 One must understand that the Arab oil embargo crisis of 1973 to 1974 came with a precursory series of events. Extremely high regional tensions after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War crippled the many attempts of peaceful negotiations and potential reconciliation by the concerned parties. The main goal was to achieve a systematic return of Egyptian and Syrian lands still occupied by Israel. But all attempts failed from the very beginning. A major obstacle for resolution as perceived by Arab nations was the United States' political favoritism and unrelenting backing of Israel, regardless of how unfair or unsubstantiated the Israeli position was. From 1972 to May 1973, warnings by Arabs to the United States and Europe went unheeded. Warnings that without the support of evenly balanced negotiations by the West, such unsympathetic inactivity could lead to subsequent Arab military action against Israel and in parallel the weaponization of oil. But let me digress. I want to share a side story that summarizes the attitudes of the times. Attitudes that were unfortunately ignorant and not conducive of resolving difficult situations. Attitudes that were conceited and contemptuous. It is well documented that prior to the Yom Kippur War by some time and during a press conference at the White House after meeting with the United States President Richard Nixon, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Amr Saqaf commented that an oil embargo was a very likely possibility due to America's hesitation in taking an active and fair stance in negotiations. An American reporter mockingly shouted in response that the Saudis could drink their oil. A Saqaf's retort? Alright, we will. Now back to our main storyline. The West concededly brushed off any reality checks given by the Arabs. Vanding together and delivering such a strong position was in Western opinion a bluff and would never come to pass. And within a few months, the Yom Kippur War started on October 6, 1973 when the Egyptian army overcame the Israeli Defense Forces and crossing the Suez Canal. In parallel, OAPEC, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries began its first phase of oil production cuts by reducing their overall output by 5% and promising further cuts of up to 5% per month. On October 11, and while meeting with Arab leaders, Nixon guarantees that a peaceful and honorable resolution will take place driven by him and Henry Kissinger, the same way he managed to conclude the Vietnam War. In the meantime, Israel was suffering great losses of personnel, equipment and territory. In Goldemir, the Israeli Prime Minister pled with the United States to urgently provide military supplies and financial support. A few days later, the Arabs initiate Phase 2 of the embargo by applying a further 5% production in oil production and institutes a partial embargo on the United States, Netherlands, Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal, all of whom are Israel's allies. On October 18, the United States grants Israel $2.2 billion in aid, almost three times the requested value, and begins a massive airlift to Israel, providing military support and equipment. A day later, a total embargo is placed on the United States due to the duplicity of Nixon's promises to the Arabs in brokering peace versus the United States' most recent actions in financially and militarily supporting Israel. On October 26, the Yom Kippur War ends with a signed armistice temporarily ceasing military activities by both parties. Oil production in December 1973 drops to 75% of September production levels, with more cuts threatened. In early 1974, Europe is hit hard and heavy by the embargo, as its petroleum imports are mainly dependent on the Middle East. Oil prices quadruple in value, leaving many developed nations in a state of operational chaos. Local pressure mounts in the United States due to gasoline skyrocketing prices and shortages across the country. The New York Stock Exchange loses $90 billion in market value, and industries are brought into sudden decline. Negotiations for settlement on the various land disputes, now pushed by motivated United States and Europe, begin between Egypt and Israel, characterized by more even-handed approach and fairness. In March 1974, the Arab oil embargo comes to an end, as Israel withdraws its final troops from the Suez Canal and the western part of Sinai. No one can be sure about the level of success that the Arab oil embargo had on the world at the time. Arabs believed that the embargo brought about a change in political and economic attitude in how the West viewed the Middle East. The West, on the other hand, belittled the embargo's impact on their politics and future strategic decision-making. But what one can be sure about is that oil was now not only a weapon, but a facilitating and primary driving factor for going to war and protecting the nation's energy security. Post embargo, it became recognized that oil and its guaranteed supply was an Achilles' Hue for the developed world, and for the West and mainly the United States to be in such a position, a position of weakness and dependence, was never going to be acceptable again.