 Enrico. Thank you. I thought many of the important issues did come out in this session. My comment is that I agree that probably the combination of financial integration was the main cause of the amplification that we saw, and I'm convinced that if you have countries with officially different institutions, the problem is not just volatility but is structural. I think what we're saying is more of a trend. In fact, we have weak countries coming together with strong countries in the Monetary Union that has several distributive effects, and they are sort of permanent, and they are cumulative. And because institutions don't adjust as fast as market prices, it means that indeed internal corrections are extremely painful and ultimately possibly create a risk. So I don't think we can talk about correcting the volatility without realizing that there is a trend. I also agree with what Jean said, that if the moment we think of some form of intervention to stabilize, they inevitably imply some net transfer. There's no hiding that. I don't believe that. Although I think the idea of weak institutions should be a bit broader than fiscal governance, I think that is ultimately where the problem lies. Because even in the countries like Italy where the deficit didn't go up further, it just didn't go down, even though the real rates fell enormously. So what I want to come to is to make the following point. There is no question if we stabilize the system, there will be net transfer. However, there is also a real justification, which is not quite the one that Paul makes, I think. I think the justification I see is that in the Monetary Union with weak countries, strong countries have a monetary benefit, an exchange rate benefit. And it's not just as mature discussions seem to imply within the Union, but with that side world. So the benefit that the Netherlands or Germany have had from the Monetary Union are not well recognized, but in general equilibrium it's clear that their surplus is so vast even at a time of expansion of China and other places only to be justified implicitly being in the Monetary Union with a bunch of losers subsidize them. Now, so I think there is a legitimate case for net transfer. I mean it's clear that if Oklahoma was not in monetary union with California, the California dollar would be awfully high. So I think that is a bit more structural way to think about it than just to think of cyclicality. Okay, thank you Enrico. Charles? A couple of questions. In a standalone country where the central bank is subject to the control of the legislature, how would you define when a country was insolvent? The next question I have is almost to everyone in the panel, which is that in the discussions of the boom, bust problems that we've had, there's been very little discussion of how this was intermediated through the banking system. And in the doom loop that occurred, a lot of this arose out of holdings by the banks of their own government debt. Now under the euro system in which there isn't a central bank that each sovereign can call upon, how in your view should the risk weightings of sovereign debts actually have been calculated? And according certainly to Paul, the risks were not zero. If the risk weightings had been appropriately applied before the crisis, wouldn't the doom loop have been much less? And how in principle should government debt be risk weighted under the euro system? Okay, Ben Friedman? I think taking a slightly broader historical perspective makes clear that Paul is right that countries not only can but do change places in terms of the vitality and strength of their institutions including their fiscal behavior. It's worth bearing in mind that within the past century and indeed within the lifetimes of many of us present in the room by far the largest debt default and need for debt forgiveness of any European country was of course Germany. In a scale that dwarfed anything we're talking about now. Now one can say that we run our sample periods only back to 1960 or something like that, but that's very arbitrary when we come to addressing some of these more fundamental questions that Paul is asking. Okay, time constraints mean I'm going to take one more, which is Luigi. Thank you. I'm from a traditionally Catholic country. I'm quite happy that Father Paul de Grauve absolved us from the original scene, but since I have some protestant blood in my veins, I'm not quite sure. I'm not entirely relaxed. The story about booms and busts. I think that fits well a number of the countries that had crisis during the great financial crisis, but does not appear to fit very well, literally, because there was no, I mean, there were little signs of excessive credit growth, private indebtedness was not high. So that's not exactly, real interest rates might have been slightly lower than elsewhere, but practically the inflation rates were the same everywhere. So that did not seem to be a major point. On the other side, the side of fiscal profligacy, I think Enrico has already made this point. The debt did not increase during that period, but it was high, and there was a clearly missed opportunity of reducing it, of reducing the vulnerability in that period. We did reduce it. Sorry? It declined. The debt-to-GDP ratio declined very, very, well, okay. It had declined before, it had declined before, but during that period it did not decline very much, and it stayed at a very, very high level. And another point, I think, is really important, which is, or it depends on the period you take into account. There was another point. The performance of the economy in terms of growth and productivity had been very disappointing and satisfactory for a long period before the crisis, and it is at least tending to see a connection between the disappointing performance of productivity before the crisis and the very bad effects of the crisis in subsequent years. And that takes in, again, the issue of structural reform and possibly some issues of governance. I don't know. I don't think that there is a kind of original sin that cannot be canceled, but I do think that there are some issues of economic policy, economic governance that have to be taken into account. Okay. So I think that I'm sympathetic to many of the things that Paul said about the need for a functioning monetary union to have other institutions, but I do think that there is more to the story. Thank you, Luigi. Now, it's very important to reward good behavior, and Barry Eichengreen undershot his allocation earlier on. So I'm going to give Barry his request at 30 seconds. So 30 seconds he will get, and then I'll turn to Paul. Two things. I wanted to first clarify what Ricardo Hausmann and I, neither of us Catholics, meant by original sin. We did not mean that some countries are, for historical reasons, burdened by weak institutions and therefore shall always be so burdened. We meant that small countries in particular find it hard to issue on international markets debt denominated in their own exotic currencies, especially long-term debt, and therefore they're doomed to incur currency mismatches. Over time, we have seen that problem of original sin diminish somewhat quite selectively for sovereigns and not for corporate borrowers in smaller countries and emerging markets at all. So that problem remains, and it has an interesting parallel where a lot of debt is, in some sense, foreign currency denominated from the point of view of what the domestic authorities can do with it and about it. Charles's question about the doom loop, I do think this is a very strong argument for demanding capital and concentration charges on sovereign debt, including the debt of one's own sovereign where that last bit is too often overlooked. As I understand it, this problem has not been addressed adequately yet, even a decade after the outbreak of the crisis in Europe. But if it is addressed, then you can, in effect, turn control of fiscal policy back to the national authorities because if they mismanage it, they no longer doom their banking system to collapse and their economy to collapse. And in that scenario, we don't need Paul's gigantic Eurozone budget. Thank you, Barry. Now, when I turn back to Paul just for a very short response, please take into account there were a lot of comments there, more than questions. So I don't think we need to solve every, Lusanne, in two minutes, Paul. Okay, thank you. Thanks for the comments. They are very challenging. They are very pertinent. Let me just take two of what Jean was saying about in his third point that individual fiscal stabilization may be a better idea than trying to create a budget, right? But the point that I was trying to make was that that's what you cannot do, stabilization at a national level because of the instability of the government bond markets. Each time you have a recession, given that the intensity of the recession will be different, right? That's the asymmetry that we have. Some countries will be hit by a more severe debt problem than others. And then financial markets look around and they sell the bonds of those who are weaker and buy the bonds of those who are perceived to be stronger, making it impossible for those who are hit by the financial markets to stabilize, right? So that's the key. And therefore we have to do it looking at the system as a whole. I think we are condemned to do it in that way. On the standalone country and the fiscal dominance point, yes, I do think that in crisis situations, in standalone countries, the government will always prevail over the central bank. There can be no doubt about this. The Bank of England will not, when the government is in trouble, the Bank of England will not say like the ECB first do an austerity program, right? No, the Bank of England will provide liquidity unconditionally. There is no question about it. And the very fact that this is known makes it impossible for the markets to force the government into a liquidity crisis. And therefore the UK government can only be forced into default if it decides in a sovereign way to do it. It cannot be forced by markets into default. And that's the difference between standalone countries and members of monetary union. Each of these members can be forced by the markets against their will into default. And we have to do something about this. That's the point, right? That's our difference between me. There were many others. There's a point that you said that it's only the small fish that can have original sin. I thought your original sin story was certainly deeper one. I mean, look at the Eurozone. Small countries, they can issue debt in their own currency, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark and all that. They do that. So it must be something else than being small that produces. I thought it was really something more fundamental that these countries have a history of instability for whatever reason. And so, but maybe we can talk about the right interpretation of what the original sin is in Latin America. So, yeah, I think there are just a few minutes. Thank you. So we've had a really interesting panel. So thank you to everyone. We start about 10 minutes late this morning. So the coffee break will conclude at 11.10. So we resume at 11.10. Thank you. He did answer really soon. He supported you.