 I turn to Kyung-Woo, former ambassador at the OECD, and presently president of the Korean Bretton Woods Club and chairman of the board of the Korea Center for International Finance. You have the floor. Thank you very much, Chairman. I would like to make two comments on the one about the general monetary policy of the advanced countries where they can achieve 2% inflation target and second is more about the Korean experience of dealing with this crisis this time. The first one about the global monetary policy, I think there is a real danger that will end up with over-tightening rather than under-tightening, there are a couple of reasons for that. Number one is that it looks like that all the advanced country central bank is doing their own tightening but there is no coordination among themselves so that each country, when they do the tightening, they also kill the overseas demand of other countries that putting all together, they might come up with over-tightening. The second point is a little bit related with the professor Ferdinand mentioned about this coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. Normally, it would be ideal to tame down the inflation the monetary and fiscal policy should tighten together but in this time, because of the very rapid increase of the interest rate that there are vulnerable groups in the society that face the danger and that probably requires more support from the fiscal side plus we talk about this inflation reduction act of the USA and the same is being mentioned in Europe, Japan, even in Korea because all this cheap industry or EV industry that requires fiscal support. Another thing is this climate change adaptation cost. We all know that after COP 27, we are behind the curve to meet this target so that there will be huge demand for the fiscal support. One side when the monetary is doing the tightening, the fiscal side, even at the best of the intentions of the government, there are many areas that still require the fiscal spending. If the tightening should be done by monetary side alone, then you can end up with over-tightening on the tightening. And the third point about the behavioral side, we all know the Fed is behind the curve. At the beginning, they would say, this is a transitory. So about six months behind the curve and the behaviorally, then you tend to overcompensate and we have all this famous delay of the monetary policy that actually have an effect. One final point that's related to the Korean side as well is through the 14 exchange channel that also requires over-tightening. So when you look at all those things concerned, we might be able to achieve the inflation target but we most likely have a recession than originally planned by the most recent to its IMF estimation. But the Korean experience, the point I'm trying to make is that we have a roller coaster during this year about the foreign exchange market. From April to October, about six or seven months this, our foreign exchange, the Korean one depreciated 18% against the dollar. And we have done almost everything recommended during the Asian financial crisis, during the global financial crisis. We have built up huge foreign exchange reserve over $430 billion. We have net foreign assets also around $400 billion. And our short on debt against our reserve is around 40%. We have some capital management, macro-prudential measures. So all those things are in place. But when you exchange rate depreciates 18% for just in short period like six or seven months is still, you cannot observe all those shocks. And the market is very much worried. So suddenly the business has to deal with huge uncertainty, high interest rate, high dollar, super dollar, and then high inflation. And there's no way to know the where it's going to end. And finally, because of all this change and expectation in the market, in November, starting from November, dollar actually depreciated. In other words, couldn't want to appreciate around 7% or 8%. That actually calmed down the market. But during the time until November, if you look at the figure and how much burden it placed on the monetary policy side, in the first half of this year, we have this energy price hike, food price hike, and then we have this depreciation. So that in our purchase price inflation, about 80% comes from overseas. And it's very much difficult for the monetary side to set up its policy based on its domestic situation. We have liquidity skews coming in the market. We have many companies facing difficulties. But because of this inflation pressure coming from not only commodity price increase, but also exaggerated by this exchange rate. On October monetary policy, we had the forward guidance that we're going to perhaps come up with a small step, like 25 base points, but we ended up with 50 base points. And that's exactly the point that through this free exchange channel, some of the monetary authorities will end up with more tightening than desired or warranted by its local situation. And another point in that regard is that our central bank government famously mentioned that our central bank is independent of the government, but not independent of the Federal Reserve. And no more times we can follow the Federal Reserve with all this capital flow. But as I said, for six months, 18%, nobody can handle it. And there is a big pressure from the business and the political side to come up with a sub-arrangement with the Fed. And it's true that we had a sub-arrangement during the Asian financial crisis. And no, during the global financial crisis, there are nine countries with a non-convertible currency that was given this lifeline to show up the confidence not so much for the money, but it's more for the confidence. And also during the pandemic times from 2020 to 2021, unilaterally, this was given by the Federal Reserve. But now probably it's not a good time, even though we ask for the Fed swap. I don't think they're going to accept it. But when you have seen such a big roller coaster movement on the foreign exchange market, I still think that there must be some more structured way for non-convertible currency countries to have readable expectations of having access to the Fed, which is still missing. The last one is given by unilaterally during the pandemic times. So that may be something that international financial architecture is missing up to now. So that's my comment. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed. Only to be sure that I understood fully that what you have said, there was a period of, if I understand well, depreciation of the U.S. dollar by 18 percent. And appreciation of the U.S. dollar, okay? And then you said roller coaster. So then at a certain moment you had the reverse. Of 8 percent. Of 8 percent. Just in one month at a time. Yeah. And so first depreciation, which we understand pretty well, because you did not augment interest rates and the U.S. Fed augmented massively interest rates with a lag. But okay, so that's not terribly surprising, obviously, if I understand well, the constellation of interest rates between the U.S. and Korea. And then in a recent period, there has been some kind of catching up. So you wanted the swap to correct the fact that there was an interest rate differential which was substantial. Is that the message? No, actually, in terms of the RER, as you just mentioned, when the Fed tightened very rapidly and Korean interest rates also began to follow up. But despite that, because the tightening was so rapid. So within just six months or seven months at a time, Korean won't depreciate 18 percent. Even at the best of Korean authorities' persuasion to the market that fundamental is okay, earlier is okay. This is not a Korean won problem, but rather caused by the Fed's tightening speed. But that does not calm down the market because if you are in the business and then you suddenly see your interest rate is going up, inflation is going up. And then we are the country very much dependent on import of energy and import of the food. I got the point. Thank you so much. That's clear enough. Thank you very much indeed.