 Okay well let's take a look at this. So in Plato's cave we have the shadows, the puppets, the cutouts, and the sun. And for Plato this represents appearances, the particular objects, form, and the good, the true and the beautiful. Locke has sensation. He's got the first act of the mind, and he's got the second and third acts of the mind for the solid objects outside. And he says, but we know we can't give any account of substance in general as what he says. Okay so here's a question then. Does sensation have any non-empirical knowledge? Well no. That sensation just is the content of experience. That's just what sensation is. So if there's any innate ideas it's not in sensation. The content of our senses that just is empirical knowledge. Okay so that takes care of one kind of experience. What about the other kind? We've got reflection. Well the first act of the mind. Alright so with the first act of the mind we group, we group particular sensations to, or we group individual sensations to a particular object. Okay well you know try in this case right. So in this case you're grouping you know these appearances here and the sound of my voice to me to a particular object. You're not grouping it to anything else that you see. Okay now is this non-empirical? Is this some kind of innate idea? Well this is difficult perhaps to say. So it's not like you have an innate idea of me. Nobody does. Right nobody does. In order to know that I exist you have to in some way have an experience or to interact with somebody who's had an experience with me. So probably not. I mean it depends. So everybody here is making a judgment that these appearances and the sound of my voice are coming from me. But technically speaking I'm not in front of you right now. Nobody is really thinking to themselves that all the appearances that they see and all the sounds that they are hearing are from their computer. But that's where they're actually from right now. Now there's a causal chain that involves me to your computer. Okay but you know immediately this is all from your computer right now. So I mean that's an interesting question. If this grouping is an innate idea, I mean the serious questions about its accuracy right, but you know probably not because it's probably not an innate idea because nobody has an innate idea of particular objects. You have to learn everything about particular objects from that object. So you know even Plato's on board is like yeah nobody has an innate idea of an individual. That just doesn't work. So it's probably not the first act of the mind. It might be and if we want to push the point, we want to push the point. It might be but it's probably not. Okay. What about the second act of the mind? So you know we have our apples again and we note the similarities and dissimilarities. Is this an innate idea? Is similarity an innate idea? Is dissimilarity an innate idea? So if I put apples and oranges up here, is dissimilar an innate idea? Well if you say it's just from experience, if you say similar is just from experience, I'm going to ask when you're looking at this right here, I'm going to ask what's the color of similar. I mean it's one thing to say that one color is similar to another. Okay fine, but it's not like there's a third color between them that is similarity. Now you're making a judgment that they're similar and you're rightfully so. I think you're right in your judgment that these colors are similar, but how did you get that? After all, you don't experience similar. You can't hear similar. You can hear two things that sound similar, but similarity itself is not a sensation. You say, well you know that's what's happening in the mind. It's like okay that's what's happening in the mind, but how does your mind do that? Because that's not an appearance. Similarity to similarity of appearances is itself not an appearance. So that kind of looks like an innate idea. And even the abstraction itself. This is not an appearance. It's what you're doing with the appearances. That's on top of in addition to the appearances. It's not the appearances themselves. So that's also an innate idea. So Locke's done some really cool work here. Like really trying to give an account of say the form of apple without saying that I have to contemplate apples. He's trying to look at the individual apples and that's fine. But similarity and dissimilarity are now forms. They're innate. They're in your head somehow. Somehow you're doing this, not from an appearance. That's what you're judging about appearances. Okay, but if it's not the appearance itself, it's a judgment about the appearances. It's not empirical. It's not a sensation. It's not an experience. You're doing that. You know that independent of on top of the experiences. It's an abstraction. Okay. But then this is smuggling in of an innate idea.