 Book 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Translated by Thomas Taylor. Book 9. In all friendships, however, which are of a dissimilar species, the analogous, as we have already observed, equalizes and preserves friendship. Thus, for instance, in the political friendship to the shoemaker a retribution is made for his shoes, according to their worth, and to the weaver, and other artificers. Here, therefore, a common measure, money is employed, and to this everything is referred, and by this is measured. But in the amatory friendship, sometimes indeed the lover accuses the object of his love that, though he loves her beyond measure, he is not beloved in return. Though, if it should so happen, he has nothing which can excite love. Frequently, however, she who is beloved complains that her lover, having formally promised everything, now performs nothing that he had promised. But things of this kind happen when the one indeed loves the object of his love on account of pleasure, but the other loves her lover on account of utility, and these things are not present with both. For, since the friendship exists on account of these things, a dissolution of it takes place when those things are not accomplished, which are the final causes of their love. For, they do not love each other, but what each possesses, which is not stable. Hence, such also are their friendships. Viz, they are not stable. Friendship, however, which is founded in manners, i.e., virtuous friendship, since it exists per se, or independent of external circumstances, is permanent, as we have before observed. But friends also disagree when other things happen to them, and not those which were the objects of their desire. For, when a man does not obtain that which he desired, it is just as if he obtained nothing. Thus a certain person promised a harper that he would reward him in proportion to the excellence of his singing. But in the morning, when the harper demanded the fulfillment of his promise, he said that he had returned pleasure for pleasure. If, therefore, this, i.e., pleasure, had been the wish of each, the harper would have been sufficiently recompensed. But if the object of the one was delight, and of the other gain, and if the object of the one was accomplished, but not of the other, the compact between them was not well fulfilled. For a man will attend to those things of which he is in want, and for the sake of them will give what is requisite. With respect, however, to the recompense which ought to be made, whether ought it to be estimated by him who gives or by him who receives. For, he who gives first seems to leave to the receiver what the recompense should be, which they say Protagoras also did. For, when he had taught anything, he ordered the learner to estimate what appeared to him to be the worth of the knowledge he had gained, and he received according to his valuation. But in things of this kind, to some persons it is sufficient to say, quote, sufficient be the price a friend appoints, close quote. Those, however, who, having first received money, afterwards performed nothing which they had promised to do, on account of the excess of magnitude of their promise, are deservedly accused. However, they do not perform what they had agreed to accomplish. But the Sophists, perhaps, are compelled to do this, because no one would give money for those things which they know. These, therefore, because they do not perform that for which they receive the reward, are justly blamed. With those persons, however, among whom there is no compact for services performed, we have already observed that those who first give to others on their own account are not to be blamed. For, of this kind is the friendship which is founded in virtue. Retribution, also, must be made according to deliberate choice. For, this is the province of a friend, and of virtue. This conduct, likewise, as it seems, should be adopted by those who are associates in philosophy. For, the worth of philosophy is not to be measured by money, nor can any honour be conferred equivalent to its dignity. But perhaps it is sufficient that a recompense as great as possible is made in the same manner as towards the gods and parents. Where, however, the gift is not such as this, but is conferred with a view to a certain thing, i.e., with a view to some recompense, a remuneration perhaps ought especially to be made, which, to both friends, will appear to be according to dessert. But, if this should not happen to take place, it may not only appear to be necessary, but also to be just, that he who first received should determine what is an equal compensation. For, if as much advantage or pleasure is returned as was received, the remuneration will be according to dessert. For this also appears to take place in traffic, and in some places there are laws which forbid any judicial processes respecting voluntary contracts, as if it were fit that in communions of this kind there should be no other judge, nor any other law, but that all differences should be decided by the person in whom trust is reposed, and by whom such contracts are used. For, they think that he who was instructed to estimate the retribution will judge more justly than he who reposed that trust, since, for the most part, those who possess, and those who wish to receive anything, do not estimate equitably. For, everyone thinks that his own property and what he gives are of great value. At the same time, however, the retribution should be as great as it is determined to be by those who receive the gift. Perhaps, however, a thing is not to be estimated to be worth so much as it appeared to its possessor, but to be worth as much as he would have estimated it to be before he possessed it. Chapter 2 Such particulars, however, as the following, are dubious, fizz, whether all things are to be assigned to a father, and he is to be obeyed in all things, or whether the sick man are indeed to obey the physician, and he who votes for the general of an army ought to give the preference to a man skilled in warlike concerns. And, in a similar manner, whether it is proper to be subservient to a friend, rather than to a worthy man, and whether remuneration is rather to be made to a benefactor than to an associate if it is impossible to make it to both. It is not, therefore, easy to determine all such particulars accurately. For they have many, and all various differences, in magnitude and parvitude, in the beautiful and the necessary. But it is not immanifest that not all things are to be given to the same person, and that, for the most part, benefits are rather to be returned to those from whom they were received than gifts are to be bestowed on associates. Just as it is more proper to return alone to him from whom it was borrowed, than to make a present to an associate. Perhaps, however, this must not always be done. For, if anyone should be made a prisoner by robbers, it may be inquired whether he who redeems him should be redeemed in his turn, be he who he may, or whether the price of redemption should be given to him who demands it, as is due, though he has not been taken prisoner. Or whether, in preference to all these, a father ought to be redeemed, for it would seem that a man should rather ransom his father than himself. Universally, therefore, as we have said, a debt ought to be paid, but if the donation surpasses in the beautiful or the necessary, we should incline to it, rather than to the discharge of a debt. For sometimes it is not equitable to return a benefit which another person has first conferred, when he indeed conferred the benefit knowing that it was bestowed on a worthy man. But the retribution will be made to one whom he who is to make it believes to be a depraved man. For, neither sometimes is alone to be granted to him who has lent. For, the one indeed, i.e. the depraved man, thinking that he shall receive back what he has lent, grants alone to the worthy man. But the other, i.e. the worthy man, does not expect that what he has lent will be returned by the depraved man. Whether, therefore, the thing thus exists in reality, the merit of the parties is not equal. Or, whether it does not thus exist, but it is fancy that it does, they will not appear to act absurdly. Therefore, as it has frequently been observed, assertions concerning passions and actions are similarly definite and certain with the things about which they are conversant. It is not, therefore, a manifest that the same things are not to be bestowed on all men, nor all things on a father, as neither are all things to be sacrificed to Jupiter. Since, however, different things are to be returned to parents, brothers, associates, and benefactors, a retribution is to be made to each of such things as are proper and appropriate. And thus, indeed, men appear to act, for they invite their kindred to weddings, since the genus of these is common, and, therefore, the actions also which are conversant with this are common. For the same reason, likewise, they think it especially necessary that kindred should be present at funerals. But it would seem that it is especially necessary to supply our parents with nutriment, because we are their debtors, and it is more beautiful to supply with these things the causes of our existence than ourselves. Honor also is to be paid to parents, as to the gods, yet not every honor is to be paid to them, for neither is the same honor to be paid to a father and a mother, nor again to a wise man or to the general of an army, but to a father paternal and to a mother maternal honor is to be paid. To every elderly man, likewise, honor is to be paid according to his age, by rising from our seat and resigning it to him and by other things of the like kind. To associates again, and brothers, freedom of speech must be granted and a participation in common of all things. To kindred also, to those of the same tribe, and fellow citizens, and to all the rest of mankind, we should endeavor to distribute what is appropriate and judiciously determine what pertains to each according to familiarity and virtue or use. A judgment, therefore, may more easily be made respecting those who are of the same genus, but in those of a different genus the decision is more difficult. We must not, however, on this account desist, that our circumstances will permit. Chapter 3 The dissolution also of friendships is attended with a doubt. Viz, whether friendship is to be dissolved with those who do not continue to be our friends. Or, shall we say, that with those who are friends on account of advantage and delight, when they no longer possess these, it is by no means absurd that the friendship should be dissolved. We are the friends of these things. Viz, of things advantageous and delectable. And these failing, it is reasonable to suppose that they will no longer be attached to each other. He, however, may be justly accused, who, loving another person on account of advantage or delight, pertains that he loves on account of manners, i.e., virtuously. For, as we said in the beginning, numerous dissensions take place when they are not in reality such friends as they fancy they are. When, therefore, anyone is deceived and apprehends that he is beloved on account of his manners, though at the same time he does nothing that is virtuous, he should blame himself. But, when he is deceived by the pretensions of the others, it is just to accuse the deceiver, and more so than those who adulterate money, because the improbity pertains to a more honorable thing. If, however, he admits him into his friendship as a good man, but he becomes a bad man, or should appear to have become a bad man, is he still to be beloved? Or is this not possible, since not everything deserves to be beloved, but that only which is good? Neither, therefore, is a bad man to be beloved, nor is it necessary that he should. For, it is not fit to be a lover of what is depraved, nor to be assimilated to a bad man. And, we have already observed that the similar is a friend to the similar. Is the friendship, therefore, to be immediately dissolved? Or, shall we say, not with all persons, but with those who are incurable on account of their depravity? For, assistance ought rather to be given to the manners of those who are capable of being corrected, then to their worldly possessions, because this is better and more adapted to friendship. He, however, who dissolves such a friendship, will appear not to act at all absurdly, for he was not a friend to this man, or to a man of this description. Hence, as he cannot restore him, being thus changed to virtue, he abandons him. But, if the one indeed continues, such as he was at first, and the other should become more worthy, so as very much to transcend in virtue, is the latter still to use the former as a friend? Or, is this not possible? This, however, becomes especially evident in a great interval, as in the friendships formed from childhood. For, if one of these should still remain a child in understanding, but the other should be a most excellent man, how can they be friends when they are neither addicted to the same pursuits, nor delighted and pained with the same things? For, neither will these be present in the future, for neither will these be present with them towards each other, but without these they cannot be friends, for they cannot live together. Concerning these particulars, however, we have already spoken. Shall we say, therefore, that when the friendship is dissolved, the one ought nevertheless so to conduct himself towards the other as if he had never been his friend? Or is it necessary that he should still retain the memory of their past friendship? As we think it is proper to gratify friends, rather than strangers, thus also shall we say, something must be conceded to former friends on account of pristine friendship when the dissolution of it was not occasioned by an excess of depravity? With respect, however, to friendly offices, and those things by which friendships are defined, they seem to proceed from the conduct of a man towards himself. For he is defined to be a friend who wishes well to another, and performs things which are really or apparently good for his sake, or who wishes his friend to exist and live for his sake, just as mothers are affected towards their children, or friends who for a time are offended with each other. Others, however, define a friend to be one who lives with another person, and who chooses the same things, or mutually grieves and rejoices with him. But this also especially happens to mothers, by some one of these particulars. Likewise, they define friendship. Each of these, however, exists in the worthy man towards himself, but they exist in other men so far as they apprehend themselves to be worthy. For it seems, as we have before observed, that virtue and a worthy man are a measure to everyone, since a worthy man accords with himself and aspires after the same things with his whole soul, i.e. with both the rational and irrational part. Hence he wishes for himself both real and apparent good and acts conformably to his wishes. For it is the province of a worthy man to labor in what is good, and this for his own sake, since he labors for the sake of his dynoetic part, which each of us appears to be, i.e. in which our very essence consists. He also wishes that he himself may live and be preserved, and especially this part, by which he is wise, for to a worthy man existence is a good thing. Everyone, however, wishes well to himself, but there is no one who, if he should become a different person from what he is, would choose, having lost his identity, that the person into whom he is changed should possess all things. For now also God possesses good, but he always remains such as he is, whatever that may be. It would seem, however, that each of us is that which energizes intellectually, or that each of us is principally this. Such a man also wishes to live with himself, since he does this willingly. For the remembrance of what he has done is delightful to him, and his hopes of what his future are good, but such things are delectable. He abounds likewise in his dinoetic part with contemplations, and he is especially pained and pleased in conjunction with himself. For the same thing is always painful and pleasing to him, and not a different thing at a different time, since, as I may say, he is without repentance, i.e. he does nothing of which he has occasion to repent. Since therefore each of these things is present with the worthy man towards himself, but he is disposed towards his friends in the same manner as towards himself, for a friend is another self. This being the case, the friendship also of these appears to be something, and those with whom these things are present appear to be friends. At present, however, we shall omit the consideration whether or not there can be friendship between a man and himself. But it would seem that there may be friendship between a man and himself when the rational and irrational parts are no longer two things, but one thing, through their union and consent. And also, because an excess of friendship resembles the regard which a man has for himself. The particulars likewise, which we have mentioned, are seen to take place among the multitude, though they are depraved characters. Shall we say therefore that so far as they are pleasing to themselves to be worthy, so far they participate of these things? For, these things are not inherent, nor do they even appear to be inherent in any one of those who are very depraved and wicked, and nearly indeed, they are not inherent even in those who are merely depraved. For, they are discordant with themselves, and like the incontinent, they desire one thing, but wish another, for they choose delectable things which are noxious, instead of those things which appear to them to be good. Others, again, through timidity and indolence, abstain from doing those things which they think are best for themselves. But those by whom many and dreadful deeds are performed, and who are hated on account of their depravity fly from life, and destroy themselves. Depraved men, likewise, search for those with whom they may pass their time, but fly from themselves, for they recollect when they are alone the many crimes they have committed, and expect the evils which are attendant on such wickedness will befall them. But they forget these when they are with others. Possessing, likewise, nothing amiable, they are not affected in a friendly manner towards themselves. Persons, therefore, of this description, neither rejoice nor condol with themselves, for their soul is in a state of sedition, and one part of it, indeed, is pained on account of depravity, when it abstains from certain things. But the other part is delighted, and the one part, indeed, draws this, but the other that way. The soul, as it were, being lacerated by sense and reason. If, however, it is not possible for him to be at one and the same time pained and pleased, yet after a short time he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes that these delectable things had not be fallen him. For bad men are full of repentance. The bad man, therefore, does not appear to be disposed in a friendly manner even towards himself, because he possesses nothing amiable. But if it is very miserable to be in this condition, everyone should strenuously fly from depravity and endeavor to be worthy, for thus a man will be disposed in a friendly manner towards himself and will become the friend of others. Chapter 5 Benevolence, however, resembles, indeed, friendship, yet is not friendship. For benevolence may be exerted towards unknown persons and latently, but friendship cannot. These things, therefore, have been asserted before. But neither is it delection, for it has not either impulse or appetite, and these are consequent to delection. And delection, indeed, subsists in conjunction with custom. But benevolence may be suddenly produced. Thus the spectator sometimes becomes suddenly benevolent towards those who contend for prizes at public solemnities and unite with them in their wishes for success. But they do not at all cooperate with them. For, as we have said, they become suddenly benevolent towards them and love them superficially. Benevolence, therefore, appears to be the beginning of friendship. Just as the pleasure received through the sight is the beginning of love. For no one loves who has not been previously delighted with the form of the beloved object. He, however, who is delighted with this form does not love the more on that account. But his love is then more ardent when he longs for the object of his love when absent and desires her presence. Thus also it is impossible for men to be friends unless they have been first benevolent. But those who are benevolent only do not on this account love each other the more. For they only wish well to those to whom they are benevolent. But they do not cooperate with them in anything. Nor do they endure any molestation for their sake. Hence it may metaphorically be said that benevolence is sluggish friendship. But by length of time and custom it may become friendship. Yet not that friendship which is founded in utility. Nor that which is founded in delight. For benevolence does not subsist on account of these things. For he indeed who is benefited distributes benevolence in return for the favors he has received. In so doing acting justly. But he who wishes prosperity to the actions of anyone hoping that through him he shall be enriched does not appear to be benevolent to him. But rather to himself as neither is he a friend if he pays attention to him with a view to a certain advantage. In short benevolence is produced through virtue. And a certain probity when someone appears beautiful or brave or the like to another person. In the same manner as we said it was produced towards those who contend for prizes at public celebrities. Chapter 6 Concord likewise appears to pertain to friendship on which account it is not an agreement in opinion. For this indeed may exist between those who are ignorant of each other. Nor are they to be concordant who are unanimous about anything as about the celestial bodies. For it does not belong to friendship to be concordant about these things. But cities are said to be concordant when they are unanimous about things which contribute to the general good and when they deliberately choose the same things and do what has been deemed in common fit to be done. Men are therefore concordant about practical affairs and of these such as surpass others in magnitude and which may befall two persons or all men. Thus cities are in concord when it appears to all citizens that magistrates should be elected or that a warlike compact should be formed with the Lacedemonians or that Pidekus should be the Archon because he also is willing to accept this office. But when each of the citizens wishes to be himself the Archon as was the case among the Phoenicians then they are in a state of sedition for concord does not consist in each person forming the same conception about a thing whatever that thing may be. But when they agree in wishing the same thing to the same person as when the people and worthy men agree in wishing that the most excellent men may govern for thus all the citizens obtain what they desire. Concord however appears to be political friendship as also it is said to be for it is conversant with what is advantageous and with those things which relate to the purposes of life. But a concord of this kind exists among worthy men for these are in concord with themselves and with each other since they are as I may say conversant with the same things. For the wishes of men of this description are permanent and do not undergo a flux and reflux like the Euripus. For their will is directed to things just and advantageous and these they desire in common. But bad men cannot be concordant except in a small degree just as they cannot likewise be friends since they desire in things advantageous to have the greater part themselves. But in labors and ministrant services they are deficient. Each however wishing that these things may befall himself explores how he may prevent others from obtaining that which he desires. For concord perishes when justice which is a common good is not preserved. It happens therefore that they are in a state of sedition compelling indeed each other but being themselves unwilling to do what is just. Chapter 7 Benefactors however appear to love in a greater degree those whom they benefit than those who are benefited do their benefactors and the cause of this is investigated as a thing not conformable to reason. To most men therefore the cause appears to be this that these are debtors and those the persons to whom they are indebted. Hence as in loans debtors wish their creditors not to be in existence but creditors are concerned for the safety of their debtors. Thus also benefactors wish those whom they have benefitted to exist in order that they may obtain a recompense but those who are benefitted are not concerned about making a recompense. Epicarmus therefore perhaps would say that these things are asserted by most men in consequence of looking to the depravity of mankind. But to act in this manner seems to be conformable to human nature. For the multitude are unmindful of the benefits they have received and are more desirous to be benefitted than to benefit. It would seem however that the cause of this is more natural and does not resemble that which pertains to the loan of money. For creditors do not love their debtors but wish them to be preserved for the sake of receiving what they have lent. But benefactors love and are fond of those they have benefitted though at present they derive no advantage from them. Nor are likely to derive any in future and this also happens to be the case with artificers for every artist loves his own work more than he would be beloved by it if it should become animated. Perhaps however this particularly happens to be the case with poets for they love their own poems beyond measure and have an affection for them as if they were children. Similarly therefore to this is that which pertains to benefactors for he who is benefited is their work. Hence this person is more dear to them than a work is to him by whom it is produced. The cause however of this is that existence is to all beings eligible and lovely but we exist in energy for we exist by living and acting. He therefore who produces a work is in a certain respect in energy in the work. Hence he loves the work with a parental affection because existence also is dear to him but this is natural for what the agent is in capacity is indicated by the work in energy. At the same time also to the benefactor that which results from the action is beautiful so that he is delighted with him in whom it is inherent but to him who is benefited nothing is beautiful in the benefactor but if anything is it is utility then this is in a less degree delightful and lovely. The energy however of present good is delectable as is likewise the hope of future and the memory of past good but the good is most delectable which subsists in energy and in a similar manner that which is lovely. To him who benefits therefore the work remains for a beautiful deed is lasting but to him who is benefited the advantage passes away. The memory likewise of beautiful deeds is delectable but the memory of useful actions is not very delightful or is so in a less degree it appears however that the contrary takes place with respect to expectation and delection indeed resembles production but to be beloved is similar to the being passive to love therefore and such things as pertain to friendship are consequent to those who excel in action. Again all men love in a greater degree things which are laboriously obtained thus for instance men love the wealth which they have themselves procured more than that which they have received from others. It appears therefore that to be benefited is a thing unattended with labor but that to benefit is laborious. On this account also mothers love their children in a greater degree than fathers for the part which they sustain in the generation of them is more laborious than that which fathers sustain and they in a greater degree know that they are their own offspring but it would seem that this reasoning also is adapted to benefactors. Chapter 8 It may however be doubted whether a man ought to love himself more than some other person for those are represented who love themselves transcendently and they are called as a thing disgraceful lovers of themselves and a bad man indeed appears to do everything for the sake of himself and in a greater degree the more he is depraved hence he is accused as doing nothing without a view to his own advantage but the worthy man does everything on account of the beautiful in conduct and he acts in a greater degree in this manner and for the sake of his friend the more worthy he is but he neglects to act for his own sake. The deeds however of men are discordant with these assertions not unreasonably for they say that he who is eminently a friend ought to love his friend in an eminent degree but he is eminently a friend who wishes well to him who is the subject of this wish for his sake though no one should know it. These things however are especially inherent in a man towards himself and therefore everything else by which a friend is defined for we have before observed that all friendly offices proceed from himself and pervade to others and all proverbs accord with this such as that friends are one soul that among friends all things are common that friendship is equality and that the knee is near to the leg for all these things are especially present with a man towards himself since a man is especially a friend to himself and therefore he is especially to be beloved by himself. It may however be reasonably doubted which of these arguments it is requisite to follow since both of them are accompanied with probability perhaps therefore it is necessary to divide such like arguments and to distinguish how far and in what respect each of them is true if therefore we understand in what manner each of these denominates a man a lover of himself perhaps the thing will become manifest. Those therefore who consider this as a disgraceful thing call those men lovers of themselves who distribute to themselves the greater part in wealth and honors and corporeal pleasures for the multitude aspire after these things and are earnestly employed in endeavoring to acquire them as being the best of things and on this account they become objects of contention hence those who vindicate to themselves more of these things than is fit are subservient to desires and in short to passions and the irrational part of the soul but the multitude are persons of this description hence also the appellation was derived from the multitude who are depraved justly therefore are those represented who are in this way lovers of themselves that the multitude however are accustomed to denominate those who distribute to themselves things of this kind lovers of themselves is not a manifest for he who always earnestly endeavors to act justly or temperately or to act according to any other of the virtues the most of all things and in short who always vindicates to himself that which is beautiful in conduct such a man will never be called by anyone a lover of himself nor will he be blamed by anyone it would seem however that such a man as this is in a greater degree a lover of himself for he distributes to himself things which are most eminently beautiful and good is gratified in his most principal part intellect and in all things is obedient to it but as that which is the most principal thing in a city appears to be most eminently the city and this is the case in every other system of things thus also that which is most principal in man is especially the man he therefore who loves this principal part of himself is especially a lover of himself and is gratified with this hence also one man is denominated continent and another incontinent because in the former intellect has dominion but has not in the latter in consequence of every man being this i.e. intellect men likewise appear to have performed things and to have performed them willingly which they have especially performed in conjunction with reason that every man therefore is principally intellect and that the worthy man principally loves this is not in manifest hence he will be especially a lover of himself according to different species of self-love from that which is disgraceful and differing as much from it as to live according to reason differs from living according to passion and as much as the desire of that which is beautiful in conduct differs from the desire of that which appears to be advantageous all men therefore approve of and applaud those who in a manner superior to others endeavor to perform beautiful actions but if that which is really beautiful in conduct was that for which all men contend and if they endeavored to perform the most beautiful deeds whatever is becoming would be possessed by all men in common and the greatest of goods by everyone particularly since virtue is a thing of this kind hence it is necessary that a good man should be a lover of himself for he himself is benefited by acting well and he also benefits others but it is not proper that a depraved man should be a lover of himself for he will hurt both himself and his neighbors in consequence of being subservient to base passions with the depraved man therefore there is a dissonance between what he ought to do and what he does but with the worthy man those things which he ought to do he also does for every intellect chooses that which is best for itself the worthy man is obedient to intellect that however which is asserted of the worthy man is true that for the sake of his friends and his country he will do many things even though it should be requisite to die for them for he will give up riches and honors and in short those goods which are the objects of contention with mankind in order that he may vindicate to himself that which is beautiful in conduct for he will rather choose very much delighted for a short time then to experience a small delight for a long time and to live worthily for one year then casually for many years he will also prefer one beautiful and great action to many and small actions and this perhaps happen to be the case with those who have died for their country or their friends worthy men therefore choose a great good for themselves and will give up their riches in order that they may obtain a greater number of friends for thus indeed riches befall the friend of the worthy man but that which is really beautiful befalls the worthy man himself but he distributes to himself the greater good there is also the same mode of conduct with him as to honors and dominion for he will give up all these to his friend for this to him is beautiful and laudable does he appear to be a worthy man who chooses that which is beautiful in conduct instead of these things it may likewise happen that he may give up actions to his friends and that it may be better for him to be the cause of their being performed by his friends then to do them himself hence in all laudable things the worthy man appears to distribute to himself more of that which is truly beautiful after this manner therefore as we have said that a man should be a lover of himself but it is not proper he should be so in the way in which the multitude love themselves chapter 9 with respect to the happy man also it is doubted whether he will be in want of friends or not for it is said that those who are blessed and sufficient to themselves have no need of friends because things truly good are present with them as they are therefore sufficient to themselves they are not in want of anything but a friend being a man's other self imparts to him those things which he cannot obtain through himself once also it is said quote, when divinity is propitious what need is there of friends it seems however to be absurd that those who attribute every good to the happy man should not give him friends which appear to be the greatest of external goods but if it is the province of a friend rather to benefit than to be benefited and if it is also the province of a good man in the virtue to benefit and it is better to do good to friends than to strangers the worthy man will want those who may be benefited by him hence likewise it is inquired whether there is more need of friends in adversity than in prosperity because he who is unfortunate is in want of those by whom he may be benefited and the fortunate are in want of those whom they may benefit perhaps however it is also absurd to make the blessed man a solitary being for no one would choose to possess every good by himself since man is a social animal and is naturally adapted to live with others this therefore will also be the case with the happy man for he possesses those things which are naturally good but it is evident that it is better to pass the time with friends than with strangers and casual persons hence the happy man has need of friends in what respect therefore is the first assertion true that the happy man is not in want of friends is it because the multitude think those persons to be friends who are useful to them the blessed man therefore will not be in any want of such persons since real good is present with him neither therefore will he be in want of those who are friends on account of the delectable or he will want them but for a short time for since his life is delightful he will be in no want of advantageous pleasure but not being in want of friends of this description he does not appear to be in want of friends this however perhaps is not true for it was observed by us in the beginning that felicity is a certain energy but with respect to energy it is evident that it is in generation or is passing into existence and is not present with him who energizes like a certain possession but if to be happy consists in living and energizing and the energy of the good man is of itself worthy and delectable as we observed in the beginning if also that which is appropriate ranks among the number of things that are delightful but we are more able to survey our neighbors themselves and their actions that are own and if the actions of worthy men that are friends are delightful to good men bracket for both have those things which are naturally delectable close bracket if this be the case the blessed man will be in want of such friends as these since he deliberately chooses to survey worthy and appropriate actions but the actions of a good man who is a friend are of this description it is likewise thought to be necessary that the happy man should live delectably the life therefore of a solitary man is indeed difficult for it is not easy for a man to energize continually by himself but with others and towards others it is easy the energy therefore will be more continued which is delectable by itself which should necessarily be present with the blessed man for the worthy man so far as he is worthy rejoices in the actions which are conformable to virtue but is indignant with those which proceed from vice just as a musician is delighted with beautiful melodies but is pained with those that are bad a certain exercise of virtue likewise will be produced from living with good men as also the Agnes says to those however physically it appears that a worthy friend is naturally eligible to a worthy man for it has been said by us that what is naturally good is of itself to a worthy man good and delectable to live however is in animals defined by the power of sense but in men by the power of sense or intellect but power is referred to energy and that which has the principle authority in a thing consists of energy it seems therefore that to live is properly either to perceive sensibly or intellectually and to live is among the number of things which are good and delectable for it is a definite thing but that which is definite pertains to the nature of the good as it also appeared to the Pythagoreans and that which is naturally good is also good to the worthy man hence to live appears to all men delightful a depraved and corrupted life however not to be assumed nor a life of pain for such a life is indefinite as well as the things which belong to it this however will be more evident in what we shall say concerning pain hereafter but if to live is itself good it is also delectable and it appears that it is so from this that all men aspire after it and especially worthy and blessed men for to these life is most eligible and the life of these is most blessed he however who sees perceives that he sees he who hears perceives that he hears and he who walks perceives that he walks and in a similar manner in other things there is something which perceives that we energize but we may perceive that we perceive and we may understand that we understand however to perceive that we perceive or to understand that we understand is for us to be for we have said that our very being consists in perceiving sensibly or intellectually but for a man to perceive that he lives is among the number of things essentially delectable for life is naturally good and for a man to perceive that good is present with him is delightful but to live is eligible and especially to good men because existence to them is good and delectable for having a co-sensation of essential good they are delighted as however the worthy man is disposed towards himself thus also he is disposed towards his friends for a friend is another self as therefore it is eligible to everyone for himself to exist thus also or similarly it is eligible to him for his friend to exist but we have said that existence is eligible because it is for a man to perceive himself which is good and a sensation of this kind is of itself delightful it is necessary therefore that he should at the same time perceive that his friend exists but this will be affected by living together with him and in a communication with him of words and thoughts for it would seem that in this way men are said to live together and not as cattle by feeding in the same place if therefore existence is of itself eligible to the blessed man since it is naturally good and delectable the like also must be asserted of a friend and hence a friend will be among the number of eligible things to the happy man but not which is eligible to him ought to be present with him or in this respect he will be indigent the man therefore who is to be happy will require worthy friends Chapter 10 are numerous friends therefore to be procured or as it appears to be elegantly said of hospitality quote want not nor be of multitudes a guest close quote may it also in friendship be appropriately said that a man should neither be without a friend nor again should have an excessive multitude of friends this assertion therefore will indeed appear to be very much adapted to those who regard utility in friendship for to be alternately subservient to many persons is laborious and life is not sufficient to them to perform this hence more friends than are sufficient for the proper purposes of life are superfluous and are impediments to a worthy life hence there is no need of them and with respect to the friends that are procured for the sake of pleasure a very few are sufficient in the same manner as sauce to food but whether or not ought a good man to have many worthy friends or shall we say that there is a certain measure of a multitude of friends in the same manner as there is of a city for a city will not consist of ten men nor is it any longer a city if it is composed of a hundred thousand men perhaps however one certain number of citizens cannot be assigned but every number may be admitted which is between certain definite terms a friends therefore there is also a certain definite multitude and perhaps those persons are not numerous with whom it is possible for a man to live for this appears to be a thing of a most friendly nature but that it is not possible for a man to live with many and distribute himself among them is not in manifest further still it is necessary if the friends are numerous that they should be friends to each other if all of them intend to pass the time with each other but this among many friends is laborious it is likewise difficult to rejoice and grieve appropriately together with many persons for it is probable that it may at one and the same time happen that a man ought to rejoice together with one person and grieve together with another perhaps therefore it is well not to endeavor to have a great number of friends but as many are sufficient for the purposes of social life for it would seem that it is not possible to be very much a friend to many persons hence neither is it possible to love many for love is a certain excess of friendship but this is confined to one person and therefore vehement love must be confined to a few that this indeed is the case seems to be verified by themselves for there are not many friends according to that friendship which subsists among associates but the friendships which are celebrated are said to have subsisted between two persons those however who are the friends of many persons and are familiarly conversant with all of them appear to be the friends of no one except politically and these persons are also called obsequious it is possible therefore to be politically a friend to many persons though he who is so should happen not to be obsequious but a truly worthy man but it is not possible to be a friend to many on account of virtue and for their own sake but we must be satisfied if we can find a few such i.e. who are true friends Chapter 11 but whether is there more need of friends in prosperity or in adversity for in both they are sought after for those who are in adversity require assistance and those who are in prosperity are in want of associates and those whom they may benefit since they wish to confer favors on others in adversity therefore friends are more necessary on which account when this is the case there is need of useful friends in prosperity however friends are a more worthy and beautiful possession on which account also men whose circumstances are prosperous search for worthy friends for it is more eligible to benefit these and with these to pass through life for the presence itself of friends is delightful both in prosperity and adversity since the grief of those who are in affliction is lightened when their friends participate of their sorrow hence likewise it may be doubted when their friends share a part of the affliction of their friends as if it were part of a burden or is this not the case but the presence of friends being delightful the conception that they participate of the sorrow produces a diminution of the grief whether therefore those who are in affliction are alleviated through these causes or through some under cause we shall admit to investigate what we have mentioned however appears to happen but the presence of friends appears to be something mixed for the sight itself of friends is delectable and especially to those in adverse circumstances and it becomes a certain auxiliary against affliction for a friend possesses a consoling power both in his presence and his words if he is dextrous since he knows the manners of his friend and with what he is pleased and pained it is painful however to perceive that our friend is afflicted by our misfortunes for everyone avoids being the cause of pain to his friends those who are of a virile nature are careful to prevent their friends from being afflicted in conjunction with themselves unless they perceive that by subjecting their friends to a little pain they shall themselves experience an alleviation of great affliction and in short they do not permit others to lament with them because they are not themselves addicted to lamentation but women who are weaker than the rest of their sex and men who resemble them are delighted with those who groan with them and love them as their friends and the associates of their sorrow in all things however it is necessary to imitate the better character but the presence of friends in prosperity is attended with a pleasing association and with the conception that they are delighted with our good fortune hence it would seem to be necessary that in prosperity we should readily and cheerfully invite our friends to partake of our good fortune for it is beautiful to be beneficent but that we should be remiss in inviting them to partake of our ill fortune for it is requisite to impart to our friends as little as possible of evils whence it is said that I am wretched is sufficient close quote but friends are then especially to be called upon when having received small molestations we can be greatly benefited by their presence on the contrary it is perhaps proper to go to those who are in adversity uncalled and cheerfully for it is the province of a friend to benefit and especially to benefit those who are in want and who do not think fit to solicit relief for this is better and more delectable to both with fortunate friends however we should cheerfully co-operate for in prosperity also there is need of a friend but we should slowly be take ourselves to a friend in order to be benefited by him for it is not beautiful to be readily and cheerfully disposed to be benefited it is perhaps however requisite to be cautious that we do not conduct ourselves unpleasantly in rejecting the beneficence of our friends for this sometimes happens to be eligible in all things Chapter 12 whether therefore as to lovers the sight of the beloved object is most delectable and they prefer this sense to the rest because love especially subsists and is produced from this thus also it is most eligible to friends to live together for friendship is communion and in the same manner as a man is affected towards himself he is also affected towards his friend but it is eligible to everyone to perceive with respect to himself that he exists and lives and therefore this is also eligible with respect to a friend this energy however is affected among friends by living together so that this is reasonably desired by them and that in which to everyone his very being consists or for the sake of which he chooses to live in this he wishes to pass his life with his friends hence some friends indeed drink together others play at days together others engage in gymnastic exercises and hunt together or philosophize together but they separately pass their time together in that to which of all things in life they are most attached for wishing to live with their friends they do these things and communicate with them in these through which they are of opinion they associate together the friendship therefore of bad men is depraved for being unstable they communicate with each other in bad things and they become depraved being assimilated to each other but the friendship of worthy men is worthy and is mutually increased by mutual converse they also appear to become better by energizing with and correcting each other for they mutually express those things with which they are delighted when city said quote from good man what is good is learnt close quote and thus much concerning friendship it remains to discuss in the next place pleasure end of book 9 recording in memory of mitchell edwards