 Question 123, Part 2 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 123 of Fortitude, in 12 Articles. Part 2, Articles 7 through 12. Seventh Article. Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit. Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action, the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude in the order of execution follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore, it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says on the Trinity 13, We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous, namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake. Without loving happiness, if they succeed in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue. But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore, the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude but to happiness. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says on the morals of the Catholic Church and on the morals of the Manichaeans, 15, that fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake. Now God is not the habit of fortitude but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore, the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.7 that To the brave man, fortitude itself is a good, and such is his end. I answer that an end is twofold, proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's form into something else. Thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is fashioned by art. So in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly, we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit. But his remote end is happiness, or God. This suffices for the replies to the objections. For the first objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end, instead of the likeness of a habit in act is stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end. Eighth article. Whether the brave man delights in his act. Objection one. It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For delight is the unhindered action of a conatural habit. Ethics 10, 4, 6, and 8. Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore, the brave man takes pleasure in his act. Objection two. Further, Ambrose commenting on Galatians 522. But the fruit of the spirit is charity, joy, peace. Says that deeds of virtue are called fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure delight. Now the brave man performs actions of virtue. Therefore, he takes pleasure in his act. Objection three. Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore, the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 39 that the brave man seems to have no delight in his act. I answer that, as stated above in Par's Prima Secunde, Question 31, Articles 3, 4, and 5, where we were treating of the passions. Pleasure is twofold. One is bodily, resulting from bodily contact. The other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principle act of fortitude is to endure not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul, for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue and things connected with them, but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof, while on the other hand he has cause for both spiritual sorrow in the thought of losing his life and for bodily pain. Hence we read in 2 Maccabees, 630, that Eleazar said, I suffer grievous pains in body, but in soul and well content to suffer these things because I fear thee. Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the blessed T. Berthius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses. Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain, and the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 2.3 and 3.9 that it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad. Reply to Objection 1. The vehemence of the action or passion of the one power hinders the action of another power. Wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation. Reply to Objection 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful, chiefly on account of their end. Yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 3.9 that to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except insofar as one attains the end. Reply to Objection 3. In the brave man, spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain. 9. whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences, or it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are foreseen. But Tully says, in On the Art of Rhetoric 2, that fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger and bearing of toil. Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings. Objection 2. Further Ambrose says on the duties of the clergy one that the brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen. He takes measures beforehand and looks out as from the cunning tower of his mind. So as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards, this befell me, because I did not think it could possibly happen. But it is not possible to be prepared for the future, in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings. Objection 3. Further, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.8 that the brave man is of good hope. But hope looks forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.8 that fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death. I answer that. Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice, and thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences, because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise in order to be able to withstand them or to bear them more easily. Since according to Gregory, in his homily 25 on the Gospel, the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge. The other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the virtuous habit. And in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the philosopher in Ethics 3.8, the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers, since the habit works by way of nature. Therefore, if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind. Yet it is possible for a person, even without the habit of fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought, in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the replies to the objections. Tenth article. Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action. Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action, for no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For as the philosopher says in On Memory 2. When a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore, a brave man should not employ anger for his action. Objection 2. Further. If a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude wherein anger is impotent. Wherefore Seneca says in his On Anger 1. Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action, but also to accomplish it. In fact, is there greater folly than for reason to seek help from anger? The steadfast from the unstayed, the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick, therefore a brave man should not make use of anger. Objection 3. Further. Just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or desire. Wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 3.8 that while the beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain and adulterous persons, there are many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore, in like manner, it should not employ anger. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.8 that anger helps the brave. I answer that, as stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde, question 24, article 2, concerning anger and the other passions. There was a difference of opinion between the peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man, whereas the peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, described to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the soul, albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality, but in their way of speaking. For the peripatetics, as stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde, question 24, article 2, gave the name of passions to all movements of the sensitive appetite. However, they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they called them sickness or diseases, and for this reason severed them all together from virtue. Accordingly, the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate action. Reply to Objection 1, Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason, so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case were it immoderate. Reply to Objection 2, Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle. Reply to Objection 3, whereas fortitude, as stated above in Article 6, has two acts, namely endurance and aggression. It employs anger not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts, though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above, Paras Prima Sikunde, Question 47, Article 3, or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner, desire by its very nature tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger. Yet accidentally, sometimes it helps one to attack, insofar as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 3, Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose, that is, for a due end. This is true fortitude. 11th Article Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue. Objection 1 It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For as stated above in Article 10, Anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now, anger is not accounted a principal passion, nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. Neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue. Objection 2 Further The object of virtue is good, but the direct object of fortitude is not good but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says, on the art of rhetoric too. Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. Objection 3 Further The cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge. Cardiné But fortitude is about dangers of death, which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue. On the contrary, Gregory, in his commentary on Job 22, Ambrose, in his commentary on Luke 620, and Augustine, in his Of the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Madden Keons 15. Number fortitude among the four cardinal or principal virtues. I answer that, as stated above in Parse Primesucunde, Question 21, Articles 3 and 4. Those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal, which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of virtue in general, one is that it is stated to act steadfastly according to Ethics 2.4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness, because he that stands firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says in his 83 Questions, Question 36, There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain. And among the pains of the mind and dangers, those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Daring and anger do not co-operate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended. For it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion as stated above, as premised at Coonday, Question 25, Article 4. Reply to Objection 2. Virtue is directed to the good of reason, which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the body as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason as the end, which it intends to safeguard. Reply to Objection 3. Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently. Since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries. Twelfth Article. Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues. Objection 1. It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For Ambrose says, on the duties of the clergy one, fortitude is higher, so to speak, than the rest. Objection 2. Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore, it is the greatest of the virtues. Objection 3. Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue. Whereas justice, and the other moral virtues, are about other and external things. Therefore, fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues. Objection 4. On the contrary, Tully says, on the duties of the clergy one, justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man. Objection 5. Further, the philosopher says in Rhetoric 119, those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others. Now, liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore, it is a greater virtue. I answer that, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 6, in things that are great but not in bulk, to be great is to be good. Wherefore, the better a virtue, the greater it is. Now, reasons good is man's good, according to Dionysius, on the divine names four. Prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially. While justice affects this good, since it belongs to justice, to establish the order of reason in all human affairs. Whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from reasons good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason. And after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now, to be a thing essentially, ranks before affecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles there too. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues. Reply to Objection 1. Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying in On the duties of the clergy one, Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being higher, so to speak, than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters. Reply to Objection 2. Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty. Reply to Objection 3. A man does not expose his person to dangers of death, except in order to safeguard justice. Wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy one that fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice. Since the stronger a man is, the more ready is he to oppress the weaker. The fourth argument is granted. Reply to Objection 5. Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favors, whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the philosopher says in Redrick 1.9 that just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace. End of question 123. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 124 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the cardinal virtues. The virtue of fortitude. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The virtue of fortitude. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 124 of Martyrdom in five articles. We must now consider Martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry. First, whether Martyrdom is an act of virtue. Second, of what virtue is it the act? Third, concerning the perfection of this act. Fourth, the pain of Martyrdom. Fifth, its cause. First article, whether Martyrdom is an act of virtue. Objection 1. It seems that Martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But Martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the innocents, who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom Hilary says on the Gospel of Matthew 1, that they attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of Martyrdom. Therefore, Martyrdom is not an act of virtue. Objection 2. Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now, it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above. Question 64, article 5. And yet, Martyrdom is achieved by doing so. For Augustine says on the city of God 1, that during persecution, certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives. And there Martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration. Therefore, Martyrdom is not an act of virtue. Objection 3. Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court Martyrdom. Rather, it would seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore, Martyrdom is not an act of virtue. On the contrary, the reward of Beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now, it is due to Martyrdom, since it is written in Matthew 5.10. Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, Martyrdom is an act of virtue. I answer that, as stated above, in Question 123, Articles 1 and 3. It belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now, the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper object and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above. Question 109, Articles 1 and 2. Question 123, Article 12. And Martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence, it is evident that Martyrdom is an act of virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Some have said that in the case of the innocents, the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered Martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of Martyrdom, which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes the place of baptism. Wherefore, just as in the case of baptized children, the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace. So, in those who were slain for Christ's sake, the merit of Christ's Martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the Martyr's Palm. Hence, Augustine says in a sermon on the epiphany. Number 46. As though you were addressing them, a man that does not believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You are not old enough to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Christ who was to suffer. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine says in On the City of God 1 that possibly the church was induced by certain credible witnesses of divine authority, thus to honor the memory of those holy women. Confirmer Question 64, Article 1, Second Reply. Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now, it has been stated in Prima Secunde Question 108, Article 1, Fourth Reply, that some of the precepts of the divine law should be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing whenever expedient. In the same way, certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind so that in such and such a case a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly. Yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation. Second Article, Whether Martyrdom is an Act of Fortitude. Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek Martyr signifies a witness. Now witness is born to the faith of Christ according to Acts 1.8 You shall be witnesses unto me, etc. And Maximus says in a sermon, The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood. Therefore, martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude. Objection 2. Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom. Thus Maximus says in a sermon, The charity of Christ is victorious in his martyrs. Again, the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom according to John 15.13. Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down his life for his friends. Moreover, without charity, martyrdom avails nothing according to 1 Corinthians 13.3. If I should deliver my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth mean nothing. Therefore, martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude. Objection 3. Further, a Gazetan says in a sermon on St. Cyprian, It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and patience. Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore, martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude. On the contrary, Cyprian says in his letter to martyrs and confessors too, Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you, most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage? Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. I answer that as stated above in question 123, article 1 and following. It belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers and chiefly against dangers of death and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue since he cleaves to faith and justice, notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the immanence of which is more overdue to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon, led to martyrs and confessors too, The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved and strength divine. Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude, for which reason the Church reads in the office of martyrs. They became valiant in battle. Confer Hebrews 1134. Reply to Objection 1. Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. One is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened and this is the end of fortitude. The other is the firmness itself whereby a man does not yield to contraries that hinder him from achieving that good and this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind and human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of divine justice, which is through faith in Christ Jesus, according to Romans 322. Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened but to fortitude as the eliciting habit. Reply to Objection 2. Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines there too as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding and the fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious like any other act of virtue and for this reason it avails not without charity. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above in Question 123 Article 6, the chief act of fortitude is endurance. To this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, notably endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their patience. Third article, whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection. Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly, that which is a matter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection. Because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation since the Apostle says in Romans 10.10, with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. And it is written in 1 John 3.16 that we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. Therefore, martyrdom does not attain to perfection. Objection 2. Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom. Wherefore Gregory says in his commentary on Job 35 that obedience is preferable to all sacrifices. Therefore, martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. Objection 3. Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual, according to the philosopher in Ethics 1.2. Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore, the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom. On the contrary, Augustine in his On Holy Virginity 46 prefers martyrdom to virginity, which pertains to perfection. Therefore, martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree. I answer that we may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue approximately eliciting it, in this way, martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only insofar as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better. A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first mode of cause, which is the love of charity. And it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says in Colossians 314, that charity is the bond of perfection. Now, of all virtuous acts, martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity. Since a man's love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life, man loves life itself most, and on the other hand, he hates death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, from fear of which even dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures, as Augustine observes in his 83 Questions, Question 36. And from this point of view, it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John 15.13. Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down his life for his friends. Reply to Objection 1. There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept as being necessary for salvation. Thus, Augustine declares in his On Adulterous Marriages, 13. that a man is under the obligation of observing continency through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence, it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom. Thus, we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for their faith and brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation of the mind. Reply to Objection 2. Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death. Thus, we read of Christ in Philippians 2.8 Hence, it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered absolutely. Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all the other virtuous acts. Thus, neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues. Fourth article. Whether death is essential to martyrdom. Objection 1. It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the assumption his letter to Paulina and Epistochium, I should say rightly that the mother of God was both virgin and martyr although she ended her days in peace. And Gregory says in his third homily on the Gospel although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit. Therefore, there can be martyrdom without suffering death. Objection 2. Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body. Wherefore also Lucy said if thou causest me to be violated against my will my chastity will gain me a twofold crown. Objection 3. Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude but it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships as Augustine declares in On Music 6. Now there are many other hardships besides death which one may suffer for Christ's faith namely imprisonment exile being stripped of one's goods as mentioned in Hebrews 10 34 for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus not withstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death. Objection 4. Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act as stated above Article 2 first reply and Article 3. Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. Therefore it is before death and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom. On the contrary Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living without faith. I answer that as stated above in Article 2. A martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible as stated in Hebrews 11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are want to despise both their kindred and all they possess and even to suffer bodily pain rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job in Job 2.4 skin for skin and all that a man hath he will give for his soul. Translators note the Dewey version translates soul as life. That is, for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake. Reply to Objection 1 The authorities quoted and the like that one may meet with speak of martyrdom by way of similitude. Reply to Objection 2 When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God however who searches the heart this may be deemed worthy of a reward as Lucy said. Reply to Objection 3 As stated above in Question 123 Articles 4 and 5 Fortitude regards danger of death chiefly and other dangers consequently Wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment or exile or forfeiture of his wealth except insofar as these result in death. Reply to Objection 4 The merit of martyrdom is not after death but in the voluntary endurance of death namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes however that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships. Fifth article Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom Objection 1 It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom For it is written in 1 Peter 4 15 and 16 Let none of you suffer as a murderer or a thief or a railer or a coveter of other men's things But if as a Christian let him not be ashamed let him glorify God in this name Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ Therefore only faith Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer Objection 2 Further a martyr is a kind of witness but witness is born to the truth alone Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth but only for witnessing to the divine truth Otherwise a man would be a martyr if you were to die for confessing a truth of geometry and derivative science which seems ridiculous Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom Objection 3 Further those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good since the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual according to the philosopher If then some other good were the cause of martyrdom you would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country Yet this is not consistent with church observance for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom On the contrary it is written in Matthew 1510 Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake which pertains to martyrdom according to a gloss as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom I answer that in article 4 martyrs are so called as being witnesses because by suffering in body and to death they bear witness to the truth not indeed to any truth but to the truth which is in accordance with godliness and was made known to us by Christ Therefore Christ's martyrs are his witnesses Now this truth is the truth of faith Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief but also outward profession which is expressed not only by words whereby one confesses the faith but also by deeds whereby a person shows that he has faith according to James 2 18 I will show thee by works of faith hence it is written of certain people Titus 116 They profess that they know god but in their works they deny him thus all virtuous deeds in as much as they are referred to god are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that god requires these works of us and rewards us for them and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom For this reason the church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist who suffered death not for refusing to deny the faith but for reproving adultery A Christian is one who is Christ's Now a person is said to be Christ's not only through having faith in Christ but also because he has actuated to virtuous deeds by the spirit of Christ according to Romans 8 9 If any man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of his and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins according to Galatians 5 24 They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith which is done by words but also to suffer for doing any good work and for avoiding any sin for Christ's sake because this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith Reply to Objection 2 The truth of other sciences has no connection with the worship of the godhead hence it is not called truth according to godliness and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom Yet, since every lie is a sin as stated above in question 110 articles 3 and 4 Avoidance of a lie to whatever truth it may be contrary may be the cause of martyrdom in as much as a lie is a sin against the divine law Reply to Objection 3 The good of one's country is paramount among human goods Yet, the divine good which is the proper cause of martyrdom is of more account than human good Nevertheless Since human good may become divine for instance when it is referred to God it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God may be the cause of martyrdom End of question 124 This is the LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 125 Of Fear in 4 articles Translators Note St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently fear and timidity The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear Otherwise cowardice would be a better rendering We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude 1. Fear 2. Fearlessness 3. Daring Under the first head there are four points of inquiry First whether fear is a sin Second whether it is opposed to fortitude Third whether it is a mortal sin Fourth whether it excuses from sin or diminishes it First article whether fear is a sin Objection 1 It would seem that fear is not a sin For fear is a passion as stated above in the Parse Prima Secundae Question 23 article 4 and in Question 42 Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions as stated in Ethics 2 Since then every sin is blame worthy it seems that fear is not a sin Objection 2 further Nothing that is commanded in the Divine law is a sin Since the law of the Lord is unspotted according to Psalm 188 Yet fear is commanded in God's law for it is written in Ephesians 6.5 Servants, be obedient to them that are your Lord's according to the flesh with fear and trembling Therefore fear is not a sin Objection 3 further Nothing that is naturally in man is a sin For sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene and on the True Faith 3 Now fear is natural to man wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 3.7 that A man would be insane or insensible to pain if nothing earthquakes nor deluges inspired him with fear Therefore fear is not a sin On the contrary our Lord said in Matthew 10.28 Fear ye not them that kill the body and it is written in Ezekiel 2.6 Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words I answer that a human act is said to be a sin on account of its being in ordinate because the good of a human act consists in order as stated above in Question 109, Article 2 and in Question 114, Article 1 Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason and reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after Among things to be shunned it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others and among things to be sought after that some are to be sought after more than others Moreover the more a good is to be sought after the more is the opposite evil to be shunned The result is that the reason dictates are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for fear is in ordinate and sinful On the other hand when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned the appetite is neither in ordinate nor sinful Reply to Objection 1 Fear in its generic exception denotes avoidance in general Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil and the same applies to every other passion Wherefore the philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame because to wit we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or in ordinate manner Reply to Objection 2 The fear which the apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters Reply to Objection 3 The reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand and the endurance of which profits us nothing Hence there is no sin in fearing them Second Article Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude Objection 1 It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude because fortitude is about dangers of death It is above in question 123 Articles 4 and 5 But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death For Gloss on Psalm 127 verse 1 Blessed are they that fear the Lord says that it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers or to lose worldly goods Again a Gloss on Psalm 744 he prayed the third time saying the self-same word says that evil fear is threefold fear of death fear of pain and fear of contempt Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude Objection 2 Further the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude exposes himself to the danger of death Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame Thus Augustine relates in on the city of God 1 that Cato in order not to be Caesar's slave gave himself up to death Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain opposed there to Objection 3 Further all despair arises from fear but despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope as stated above in question 20 article 1 as well as in the Pares Prima Secunde question 40 article 4 Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude The philosopher in Ethics 2.7 and Ethics 3.7 states that timidity is opposed to fortitude I answer that as stated above in question 19 article 3 as well as in the Pares Prima Secunde question 43 article 1 All fear arises from love since no one fears save what is contrary to something Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice but ordinate love is included in every virtue since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue while in ordinate love is included in every sin because in ordinate love gives use to inordinate desire hence in like manner in ordinate fear is included in every sin thus the covetous man fears the loss of money the intemperate man the loss of pleasure and so on But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object as we find proved in Ethics 3.6 Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death For this reason timidity is said to be antnomastically opposed to fortitude Translators note Antnomazia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term for example the philosopher for Aristotle and so timidity which is inordinate fear of any evil is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death end of note Reply to Objection 1 The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic exception which can be opposed to various virtues Reply to Objection 2 Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end as stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde Article 3 as well as in 18.6 And it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery hardships is overcome by fear which is contrary to fortitude Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 3.7 that To die in order to escape poverty, lust or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice Fortishan hardships is a mark of effeminacy Reply to Objection 3 As stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde Question 45 Article 2 Fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope So on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear It does not follow however that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear but that only from fear of the same kind Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind namely to divine things whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death Hence the argument does not prove Third Article Whether fear is a mortal sin Objection 1 It would seem that fear is not a mortal sin For As stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde Question 23 Article 1 Fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality as stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde Question 74 Article 4 Therefore Fear is not a mortal sin Objection 2 Further Every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God but fear does not do this For a gloss on Judges 7.3 Whoever is fearful etc. says that A man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart but that he can rally and take courage Therefore Fear is not a mortal sin Objection 3 Further Mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept But fear does not make one lapse from a precept but only from perfection For a gloss on Deuteronomy 20 verse 8 What man is there that is fearful and faint-hearted says We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare if he still fears to be dispoiled of earthly riches Therefore Fear is not a mortal sin On the contrary For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due and yet this is due to the fearful according to Apocalypse 21 verse 8 But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable etc. Shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death Therefore Fear is a mortal sin I answer that as stated above in Article 1 Fear is a sin being inordinate that is to say through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites without the accession of the rational appetites consent and then it cannot be a mortal but only a venial sin But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the will which deliberately shuns something against the dictative reason and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes immortal sometimes a venial sin For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden to commit what is commanded by the divine law such fear is a mortal sin Otherwise it is a venial sin Reply to Objection 1 This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality Reply to Objection 2 This gloss can also be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality Or better still it may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy Now even when fear is a mortal sin it may happen nevertheless that one is not so willfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside Thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence and is turned aside from accomplishing what he is doing Reply to Objection 3 This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary not for the fulfillment of a precept but for the perfection of a counsel Such like fear is not a mortal sin but is sometimes venial and sometimes it is not a sin for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear article whether fear excuses from sin Objection 1 it seems that fear does not excuse from sin for fear is a sin as stated above in article 1 but sin does not excuse from sin rather does it aggravate it therefore fear does not excuse from sin Objection 2 further if any fear excuses from sin most of all would this be true of the fear of death to which as the saying is a courageous man is subject yet this fear seemingly is no excuse because since death comes of necessity to all it does not seem to be an object of fear therefore fear does not excuse from sin Objection 3 further all fear is of evil either temporal or spiritual now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin because instead of inducing one to sin it withdraws one from sin and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin because according to the philosopher in ethics 3 one should not fear poverty nor sickness nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin on the contrary it is stated in the decredals a man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics has an obstensible excuse I answer that as stated above in article 3 fear is sinful insofar as it runs counter to the order of reason now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others therefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference on the other hand if through fear to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided he could not be wholly excused from sin because such like fear would be inordinate now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body and the evils of the body more than evils of external things therefore if one were to incur evils of the soul namely sins in order to avoid evils of the body such as blows or death or evils of external things such as loss of money or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money one would not be wholly excused from sin yet one sin would be avoided somewhat for what is done through fear is less voluntary because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing hence the philosopher in ethics 3 1 says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary reply to objection 1 fear excuses not in the point of its sinfulness but in the point of its involuntariness reply to objection 2 although death comes of necessity to all yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear reply to objection 3 according to the opinion of Stoics who held temporal goods not to be man's goods it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man's evils and that therefore they are no wise to be feared but according to Augustine these temporal things are goods of the least account and this was also the opinion of the peripatetics hence their contraries are indeed to be feared but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue end of question 125 read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert, LC question 126 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 126 of fearlessness in two articles we must now consider the vice of fearlessness under which head there are signs of inquiry first whether it is a sin to be fearless second whether it is opposed to fortitude first article whether fearlessness is a sin objection one it seems that fearlessness is not a sin for that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin it is written in praise of the just man in Proverbs 21 verse 1 the just bold as a lion shall be without dread therefore it is not a sin to be without fear objection 2 further nothing is so fearful as death according to the philosopher in Ethics 3.6 yet one ought not to fear even death according to Matthew 10.28 fear ye not them that killed the body etc nor anything that can be inflicted by man according to Isaiah 51.12 who art thou thou that shouldest be afraid of a mortal man therefore it is not a sin to be fearless objection 3 further fear is born of love as stated above in question 125 article 2 now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly since according to Augustine in On the City of God 14 the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly on the contrary it is said of the unjust judge in Luke 18 to that he feared not God nor regarded man I answer that since fear is born of love we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear now it is here a question of that fear where by one dreads temporal evils and which results from the love of temporal goods and every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed there too and to do so in due measure that is to love these things not as placing his end therein but as things to be used for the sake of his last end hence it is contrary to the natural inclination and therefore a sin to fall short of loving them in due measure nevertheless one never lapses entirely from this love since what is natural cannot be wholly lost for which reason the apostle says in Ephesians 5 29 no man ever hated his own flesh where for even those that slave themselves do so from love of their own flesh which they desire to free from present stress hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought for the reason that he loves them less than he ought but that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves this is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others according to the saying of Job 41 verses 24 and 25 he was made to fear no one he beholdeth every high thing and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason thus the philosopher says in Ethics 3 7 that the Celts through lack of intelligence fear nothing it is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul or dullness of understanding yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible reply to Objection 1 the just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good not that he is altogether fearless for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 128 he that is without fear cannot be justified reply to Objection 2 death and whatever else can be afflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue either as regards himself or as regards the progress he may cause in others hence it is written in Proverbs 14.16 a wise man feareth and declineeth from evil reply to Objection 3 temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God and on the same score they are not to be feared wherefore it is written in Ecclesiasticus 34.16 he that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing but temporal goods are not to be despised insofar as they are helping us instrumentally to attain to those things that pertain to divine fear and love second article whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude Objection 1 it seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude for we judge of habits by their acts now no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless since if fear be removed one is both brave to endure and daring to attack therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude Objection 2 further fearlessness is a vice either through lack of due love or on account of pride or by reason of folly now lack of due love is opposed to charity pride is contrary to humility and folly to prudence or wisdom therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude Objection 3 further vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean but one mean has only one extreme on the other side since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other it seems that fearlessness is not opposed there too on the contrary the philosopher in Ethics 3 fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude I answer that as stated above in Question 123 Article 3 fortitude is concerned about fear and daring now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason namely that he should fear what he ought and when he ought and so forth now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency therefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear insofar as a man fears what he ought not and as he ought not so too fearlessness is opposed there too by deficiency of fear insofar as a man fears not what he ought to fear reply to Objection 1 the act of fortitude is to endure death without fear and to be aggressive not anyhow but according to reason this the fearless man does not do reply to Objection 2 fearlessness by its specific nature imposes the mean of fortitude wherefor it is opposed to fortitude directly but in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues reply to Objection 3 the vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring and fearlessness by deficiency of fear fortitude imposes the mean on each passion since there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects end of question 126 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 127 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 127 of daring translators note daring understood as excessive daring or foolhardiness in two articles we must now consider daring and under this head there are two points of inquiry first whether daring is a sin second whether it is opposed to fortitude first article whether daring is a sin objection one it seems that daring is not a sin for it is written in Job 3921 concerning the horse by which according to Gregory the godly preacher is denoted that he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men but no vice redounds to a man's praise therefore it is not a sin to be daring objection two further according to the philosopher in ethics 69 one should take counsel in thought and do quickly what has been counseled but daring helps this quickness in doing therefore daring is not sinful but praise worthy objection three further daring is a passion caused by hope as stated above in the primus akunde question 45 article 2 when we were treating of the passions but hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin on the contrary it is written in ecclesiasticus 818 go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils now no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin therefore daring is a sin I answer that daring as stated above in the paris primus akunde question 23 article 1 as well as in question 55 is a passion now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason and sometimes it lacks moderation either by excess or by deficiency and on this account the passion is sinful again the names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger in which case it is sinful and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin reply to objection one the daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude reply to objection two it is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel which is an act of reason but to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful for this would be to act rashly which is a vice contrary to prudence as stated above in question 58 article 3 where for daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason reply to objection 3 some vices are unnamed and so also are some virtues as the philosopher remarks in ethics two seven and in ethics four four five and six hence the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices in virtues and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil as in the case of hatred fear anger and daring but hope and love have a good for this object and so we use them rather to designate virtues second article whether daring is opposed to fortitude objection one it seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude for excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind but presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude objection two further daring does not seem to call for blame except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately or to others whom he attacks with daring or exposes to danger but this seemingly pertains to injustice therefore daring as designating as sin is opposed not to fortitude but to justice objection three further fortitude is concerned about fear and daring as expressed above in question one hundred and twenty-three article three now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of fear if then daring is opposed to fortitude in the point of excessive daring there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring but there is no such vice therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude on the contrary the philosopher in both the second and third books of ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude I answer that as stated above in question one hundred and twenty-six article two it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned where for every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue as immoderate to moderate now daring in so far as it denotes a vice implies excess of passion and this excess goes by the name of daring where for it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring as stated above in question one hundred and twenty-two article three reply to objection one opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species where for it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause reply to objection two just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause so neither does it depend on its effect now the harm done by daring is its effect where for neither does the opposition of daring depend on this reply to objection three the movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source hence the vice which exceeds daring has no contrary deficiency save only timidity yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity for as the philosopher says in ethics three seven the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger yet fail when the danger is present namely through fear end of question one hundred and twenty-seven by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC