankly pretty predictable bipolar world of the cold world to where we are today. And as the report does I think a very good job of laying out the, the, the multiplicity of challenges, any one of which would, would by themselves be a significant challenge for the global community, whether it's whether it's global health whether it's a provocative China, whether it's climate, whether it's migration, changing demographics. And of course the issue suggests as domestic suggest the enduring challenge of the transnational threats terror, terrorism certainly in there. I think that's in very stark terms, it laid out to me that the incredible challenges that leaders face today of addressing those very those often in almost always interconnected challenges, very serious. And this is a great takeaway to all to all of us in the complexity that it takes to do, but I will tell you that the other, the other great takeaway is, is that the outcomes are not predetermined. The report I think lays out a great map to say here are here are many of the challenges the most significant challenges, but but they also offers the report also offers some insights into how those address those challenges might be addressed to perhaps give the opportunity to achieve a more positive outcome than might otherwise occur if we decide to not confront the confront the challenges. So I again I applaud the, the, the Council for a great report I really have enjoyed I'll read it again. And I found it very very useful and hopefully that the leaders, both public and private leaders around the globe will find it similarly helpful. Thank you quarter I think for all of us that report will be very dog ear by the time we finish reading our readings and rereadings of it. But thank you also then for reminding us that the outcomes here are in fact not predetermined and in fact one of the benefits of the report is that it shows us where we have decisions to make, and how those decisions could in fact impact the various scenarios that the report identifies. So, David let me turn to you next if I might as somebody who's read this report closely over many many years. What most struck me about this year's report is the elevation of the theme of fragmentation as one of the dominant features of the landscape certainly fragmentation has been with us before, but perhaps not to this degree not to this effect. The report describes how this phenomenon manifests itself at every level of governance both within societies and among societies. And so the question I would have for you what are what do you see as the implications of fragmentation for our ability to deal with the agenda of urgent global challenges such as climate change and pandemic disease and, and of course poverty and inequality. Thanks ambassador to very good question. I've learned in America that when people say that's a great question. It generally means that they're buying time to think about what on earth the answer is so when I say that's a great question. I mean it in more ways than one. Look, this is fragmentation at a particular time was I think the fragmentation is right, and it's fragmentation at a time of growing interdependence. And it's worth pausing on that. Because you might think that fragmentation would occur at a time when people are less and less connected. But actually, we've got fragmentation sometimes localization sometimes called, I don't know, retreat into nativism. We've got growing fragmentation which I think is a undoubted trend at a time of growing interdependence. And so to directly answer your question the implication is that we are going to get driven as a world into the tragic fifth scenario that Maria outlined, because if you have growing fragmentation in other words, what we call in Europe bigger my neighbor approaches approaches where localities or communities or sub communities or nations take their own course. America first China first Britain first you name it. If that happens at a time of growing interdependence. In other words when we're actually more dependent on the actions of others for our own prosperity and security. That puts a very big red flag that there's trouble ahead, because the global commons is going to be under managed at a time when it needs to be better and more managed. Now I want to just say two things to condition that and caveat that one is that while it's true that there's growing fragmentation. I think I didn't notice in the report much recognition that there's also new connections new assertions of common experience news reaching across lines of region religion. So I think, for example, about the global movement for women's equality, gender equality that stretches across time and space, and there are new connections being forged that in a way defy a singular trend of fragmentation. And I think you can think of that in other areas as well. So the first point I want to make is yes, is it would be wrong to blind ourselves to shield ourselves from the realities of fragmentation. But I think we've also got to recognize that in a world that is more connected than ever before. There is also cultural political ideological connections that haven't existed before, and some of those are positive, not just negative. So I think that's an important thing to assert more and more people are saying, well, hang on, if people can have those rights there, why can't we have those rights here? The second thing is I want to put on the table that if you buy the argument that there is fragmentation at a time of growing interdependence, it's important to drill into what might be the resolution of that. And I just want to give an example in respect of global health, which you did mention in your question. I've recently served on something called the Independent Panel on Pandemic Preparedness and Response, which was established by the World Health Assembly. And there's essentially a very simple lesson of the current pandemic. It's not that global institutions are too strong and too bossy when it comes to dealing with global problems. It's that they're too weak and underpowered. And that's certainly the case in respect to the World Health Organization. It's not just underpowered in the sense it doesn't have rights of inspection to inspect and investigate potential pandemics. It has nowhere near the powers of the International Atomic Energy Authority, even though global pandemics are signally dangerous for the world. It's also underfunded. It's funding is also marked by fragmentation, actually. The second biggest funder is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, even though the World Health Organization is an international body and the clue should be in the name, international. It should be a body of nations. Now, that's even before you get into the business of the US pulling out of the WHO temporarily. Now, our Independent Panel on Pandemic Preparedness and Response argued forcefully for a more powerful WHO, but also made the point that pandemics cannot be addressed solely by health ministers. They need political leadership ahead of government level. So we advocated for a global health threats council. And we made the argument that if such a council had been in existence before COVID, then the warnings that were coming in January and February wouldn't have led to the lost months at the beginning of the pandemic. There would have been political leadership to say this pandemic is coming to get us unless we react as a global community. And we're not just playing with hindsight there after the Ebola outbreak in 2016, the Kikweti Panel did recommend a similar heads of government level engagement with issues of pandemics and the proposals were diluted and never properly acted upon. So I think that if you buy, if you want to follow through the logic of the report about fragmentation in an age of independence, if you want to recognize that there are new connections being forged by social movements across the world. And I think you have to take on the chin, the implication that we need stronger international, not just coordination, but executive capacity if we're to govern this interdependent world in an effective way. And the only way to give that legitimacy is for the leaders of nations to come together in a systematic and more effective way. David, thank you for that. And I do appreciate very much your, if you will, doubling down on the importance of strengthening those institutions that we do have in order to enable us to better respond to this current challenges that we face. And one of my concerns, frankly, in reading the report is that it might lead some folks to conclude that it is a fool's errand to try to reinforce and strengthen and sustain and repair and make fit for Purse's purpose, the institutions we have. On the contrary, if we fail to do that, it seems that we are disarming in the face of the very challenges that we confront. Now, but let me ask, Kanesu, what would you wish to, what might you wish to add to what to attract from what David has put on the table? So I agree with David that it is quite paradoxical to talk about a fragmented world when we are increasingly interconnected. And I would go as far as saying that it is because we are so interconnected that technology has brought us very close to one another that we're all trying to find our own ways. And that might have actually contributed to the fragmentation of the world as we are seeing it. I'm looking at the way the COVID pandemic was handled in the Western world. When the Western world was hit very hard by the pandemic, the African continent wasn't as much. And so the question of vaccines, for example, was not such a priority for African countries than it was for Western countries. But now we're seeing Western countries trying to get the vaccine and distributed widely when African countries are being left behind. And so that might also be a symptom of this question of fragmentation that we are continuing to see in the world moving forward. It might actually even be dangerous and we might try and find a way to manage it, thanks to this connectivity that's bringing us together. Thank you very much for that contribution as well. You know, Carter from, again, from a military perspective, this phenomenon of fragmentation has to be concerning, considering that so much of our international defense relies on trying to bring various partners and allies together. So how do you see the implications of this? Thanks, George. And I think both David and Commissar's comments about this, the idea of fragmentation is readily apparent to each of us, but it's kind of paradoxical. You see how is fragmentation occurring when we have tools that offer us the opportunity to be so much better connected. We see fragmentation as the report lays out at the community, societal and national levels. At the same time, we see in the economic sphere, we see global companies operating in a way that is contrary to that fragmentation. And global giants, economic giants that are operating around the world, they have found a way to work through or beyond or differently than the fragmentation that is occurring societally. It might be interesting to compare, you know, how is the private sector able to operate more effectively globally where public and governmental institutions, international organizations have had certainly some challenges. From a military standpoint, fragmentation certainly is an enduring challenge as evidenced in the United States national defense strategy and the interim national security strategic guidance by the current US administration. The US reliance interdependence with allies and partners remains a cornerstone of our national security and finding ways to maintain those alliances, finding opportunities to strengthen standing alliances. NATO probably at the top of that list is important, not lost to anybody that the President Biden's first trip underway today is to Europe and as part of the reassuring US role in NATO. Increasingly as the report lays out, the US is going to find itself, perhaps, while remaining firmly embedded in the standing alliances that we have around the globe, but more and more reliance upon ad hoc or temporary alliances and partnerships that are focused on a specific problem set as we do move forward. That becomes, again, very difficult in this fragmented cultural environment at which we find ourselves operating. And I think the only way you counter that is through persistent engagement, through persistent communication. And the more we can do that, not just in the military domain, but in all domains, then at least affords the opportunity perhaps to counter some of the effects of fragmentation. Thank you for that. And I think it's true not only in the security realm, but as David said in the outset, it certainly is conceivable in my mind that we can build a common agenda around these issues of pandemics. I mean, if there ever was an issue that ought to bring us together, it would be that and that if we choose carefully the issues around which we want to build our partnerships and our alliances, perhaps we can counter this trend that we are seeing in terms of fragmentation. But let me complexify this even more. And let me turn next to turn this question to you, can I say, because one of the things that the report also documents is this growing this equilibrium between the needs and the demands of citizens and what states and international institutions can provide. And this this equilibrium is, I think, especially acute for marginalized communities whose rights are often seen as secondary to addressing the challenges that are threats to national or international security. This deficit in governance capacities, I think can be clearly seen in the response to COVID-19 and the related economic crisis. How should we approach this challenge this problem of this equilibrium and the challenges that it presents. Well, thank you for this very, very difficult question. Maybe, building on what we just said about this fragmentation. I think, like you said, it is further complicated by this disequilibrium that you you're mentioning. I was minister for over two years in a developing country, and there was a real challenge in understanding citizens' demands and also in communicating what the state could do with the means that it had available. And it was a huge challenge that was further complicated by social media, actually, because what we were seeing is that we were being criticized every step of the way for not doing this or that or for not reacting as soon as possible. When we knew ourselves that we did not have either the financial means or the political means to actually do the things that the citizens needed. So we always found ourselves facing those citizens that we were supposed to serve, but not being able to do our job basically. And so I would go as far as to say that this disequilibrium question in developing countries is also a competing priority between domestic expectations and international pressure. Most developing countries are, and I'm not saying this in a negative way, are playground to international powers. And so they are in your country or they're helping you with X, Y and Z, and they might even have more power than you do as a government. And so as such, they will impose their priorities when you know that they are not compatible with what your citizens are demanding. And so that is a constant battle that development countries are facing on a day to day basis. I will also add to that, that on the African continent and the report says it very clearly there is a demographic explosion. Most of the population 50% or even more or 15 or under. This is unbelievable, mind-boggling. And you can add to that that these folks, these young people are on social media every day and they're seeing what is happening in other countries. And they're comparing themselves to Americans, to British, to South Africans when the country that they live in does not have the financial means or even the vision to put them there. So this has grown into contestation, which is increasing in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Sahel region, which is a region I know very well, and an increasing battle between the youths and the leaders they think do not understand what their needs and their expectations are. And so, you know, looking at the report, I was trying to see maybe a glimpse of hope, some, you know, where the report would say somewhere that this question will be solved. But it looks like it's going to be more and more difficult as the years go by. And indeed, and highlighting the conjunction between that population explosion on the one hand, youth bulge, and the intersection with social media, and the impossible situation that puts governments in because there is no way that any government is going to keep pace with the demands and expectations of citizens fed by that phenomenon. But it also, Carter, raises, I think, some very serious concerns about security, because in that midst of drivers and forces, one can easily see the makings of not just social protest, but more militant protest. How do you do that? Yeah, George, I think that's exactly right. And certainly this idea of disequilibrium, I think, is a great term to capture what's happening. And so it isn't just this mismatch between the expectations of a people and the ability of a government to deliver. But it certainly encompasses local and national security as well. The two are very closely intertwined and, you know, commit to noses far better than I do. But certainly, you know, when people do feel disenfranchised, that certainly opens the door for extremist organizations to recruit, to foment unrest, to seek separatism, all the negative consequences that result from that gap between expectations and ability to deliver. I think there are, but I think there are some reasons for hope. And again, commit to noses far better than I ever could. But if you look at the African Union and its regional economic communities that have tried to take this, take a more localized regional approach to some of these challenges, rather than bias upon, you know, international organizations and others to say, okay, we're going to first try to do what we can do ourselves. Maybe we need a little bit of help from, you know, from, from, you know, larger nations and maybe some help from international organizations. But to me, it's not a bad model. It's not a perfect model. But I think there are enough examples where some of the regional economic communities in Africa have been able to make progress. I think that's a place to look. Absolutely. This, you know, this equilibrium is not going to be addressed tomorrow. This is as was stated in the, in the opening comments. These are long term. These are generational issues, and we don't like those. Right. I mean, I want to solve this problem tomorrow. And that's just not the nature of this problem. So a little bit of patience. I would offer one, one US example of that. And that's the, you know, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, HEPFAR. George, I know you know very well about that. And others do as well. You know, it's been a pretty successful program. It's been enduring over multiple administrations in the United States. It has had, I think, a positive effect. You know, what it, what it says to me is that the principal way to address this equilibrium is through investment in human capital. And I think that's a way that international organizations, larger nations can help communities in developing nations the best. Thank you, Senator. Thanks for that. I too have often cite our, the global response to HIV AIDS as an illustration example of what we can do when we put our hearts, our minds and our money behind a project to address a major challenge. And so perhaps we will remember that going forward. But David, it's not just governments that face this, this challenge of the expectations and demands of clients, particularly those we are serving on the one hand, in our capacities. And how do you see this challenge from the perspective of IRC? Well, I don't, I'll interpret your question, but broadly and generously say two things. One, just be aware, you said, Ambassador, that all governments are unpopular, they can't satisfy the demands of their citizens. I'm quite struck a year into COVID, not by the unpopularity of incumbents, but actually by their relative popularity. If you think about the leaders who are going to meet in the G seven democratic countries, actually President Biden is pretty popular. Now, you could say, oh, well, he's new. I mean, Mrs Merkel, she's been there for 16 years. She's on 82% popularity. Well, you could say, well, she's on her way out. So everyone likes people when they're on the way. President Macron, he's in the 40s. Boris Johnson is not my party, but he's actually pretty popular. So just a small coder. It's, I don't think we should convince ourselves that the electorates are completely unreasonable or unsatisfiable. People actually have a set of expectations, which I don't think are outlandish. And anyway, as a matter of fact, it looks like incumbency isn't. I mean, there's a famous Prime Minister of Luxembourg who said about 10 years ago, we know what to do, but we can't get elected if we do it. It's not entirely clear that that is actually the situation today. Sorry to mention it, but President Trump, many people would argue that he fouled up pretty badly on the corona. He actually got more support in the 2020 election than he got in 2016, even though he lost. There's something interesting going on. Incumbency isn't a certain root to defeat. Secondly, I want to go back to your very interesting way you phrased the question about disequilibrium. And you took that from the report. Ultimately, disequilibrium comes from imbalance of power. That's the fundamental source of disequilibrium. And that power can be hard or soft, it can be economic, it can be political, it can be security, as General Ham has said. But what I see is a dangerous disequilibrium in the exercise of power. And interestingly enough, what General Ham said about global business, which works around national regulatory and tax systems, not just with them, is a further example of the imbalance of power. What he said at the beginning about the weakness of the rule of law in the places that we work, that's imbalance of power. Impunity, which I mentioned at the beginning of this session, is above all an expression of an imbalance of power because it means that those in power feel that they can get away with anything. That the law is for little people, the law is for suckers, and that actually those with power can exercise it in a way that has no fear of justice or of accountability. And it seems to me that if you buy that argument, that the disequilibrium that we see around the world and that we fear in the report, flags of fear, if you buy the argument that fundamentally it's a disequilibrium of power, then the only answer to that disequilibrium has to be related to the question of power. You can't restore equilibrium in the balance of power if you don't address issues of power. And that's why I come to this notion of countervailing power. If there's power being exercised without accountability, without checks and balances, the only response that will have effect is countervailing power. Now that countervailing power can come from the actions of governments, and both my co-panelists have referred to this, the way in which governments come together. Countervailing power can come from civil society organizations, you've mentioned my own, we're a $900 million organization, but we don't overestimate our power, but nonetheless civil society has countervailing power. So does business have countervailing power and citizens have the means of making countervailing power. If I think about the situation in Syria where hospitals have been bombed, where civilians have been killed. The greatest countervailing power hasn't come from UN commissions of inquiry, it's come from independent civil society organizations reporting on what's happening, making it safe for citizens to report. And then interestingly, the German government prosecuting Syrian generals under universal jurisdiction. So I just say to you that if you buy the analysis about disequilibrium of power, then the resolution must come through a countervailing power. I didn't invent the idea, I'm sure you know this, but for the benefit of our audience, countervailing power isn't my idea. It was coined by John Kenneth Galbraith in the 1950s in a book that he wrote called American Capitalism, The Case for Countervailing Power. And the countervailing power he was talking about was against the power of big corporates in America. And what I'm saying to you is that we need countervailing power as an organizing idea globally. And it needs to come through public action, through governments, it needs to come through private action, through pressure on companies. But to your point, it should come from the role of civil society as well. Sorry for the long answer. No apologies needed, I think it's a wonderful answer. And I couldn't agree more. Typically when we see disequilibrium or we see inequality, it is a reflection of a disequilibrium in power. And that's just what perpetuates it. And so that to your point, if one is serious about correcting that, one has to examine the structures of power and try to find ways in your example of finding countervailing powers that will offset that and that will introduce greater accountability into the system. Let me, we are running long, but that's all right. I've been told that we can run a few minutes long and certainly the topic is worthy of the time we're devoting to it. But let me turn to our next to last theme, which is the theme of contestation. And so, and I'd like to start if I might with with Carter on this one. So just as fragmentation has been given an elevated status in the current global trends report. And those two has the theme of contestation. It's become clearly and the most prominent feature, and no longer no longer a deniable feature. This rivalry internationally and not least of course, the rivalry between the United States and China. One of the three possible strategies for managing this rivalry as outlined in the report. The most optimistic one is a what they describe as a renaissance of democracies and which democracies come together to try to defend a reinvigorated liberal world order and going back to David's point, one where we attempt to preserve and restore this concept of the of the rule of law. Given Carter given the trends laid out in the report. How realistic, do you think this scenario truly is. And what would be the key elements of that strategy that might get us there. Well, it certainly is they be from a US perspective or Western perspective, it's certainly the most optimistic and perhaps the most desired outcome of those postulated in the report. I mean, you might have a differing opinion of that outcome to be sure. And it is I think again from through my US lens, it is the outcome that I would hope for, but I but I read several years ago, a book by former US Army Chief of Staff Joe Gordon Sullivan that said, hope is not a method. Right, so we might hope for that outcome. But to recognize that that unless we take positive concrete steps to lead us to that outcome. That outcome, I would argue is the is the least likely of the proposed outcomes that are listed in in the report. So most desired least likely leads you with a pretty wide gap of how would how do you change that. How do you change how you increase the likelihood that that is an outcome that that that you might that you might achieve. And I think many of the issues that we've talked about here it is addressing. I think fundamentally as Davis said it is addressing those issues of power. The other ingredients that are discussed here it is seeking as I think President Biden said in his upon departure for his European travels is is looking to kind of rekindle that community of like minded democracies to say you know what are the how can we how can those nations operate together more effectively to address the problems the common problems that that exists. So it is finding those, you know that connective tissue amongst like minded nations that allow us to address those, but also seeking opportunities to engage with, you know with China with Russia with other nations that may not have and also certainly do not have a similar view of what the future should look like and seeking to find where there is common ground as seeing where perhaps we can find opportunity there. But the reality is that we live in a competitive world. And I and I think the challenge moving forward for nations is that how do you compete in all the various domains without without allowing that level of competition to blend into conflict. And it's certainly again through my military lens that's what that's really what deterrence is about but I think it leads us to a different view of deterrence that is much broader than purely military deterrence. There's economic informational probably technological elements to deterrence as well. I think we need this time for us to have a rethinking reshaping of what deterrence is so that we increase the likelihood for that positive outcome by 2040. And so you said earlier, talking about foreigners and external actors present in your space and the ways in which they impact challenges of governance. And what we are seeing of course in the report documents is that we're having more of these external actors who are seeking to play roles and to intervene in these spaces. How do you see this question contest station and its implications particularly for developing countries. So there are multiple implications of constant contestation in developing countries. First of all, you know there is no democracy without contestation so contestation in itself is not is not a bad thing. And I think for policymakers for rulers it does provide an opportunity to better understand what citizens are asking asking for or asking about or challenging. And it is an opportunity for policymakers and rulers to get closer to citizens so that's one point that I wanted to make the second one is what we are seeing in developing countries where international, well, I would say traditional international powers are at play in facing contestation against those those international actors. We're seeing again in Africa, Africans saying well we are challenging the old world order. We do not want our old colonizers to come and tell us what to do. We don't want to use their currency anymore. And we want to take ownership of our own security, our own economy, and our own governance standards, because we feel that governance standards that have been played in our countries have been imposed to us by our former colonizers. We are seeing an old world order that is being challenged on a day to day basis. And I do feel that looking forward looking towards 2040-2050 things are just not going to be looking the same. I don't know where they're going to be seeing. Again, I have heard in the opening remarks for introducing the report that the report is not predicting the future, but we can sort of guess that, yeah, the world is just not going to look the same in 2040 or 2050. David, not to set up an opposition here, but you talked earlier about some of the benefits of that old order in terms of the rule of law and the protections that it attempted to afford, particularly to ordinary citizens. And I wonder, in light of what Kinesis just said, how do you see this issue of contestation affecting the ability to sustain those aspects without throwing the baby out of the bathwater as it were? I very much agree with what Minister Kamara said. And just to be clear, the words on the paper of the foundation of the United Nations did not constitute an order. They constitute an aspiration. I mean, the phrase rules-based international order might have been better if it had called a rules-based international aspiration because there was no golden age. And it's very important to be clear about that. But my point is the standard was set. Now, all sorts of countries failed to live up to it, some with hypocrisy by saying they would but then not. Others never signed but never intended to. So I think that I'm not saying we need to go back. I'm saying we need to go forward in a way that honours the aspirations that have been set, which were universal. They were about individual rights, which remember the post-1945 order wasn't new in saying that states should have rights. That had always been said since 1648. What was new was saying that individuals should have rights alongside states. It was new in all countries signed up, whether you were a communist or capitalist, whether you were a Democrat or an autocrat, all countries signed up to that international set of aspirations. And thirdly, it was new because new institutions were set up to forge the compromises that would move towards that goal. And so my, what I see today is contestation of power. Now, what's interesting, and I live and work in New York, the International Rescue Committee is a global organisation. It's U.S. headquartered, but I'm not an American resident, not an American citizen. But countries that want to defend those aspirations need to practice what they preach first because unless you practice what you preach, no one's going to follow you. And so the work that you're doing to restore the rule of law at home, that's important to this, the work you're doing to ensure that America or the administration is doing to say that America will follow the international rule of law. That's essential because no one can, you can't call for others to do what you're not willing to do yourselves. But the contestation is obviously real. Personally, I'm skeptical about the idea of a G2 world, that everything is going to resolve down to a conflict between America and China. But this is a much more nuanced debate than we can have in the last 30 seconds. What I would say is one, practice what you preach. Two, those who are willing to practice what is preached in the UN Charter and its associated documents need to work together. Third, to your point, Ambassador, on climate, on COVID, there is massive strategic interest in all powers working together. But they've got to suspend some of their shibboleths if they're going to be able to be effective in doing so. David, thank you for that. I'm going to invite us all now all of you to close us out on this theme of adaptation because it seems to me just precisely to your point, your final point David and to yours, it is in the adaptation, our ability to adapt our processes, our procedures, our conceptualizations that we have the greatest possibility, the greatest promise for helping us forward. And so let me start, tell me what it is that what is it out of this that you see is promising as optimistic as something that offers a promise of helping us get through this next era of challenge between now and 2040. I think technology is the big theme that will take more and more importance in the next few years. And we're talking about connectivity infrastructure related to connectivity. And I would say a more and more or a larger implication of citizens and in the way that they are being governed. And I think technology is really the big disruptor in the next few years. And I'm not sure how to explain or even think about the adaptation process because we are adapting and looking at the way that we have been handling the COVID pandemic and the way we have been making sure that business goes as usual. And we're even improved. I think the way that we've conducted business during the COVID pandemic. Thanks to technology. I think that we are we have been adapting. And this is a trend that will definitely continue in the next few years. Thanks, Commissioner. We haven't talked much about technology, but I think we need obviously needs to talk more about it in our future conversations. But Carter, to you, what do you see as this potentially promising out of this set of scenarios have been described. I do agree that I think there's lots of hope in technology and what that but that might offer there's risk, obviously inherited technology as well, but there is great promise. I think from this report, I think greatest hope in the promise of youth. As Commissioner said, you know, the burgeoning youth population in Africa and other places. There's opportunity there. There's also great risk if not if not, you know, well led and and and take an advantage of but I think, you know, a younger population that is more interconnected again, largely due to technology less constrained by the Cold War thinking of people like like me. I think there's great, great hope and great opportunity in the youth population that can lead us to some of the more positive outcomes that are postulated in the report. So for me, it's investment in human capital, and particularly the youth across the globe. Thanks for that Carter. Actually, David, that sort of brings us back to a point with which you began looking at the possibilities for new connection, and you mentioned women, for example. So what would you have us go out on in terms of an observation about the way forward. I'm going to be very brief, but I hope not fall into the trap of being too glib. And that is to say, the resources for making a better world have never been greater. So we haven't got the excuse not to use them well. True. That's, and we tend to forget that we look around and we look at the scarcity of resources. But in fact, if you look at what our economies are generating in terms of output, the scarcity of resources should not be a pretext or an excuse for addressing these problems. Well, look, obviously, we could, we've only begun to scratch the surface of this very, very rich report. And then we hope, however, that this conversation will encourage our audience to spend some time with it as well. And I want to thank sincerely our panelists for watching this discussion, this discussion, and for helping us understand it's wide ranging and it's far reaching implications. It's clear from what they have shared with us this morning that the forces and trends described in the report are destined to impact every aspect of our lives. And in most instances, not necessarily for the better, but that within that, there are possibilities and opportunities for progress. Our panelists certainly described these forces and the ways in which they are compounding and complexifying the problems that we already have. And I think most ominously, they have described how these forces are challenging and threatening the very systems and the very structures of governance that we have traditionally relied on to help us manage these international problems. And the assault on those structures of governance can be seen at all levels, national subnational regional and global. But I think the takeaway for me is that we cannot cannot allow these impacts, the impacts of these forces to become a pretext for despair, or for an action. On the contrary, that we must instead seize this moment to preserve, to sustain, to reform, to rectify the systems of, to adapt to the systems of international institutions and relationships that have been key to our ability to manage problems in the past, and to find ways to make those systems relevant to the challenges of the future. With that, on behalf of the US Institute of Peace, I would like once again to thank our outstanding panelists for sharing their valuable insights on where the world might be headed and what actions might be taken today to ensure that the world we meet in 2040 is indeed a more peaceful and secure one for all of us. Let me thank again, Director Haynes for her outstanding and her outstanding team at the National Intelligence Council and notably to Maria for their work in producing this current edition of the Global Trends Report, which has become an invaluable guide and tool for policymakers and practitioners, notably including those of us who labor in the humanitarian and peace building fields. And finally, let me express my sincere appreciation to our audience for joining us today. Thank you all, and have a great day.