 Well, good afternoon, everyone. Can I just remind everybody it's chat in the house rooms as usual? That is that the statements are on the record, and the questions and answers later are off the record. Excuse me. Could I also ask everybody to turn off their phones or put them on silent? We have a very interesting topic today, a new disarmament agenda, ensuring a safer and more secure world. I think we would all agree it's not quite as safe or secure as we would like it to be, and that the multilateral system is not as robust as we would like it to be. We have an excellent keynote speaker who will start off the discussion and will be followed then by a response. Izumi Nakamitsu has a very distinguished academic career in Japan before she came to the United Nations, where she has worked in a very broad range of areas, including peacekeeping, UNDP, policy and planning, I think also, but she ended up with probably one of the most important jobs of the system, which is under Secretary-General and high representative in the disarmament affairs area. She will talk to us about the Secretary-General's new program, his Agenda for Disarmament, which attempts to mainstream disarmament issues throughout the UN system and attempts in a very imaginative way to relaunch the disarmament agenda in the global international community. After Izumi Orlithet-Smarris, who's the director for disarmament affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs, will outline Ireland's response to the agenda and also Ireland's priorities in the disarmament field at the moment. Izumi, would you like to start off, please? Thank you. Thank you very much, Mary, for that exceedingly kind introduction. I was very, very much looking forward to this opportunity to visit Dublin. It's not the first time, actually. I had been here before when I was working for peacekeeping, but it's a real pleasure for me to come to this country, which is one of the strongest supporters, I would say, of multinationalism and in particular, disarmament field. What I'm going to do today is, of course, briefly to touch on the Secretary General's agenda for disarmament, which was launched last year, in May, in fact, which is composed of four pillars, disarmament to save humanity, disarmament that saves lives. The second pillar is about humanitarian consequences of largely conventional weapons and disarmament for future generations, which is about impact or mitigating the impact of new science and technology on international peace and security and a partnership for disarmament. This is about strengthening or reinforcing common people really understanding disarmament as part of their own agenda. We need new partnership, women more represented in the discussions, the youth population also taking these issues as their own. So this is a broadly, the Secretary General's agenda for disarmament and Ireland, again, has stepped forward, very forcefully to become a strong supporter of Kuprova action points. And we are in a difficult situation at the moment when it comes to international peace and security. So I would like to take one element of the disarmament agenda and focus perhaps on the most acute areas, mainly related to nuclear disarmament. There is a sense that perhaps a new vision is required. New approach is required in order for us to move forward or closer to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. What does the strategic stability look like in today's world that has really changed in the past couple of years, I would say. So I wanted to talk about, with a question mark, a new vision for arms control, question mark. This is the beginning of our discussions. I'm starting to hear many experts, many political figures, especially in this part of the world, Europe, starting to say that perhaps there is a new vision that is required. So I would like to focus on this particular element of the SG's disarmament agenda, and I could not think of any better country than Ireland to talk about this. As you know, of course, Republic of Ireland is historically one of the strongest supporters of disarmament, and of course Ireland's dedication ranges from that very famous resolution, Irish Resolution of 1961, which led us all to the creation of a treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, NPT. And of course, more recently in 2017, you are one of the mothers and fathers of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. So you are a strong figure in nuclear disarmament, and I could not think of any better country to actually talk about this issue. As of now, as we talk and move towards the 2020 review conference of the NPT, Ireland, as a member and a chair, in fact, coming up of the new agenda coalition, Ireland is really a leading country to help achieve success through, if you will, bridge building between sharply divided positions of the NPT review conference. I am also, I have to talk about this, I'm also really impressed by your leadership role in achieving gender parity, gender equality in international security and disarmament meetings and activities. You are one of the strongest supporters of our work also in that regard, and I wanted to put on record that the United Nations is really very grateful for a very diverse areas of leadership, which your country, in fact, demonstrates at the international platform. I think the UN was created first and foremost to fulfill the mandate that was given in the preamble of the UN Charter, which is to save succeeding generations from the scores of war. And obviously, for the UN, we strive to play a role in the efforts to achieve this score by seeking the abolition of weapons, of mass destruction, most importantly, of course, the nuclear weapons, but also facilitating the strict regulation of conventional arms in accordance with, of course, the principles of the Charter and ensuring that innovations in science and technologies are not used in ways that are harmful to us in contravention with international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. And that's why we made the Secretary General's agenda for disarmament. Unfortunately, creating a safer and more secure world is one that is increasingly difficult. Throughout the nearly 75 years of the UN's history, the world has experienced really warring periods of instability and turbulence. I believe that now, due to a variety of factors that I will touch on briefly, we are on the verge of an especially dangerous era. It is an era which the potential in use of nuclear weapons either intentionally through accident or miscalculation is higher than it has been since the darkest days of the Cold War. The web of agreements, instruments and arrangements that make up the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control regime, is being eroded in front of our eyes and the brakes on armed conflict is being removed in front of our eyes. As Secretary General Gutierrez set to the conference on disarmament in Geneva earlier this year in February, key components are collapsing and there is potential for contagion across the entire regime. Yet while the current regime is under threat, there is not as yet, obviously, anything to replace it. The prospect of world without control over nuclear weapons is a potentially catastrophic one. I think we all agree. For the first time since the 1970s, in fact, we could be facing a world without any constraints on those states that possess nuclear weapons if the new START treaty is not going to be extended. So addressing this dire situation should be a global priority, but a solution will not be found in adhering to a business as usual approach. To paraphrase the Secretary General, what is needed is a new vision for disarmament, perhaps, non-proliferation and arms control one that is capable of tackling the challenges of our time today. And the challenges we face today are a result of multiple interlinked factors. And let me just mention three. First, the international security environment is now characterized by an absence of trust, the monetization of international affairs and lack of dialogue. Relations between so-called great powers, including those that are nuclear armed, are deteriorating into openly hostile behavior that we observe in front of our eyes. Unprecedented defense spending, blurred lines between conventional and strategic forces and the proliferation of advanced weapon systems are increasing the risk of armed conflict. The rules-based international order is being challenged by the failure to implement existing obligations and the abrogation of others. Finally, the concept of strategic stability, essentially defined as mutual vulnerability during the Cold War and its aftermath, is being undermined in favor of efforts to secure lasting strategic dominance. Second, the global nuclear order is now multipolar. Nuclear diets, even triads, are dangerously linked to regional crisis and could drag in other nuclear armed states. And we had very concrete and dangerous examples in the recent past in Kashmir. After decades of efforts to reduce the numbers, risks and sanions of nuclear weapons, the progress has stalled and probably may even be going backwards. Instead of the Cold War, quantitative arms race based on numbers, we now face a qualitative one based on weapons that are faster, stealthier and also more accurate. And the development of a new nuclear capabilities is coupled with a dangerous rhetoric promoting the false assumption, I will argue, that the nuclear war can be controlled or even won. Third, the world is in the midst of a technological revolution. Developments in information and communications technologies, artificial intelligence, sensors, robotics and computing power rapidly transforming every aspect of our daily lives. However, those same innovations also have the potential to radically alter conventional arms balances, increase prospects of armed conflict and undermine nuclear stability. For example, networked enabled warfare opens up the possibility that command and control systems could be hacked including by third parties with malicious intent. Data analysis coupled with advanced sensor arrays or uncrewed swarms could expose previously hidden second strike capabilities, possibly creating use it or lose mentalities regarding those capabilities. Existing concerns about attribution for cyber attacks, huge issues and offensive cyber capabilities and what constitutes an appropriate response to those would become even more complicated with the addition of potentially nuclear consequences. An AI produced so-called deep fake in the nuclear context that is the potential to fall command and control structures or early warning systems could be really catastrophic. The development of weapon systems such as those that can maneuver at hypersonic speeds that is six times the speed of sound designed to evade defensive systems will further increase anxieties about vulnerability promoting responses in kind. So those new technologies could incite the type of destabilizing arms racing that characterize the Cold War. Meanwhile, the current lack of transparency encourages states to pursue risky application simply to keep up with the Joneses. So taken together those factors, they have created a combustible international situation that increasingly threatens our collective security. In such an environment, the need for a new approach is probably clear. The question is what will it look like? This is a big question that is starting to be asked and we know it will take some time to articulate. I would like to suggest five elements to consider for such a new approach looking from the UN's point of view. But before that, I would like to touch on three things that should guide our thinking process. So to begin with, it must acknowledge the lessons of the past and the great gains made in preventing nuclear war. These gains were hard won and in many cases remain valuable pillars of international security today. Let us not throw them away while we consider a new approach. For example, and to flip Shakespeare, I come not to bury the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty but to praise it. Extending that treaty to all states that possess intermediate-range missiles is something that should be explored and it's been talked about for a couple of years now. But it should not come at the expense of existing benefits, especially given the two most relevant parties hold some 90% of a nuclear global nuclear arsenal. In the same vein, all efforts should be exerted to extend new start, which maintains not only caps on the world's most dangerous weapons, but also the strict verification measures that help provide a basis for confidence in compliance. In the agenda for disarmament, securing our common future, the Secretary-General highlighted some of the unfulfilled building blocks, if you will, for a world free of nuclear weapons that could help both advance the goal and strengthen global security. The entry into the force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Fund Treaty and a negotiation of treaty prohibiting a production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are too long overdue instruments in danger of being thrown in the too hard basket. The opposite is required. We must redouble our efforts to achieve those goals. I also do not believe the bilateral arms control process between the United States and the Russian Federation has run out of runway. With some 90% of the world's stockpile between them, there remains a need for further reductions in strategic weapons by the two largest possessors. I know it is possible because I have heard military experts from those countries say that it is possible with political will. Beyond these instruments, any regime must be based on the fundamental principles developed during the nuclear age, namely the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons and the understanding that the only way to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons is to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves. In other words, a world free of nuclear weapons is the goal we must continue to exert all efforts to achieve. This is my second key principle in search for a new approach, process-wise. Striving to preserve the gains of the existing water is important, but failing to recognize that new challenges and dynamics require new thinking would be the diplomatic equivalent of sticking our heads in the sand. So, third, in light of the challenged environment, perhaps a first step could be to develop a common understanding of the new risks that we face and how they interact with existing concerns. Risk reduction is a broad term. It means different things in different contexts, especially in regional context. Similarly, a better understanding of and also agreement on the potential consequences of technological developments, including the unintended consequences, could help states agree on ways to minimize challenges in the area while maximizing the benefits of science and technology. Obviously, there are many questions about what is needed. There is also no one panacea or problems and therefore no reason why multiple initiatives cannot move forward in parallel. With those said, there are five issues that I believe states should take into account when considering an appropriate framework and new approach to arms control and disarmament in the new and current context. First, because several nuclear arms states continue to grow their arsenals and as nuclear-capable delivery systems become not only more dangerous but also more numerous and more available, a solitary bilateral arms control process will not be sustainable for much longer. All states that possess nuclear weapons should be engaged in a dialogue on first, how to reduce nuclear danger and second, to develop the immediate steps that will get us back on a common path to a world free of nuclear weapons. Numbers will continue to be important, that is numbers of arsenals, but might not be the only factor. The concept of what constitutes a strategic weapon might need to be reconsidered. As has been noted in some nuclear equations, intermediate range missiles are in fact strategic. Questions that we should be asking ourselves include, are regional specific arrangements appropriate? Can caps on development of specific delivery vehicles be instituted? Can those weapons traditionally considered non-strategic be brought into broader arms control agreements and arrangements? This non-strategic issue is important for two reasons. First, because regional nuclear crisis show how dangerous these weapons can be when it comes to issues such as escalation, and then second, because there are currently no constraints on their development. My second point about a possible new vision for arms control relates to the new challenges posed by a qualitative arms race. It is possible to limit numbers, but constraining the quality of weapons is more difficult. Yet reducing and eliminating the risks posed by especially destabilizing categories of weapons is a critical step in taking the world back from a brink of armed conflict. Take for example, the deployment of so-called hypersonic weapons. I do not believe that the genie is out of the bottle yet, I hope, on these inherently dangerous weapons. If an outright ban is not feasible at this stage, possible options should include a test ban, for example, or mechanisms for increasing transparency around their deployments to avoid ambiguity about their purpose. That is, whether they are carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. Third, the international community should consider how to show up any new regime against the potential vulnerabilities exposed by advances in technology. I fully support existing processes aimed at further developing normative frameworks to secure and stabilize cyberspace, and I spend a lot of time working on this, and to ensure that AI, artificial intelligence, is used in ways that are consistent with international law and does not increase the possibility of armed conflict. However, to date, existing processes have not yet addressed concerns about how technological innovations could potentially increase the chances of nuclear detonation. States should examine what transparency and confidence-building measures or political initiatives can be developed to avoid these terrible linkages, terrible outcomes. These could include more transparency about offensive cyber capabilities, and politically binding at least at this stage, instruments prohibiting interference with nuclear command control structures or early warning systems. The fourth issue, any future regime will need to address, and this is controversial, is ballistic missile defense. No development in arms control has appended a strategic stability in the way that BMD has. It seems that despite the nascent capabilities in this sphere, fears about future deployments really run deep. So key questions include whether it is impossible to introduce enough transparency to counter the fear or whether an offensive defensive balance can be included in future arms control agreements. My final and fifth and final issue that a future regime could consider is the problem of blurred lines between strategic and conventional capabilities, including through the proliferation of missiles and the myriad potential ways in which recent technological developments will affect future capability. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were effectively quarantined or sealed from all other weapons. Is this possible anymore? Do future arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation agreements that involve nuclear weapons also have to consider conventional capabilities, let alone emerging capabilities in nascent domains such as space, outer space and cyber? Could we, for example, look at a package of measures, legally binding instruments mixed with political commitments and confidence building measures? Regardless of how a new vision is elaborated, two elements will be essential for the success of any regime, and those are trust and compliance. The two go hand in hand, but the latter feeds the former and the needs to be both verified and enforced. Verification of nuclear disarmament is a priority for many states and there are multiple initiatives making progress on this issue and there are endeavors we should all support or continue to support. I've spent some time talking about potential dangers posed by technology, but I also want to really emphasize that the technological revolution can assist us also in seeking a safer and more secure world. We should engage with the creators of those innovations to seek their help and finding those solutions. How, for example, can we use AI for verification? How can we verify software as well as hardware? Trust would not be built through verifications alone. It requires real dialogue and it requires rebuilding habits, rebuilding of habits of cooperation and I think that is really essential. Strategic dialogue that considers the effects of developments in domains such as space and cyber should be a priority. We need to understand the enormous impact of these domains on strategic stability. Technical discussions are useful and they are continuing, but we also need dialogue at a more strategic level and we continue to encourage member states to return to it. A new regime will also need a new and different voices and this is my final points. I've already mentioned the need to engage with industry, but a new generation of arms controllers and disarmers must be nurtured to meet the challenges of the 21st century, including through understanding the lessons of the past. As the Secretary General Gutierrez is fond of saying, these are future peacemakers and they are the ultimate force for change. Finally, in any new vision, needs to foster return to understanding that disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control are not end in themselves. They are the key measures to create a safer and more secure world. They are essential conflict prevention, reduction and resolution mechanisms that should be really intrinsic to any peacemaking and peace-building processes. So I apologize, I've asked more questions than given answers today, but I came here to seek your views in finding those answers. I hope that at least I have provided some fruitful thoughts and call to action. We cannot afford delay. I think we really urgently return to more serious thinking on those issues, because I feel very strongly that the stakes are too high, not just for us, but also for our children and our grandchildren. Thank you very much for listening and I look forward to your answers. Well, Izumi, thank you very much. You frightened us, frightened me anyway, but you also, I think, gave a lot of hope there. You gave a sense that the United Nations is playing the role it should play in stimulating discussion and identifying issues and in providing solutions, which are a threat to no one. And while you spoke of a new vision, I think the emphasis you put on that being a shared vision was much to be welcomed. Orla will now speak, I think you will sit here on Ireland's overall response to the agenda. Sure, thank you, Izumi. It's really wonderful to have the opportunity to discuss this argument in Ireland. We spend a lot of time talking about on the international stage, but actually we don't have a lot of opportunities to discuss it within our own four walls. So we're very pleased to be invited to be part of this discussion. Disarmament is one of Ireland's five signature foreign policies set out in our foreign policy statement. The people in this room probably know the other four, so I want those as well. But it's, I suppose one of the questions we look at sometimes is what does it mean to be a signature foreign policy? What is, why have we selected that as one of our policies? Where should it come from? And what does that mean going forward? One of my predecessors identified it as a blessing and a challenge. It's like inheriting the most beautiful vase and you need to make sure at the very least you don't break it on your watch and that you can hand it over to the next generation hopefully improved or burnished. So within that context, we are very lucky in that we benefit from a long history of political support for the work that we do on disarmament. It's been very consistent across governments and has featured in successive programs for governments, including in the present one. But again, that doesn't really answer the question of why. By some measures, I suppose our nuclear diplomacy shows in fact be vanishingly small. We don't have nuclear weapons. We don't have uranium mines. We don't have nuclear energy in our power mix. So why we are invited to be part of the discussions at the highest levels with the countries who are objectively the most powerful in the world isn't obvious, but it comes back to our legacy over decades of engagement and of consistent, persistent diplomacy in this field. The very first resolution adopted in the UN was the establishment of a commission to deal with the problem raised by the discovery of atomic energy. Unfortunately, I think we haven't yet finished dealing with the problem raised by the discovery of atomic energy. And that obviously remained unfinished business when we joined the UN in 1955. And at that time, in the context of the Cold War, we were in a challenging place. Our accession at that time coincided with a massive increase in the number of nuclear weapons held by the United States and the USSR in a deepening of tensions by acquisition of nuclear weapons by the other members of the P5 ultimately. So there was a push factors in some way, but probably the most decisive factor in our engagement was Frank Eakin, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs. Quite what drew him to nuclear diplomacy isn't exactly clear, but it seems to be pretty evident that it was linked with his role in seeing warfare on this island and the role that he played in the War of Independence and the Civil War and understanding the consequences as the Tzumi has laid out for humanity of the most destruct, you know, of warfare and the conventional sense in the early 20th century was sufficiently disruptive for warfare and the atomic age being. So he was driven to assert a more positive version of Irish neutrality at that time to try and bridge or stop some of the deepening of divisions within the Cold War. And that led to the Irish resolutions that the Tzumi has outlined, which ultimately became the foundations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, which will be celebrating its 50th anniversary next year. We are very supportive of the NPT, which remains absolutely the cornerstone of our engagement and the cornerstone of the International Disarmament and Nonproliferation Regime. More recently, we have been extremely active in the negotiation of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, where Ireland was one of the core group members there and played a vital role in that negotiation. We see it as giving effect to the disarmament obligations in the NPT to ensuring that disarmament isn't just an issue, the effect of outworking of the Article 6 obligations and disarmament aren't just a discussion between those states that have weapons, they also have a responsibility to the rest of us, that we have a legitimate interest in being part of this conversation and that we have, that the international community has momentum and has an energy to drive that forward. So for that reason, we were one of the leading countries proposing the Treaty, we were one of the leading countries in negotiation of it, and if you look at it, you will see our fingerprints on quite a bit of it, particularly the gender dimensions, the recognition of the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons use on women and girls, the recognition of the need for full and effective participation of women and men in disarmament discussions at all levels. There's a phrase we see a lot in disarmament and it always makes me laugh because it's something like, you know, encouraging the participation of both women and men and in my experience, that's two women and all of the men, so it's both of them there, but I think it's the changing face of disarmament discussions and the diversity that we've been encouraging is something that can give hope to the new vision, to the new way of thinking, to a new way of engaging, and it's not just something that we're not promoting gender perspectives just simply because it's the right thing to do, we know from our experience in Northern Ireland and peace-building on our island that having all of the voices included, particularly having women's voices included, is incredibly important. Beyond the gender issue, which is obviously a very important priority for us within the TPNW also, the Irish delegation at the time was very centrally involved in negotiating some of the tricky issues around accession pathways or around victim assistance and environmental remediation provisions, so you'd see it's a very holistic treaty it's not looking at disarmament purely as a disarmament or purely even as a security issue, it's addressing the environmental impacts, it's addressing the developmental impacts, and we're at the stage now where the treaty is not yet entered into force, it'll require 50 ratifications to enter into force, work is underway on the Irish ratification, the tonnage there is hoping to publish a bill in the summer programme and that'll be considered by the Oroctas later in 2019 and we'd hope to be in a position to ratify shortly thereafter. So we are very pleased to be part of the conversations, we're very pleased to be the first to hear the new vision that you have set out, there's a lot of scope I think for navigating new paths between some of the challenges there and our contribution on disarmament I think isn't just limited to nuclear weapons or that we don't look at just purely nuclear issues, people in this room will know well that we played a leadership role in the anti-personnel, anti-personnel landmine convention which will be celebrating its 20th anniversary of entry into force later in the year and the cluster munitions convention of course was and was a negotiation to the leadership of that, you'll clearly be well known to everybody in this house and behind all of these, what's consistent in all of these engagements I think really is the recognition of the indiscriminate disproportionate enduring effects of these type of weapons which incur a cost that cannot be, that is not acceptable to us as an international community. We are increasingly trying to situate disarmament beyond the purely technical, to integrate it into the STGs, to integrate into our development policy and so on. If you look at the 2030 agenda for development, you won't find the word disarmament in there anywhere but it's certainly a key enabler because the nuclear destination in any population city in the world would not allow us to achieve any of the goals that we want for 2030 and equally progress on conventional disarmament is equally important to do that. So when we launched, when we prepared our new international development policy earlier this year and the better world, I was very pleased to see that we were able to secure disarmament and our work on disarmament and its links to development in there. We've made it on page three, which is pretty high up I think as it goes, unfortunately not quite the first page, but it's a commitment to what we're doing and equally one of the first outworkings of the better world policy has been an agenda for small island developing states or a national strategy for small island developing states launched by the Toniceta very, very recently, where within that we also address remediation for the effects of nuclear weapons testing in a lot of the Pacific states as well that we'll be looking to see how we can assist to the remediation there. So beyond that our priorities right now in our very strong link to making the UN processes work as best as much as we can, very much supporting the UN sexual genitals agenda and disarmament and encouraging our European colleagues to do likewise. We've specifically identified three key actions where we have the status of championing. First action on dialogue for nuclear disarmament and in particular we'll be looking to take that forward when we turn the new agenda coalition next year which is a particularly important year for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The new agenda coalition is a small cross-regional grouping that focuses very heavily on disarmament includes ourselves, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, South Africa and New Zealand. So as you can see a very diverse and cross-regional grouping. We're also looking very heavily at action 14 in the agenda on explosive weapons in populated areas because we're deeply concerned about the causes of humanitarian need. And again that fits in with our new development policy approach for removing from meeting humanitarian need to addressing the causes of humanitarian need. And we look forward to hopefully progressing work on a political declaration in that and hosting a Dublin event sometime in 2020 to allow states agree a political declaration there. And finally we're championing action 21 of the agenda which brings together arms control for conflict management and which looks at drawing on our experiences of Northern Ireland including our experience in decommissioning to address conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution. Equally looks to bring in our work on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women peace and security where we're seeking to bring a gender perspective to conflict management and to address issues. You know sometimes the challenges gender is seen as women and girls, it's seen as, I think we're looking to expand that conversation to ensure issues like harmful forms of masculinities are included there and that we're looking to bring experiences that we've had to an arms control focus. So it's a fairly broad remit but I think through it all is the commitment that I think that the Secretary-General has previously said the phrase about there are no right hands for the wrong weapons and that while we accept that in this world we're going to have conflict situations that is not, that cannot be without its limits and that cannot be in a way that affects the future of our planet. That cannot be in a way that disproportionately affects the communities in which we live or the communities in which people in conflict zones live and that there has to be some governance, some framework around there. So it's been, it shouldn't be a priority issue but it has always been a priority issue and I think we're very, very lucky or I feel very, very lucky to work in this area and to be able to have Ireland's voice as part of that conversation.