 Can you talk a little bit about this dynamic where you have, you know, within this Republican party, you have two very much different camps responding to this intellectually. I think this is some of the stuff I love with an American history. Yeah. So, the panic of 1819, you had this, the second bank of the United States caused this big credit bubble, and then it contracts to save itself from going illiquid if it's losing too much species. William Gouch had the famous quote, the bank was saved, but the people were ruined. This caused a lot of controversy, and people were upset about this. They were upset that there was this downturn going on. Started in basically February of 1819, right around the scandals of the Baltimore branch being exposed, and then especially after basically those individuals get off with a slap in the, you know, a light slap on the wrist, so nothing very serious. These people go on to have like successful political careers afterwards. There's like no consequences at all to this stuff. Yeah, basically, and this infuriates people because they're seeming, it seems that, well, this bank is basically this giant monster, this Hydra, if you will, that's corrupting the very fibers of the government. And so you see this growth in either the hard money forces, the people who are opposed to central banking, they're opposed to fractional reserve banking, they want to reform the monetary system along the lines that Jefferson proposed in the 1790s, but he didn't really carry out in his first administration. Then you see the soft money forces, the guys of Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, even John Marshall, et cetera, who are basically advocating, yeah, well, this central bank is good. It's actually, we need more central banking because in order to stabilize the economy and to promote economic growth and so on. And this was really kind of dovetailed nicely with these new intellectual works coming out. Some of us says, and the suits of Tracey's works were being translated into English and promoted. Partially, one individual who's doing this was Thomas Jefferson, which I think is really cool. Once he's out of power, he's kind of back in the saddle for laissez-faire, as I put it, and that just shows you how he was just really a good ideologue. And he was always someone better outside of office than in office. I believe Murray Rothbard once said that. And you see these individuals are advocating, well, they're anti-central banking. They're arguing, well, we need to either have 100% reserves or some form of free banking among fractional reserve banks to promote competition. This would limit credit expansion. And then you're seeing various American system economists of the Henry Clay variety. They're promoting additional government intervention. They're justifying the central bank and so on and even some establishment periodicals. They're doing this. And so this is something I try and hammer home all the time in my book, as well as when I'm giving talks and et cetera. You've got the abstract theory that various economists and intellectuals develop and that has to actually get filtered down to the masses in some way. So either through newspapers or shorter writings, et cetera, many Americans had learned of say the writings of say through college. Say's work was a very popular college textbook, et cetera. And this is how ideas get filtered down and why you need sort of that structure of production. So the forces of liberty had kind of amassed the structure of production. And this led to this really brilliant, I'd say heroic, resurgence of hard money thought that would exert a very important influence in American history in the decades to come.