 So with that, Andrew, I think. Great. We'll take your questions. If you could give us who you are and what news organizations you live with, that would be helpful. Good question. Okay. So I've been in Muscat with the Financial Times Deutschland here in Washington. You mentioned trade briefly and I would like to ask you to expand on that a little bit. The President has basically affirmed his commitment to trade in the Asia Pacific. He wants to use this trip as a way to show that he is committed and he's engaged. So with regard to, first, the TPT, but also his export promotion initiative, how realistic is it that he can first convince the world and second, maybe even bring the message back home that perhaps ratifying the outstanding trade agreements would be a good idea of how can he use this trip to be back on the stage in trade issues. Thank you. I should first advertise for CSIS and mention that Gary Locke, we've invited Gary Locke, the Commerce Secretary, to give a speech and he's going to be here Wednesday morning at 10, I think, at CSIS to talk about the Administration's Asia Pacific trade strategy. The President, beginning with his trip to Asia for APEC in November, began talking about trade, particularly in Asia. And then in the State of the Union, he had a brief reference, one line, saying if we don't join these free trade agreements, we'll be left behind. That's the good news. The bad news is that, for example, in the State of the Union, after saying if we don't join these free trade agreements, we'll be left behind, what came next was a non-sequitur. And he didn't explain how he was going to get these free trade agreements to the Congress. He didn't ask the Congress to support them. And I am quite certain that Kevin Rudd of Australia is going to privately, if not publicly, urge him to move on trade because for Australia, which depends on an open, trans-Pacific marketplace, the American lack of movement on free trade right now is deeply problematic. We have, the Administration has, and the President has said, would like to get the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement chorus to the Congress this year and he has said that he would engage, is the word, engage in the trans-Pacific partnership negotiations. The problem is there are several problems. One is to do TPP, to actually participate, the Administration has to get from the Congress trade promotion authority. And to do the chorus, they have to get the Congress to pass the free trade agreement with Korea. And there's a real question about whether the President still controls his caucus enough to do this and where it will rank in priority compared to health care, climate change, education reform, and stimulus packages. And my guess would be, and I think probably the conventional wisdom in town is the Administration is not going to try to do much, frankly, on the legislative side before the midterm elections. And people in Australia and Asia will know that. So, you know, how much time do we have before Asia starts creating preferential free trade agreements and we get left out? We probably have a few years. So the President can let the wheel spin politically for a year on this, but if by the end of his term we're not actively and credibly engaged in some of these free trade arrangements, there will be things like Korea-EU free trade agreement, ASEAN, India, and so forth, and increasingly the U.S. business will find that they're dealing with disadvantaged positions. And it will be particularly hard to promote exports the way the President wants to unless we're engaged. So right now it's a game of rhetoric and what isn't happening is action on the ground in Washington. The rhetoric's been late in coming, so that will carry us for a little while, but sooner or later I think there's going to be a credibility problem. And again, it probably won't move till after the midterm and then we'll see what happens. Well, I would, I give the Administration a little bit of credit. When they started out completely non-existent on trade, completely non-existent. APEC in November, APEC countries make up 44% of global trade, totally non-existent trade policy. Every leader he sat down with asked him, what's your policy on trade? And then Major, you interviewed him in Seoul and you pushed him really hard on the course. Yeah, I remember the interview. You had it down before, after the November election. And then they started changing. You saw in the State of the Union speech he had this export promotion strategy. So, you know, I give them credit for that, right? Having said that, this trip is not going to do anything to help him on trade. If anything, it's going to expose how vulnerable they are on trade policy. Because, as Mike said, they've talked about TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership. Indonesia is not part of the TPP, right? To do any of this, the President has to request trade promotion authority from the Congress. He's not made that request yet. It hasn't even come up as far as I can tell. And, as many of you know, ASEAN represents, you know, not just Indonesia, but all of ASEAN represents the fourth largest overseas market for the United States. And the U.S. invests three times as much in ASEAN than it does in China. So this is going to all show that there really is a lot of talk about trade, but there isn't a whole lot of substance. But I think it's, you know, and, but again, I give them credit because he came out in year two and really has sort of put trade on the agenda in a way that many of us in year one were wondering where they were on trade. This was just a glaring hole while all these free trade agreements were being negotiated, right? The Koreans negotiated the EU FDA, then the FDA with India, just leaving the United States behind. So again, I give them points on making the turn, but this trip is not going to help them on the trade front. Questions? Hi, I'm Julie Pace from the AP. You mentioned tensions in Australia on Afghanistan. Could you sort of lay out what the public sentiment in Australia is right now with their involvement in Afghanistan, and if we can expect any changes in the coming years and their involvement there? Australia's strategy for both labor and liberal for left of center and right of center governments has been to support the neoliberal order internationally, and that meant up until basically December 7th, 1941, supporting Britain primarily, and then after that making sure that U.S. preeminence is sustained. And as part of that strategy, Australia has gone into almost every fight the U.S. has been in with us, and they've gone in as they put it down under at the pointy end of the spear. They haven't waited to be asked. They've stood up at the beginning, often in Iraq, in Afghanistan, some of the earliest forces to go in are Special Air Service, our Australian F-18s. Their whole army is smaller than the U.S. Marine Corps, but they're extremely capable in their philosophy is we'll go in early, we'll take high risk, we don't do the cleanup, we don't have the numbers for that. So that's what they've done in Afghanistan, and they have somewhere I think just south of a thousand boots on the ground, which is pretty good. I don't think they're going to significantly increase that. I don't think there's an expectation that they will. In public polling, I haven't seen it in the last month or so, but a few months ago it was very similar to the U.S., it was sort of evenly split about Afghanistan, but it's not the kind of thing where the Prime Minister has any major, where Rudd has any major problem. The opposition liberal party headed by John Howard was in at the beginning, and they support him, and within the Labor Party, most of his caucus supports him as well. It's the kind of pressures that some other allied governments in NATO do. Thank you. My name is Kimura, I'm with the Japan Security Service. Dr. Green, you said his stop at Guam is just a refueling, but at least Japanese audience would try to look into some implication here, since the Guam is a part of realignment program, and this is the course of tension between the Japan and U.S. government today. You don't expect any significant speech by Mr. Obama, like calling for Japan to implement the original plan of realignment? I haven't seen the White House hasn't briefed the details of the trip. I don't know, maybe you know Victor, if he has a speech planned in Guam. My guess is that he's meeting with U.S. forces and their families. That's usually the pattern that one would expect, whether it's in a stop in Alaska or also on Air Force Base in Korea or Camp Bond Steel. So it's possible in that context he'll say something about the relocation, it's true, and that'll be big headlines in Japan. Guam, as you know under the U.S.-Japan realignment agreement, the U.S. agreed to move about 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, which would basically cut the size of the Marine Corps in Okinawa in half and reduce a lot of pressure on the Japanese citizens there. The Marines agreed to do this even though there was some concern in the Marine Corps about splitting the force operationally because the strategic payoff was worth it, because they thought that would get them a durable, long-term, credible presence in Okinawa, and they wouldn't constantly be facing these pressures. But the condition the Marines had and the U.S. Congress was that Japan would build this new base for the helicopters at Hinoko, this offshore base. And that is what, that Marine Corps Air Station, is now what is at issue. I just came back from Japan and it is just not at all clear whether the Hachiyama government is going to be able to implement that agreement and build the new base offshore base at Hinoko as promised. If they can't, if the government can't do that, if it's unable or unwilling to do it, then the move to Guam could be in peril because that base was the condition for moving the Marines. If the Marines can't get that base, then operationally the cost is too big. It's not worth it. And the Congress will support them on that. So given the declining popularity of the Hachiyama government and public opinion polls in Japan saying that he's mismanaging the U.S.-Japan alliance, whatever the President says about Guam will be big news in Japan. At most, remember he'll be speaking to families, he'll be speaking about their service and sacrifice. At most, I can't see him going beyond what Secretary Clinton and others have said, which is we think that the plan is the best plan and expect the Japanese government to move forward with it. I don't think he'd make any news. But I'm sure whatever he says, even if he moves his left arm a little bit, it'll be big news in Japan because Guam is so critical. Thanks, Margaret Taleb with McClatchy. So what the President has been doing on these foreign trips is in the most important country that he goes to, he'll always give a big speech and we'll expect him to do that in Indonesia. How do you think that might be different from the speech he gave in Cairo? And since Indonesia is such a big country, I don't know that much about their posture of the war in Afghanistan and where they stand. Can you talk about engaging Muslim nations in an Afghanistan fight? I had a final quick question about US-Australia relations. Can you talk about to what degree there's tension over China in the US-Australia policy? Thanks. First on the degree of tension in US-Australia relations, with John Howard, it was fairly clear. For John Howard, it was, we have a very good economic relationship with China, which is very different from your economic relationship with China. But strategically, we are on the same page. Strategically, the United States and Australia are on the same page with regard to China. Rudd came in and there was a few that he was a sinologist and that he was going to, therefore, attack Wei in the direction of China. And I think that was sort of the initial assessment. I don't know if that's really the way he is. I mean, if anything, the more you know China, the more you see all the blemishes and the flaws, as with any country. And I think what we've seen constant is clearly the economic relationship with China continues to grow. I think Rudd has certainly been much more active than his predecessor in terms of thinking about regional frameworks in Asia that involve China as a very central part of it. And ideally, he'd like to see the United States as another central part of it. But I think in the broader scheme with...