 Thank you. It's kind. I call my talk a sea change. Naval Warfare and the American Revolution during the spring of 1778. And as Mr. Kennedy was kind enough to point out, my purpose here tonight, or today, is to highlight the publication of volume 12. And let me start off by saying it's difficult pushing a book that even your publisher is less than enthusiastic about. I quote here from the blurb of the publisher, quote, this book is a key scholarly resource for a narrow group, naval and military historians and researchers of early American history and the American Revolution who require primary source documents. Potential interests may exist with some military or revolutionary war enthusiasts. However, as you can see, Barack Obama was enthusiastic about the volume and the project. Now, unlike the publisher, which is the government printing office, I think volume 12 is an important book and should enjoy a wide audience. Now, although the period covered, April and May 1778 is a small window in time, I believe a number of important changes in the nature of the naval conflict occurred during those two months. And those changes would significantly affect how the war was fought and contribute greatly to its outcome. The most important of these developments was the internationalization of the war with the dispatch of a French fleet under the comp de Stang from Toulon on 13 April bound for American waters. The signing of the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States in February 1778 was obviously a major event. It was not, however, a guarantee that the French would commit naval resources to support American independence or to operate in American waters. In fact, the first request made by the American commissioners in France, that's Franklin and Adams and Dean and Lee, in early April, asking that the French Navy convoy and protect American merchant men and route from France to the United States, was denied by Gabriel de Sartine, the Minister of Marine. While the French leadership was unwilling to commit resources to protect American commerce, they were willing to commit their Navy to assist the Americans. In a bold move, which can be credited to the triumvirate of Sartine, Sartine's assistant, the Chevalier de Fleurier, and French Foreign Secretary, the comp de Vergen, the French decided to send the two-lawn squadron to American waters. Since the British had few ships in the Mediterranean Sea at that time, that squadron was free to go on the offensive. At the same time, the presence of a larger French squadron at breast, the threat of a cross-channel invasion and concern which was supported by intelligence, which was incorrect but on good authority, that the Spaniards were preparing to enter the war as allies of the French disquieted, and I'm quoting here, the British and forced them to keep a significant naval force off Euchante and in the English Channel and to delay sending a reinforcement under Admiral John Byron to North America. In fact, Byron first received orders to sail to America on the 3rd of May, but delays and then a decision by the Lords of the Admiralty on 25 May to postpone its departure until the British Channel fleet commander got, quote, good intelligence of Monsieur de Stang's fleet and is satisfied that it is bound to America or the West Indies meant that the relieving fleet did not sail until the 7th of June. The time gained for the French by British indecision grew when foul weather Jack, and that was his nickname, Byron's fleet encountered horrific weather and was battered and scattered. Some of them ended up back in Europe as a matter of fact. This afforded de Stang an opportunity to arrive well before British reinforcements. However, the riskiness of sending de Stang to American waters shouldn't be minimized. Had the British detached Byron's reinforcements quickly, the Toulon squadron might have been trapped and defeated or maybe even lost. French planners understood, however, that the possible benefits outweighed the possible dangers and they acted decisively. Now, had the execution of this strategy been as bold as the planning, the French Navy could well have ended the war in the spring of 1778. Vice Admiral Viscount Howell's fleet in North America was badly scattered and in number of ships in the line far inferior to de Stang. Moreover, the British Army abandoned Philadelphia on 18 June to move to New York City and I'll talk a little bit more about this later. While the army marched overland through New Jersey, that's the Battle of Monmouth if any of you know it, it shipped the bulk of its stores on merchantmen which moved slowly and in a disorganized fashion down the Delaware River to Delaware Bay and then northward to New York. Had de Stang arrived earlier, he could have captured that enormous prize, crippled Howell's fleet before it had established a strong defensive position at New York and then could have blockaded the city, the center of British power in North America. The large British garrison there depended almost entirely on supplies shipped in from elsewhere. So without resupply, it probably would have been forced to surrender. So you can see they could have ended the war. However, this didn't happen obviously, because the too long fleet was slow getting to American waters. Although it sailed on 13 April, it took more than a month for de Stang to pass the Straits of Gibraltar. Documents published in Volume 12 demonstrate that adverse weather, poor sailing, faulty equipment, the need to go only as fast as the slowest sailing ship and most importantly, de Stang's decision to use the voyage as a training exercise caused the squadron to proceed across the Atlantic at a pace that can only be described as leisurely. One of the most informative documents in Volume 12 is the Station Bill for de Stang's flagship, the Ship of the Lying Languadock, which demonstrates clearly how de Stang used the voyage to America to train his officers. The Station Bill gives not only the station of every officer on the ship during combat, but also detailed instructions regarding their duties, such as this. On the poop deck, Monsieur Grimaldi, Ensign, as near as possible to the breastwork, will command the maneuvers, the musketry, and watch over the rapidity of the fire of the swivel guns on the poop deck, mizzen top and main top, as well as musketry from these two tops. While the French fleet may have been better prepared as a result of this training, its slow progress across the Atlantic meant that it did not arrive at the Delaware Capes until 8 July. By that time, the chance to defeat Howell's fleet before it could collect and retreat to a strong defensive position at New York or the chance to capture the British Army's baggage had passed. Despite this missed opportunity, the nature of the naval war had changed dramatically. Internationalization of the war meant that no longer could the British assume they had unchallenged control of American waters or even the English Channel. Another effect can be gleaned from Howell's reports to the Admiralty printed in this volume. Service in American waters was hard. British ships and crews suffered accordingly. British commanders in North America were thus put between a rock and a hard place, especially as there was no good facility for repairing ships in the Americas. Although as seen in volume 12, the British had had plans to establish one. Interestingly enough, that was in the Virginia Capes and you know what happens when they go down there. To rotate ships to England for refit and repair left the American fleet weak, but to keep those vessels on station as Howell and his excessors were often forced to do reduced their effectiveness. Remember, one of the contributing factors in the French victory at the battle of the Virginia Capes in 1781, where the war ended really, was the poor condition of the British fleet. Literally some of their ships of line were sinking as they went into the battle. The spring of 1778 also saw a dramatic change in British naval strategy. The British de-emphasized the war in the heartland of America. As mentioned, the British abandoned Philadelphia and consolidated their forces in New York and Rhode Island, which they also later abandoned. Under the new strategy, mobile detachments would be sent by water from New York to destroy American forces in detail, to raid American seaports, to keep down American privateering activity, and to support a British attempt to create and build up a self-supporting loyalist base. Thus the focus of British efforts would be in the West Indies and on the periphery of the United States. In a letter to Lord Howell of 21 March, the Lords of the Admiralty spelled out this new strategy and ordered Howell to send an expedition to St. Lucia in the West Indies and to reinforce East and West Florida and Nova Scotia. West Florida went as far west as the Mississippi River today. It was a viable strategy. However, fear of invasion caused the British leadership to limit reinforcements sent to its army and navy in America. Because of this, the British were overextended and outnumbered in both the United States and the West Indies. Also, New York was a difficult position to hold, which limited the troops available for detaching. As a result, Britain forfeited the naval initiative in the Western Hemisphere and became increasingly reactionary. Again, another rather major development. The concentration of royal forces in American waters did open up the opportunity for British and loyalist privateers a trend that would continue until the war's end. While Admiral Howell fought a delaying action against allowing New York to become a center for loyalist privateering activity because he feared such privateering would result in desertion from Royal Navy ships and a smaller pool from which to draw impressed sailors, he eventually had to give way. As a result, the royal governor, William Trion, Trion Palace in North Carolina is his, began issuing letters of mark and reprisal in August 1778 and the success of privateers operating out of Bermuda, St. Augustine and especially New York became more and more evident and saw them garner greater official support and have a greater impact on United States shipping. The Continental Navy too saw changes during this period. The foremost was a dramatic reduction in its size. In the period of March to May 1778, the Continental Navy had six ships captured or destroyed. The Alfred on 6 March, the Randolph on 7 March, the Columbus on 28 March, the Virginia on 31 March, the Washington on 11 May and the Effingham also on 11 May. Member of Congress William Ellery on 25 April wrote to a friend, our little fleet is very much thinned and then he listed six frigates which were the biggest ships in the Continental Navy that had been destroyed or captured within the last year, adding tellingly, quote, only one have been captured on the ocean. Those losses called into question the competence and the character of the Continental Navy's leadership, particularly its ship's commanders, and also forced a change in the role that the Continental Navy played. Unable to contest British dominance in the bays and seas surrounding the major cities of the United States, American seamen were pushed to the peripheries where they enjoyed some success at least early in 1778. In North America there were two areas, Nova Scotia and East Florida slash Georgia, where American vessels came to dominate in the spring of 1778 and a third, the Mississippi River and the West Florida coast where they could realistically hope to contest British dominance. In Nova Scotia, privateers from New England including Rhode Island so infested, and that's the term they were used by contemporaries, the waters of that providence that the residents of Liverpool, Nova Scotia voted on 1 June 1778 to dismantle the town's forts and to inform American privateers, quote, that if they attempted to land under arms, we should oppose them, but if they do not land nor offer to take any vessel out of our river, we will not molest them. In Georgia, gun boats of the Georgia State Navy, that's something a lot of people don't realize, during the American Revolution, the states had individual navies as well. It wasn't all under the continent. Gun boats of the Georgia State Navy, manned in large part by continental soldiers, scored a dramatic victory over a force of Royal Navy and East Florida provincial vessels. To check an invasion of East Florida by the Southern Continental Army, Royal Navy Captain Thomas Jordan sent a force of three vessels to St. Simon's Inlet in Georgia with the intention of destroying the galleys of the Georgia State Navy. Instead, the British squadron was soundly defeated and two of the vessels, H.M. Armbrigh Hinschenbroek and East Florida provincial arm sloop Rebecca, were captured. It was a dramatic victory and gave the Americans control of the intercoastal waterway from Charleston to St. Augustine, thus threatening the very existence of the British colony of East Florida. While an active Patrick Tonan, the governor of East Florida, was able to cobble together a naval defensive force, thus mitigating the damage and unrelated issues halted the American advance toward St. Augustine. It was nonetheless an important victory and established, at least for the short term, American dominance in those waters and could have, if it had been exploited correctly, changed the course of the war in the American South. Another success and missed opportunity for the Americans on the periphery occurred in early 1778 along the Mississippi River. The origins of this expedition to conquer West Florida go back to the summer of 1777 when the governor of Spanish Louisiana, Don Bernardo de Galvez, Galveston, is named for him. Received a letter from Colonel George Morgan, who was the commander at Fort Pitt, which is present-day Pittsburgh, proposing that the Americans would send an expedition against Pensacola and Mobile. Morgan asked if Galvez would provide intelligence and supply transports, artillery, powder, and provisions. Now remember, Spain's still neutral. Galvez's response was equivocal, but probably more convincing was the fact that the flotilla sent to deliver Morgan's letter returned laden with arms, ammunition, and provisions worth some $70,000. After much debate, American leaders decided to dispatch a much-scaled-down expedition, James Willing, a captain in the Continental Army, but we think he was transferred to the Navy at that point in time, and 29 men in an armed boat appropriately named the Rattle Trap. Arriving unmolested into the heart of English territory, Willing's party captured or ravaged a number of British settlements, including Natchez, Manchak, Port Coupé, and Baton Rouge. They also captured several vessels, one of which was later turned into an American warship. At Natchez, Willing convinced the inhabitants to sign an oath of neutrality. Had the expedition continued to practice restraint, Willing might have successfully captured all of West Florida. However, the Americans began plundering those not considered friends and thus created a pool of disaffected who were instrumental in helping the British to re-establish authority. One result of the Willing expedition was that it almost sparked a war between England and Spain. Willing's party was so too small to be viable without the help of Galvez, who extended the American raiders, and I'm quoting here the sacred rite of neutrality. The English saw it as, quote, aiding, assisting, abetting, entertaining, suckering His Majesty's rebellious subjects, looking upon them as a separate and distinct power from that of New England. Galvez also permitted the American agent in New Orleans, Oliver Pollock, to dispose of plunder accumulated by Willing's raiders, including 680 slaves, through a public sale in New Orleans. In a letter of 7 May to Lord George Germain, Peter Chester, Royal Governor of West Florida, argued that, quote, the only effectual method to redress our injuries after all other means has been tried would be to make reprisals and detain Spanish property until ample restitution has been made. Therefore, it was not a paranoid rant, but an appreciation of the situation that led up beleaguered yet determined Galvez to write his superiors on 14 April, quote, it seems that the English are plotting an attack against this city, New Orleans, in retaliation for the refuge given to the Americans and their prizes. I already have two frigates in front of the city, and according to reports, an additional two or three are expected, one of which said to be a vessel of 32 cannon is at the mouth of the river. These frigates cannot have any other object but this town, as there is no need to move upward and no business to attend to in Manchac. Natchez and the other... Manchac, Natchez and the other English settlements given as there is no one there. I have been informed that the commander of these frigates is a brutal man, willing to commit any kind of transgression without regard to consequence. It appears he intends to demand I turn over the Americans and their prizes, especially the commander and the officers in his party, and to open fire and destroy this city if I do not exceed to his demand. His intention is clear and your lordship knows I cannot accept such a demand, and that I should be, as in fact I am, determined to defend said Americans and their prizes and to use all force and by disposal, although they are few for this purpose. It's a testament to the strength and will of Galvez and to his friendship to the United States that he was not cowed into submission by the British intimidation. As Oliver Pollock reported to Congress on 7 May, I cannot conclude this important subject without giving the greatest applause to Governor Galvez for his noble spirit and behavior on this occasion, for though he had no batteries erected or even men to defend this place against the two ships of war, namely the Hound and the Zilf, at the same time a small sloop with 100 men in the lakes was coming against him with demands and threats. Yet in this situation he laughed at their haughtiness and despised their attempts and in short they retained as they came, or they returned as they came. I have maintained that Galvez, if you want to have a Hispanic hero in the early American Revolution, or in the American Revolution, Galvez would be a perfect candidate for that. Now I understand that there's somebody that's doing a book on him and they also are building a replica of his flagship, the Galveston, in Malaga, Spain. Now I think they've run out of money temporarily, but someday you may see a, you know, a model ship up here like the Larmini did from France with Lafayette. So anyway, that's an editorial comment beyond my other editorial comments. What then ensued was an elaborate game of chicken, which went on for several months and was not resolved and chilled. Chester received a letter from Lord George Germain on 5 August, forbidding him to take the, quote, rash step of seizing Spanish property or committing any act of hostility against the king of Spain or his subjects. By then the mercurial willing had exhausted the patience of both Galvez and Pollock so that both were dedicated to getting him out of New Orleans and Spanish Louisiana as quickly as possible. Even so, it was November before willing and a handful of his companions departed from New Orleans aboard a privately owned sloop. That sloop was captured at sea, willing was taken prisoner, assuaging to be sure some of the British anger and he languished in British custody almost two years before his captors would permit his exchange in late 1781. While the willing expedition boosted Galvez s reputation, it was a failure for the Americans. Contrary to expectations, it did not permanently open up the Mississippi River to American commerce. In fact, the river was less available for Americans after the raid than before. It also hardened sentiment in British West Florida against joining the American cause. George Rogers Clark assessed the expedition in a spot on fashion. He wrote, quote, When plunder is the prevailing passion of any body of troops, whether great or small, their current country can expect but little service from them. Therefore, in West Florida, Georgia, East Florida and in Nova Scotia, the Americans were unable or were unable to transform temporary advantage into long term success. The opportunity was fleeting. By the end of 1778, the British had reinforced both Florida's and Nova Scotia and had undertaken an offensive against Georgia. However, the idea that the Continental Navy could not contend for the American heartland prevailed. And following a strategy promoted by, among others, Robert Morris, the financier of the American Revolution, Americans looked to attack Britain where British strategists did not expect it or where Britain was weak. An example of the former was the activity of the Continental Navy in European waters in 1778. An example of the latter was the activities of the Rhode Island privateer Marlboro on the coast of Africa. First, let's look at European waters. While a number of continental vessels were dispatched to European waters, including Continental frigates Providence and Boston, the activities of which are covered extensively in volume 12, there were two Continental Navy captains who did the most to forward this strategy of American presence in European waters. They were Gustavus Cunningham and John Paul Jones. I think you've probably heard of the latter. I wonder if you've heard of the former. Between May 1778, I'm sorry, between May 1777 and May 1778, Gustavus Cunningham in the Continental Navy Cutter Revenge captured 24 British vessels, including six in the spring of 1778. These captures are detailed in volume 12. Thanks to the onslaught on British commerce by Cunningham and others in European waters, British maritime insurance rates increased to 28% of the value of the cargo, higher than at any time during the Seven Years' War. It's little wonder that the pirate, and that's what the British called him, Cunningham became the most hated man in England. Another more famous Continental Navy captain who brought the fight to the British was John Paul Jones. While the battle between Jones' bone-home Richard and the British ship Serapis is the one Americans know best, Jones' 28-day voyage in the Slope of War Ranger in the spring of 1778 probably had more impact on the British public opinion and the conduct of the war. Sailing from Brest. Go back, Carol, for that one. Sailing from Brest, and you can see the outline of his voyage there. Jones and the Ranger cruised the Irish Sea, captured and destroyed British merchantmen and the British Navy ship Drake, and most notably executed a land raid against the northern British coastal town of Whitehaven and an estate at Kier Kupri near where Jones had grown up. Jones tried unsuccessfully to burn some 200 merchant ships lying aground at Whitehaven, and at Kier Kupri he attempted to capture the Earl of Selkirk who Jones believed was an important peer who could be exchanged for a great number of American seamen captured and languishing in British prisons and prison hulks without any possibility of exchange. While the attempted arson was thwarted and the Earl was away from home and probably not important enough to command the kind of exchange that Jones envisioned, the fact that Jones and his crew landed on British soil twice and escaped demonstrated the vulnerability of English coastal towns. Or as Jones put it in his after action report, what was done is sufficient to show that not all their boasted navy can protect their own coasts and that the scenes of distress which they have occasioned in America may soon be brought to their doors. The raid provoked a firestorm of criticism of the Admiralty. It is something strange and worthy of particular notice that at a time when the ministry are boasting of their invincible fleet which they have fitted out, which is now riding at Spithead that a little American privateer, oh the British never considered a continental navy to be a true navy. They always considered them to be privateers or pirates. They never afforded our officers any recognition. Only plunder and ravage the coasts of this kingdom but in fight to take his majesty's slups of war it is a particular plague of the present time to rely upon appearances and neglect realities to put the nation to a vast expense and to do little or nothing for it and that's from a British newspaper. Such fears concerning the vulnerability of England strengthened the hand of those who argued that greater resources should be committed to defend the home island which was the goal of American planners when they committed the continental navy to this risky strategy. Finally, the raid strengthened the perception in Europe that the young republic might actually survive. According to a neutral Italian observer the raid quote caused a sensation in Europe and especially France because it again confirmed the opinion that the American sea forces are vigorous. Thus I think it can safely be argued that the actions of Cunningham and especially Jones when paired with the entry of the French into the war was a game changer. Now, the coast of Africa was another area on the periphery in which the American revolutionaries enjoyed success in early 1778. The cruise of the Rhode Island privateer Marlboro which is documented in great detail in volume 12 illustrates how American privateers operated in those distant waters. Testimony in Parliament in February 1778 which is included in volume 7 analyzed the effect of the war on the British African trade. Before the war some 200 ships were engaged in the trade but by 1778 that number had been reduced to 40 and 15 of those ships had been taken by American privateers. Although most American privateers cruised for slave ships near Barbados which meant they could take the cargo and because of its proximity to the American coast would lessen the possibility of recapture a few, like Marlboro operated directly on the African coast and it should come as no surprise that a Rhode Island privateer would choose to operate in African waters since Rhode Islanders had actively engaged in the African slave trade before the war and were familiar with those waters. While there's no record that Marlboro's captain George Waite Babcock sailed on slaving voyages his employer John Brown of Providence had been involved in that trade his entire life. Marlboro was a 250 ton ship mounting 20 carriage guns and navigated by a crew of 125 from New Bedford a few days before the new year and volume 12 picks up its story off the Cape Verde Islands. The crew sailed east to the French trading post of Gris and then southward along the Guinea coast toward the English trading settlement of Ile-de-Lô. In route and at Ile-de-Lô Marlboro captured five vessels persuaded a British master to act as a pilot negotiated a mutually beneficial deal with a local tribal leader and burned the settlement Ile-de-Lô when the British factors there refused to surrender the English property they held. The climax of the cruise came off Cape Messarado and let me quote the log concerning that incident. Quote there came a canoe from shore with a black king called Robin Gray steering for Montserrado when we hear of a slave ship ready to sail for the West Indies all sail set running southeast by east with our fleet after us at 2pm we made sail to anchor under the land all hands getting ready to engage if needed. At 5pm we came up with the ship at anchor the captain ordered them to strike their colors which they immediately did at the same time running under their stern if you get behind a sailing ship the stern is the weakest part so if you put a broadside into the stern you really destroy a ship a sailing ship in those days. Captain, this prize proved to be the Liverpool letter of Mark, I'm sorry this prize proved to be the Liverpool letter of Mark ship Fancy Captain William Allinson mounting 16 guns with a cargo of 300 slaves as well as ivory and rice a very lucrative prize after missing a second slaver that he had intelligence of Babcock decided to return to North America but obviously not before having dealt a heavy blow to the English African slave trade Finally, and this is not unique to the spring of 1778 volume 12 illustrates that attitudes among sailors in the continental navy were becoming more volatile and they were exercising more control or more agency in their situation By law a naval captain's authority was awesome and the tools he could wield to enforce his will aboard a ship were formidable but documentation in volume 12 illustrates the other side of the coin. Sailors were now powerless and could influence matters far more than one would think given the imbalance of power at least on paper between the officers and the enlisted. Recruiting skilled sailors was such a struggle that officers had to accept seamen of dubious loyalty and to frequently to accommodate their wishes in order to keep them content and dissuade them from resistance desertion and mutiny Both John Paul Jones and Gustavus Cunningham gave in to demands of their men and allowed actions which neither officer believed was legitimate. When Jones discovered that the Earl Skelkirk wasn't home he wanted to leave the estate unmolested but gave in to his men's insistence that they repay the British for their destructive raids in America by allowing them to loot the estate. In the end he got his men to agree to only take the family silver. This cost Jones personally since he later felt it necessary for his honor to repurchase the silver from his men and return it to the countess of Skelkirk and there's an interesting exchange of letters back and forth most of which the British post office wouldn't refuse to deliver. Similarly Cunningham allowed his men to seize British goods found in a neutral vessel even though the Congress had determined to follow the rule practiced by France that free ships in other words a neutral ship makes those goods neutral. This capture therefore caused major problems for Cunningham and angered America's allies. Continental Navy captains also put their enter prizes at risk by signing on Seaman whose loyalty were neither to them nor even to the United States. In volume 12 for instance when he came into conflict with his principal lieutenant Thomas Simpson John Paul Jones found that most of the crew which were recruited from Simpson's hometown of Portsmouth sided with Simpson against Jones. In another instance one of the rangers of the crews a member of the party sent to burn that shipping at Whitehaven the 200 ships I told you about decided that this was his chance to return to Ireland which was his native land and he deserted and alerted the townspeople thus limiting the damage the raiders could do. In another instance recounted in volume 12 Captain Samuel Tucker of the continental frigate Boston narrowly escaped death from a timely discovery and suppression of a plot aboard his vessel. As Boston was completing its refit in Bordeaux France two or three Englishmen who lived in the city hatched a plot to seize the frigate and sail it to England. The plan was for these Englishmen to sign on as Seaman and joined by disaffected crewmen already on board and a few deserters turned to the frigate to seize the ship. To ensure the success of the mutiny however the plotters wanted to neutralize the marines on board. This they sought to do by discussing or negotiating with the marine sergeant. Jerome Caseneuve a Frenchman Caseneuve played along and then later informed Tucker. The plan was diabolical and included adding opium to the drinking water to drug the crew and the officers the latter of which were to be murdered. Caseneuve denounced the schemers and although the ringleaders eventually escaped ironically Caseneuve himself later successfully petitioned French authorities for release from his enlistment claiming that he had been ill treated. Thus in the months covered by volume 12 these two short months globalization of the war a redirection of English war efforts the devastation of the continental navy a move to the periphery of the United States the emergence of New York as a center of loyalist privateering and what remained of the continental navy projecting power into European waters and finally the devastation of the British slave trade. I hope that you agree with me that volume 12 does evidence a sea change in the way the American Revolution naval war was fought. Thank you. Any questions? Yes sir, in the back. The British we're occupying what happens is disdain after he misses the British in the Delaware Capes. Goes up and he sits outside of New York until early August and then he decides he tries to get attacked New York which is where House Fleet was. However, his ships were too big to go over the Sandy Hook Bar or at least that's what he says that's what American pilots told him and he said he offered 100 Louis in gold for any pilot that could get him in. So when they say we can't go into New York Harbor and how it actually ships in a bow right at the hook disdain had to sail in he would have been blasted by House ships because the only way they could probably get those big ships like the Langwood Dock 110 guns would be to take the guns out and then sail it in and then put the guns back in so it didn't work. So instead of that they decided to go against Newport and that's the Rhode Island Campaign so they sail up here and they are supposed to join the Army which has been formed under John Sullivan General John Sullivan Sullivan was putting together militia and then there were some Continentals from the Northern Command and also Lafayette came up with some reinforcements so they put together this force and the idea is that they are going to invade and capture Newport. Well, the British really thought this was going to happen they were outgunned the French sailed right by them and so the British actually scuttled, destroyed, burned or sank most of the ships up here at Newport and it was the greatest military disaster that the French suffered in the American Revolution because they scuttled so many of their ships but what happened is Hal was able to get his ships back in service he sailed out of New York he came up to Newport to Stang Syme and he decided I want to fight him he sailed out to battle Hal and a hurricane hit and Stang's fleet was far worse hit than Hal's so what happened is a lot of Stang's ships were demasted they took some pounding from British ships because they couldn't maneuver at times and so what happens after the end of the battle even though Hal sailed back toward New York Stang goes to Sullivan and says look I can't fight and Sullivan was berserk he wrote some letters that probably could have ended the alliance but so what happened is Stang went up to Boston and he refitted so that was the end of the invasion now as the Americans are pulling back and Nathaniel Green's here by the way as the Americans are pulling back the British chase them further north tip of the island the Americans get behind some fortifications temporary trenches type thing and they inflict a pretty heavy toll on the British particularly Hessians and so what happens is the British then retreat back town to the southern part of the island hold on to Newport Stang spends his time in Boston refitting and he has orders that at a certain time when the season is over in America he has to sail down to the West Indies which is what he does and the British decide they're not going to hold on to Newport so they evacuate Newport at the end of this year so yeah I mean Stang probably had he not sailed out for the how but he was afraid how might somehow attack his ships as they were piecemeal around the island supporting American operations yeah it looked like the Newport garrison was dead meat in a sense at that point in time but you know for a stroke of fate and who knows maybe how would have defeated him anyway how is one of the great British admirals I mean he later on during the Napoleonic era he's the one you know he predates Nelson with one of the great victories as well so he was a good naval commander so he may have defeated Stang anyway who knows certainly the hurricane made a huge difference yeah yes how had a brother and that's his brother was just about going home I mean literally he was about to sail from home he had been the army commander in America and he had been replaced you know depending on who you listen to he had requested it he'd been you know he or he'd been back because he hadn't achieved what he wanted so right before this period William Howe had gone home and Clinton Henry Clinton was now commander in chief of the British forces in America but he did know better than Howe had done so you know they really didn't the army the British army in America didn't cover itself with glory that's for sure yes sir you mean after the war well I mean he continued then after this raid of the ranger he goes back to France and he's expecting to get a good vessel you know give me a fast vessel and I'll sail into harm's way one of his famous quotes but he didn't get it the Americans couldn't come up with the money and things felt so he got that old East Indium and the bone home Richard again he sailed with the idea of attacking the British Baltic fleet the British got most of their naval stores mass spars those kinds of things from the Baltic they had cut most of the good wood in England itself so that's where they got their wood well he was going to intercept the Baltic fleet and do some damage well he did but it was escorted by a new heavy frigate well small ship the line heavy frigate take your pick the Serapis and that's the famous battle between Serapis or sometimes we call it Serapis it's dependent on how you and bone home Richard bone armor chart won the battle but sank afterwards green had our Jones had to limp back into Europe and thereafter the British watch him very closely and he never gets another ship so after the war he wants to be the first American Admiral and he agitates he has some people in Congress that he works with he doesn't get it so he goes and actually goes to work for the Zarina Russia Catherine he gets involved in court politics he actually wins probably wins a battle for them naval battle against the Turks but but he's outmaneuvered politically he gets charged with statutory rape it was a it was a setup probably you know and so he has to leave and so he spends his time in France and then finally when he's in rather difficult financial situation the Americans give him a mission to go and collect some money that we said was owed to him but he died I mean he was in failing health and that's and then he was buried there and his you know we didn't know where for years and it's only when Teddy Roosevelt comes to be president the ambassador to France the American ambassador of France rediscovers his grave and that's when they dig him up bring him back to America and create that sarcophagus if you've ever been to the naval academy gone down below the chapel you see that that's based on Napoleon's by the way you know it's very grandiose very spectacular but Teddy Roosevelt wanted to you know he was the navy president he wanted the navy to be glorified and so this was one way of doing it coming up with our great early American hero and bringing him back in you know real majesty back to America and then they had this wonderful ceremony putting him at the naval academy so that's the story of John Paul Jones there's a there's a couple of good biographies on Jones let's see I always forget his name it'll come to me talk to me afterwards okay I'll give it to you okay any other yes sir he was regarded as the father of the American Navy yeah even though he's not American you know he's a Scott his name is John Paul and what he did is right before the war he killed a sailor he said it was mutiny but he skipped out came to America he had a brother who was a tailor in Fredericksburg Virginia that's how he ended up here and then he made some connections maybe through his masonic he was a mason through his connections he made some connections with some of the some of the congressman and he got a he got a commission as a lieutenant on the flagship the Alfred under E.C. Hopkins a Rhode Islander and so that's how he started out now he made a mistake he probably should have taken a command of a smaller vessel and he later said that but he thought he would learn more by sailing under on the flagship and then and then from there he took command of the Ranger I'm sorry the Slute Providence and he ravaged he captured a lot of British commerce up in around Nova Scotia he was one of the first to make the raids up there and so that established his reputation and after that excuse me he had a couple of guys including Robert Morris who was in his corner and so that's you know that's the development and from there he went to he was sent to Europe with the idea that he would do some damage and he did I mean he was he was a good fighting captain he didn't in both cases but particularly when he was in charge of the Bonhomer Shard how he ran his squadron was a disaster I mean he really could have used some training on how to how to run more than one ship as a matter of fact he ended up supposedly he was shot on by his own by one of his own captains but you know that's another that's another matter but anyway he didn't he didn't manage the flotilla well but he could fight a ship I mean Bonhomer Shard it got so bad that literally the British could not fire on it anymore because they blown holes so wide that they their balls weren't hitting anything so they were jacking them up or jacking them down trying to hit something and they said literally you could have ridden or you could have drove a carriage what is a 2 by 2 by hand you know big carriage through the sides of the Bonhomer Shard there were so many holes but he kept he kept them and also I should say in the first part of the battle his big guns had blown up of themselves because this happened a lot of times on guns of inferior quality they blew up and his his main his main cannon his biggest cannon were put out of action so he went into the battle with with you know far inferior to the Serapis which was a new vessel and was very strong now you know they won luckily what happened is one of his sailors literally climbed out over and dropped the 18th century equivalent of a grenade it happened to bounce down went into the gun deck of the British and the the boys that had been carrying up the powder the gun powder had been stacking them instead you're only supposed to bring it up but they decided that you know okay we'll have them you know have lots of powder here for the guys and they had stacked it and that grenade happened to land right near the powder boom and literally it took out the Serapis's gun deck I mean it was horrific it either killed or burned you know third degree burns 90% of the body type the whole gun so really the captain of the Serapis had nothing left to fight with and so that's when he surrendered so you know both ships were in really tough shape after that battle yes sir was there something about the French ships being superior in speed because they had copper although the British started to copper their bottoms as well but early on the French had developed the technology of putting copper on the bottom which saves the process of fouling so they would now so the British were doing some of that with some of theirs as well so they had it wasn't as great an advantage and what the British I think the British were the better navy because their tactics in battle were to get broadsides as fast as possible into the side of the ship the French like to shoot at the rigging and the spars and the and they tried to essentially you know kill a ship so it couldn't move anymore but it's harder to hit those kinds of things I mean you can cut up the rigging etc but the British also the rapidity of fire that the British crews were able to generate was impressive and so they tended in a one on one battle with the French they tended to win you know not always I mean you sometimes would have a French frigate captain take out a couple of British now I interestingly enough the Americans were probably the equals of the British in terms of fighting capacity so when you talk I mean our ships were always so much smaller usually but that's what happened in the war of 1812 we build super frigates you know like the USS Constitution up here in Boston and so what we do is we you know we take out any ship British ship equivalent or smaller and we run away from the big ones you know the ships of the line and so the Admiralty actually issued orders to its captain do not engage the American frigates one on one you have to have two or more of you and so that's you know and then they got smart and then they blockaded us so we couldn't get them out anymore but you know that was so that's in that case my point is that the American crews were probably every bit as good as the English often times they were made up of they were deserters English deserters as well so yeah we were good sailors everybody admired us even though they called us pirates and privateers yes sir well a lot of that difference as I was going to have to do with the way the sailors were managed by the different countries I mean the British were very impressed as far as their sailors they were in the sense that once you were on a ship you didn't get off you were there for a long time yeah there was but the British sailors were nationalistic and patriotic enough that they didn't have many issues I mean you know when they could run they probably would but you don't have major mutinies except at Spithead that one time and that was I mean what you had to whole fleet say hey we're not getting lead our people you know our wives and children are starving and so that was that was kind of a labor strike if you would but in terms of in terms of you know in a battle if they saw an American would they you know say oh no we're going to join the Americans no they didn't do that they fought and they fought well usually and against the French I mean one of the things that happens when disdain goes up to Boston is there's what is called the bread riots and actually some Bostonians attack French bakers and kill two officers that could have been the end of the alliance as well they said that it was British sympathizers and privateers and expertise that's how they covered it up but the evidence is probably no it was a bread riot people in Boston it was a bad time inflation food was scarce and they saw the British I mean saw the French bakers and there was probably a set to language issues but no and anti-French act anti-French feelings on the part of New Englanders and in France I mean in England itself they didn't like the French and so that's almost a constant yes sir no after the British evacuated late 1779 to Stang I mean I'm sorry Roshan Bow comes in 1780 so if you go to Providence Providence if you go to Camp Street that's where that's essentially where they and then you know they did the march all the way down to Yorktown Washington wanted them to attack New York Washington had a bugaboo in his because he always wanted to attack New York and even his subordinate generals would say George yeah well you didn't say George you didn't say General Washington you know but Roshan Bow said no that's too hard a nut to crack and besides that the French fleet would only come as far north as Virginia Capes and so that's why they decided to do Yorktown worked anyway I mean after they took out another army the British were tired of war and so they just said you know okay that's enough we don't care enough about these colonies about the American Revolution and people don't realize this that's the start of the Great British Empire the second British Empire the one on which the sun never set they picked up Cape Town South Africa they picked up a lot of big chunk of territory in India and they also picked up some territory in the westernities so that's that war became a world war and the British did very well in the end so you know they lost the American colonies but in the day of mercantilism you don't care because they produced the same thing the Brits do anyway and what they did is they picked up some lands in tropical areas that were they considered to be much more valuable so you know you can debate whether the British actually lost that war yes sir yes oh definitely as I pointed out here the British decided to shift their strategy all completely they essentially rode off North America they were going to what we called Vietnamese the war they were going to use the locals to fight their battles and so what they did is the focus of British activity, naval and army was going to be in the west Indian islands yes you're right correct I'm sorry yes well the Spanish weren't in the war yet but the French had a whole series in the windward islands but actually they traded back and forth and in the end neither side got a real advantage as to what happened up there yes sir oh really well the green family took one of them the flora and Griffin Green who was Nathaniel Green's cousin got a the encyclopedia of Dennis Diderot who was one of the French philosophes and he saw a way of how to float using bags inflated bags he floated the flora back up to the surface and the green family then went broke trying to refit it out and make a killing with it but yeah it was and Nathaniel was very proud of him to use and we actually you can see Dennis Casanoves I'm sorry his encyclopedia and you can see actually what Griffin Green used and how he did with bellows and inflatable things to raise the flora out of Newport Harbor so yeah okay any other questions good alright thank you thank you you've been a great audience