 Good afternoon. I'm very pleased to welcome you to this event of the Institute of International and European Affairs. It's part of the Global Europe project, which is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. The project aims to analyze and communicate to the wider public the debate on the future of Europe, the EU's role in the world, and Ireland's role in the multilateral order. We're delighted to be joined today by Margaritas Schienas, the European Commission Vice President for Promoting Our European Way of Life. And I thank him for taking time out of his busy schedule to speak to us on the topic of EU migration and asylum policy. Vice President Schienas will speak for about 25 minutes or so, and then we will go to Q&A with our audience. Now you'll be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen. Please feel free to send your questions in throughout the session as they occur to you, and we will come to them once the Vice President has finished his presentation. You can also join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA. We are live streaming this afternoon's discussion, so a very warm welcome to all of you tuning in via YouTube as well. Now a reminder that today's presentation and Q&A are both on the record. I'd like to now formally introduce Vice President Schienas and then to hand over to him. Margaritas Schienas took office as European Commission Vice President for Promoting Our European Way of Life in December 2019 in this capacity. He oversees the EU's policies for migration, security union, social rights, skills, education, culture, youth, health and dialogue with churches, religious associations, and non-confessional organizations. Vice President Schienas is no novice to the Commission. He has held a number of very senior positions in the Commission, including Chief Spokesperson under President Junker and Deputy Head of the Bureau of European Policy Advisors under President Barroso and his experience is not confined to the Commission alone because Vice President Schienas also served as a member of the European Parliament between 2007 to 2009. So without further ado, I would like to hand over to Vice President Schienas now. Good afternoon. Thank you, Professor Barrett. Thank you all for giving me the opportunity to be with you today, although virtually but still being able to discuss migration. I would say from the very start that already from my previous professional lives, I'm a long standing supporter and admirer of the Irish Institute for International and European Affairs, and not only because my friend and former colleague Catherine Day always sang your praises. I'm also looking at your publications, past records that the Institute has not yet produced a publication on EU migration policy and the new proposals we put on the table so I hope that this is the beginning of a new relationship. The first stage or the incentive that you like that will make the bright minds in your midst to put pen to paper on this topic because migration and asylum policy is really a crucial one. It's a topic that affects our society, our way of life, it determines our policies, our politics, it's a cross-crediting issue that is with us and will stay with us. We also have to recognize that the EU cooperation in the field of migration and asylum is relatively young. Let's face it, has had a tough birth. The EU didn't get competence on asylum and migration until the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, and the first generation of the common European asylum system was only introduced back in the year 2000. So basically we are looking at 20 years of policy development. And these are issues as I was saying that traditionally are predominantly seen from a national perspective and consider to touch on core issues of sovereignty. And this is precisely why during these last 20 years, that perception was difficult to change. So, in a way, as it happened with the pandemic that shed light on the need for a European approach to health policy, a series of crises has also highlighted the need for a European and orderly approach to managing migration. Let's face it, dear friends, the system in place, the system we have in place was not designed to deal with the realities we're facing today. It places the burden entirely on member states of first entry and has no in-built solidarity mechanism. Rather than a system, I would call the current situation on migration and asylum a non-system, based on outdated concepts of a nation state managing its own small borders that doesn't match up to the need for a holistic, truly European approach. It didn't allow us to cope with a crisis with a major crisis of 2015-16, which shaped politics in many of our member states when 10,000 people were arriving every day at one entry point in the union. At the time, since that time, we had to start looking outside the system to cope with a crisis. And a lot of what we have managed to do by looking outside our system was done in a fragmented and ad hoc way. Let me give you some examples. We tripled the number of live XA boats at sea and created a CSDP operation to fight smugglers. We started putting in place systems in countries of first entry to screen and register all new arrivals. We started working with third countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the Western Balkans to address the situation there. We started raising funds to address the crisis in Syria and to address the root causes in Africa and our neighborhood. And we put a place at hoc, fragmented at hoc, separate solidarity mechanism. We did try back in 2016 to modernize our common European asylum system with a commission proposal. But we now know that it's never easy to have architects and firefighters working on the same site. It has often been the case in the past that leaps and bounds in the European integration have taken place in the height of crisis. But that was not the case in 2016. We managed to cope with ad hoc situations, but we failed to provide a single cohesive holistic framework for managing migration in Europe. Only with the benefit of a bit of hindsight and with the fact that we are now in a sort of grace period where irregular arrivals to Europe are at the lowest for years. That we can now have an opportunity to look for a much broader, more comprehensive approach to managing migration. As my former boss said, we have to fix the roof now that it has stopped raining. And this was my starting point when designing the new pact on migration and asylum, a set of reform proposals that we presented on last September. And which I'm delighted to be able to discuss with you today. Our proposal starts by recognizing that no EU member states leaves migration in the same way. And that each have very different but equally legitimate concerns, all of which deserve to be taken into account in any European approach. A major mistake of the 2016 proposal, which was a proposal by from the heart was that automatically created red lines and very deep gaps between competing blocks of states. And that's why with our new proposal, we're starting point is to recognize that everyone's concerns have to be accommodated and take it into account. In my own mind, I would like to, I always do to present our proposal for a new EU pact for migration and asylum as a three store building as a building with three floors. The first floor is the external dimension. We have to recognize that migration starts outside our borders. It was one of the stark lessons of 2015 that if we don't cooperate with countries of origin and transit red mission on issues like capacity building legal migration, we will never be able to manage migration internally. In fact, represents a change of paradigm in the way we engage with our international partners on migration, recognizing that this is a global phenomenon, which calls for global solutions and responsibility sharing. On Monday, 15th of March, we had a historic meeting jumbo cancel of foreign and home affairs ministers together in one virtual room for the first time since 2015. This was done, not as was the case of the time in the aftermath of the Lampedusa tragedy, but this was done under normal circumstances with our past proposal on the table, aiming at solely define the need for this paradigm shift. I was referring to earlier on the external dimension of migration. We know well that a one size fits all approach won't work in this area. And this is why we are putting the focus on comprehensive balanced win win mutually beneficial partnerships tailor made to each partner country specific situation interests and needs. We are determined to mobilize everything that the European Union has in our disposal to build the components of these partnerships. Not only investment or money, but also visas, trade preferences, Erasmus scholarships, we will do whatever it takes to help countries of origin and transit create the conditions for better lives for their citizens. Putting their lives in the hands of the smugglers and the Mediterranean or the gene and at the same time, we would ask for their cooperation in managing more effectively their borders and engage more forcefully with us on returns and read the mission. The second floor of the building. And of course, the emphasis on resilient system for managing the European Union's external borders. The external borders of the union are a common responsibility. And we need to ensure that they are managed effectively. And that we support the member states at the external borders in doing so. Under the new pact, they will be a new and mandatory screening at all borders, allowing for directing people immediately to the right procedure with strong fundamental rights monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that this is done right. Alongside the new border procedures, we will create a seamless procedure at our external borders, which ensures people are quickly channeled to and through the right procedures. This is crucial because we have seen clearly in the past how inefficient procedures in the borders can cause hardship and dysfunction in the system. Keeping people in uncertain situations for long periods such as the situation in Lesbos or Calais. And this will be complemented by a new European ecosystem geared towards effective returns. Those Europe will continue to be an asylum destination for those who flee from dictatorship and oppression. But those who have no legal reason to be under the European Union's legal protection will have to be returned. So this new system of external management borders management or external border would be a crucial element of responsibility in the overall policy mix of the future European migration policy. This will be, of course, complemented by the reinforcement and building up of our new European Coast Guard and Border Guard Agency, Frontex, which will have a standing Corp of 10,000 staff by 2027 and an increased budget of 6 billion for the next seven years. Finally, the third floor of the building of the proposal. Would pertain to strong and fair solidarity and burden sharing arrangements. A credible European migration system must be able to provide for permanent effective solidarity. For all those who are by geography are the most confronted with migratory challenges. So this third floor is a key element of the overall architecture of the overall construction and the solidarity, of course, also has to be one of the details on the lessons learned and respects respective red lines. Solidarity will be the rule in the future European migration policy, but we feel that it is possible to combine the principles of flexibility with guaranteeing that effective solidarity is available when needed. So what member states can do is choose how they would contribute into the solidarity effort, not if they contribute. In other words, there will be no exit door from the solidarity floor. All these new proposals we're presenting under our pact must be seen as a connected whole as a connected circuit, not as the current patchwork of regulatory fragmentation that we were discussing earlier. The next proposal is for a system where there is one circuit and everything connects to everything else, screening, border procedure, asylum procedure returns solidarity, everything must connect seamlessly. This system should also look at migration from A to Z, which also means having credible legal migration and integration policies that will benefit European societies and economists now and in the long run. This is a much more effective and comprehensive governance system that ensures that solidarity is effective in practice and that the challenges of migration are addressed comprehensively, be it outside or inside our union. We will also continue to roll out further elements of the pact. In April, we'll come forward with a voluntary return and reintegration strategy, and we will also soon put forward proposals on the future of Schengen. These are the proposals for this new system on the table. Last September, 23rd of September, the pandemic of course has of course limited somewhat the ability to advance the discussions and the negotiations with a full ambition that I would have liked. But nevertheless, I believe that the discussions that have taken place so far and recently in the Jumbo Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs Minister last Monday do present a path forward of convergence. We think on these issues, despite their sensitivity, as issues where there is a wide recognition emerging that member states can no longer go it alone. In the area of migration and asylum policy, as much as in health policy, now is the time for Europe to come together around practical and fair solutions. I'm also convinced that this is an area where we need Europe the most. It remains the fact that the biggest pool factor for irregular migration to Europe today is precisely the lack of a proper and common European migration management system. This is what makes smugglers richer and richer. The fact that they somehow think that the lack of a system of a comprehensive system allows for the gaps and the cracks to be advanced exploited and this creates a permanent pool factor that we need to address. Now is the time, and I'll finish with that, to move away from these ad hoc fragmented solutions and put in place a common European framework to what is a common European challenge. I will stop here and look forward to our discussion. Thank you very much. Indeed, Vice President Skinas, that was a fascinating introduction to a topic which is of huge importance and relevance. So I'd like to invite those in the audience now, and we have a big audience of about 100 participants here today. The attendance at many of the Institute events has really been facilitated, I think, by the ability to watch them online, so we're delighted to have so many participants. So now is the opportunity, if you like, to pose questions relating to the topic addressed. I might abuse, if I may, my position as host by perhaps getting the ball rolling in this regard. First, maybe one question. The European Union is the world's largest provider of development assistance and the pact, of course, reasserts the Union's values and support for human rights. But is there nonetheless a reputational risk for the EU and associated with the past strong emphasis on effective returns and readmissions mechanisms and on legal pathways, and that would be one question. Secondly, if I could put, without overburdening you with questions, but if I could put a second question relating to two countries, what significance would you attach to the UK's changed status as a third country on this issue. And I suppose EU-Turkey relations would be another one there. They continue to be fraught in a number of areas, and yet the European Union and Turkey are condemned to interdependency, if you like, particularly on the issue of migration and asylum. So in this context, what scope would you see for continued constructive engagement between the European Union and Turkey within this new vision for EU migration policy. So I can't be accused of giving you two easy questions to begin with. Okay, thank you, thank you for that Professor Barrett. Let me start with the returns and readmission than the reputational risks or not. I think that the center of gravity of the pact is an effort that we intentionally made to find the right mix between solidarity and responsibility. Because one of the lessons we learned from our 2016 failure is that we came forward with the solidarity element with the third floor, without being able to prove that there is possibility elements were in place, the first and the second floor. Third countries and borders. So obviously, those member states who were rather reluctant, use this as an excuse to create the problem that the gridlock in which we found ourselves six years ago. So now we are creating a landing zone, or this notion of three floors, where we think that the right balance between responsibility and solidarity is very clear. On the responsibility side, we have this change of paradigm with third countries, where we will invest in these partnerships, which are not only good for us will be also good for them. So it would not be about us imposing anything to our neighbors and countries of origin transit but is also offering them the incentives to engage with us on a meaningful way of managing migration. So the two returns and read missions are part of this. They should not be demonized or should not be victimized. This is a part of the responsibility element, which is in, in turn is part of the responsibility solidarity equilibrium that we're looking for. Now, on the two countries, third countries. Now that you mentioned, of course there is, there is a difference. Because the UK the United Kingdom is a country of destination of reception, whereas Turkey is a country of transit, and sometimes also origin migratory flow so there is a difference on, on, on between the two. The UK did not want to have a migration chapter in the, in the, in the future relationship per se, we have agreed to continue talking on how we can enhance cooperation in the, in the issues of justice and home affairs to do more. But clearly the focus of the future relationship is, is on, on trade. And I think the time did not allow for, for, for more on Turkey on the contrary, we have the 2016 agreement or rather EU Turkey statement, which worked, which worked well. It's, it's a, it's a contract of mutual trust if you like, where both parts engage in a number of deliverables. Turkey is the country that hosts the biggest number of refugees in the planet, they have around four million Syrians that they, they live there. And our efforts were of course to provide for support to be receiving communities host communities in the national organizations NGOs to help accommodate Turkey and alleviate the burden that Turkey had to assume for these people. Now, this March on the 25th of the European Council of 25th of March, it is the five year anniversary of the, of the 2016 statement. I feel that there is scope to refresh this arrangement, not to conclude a new contract, but to review the contract and see how we can use fully expand our cooperation, not only in terms of money but also in terms of qualitative improvements. For example, consider if certain parts of the Turkish state apparatus that deliver services to the refugees like the health service or education ministries can become directly recipients of support. We can also see there are other populations other than Syrians that are there that need support so there is a sparing of openness and cooperation, this is also win-win. The European Council of last December specifically asked the Commission to consider this move and I think we still have what eight, 10 days before the summit, and we are still in time to do it. Thank you very much indeed for those very useful replies with quite a number of questions coming in at this date I'm delighted to say one of them is from former Irish ambassador to the United Kingdom Bobby McDonough. And he notes that you are commissioner for promoting the European way of life to the different attitudes to inward migration in Europe for example in Hungary suggests that there is no agreement on what that European way of life should be. Yes, I'm sure that many of the participants would have followed in December 2019 when my vice presidency was announced for the first time by President founder Lyon that followed the very, how should I call this, schizophrenic and self-flagellating debate on what the European way of life actually means, which says a lot about Europe that we have to like dispute or interpret differently what the European way of life means, taking into account that the rest of the world considers the European way of life as a model for most parts of the planet, but still, as it may, I think I had the chance to explain in my hearing in the European Parliament that I never saw this job as something that entails binary choices. It's not us or someone else. It's not us against the rest. The European way of life, it's not a bulldozer that would sort of crush everyone or impose our model to anybody else. I always thought that the European way of life and that's the spirit with which I'm working is more like a mirror that reflects the diversity of what the European Union represents today. The richness of our traditions, of our politics, of our culture, of our arts, of our languages, of our education system, and this is what makes us unique. This is what makes us being so diverse, but at the same time being able to be together democracies, protecting minorities, defending the role of women in society in the workplace, being the world champions of human rights, having universal systems for healthcare and education, taking care of our elderly, no death penalty. You can find bits and pieces of this elsewhere, but all this together basically you can only find in Europe. So for me, this was never something that should be used to polarize politics or face one another. This is what Europe is, is united through diversity. And I very much also like to recall President Macron's famous speech at the Sorbonne, who described the European way of life as the aggregate of a Europe that protects and the Europe that empowers. I think this is very much my job, a Europe that protects with policies like migration, security, public health, and the Europe that empowers, which is a Europe of mobility, European culture, education, skills, youth. So, yes, of course, in certain parts of our geography, there are political traditions that often project different messages. But I think that this overall diversity or overall unity in diversity is much stronger than we think and keeps us together. Great. Thank you very much indeed for that. And a question from Eiffa MacMachan now. Are there plans to broaden the scope of legal migration into the EU? For example, visas for long term low skilled work. It seems that there would be less unlawful migration. She argues if there were more legal routes. And also it seems that EU member states need low skilled workers. And she adds in, thank you very much. I think immigration was very informative, so a little compliment there as well. Thank you. I think she's absolutely right. Indeed. And I think I said it, probably not extensively, that there will be no overall success in migration and asylum policy unless we have a very strong integration and education component, at the same time, a legal migration component. The reasons are obvious. Not only demographics, Europe still faces a huge demographic challenge, but also we are facing a skills gap. Europe needs a skills revolution in the years to come. And in both of these areas, demographics and skills, legal migration can play an important role. Tactically, and we are on the record now, but I have no problem to say that we thought that introducing the legal migration dimension into the proposals for the EU pact would put together two very important subjects together. And practically in European policymaking, it's always easy to sequence important proposals. So we decided to do that sequentially. It will come. We have proposals on legal migration that will be coming later this year. Thank you very much. And a kind of question, if I may follow that with a further question from Nora Owen, who's a former Irish minister for justice, who's also in the audience. She, this is a question more or less on the borderline between the last two. Many people who are awaiting answers to their application for permission to remain in Ireland and have worked very hard providing service during the pandemic. Has there been any discussion on granting asylum or permission to stay or would a type of amnesty for this particular cadre cause a problem for the system? This is also a very interesting question. But as you probably know, under the existing system, all asylum decisions are national decisions. National asylum systems that govern this type of decisions. In our pact, we are aspiring to have a European way of managing migration, always with a very strong national asylum service component. But in under the new proposals, we also provide for a reinforced role for ESO, the European asylum agency, which will be helping national authorities. So I think this is a totally legitimate request to consider, but it does not depend from Brussels. This is something that would have to be discussed and decided upon at national level. Very good. Very good. And with a question from Connor Ryan, he first of all, thanks you for your comments and says that he has fond memories from hearing you speak a number of times at the College of Europe in Bruges. So that's good to hear. And now Connor wonders if you could convey if we could convey the following question to you. Is there really true solidarity among member states if countries like Hungary, for example, contribute to the new migration pact merely by organizing or facilitating returns or could contribute by doing that. And he notes that he remembers a director of Human Rights Watch describing this element of the policy as like asking the school volley to walk a kid home. So he wants to know if you've any, any thoughts in relation to that. I think one has to compare what happened back in 2016 with what we're trying to do now. Back to 2016. Let's face it, we failed. We failed for the reasons I discussed the overall balance responsibility solidarity was not there. Also, we were in the middle of the crisis so it's always difficult to have firefighting and architects firefighters and architects together as I said, and there was also another difficulty for those of you who remember that a few months ago we had decided to have a qualified majority in the council, a system of relocating people to within the European Union, and we did that against the countries of Central Eastern Europe and this created wounds that were very recent that were not healed when we came up with the proposal The starting point to answer Connor's question is that now we took time effort and we consulted at Nozean precisely to make sure that this landing zone that we are we have presented it's a meeting point where everybody can meet that we do not want to reproduce the red lines of 2016 but we want to create the conditions for an agreement. And we have to offer alternatives to different geographical settings, but alternatives that contribute to the overall functioning of the system. Let me give you an example. The system is designed to work from the moment that a member state at the point of entry pushes the solidarity button and requests a certain amount of solidarity and help from the union. The solidarity machine that is being activated by the commission, so we make sure that the member state that asks obtains a certain amount of support and help they need. We are confident that we can do that, that we can produce matching the demands with the offer. If there is a part of solidarity that is still missing, we can still have a second round of collecting contributions. And if at the end of the second round there is still something missing then Ultima ratio, it is up to the commission to issue an implementing act and impose the level of solidarity that's missing that's that's the overall system that's what guarantees solidarity permanently. Now, at the same time, those who are to provide solidarity, including countries like the one that Connor mentioned, should be given alternatives, but meaningful alternatives. And this idea of return sponsorship is not at all reminiscent of the bully who takes the boy back from school, no. On the contrary, it takes pressure off the system. It is not relocation, but it's a meaningful contribution because it takes pressure out of the system so meaningful contribution to the solidarity basket. These return sponsorships will be done with the help of Frontex and with the financial instruments of the community budget. And at the same time, there is a clause that's not very well known but there is a clause there that if a member state that assumes returns sponsorships fails to implement them fully. And this member state would be obliged to relocate those who have not been returned under the return sponsorship scheme. So, as you would see from the new system the new system is designed to create equilibrium at any moment at any time. The key to that is what I was saying earlier, that there is no way out of the system, there is no exit door, you cannot pay your way out of the solidarity obligations. And again, this is the notion of the landing zone, and this is why I'm personally I'm an optimist I'm a born optimist but I think that this time it can work. Optimism will prove justified. Dara Maloney has a question. Is an increase in staffing numbers and in their budget of Frontex's budget and in their numbers necessary, given that the number of migrants and asylum seekers entering the European Union reduced greatly in 2020. It is also true that we are now discussing migration in normal circumstances without the heat of the 2015 2016 situation. It is also true that this is not the result of, let's face it, let's admit it. This is not the result of our policy success. This is also related to the global hold that the planet is finding itself in due to the pandemic. At any moment, at any moment things can change. And is now an opportunity that we have is to plan and work under normal circumstances so that we are prepared against all all eventualities. Our projections here in the commission point to an explosion in demand for mobility that would follow the pandemic, we will go through a tsunami of mobility at all levels from tourism travel, Erasmus exchanges, academic exchanges, and migration of course is part of that so we have an obligation, we have an obligation, a responsibility and an opportunity to seize the moment and prepare against all possible scenarios, future scenarios. Okay, thank you very much. And a question from ifa Hanrahan. And could you please explain to me why it seems that unaccompanied minors fall through the EU immigration policy and the conditions of member states reception centers for unaccompanied minors seem to have different conditions or indeed a lack of suitable conditions at all. Yes, this is true. This is true. And it's part of the regulatory fragmentation I was referring to earlier as a general rule. Unaccompanied minors cannot be detained, but you would agree with me that unaccompanied minors should be protected and should be put in a safe environment and protected environment. It is true that different member states interpret differently this provision so we have all different kinds of situations. I think that especially in the member state I know best Greece that has been a tremendous effort now on unaccompanied minors not only to relocate them basically there are no unaccompanied minors located there are no unaccompanied minors anymore in the Greek islands, most of them have been relocated and we have a system in place with tutors that are in charge the national organizations financed by the European Commission. I agree with you that the situation is not uniform I agree with you that there is room for improvement. And that too goes through the European agreement on the fact that we need which will connect everything to everything. It's easier to to work on these sensitive areas with a packed in the static book than it is now. Thank you very much indeed. And we have a question from Donald Cronin of the Department of Foreign Affairs, I suppose it's a perennial one in relation to European affairs but it applies perhaps with particular force in this area. How best should we tackle misinformation with regard to, with regard to migration. It's not an easy one, because migration, as I was saying earlier, is directly linked to at the heart to the heart of politics of the political debate and political exchange. We have been calling both the Commissioner in charge of home affairs and myself for for two years now for a more sober approach to migration, we want migration to be a normal subject as as environment if possible as agriculture. But it is not the case because there is a direct link with political debate. There are, you know, political parties, political groupings that are single issue parties based on migration. So, the efforts to de dramatize migration are not that that simple. So, yes, we're facing with lots of disinformation, lots of conspiracy is in my previous life as chief spokesman for the Commission, I have seen my picture in billboards in parts of the European geography as Soros his friends as the Greek wants to Islamize his country and so on and so forth. There is only one way to cope with this sort of pathologies is fight back answer back debunk. We are trying to do this in the Commission, I think, since we are a prime target of these attacks. Now we also have developed the capacity to to respond in a way the era of innocence is over for us to, but there was always a limitation when you are attacked by the extremists by the populists to reply from from you know there is always an asymmetry between a vocal populist attack and the Brussels institutional response, which can never be equal in intensity, but I will say this. The best way to face to the populist phenomena and win the battle is to have a European agreement on the EU migration and asylum packed. Because those who have attacked or packed are mainly the extremists and the populists in Europe, not mainstream parties, when mainstream parties, we had an equal share of complaints and pain. For me, it's a good thing. It shows that there is a way to compromise where everybody protests. That means that there is room to get an agreement, but those who attacked violently the packed where the extremists and the populists. And we have two important fights against these forces in Europe. Next is the German legislative election in September this year. And the other fight will be the French presidential election in May 22. There is no better way to silence the populists by being able to show that Europe can produce agreements on difficult issues like migration. And this is a moment. We can do it. We can do it before the two elections. Ideally, we could do it in between. But if we do it after, I think we won't make a service to our democracy. We will have the extremists more. Okay, thank you very much indeed for that. And we have a question from Sarah West, who thanks you for your informative presentation. And she wonders if you could speak more about the new pre screening at borders where asylum claims would be initially assessed, which would take into account if there are low levels of successful asylum claims from their country of origin. And she asks, how can this be reconciled with the obligation to assess individual asylum claims. And I think that what I'm going to say is something between the first and the second floor of the building. When someone arrives at the external borders of the European Union, something needs to happen. It may as when someone arrives at the external borders of the United States or Australia or, well, I think in Australia it's not easy to arrive at the external borders unless you're part of the legal migration system but as far as we are concerned, we want to make a difference under the pact proposal that the entry into the European Union is not a trivial affair. That means that whoever arrives before filing for asylum would have to go through the so called screening procedure that would determine his background, the origin, whether he comes from a country that has a low or high recognition asylum recognition rates. We have to have him checked for health and security. This is obligatory. May I remind you that the butchers of Paris and Bataclan came through the Greek islands and found their way in 2015 from Syria to Central Paris in a week without any control, without any filtering, without any screaming. We need this screening procedure, the border. It is a procedure that would be fast, and we will seamlessly connect to the next stage which is the border procedure, which is the asylum procedure, but we need this first screening test. Of course, that would determine this connectivity of the system that I was referring to. Those who would not have grounds for asylum would have to go through a return procedure. Those who are security risk will not be able to apply for asylum. Health issues would need to be taken to special facilities, and may I say so, if I may say, this is not only something that you will see happening in the external borders of the Union in the Greek islands or in Canary Islands. This can very well happen in Dublin Airport or in Amsterdam Airport, because these are all part of the Union's external borders. We do need the screening procedure. We will have full guarantee of respect of fundamental rights, because we have provided for a reinforced role by the European Fundamental Rights Agency, who will be present in helping member states to handle these procedures according to our values and our principles. So yes, we need the screening procedure, and I think it's good that it's part of our policy mix. Okay, a question then that perhaps overlaps a little bit without with a question from Ross Fitzpatrick, who called attention to allegations that were made about from tax that it was involved in illegal pushback of migrants, which led, I think the UN Refugee Agency to call on EU countries to investigate and he wants to know what steps are the Commission taking to ensure that from tax isn't engaged in doing anything illegal in terms of pushbacks. Yes, I first of all I fully agree that all allegations pertaining to these kinds of incidents need to be investigated and not only as a means to attribute blame and demand responsibilities, but also as a major element of legitimizing the increased role that we expect from Frontex in the years to come. So these allegations have been investigated by the Management Board of Frontex, and these are 13 allegations at all they have been investigated thoroughly. And 10 days ago, the Management Board ruled that there was no involvement of the agency in this type of incidents. I repeat that we are the European Union and everything we do on migration and asylum would have to be compatible with our values and our principles cannot be at the expense of our values and principles. So everyone who aspires and is entitled to file for asylum should have the possibility to do so. But at the same time, the Frontex regulation clearly allows the agency to fight smugglers to ask smugglers to deviate from their course. Frontex is under legal obligation to help us face and respond to hybrid threats. May I remind you that a year ago in the Greek-Turkish land border in Evers, there was the weaponization, the instrumentalization of 20,000 poor people who were put in buses and were brought from Istanbul to the border with a promise to, you know, you will be in Munich tomorrow morning. Europe needs to be able to face, to defend the border, to defend our collective management of the border against all these threats, without putting in doubt the right of individual filing for asylum. I do not think that these things are antithetical. I think that they are perfectly, it is perfectly doable to combine effective border management control with the fullest respect of the legal rights of an asylum. Okay, a perhaps linked question to that comes from Adriana Parejo, who asks, would it be possible for Vice President Skinas to elaborate on the distinction between legal and illegal migration? I think what she's particularly concerned with and more in connection with the new pact is how asylum seekers can possibly reach EU borders regularly without resorting to smuggling, if you like, so thereby if you like becoming illegal migrants. Well, there is a terminology issue of migration policy. I think I do not want to discuss legal versus illegal migrant. I think the right term to use would be legal migration is a system that would bring people within the European Union on the basis of a well established legal procedure, be it through legal pathways or resettlement or on a skills based scheme, we have some pilot projects that work in quite well, I would say, in Northern Africa. So legal migration I think is clearly defined as that. Now, asylum is, of course, a process where individuals can apply for asylum but clearly there are relevant factors in this process named that our member states are obliged to consider, which other than security concerns of course is the fact of the high or low recognition rate, this is an important element that our member states can take into account. And rather than illegal migration, I would say irregular migration. Irregular migration are people individuals who do not flee persecution or dictatorship, which is a direct link to the asylum laws and the Geneva Convention but to flee from other conditions. And this is something that clearly would have to be established. So fighting smugglers is about fighting smugglers addressing legal asylum claims is a different thing. I mean, one can always be able to apply for asylum to file for asylum, but smuggling operations are illegal. So we do strike a right balance. And I think when we have orderly manageable mandatory flows this is, this is possible. When we have massive migratory flows this is practically impossible. When you imagine how we could process 25,000 people in Everest, who were brought there in an afternoon, and, and we're sort of throwing stones and organizing unrest. This cannot be managed. We're looking for a system where everything can be manageable. Asylum requests, returns and readmissions solidarity for those who stay speedy procedures integration into our societies. And this is what you find in the packet. Thank you very much indeed for that commissioner. There are in fact a range of further questions that I could put you but I see that we're actually coming up to two o'clock at the moment Irish time. So, having promised to keep the event to one hour only, I can only apologize to those either some excellent questions that that remain to be asked. Unfortunately, perhaps that might be something we have to do in the framework of the suggestives and examination of migration policy. I think and hopefully we might be able to call on you again at some stage in the future to address. I'm wonderfully and answering a range of questions as an academic. And I think I would feel quite challenged if I had a range of questions from such from containing such a broad number of issues. So it's wonderful that you came here and you were so willing to deal with those questions again. Great to have you back and we look forward to welcoming you not just digitally but perhaps actually in the flesh in the not in the not too distant future commissioner. Thank you very much. One of the first things I will do after the pandemic is to visit Ireland. This is something that I have very much present in my mind and be under no illusion. That would entail also visit to the Institute. Hope to see you all there. We will look forward to that very much. Thank you once again. Thank you.