 So now we can take two or three questions from, well, I say hundreds. Enrico Letta. Thank you. Thank you, Kevin. It was terrific. I would like to ask you to elaborate a little bit more about the divisions of European countries in the relationship with China. How do you see these divisions? What is the future in that, on that point? Well, what I didn't get round to saying before, Enrico, was that if China's strategy is, as I described it before, if I'm accurate on that, and if the US-China divide is, as I described as well, into an increasingly bipolar world, for Europe, Europe becomes increasingly the swing state for the future. That is, which way does it go? The Chinese, when they look at Europe, they see there's very large integrated economic entity. They know that in political and foreign policy, insecurity policy terms, it's relatively weak in terms of a single voice in Brussels. But China, given the reality of, let's call it, unfolding, decoupling with the United States, however far it goes in trade and technology and in finance, let alone currency questions. The Chinese thinking is that in Europe, if we're cut off from American technology, if we're cut off from American finance, even if we're cut off from a goods and services market, there's only one other entity in the world currently big enough to actually fill up that gap, and that's Europe. Now, I'm describing, I think, very early stages of China's thinking because this decoupling process really has only unfolded in the last 12 months in one form or another. Therefore, that is going to present Europeans with certain binary decisions for the future. Whereas all of us as American allies love a world where we can be friends of both, China and the United States. This will prospectively become harder and harder for which the 5G demand by the current US administration is just the first example of many others still to come. Chinese perceptions of Europe itself, I think, as you can see what they've done in Eastern Europe or the former Eastern Europe with 16 plus 1 or is it 17 plus 1 now, I always lose count. They are reasonably happy with success there. They're delighted that Italy joined as the first G7 state to Belt and Road Initiative. They've had for 10 years now big investments in Greece and seeing Greece as a country which will reflect Chinese realities and internal European deliberations. I think the Chinese are following carefully their analysis of the reformation line, which is they will be targeting a whole bunch of countries in Southern Europe, but elsewhere as well, Eastern Europe, parts of Northern Europe. But the binary nature of our future, which is uncomfortable for all of us, including US allies in Asia, including Australia, is going to be one of the characteristics of this difficult period we're about to enter. So I am asked to take only one question, so I will take two. And because it is easy for me, I will take, well, I see so many. Well, Brian Gallagher, and yes, because we need a British citizen. Okay, so please, let us start with America and Britain. After all, this was, Hong Kong was British not so long ago. So thank you, I'm Brian Gallagher, the CEO of United Way Worldwide, two of the most confused countries in the world, apparently. Prime Minister, so I presume you believe the decoupling in the strategic competitive path now that US and China are on is not a good thing, is a negative thing. Besides Europe, who are the other mitigating players to avoid what would be catastrophic decoupling? So other state actors, multilateral players, even civil society players, what will keep China and the US from coming when we do come back together again to come back in a in a in a military conflict or an all-out cyber conflict or something that would be destructive globally. Thank you. On the trade war, let's be clear about our American friends, this is not just a Trump initiative, it has widespread Democrats support in the United States. There's a change administration today. The Democrats would be pursuing a strategy towards China about as hardline as the current one, but more systematic than we have seen under President Trump. So the second point is that remember the trade war exists for a purpose and that is China has been dragging its feet on trade liberalization, market access, force technology transfer, IP protection and state subsidy for its firms and these are alive in WTO disputes raised with China over a long period of time. So these are necessary frictions to resolve. Thirdly, however, it is a vast ocean between that on the one hand and a decoupling of tech and finance, let alone the currency on the other. That's where you're into economic war or let me call it economic cold war and there is a view within the White House, sorry, within parts of the White House, that that in fact is the direction in which we should go, that to decouple is necessary to contain and that is in fact part of an integrated strategy to do that. For me, it is unclear how much the United States will actually proceed down the decoupling road. What I fear is that China has concluded internally that there's a big enough risk for it, that China must take its own preparatory actions, which then once they're prepared tend to be implemented rather than simply remain on the shelf. We have mutually reinforcing as it were concerns, which therefore produce a more adverse reality. On the final point about off-ramps for this, how do you exit it? I think countries which have an ability to talk to the United States about where to go in the future on this, who will be listened to in Washington, would be Japan, Germany, which the United States identify as the new core of Europe, given Britain's decision and less so India, possibly countries like Australia. In other words, close allies, but those who are able to say to Uncle Sam, be careful what you wish for. Lord Lutian, that's the last question. Thank you very much. I might make it the last two questions. Very brief. The first is really seeking your advice, Kevin. As you know, Britain still has guarantor status in relation to Hong Kong. We've been fairly cautious in the light of what's been happening in Hong Kong. What would your advice to us be as to what we should be doing at this moment? And secondly, you referred to the Belt and Road as advancing trading opportunities for China. It has been described by certain military figures in Europe as neocolonialism, building a colonial empire on behalf of China. Would you agree with that? Let me take the second question first and then let me allow me to duck and weave and try and avoid a direct answer on the first question that you asked. Then I'll speak to you privately about it later on, which is on Hong Kong. On Belt and Road, what is the big distinguishing feature about China's global strategy? Is it against what, frankly, for 500 years was a relatively appalling Western colonial history in the rest of the world, whether it's Asia, Africa, or Latin America? China has no interest in occupying anybody else's territory. It's just not there. China's territorial boundaries were largely settled in the Qing dynasty between, let's call it 1600 and 1900, and achieved their maximum shape, but that's kind of where they are today. And there will be debates with the Russians primarily about the long-term durability of that border. So therefore, an interest in foreign acquisition of territory is just not on the agenda. That's not the way in which China views the world. China's ultimate view, though, of, let's call it Eurasia, is that they would want it to be as strategically benign and ultimately as compliant as possible to China's core strategic interests. And finally, on the question of markets, so China is in the hunt for global markets in Africa, as all of our American friends and colleagues at this important conference will know, but also in Latin America and the rest of Asia, look at the recent changes in Chinese economic diplomacy and political diplomacy towards India because of its anticipation of where decoupling might go. So I do not see Belt and Road as such as a military strategy. There is a separate Chinese reach through the Indian Ocean, evidence most recently by the acquisition of a 99-year lease in Djibouti for a Chinese effectively a naval base there. China will have a range of justifications for that, including protecting its own sea lines of communications out of the Gulf if they can't in the future rely upon the United States. But that will also generate its own other strategic consequences as well. But when I've spoken to people at the core of the Belt and Road Initiative business in Beijing and queried those who are frank enough to explain what they're on about, I think that's a misread of what it is. And that is not me saying that China has no interest in extending its military presence in various parts of the world for other reasons it does. And watch closely what China is doing in terms of the increased pace and locality of its joint exercising with the Russians in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, and certainly in the Pacific. On Hong Kong, it's a highly sensitive matter that you raise, which is what should Britain's diplomacy be towards Hong Kong right now. Let me just say this, and I've just come from London, so I've been chatting to a few of our friends there about these questions, is uniquely, as you say, under international law the UK has a responsibility. None of the rest of us do other than international human rights law and the UN Charter and the provisions there. But the UN Charter is about states, and Hong Kong is not a state. International human rights law is valid for all peoples, but as we know it's a soft international instrument, so you uniquely have the treaty power. But to be frank, if I was Whitehall and Westminster, I would be rarely, but clearly articulating where in the United Kingdom's view the joint declaration and the basic law contained in the 97 treaty arrangement were being violated at a particular time. These are not occasions to use lightly. Thank you very much. We could spend hours with you talking about China. Thank you very much.