 Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and General Paul O'Kamera, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea. Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the nation and please convey my thanks to the men and women serving under your commands at this critical time. The Department of Defense has appropriately identified China as the pacing threat for the United States military. In the next decade, the Indo-Pacific region is projected to generate two-thirds of the global economy and be home to two-thirds of the global population, and we must calibrate our strategy accordingly. For the past several decades, China has studied the United States' way of war and focused its efforts on offsetting our advantages. Beijing has made concerning progress in this regard, especially with respect to disruptive technologies and weapons like hypersonics, artificial intelligence, 5G, and biotechnology. China does not accept U.S. global leadership or the international norms that have helped keep the peace for the better part of a century. Maintaining our competitiveness in this region will take a concerted whole of government effort, but the U.S. military, specifically Indo-Pacom, will play a central role. As we speak, the importance of getting our approach right is on full display, as another near-peer competitor, Russia, continues its brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Even as China has made progress, however, there is broad consensus that our comparative advantage over China is a network of allies and partners in the region and globally. Strengthening that network should be at the center of any strategy, the Indo-Pacific region, and the maturation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or QUAD, involving United States, Japan, India, and Australia, presents an opportunity to establish a durable framework. It is my hope that the Quad, as well as Korea, will provide a platform for engaging other regional partners. The most likely flashpoint that could turn our competition with China into a conflict is Taiwan. If China is the pacing threat for the Defense Department, Taiwan is the pacing scenario. Following the brutal repression of pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong by China over the past two years and the unprecedented number of aggressive Chinese military incursions into Taiwan's airspace, the world has a right to be concerned. There has been discussion in the last year regarding whether we should be more explicit about coming to Taiwan's aid militarily if they are attacked by China, the so-called strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity debate. In my opinion, we should maintain the policy of strategic ambiguity that has helped to maintain the peace in Taiwan's great for decades. More than anything, changing our policy to strategic clarity could actually lead to escalation and the very conflict we are working so hard to prevent. Admiral Aquilino faced with these wide-ranging challenges, I would like you to assess Indo-Pagans preparedness to carry out the United States strategy in the region. As we seek to more effectively compete with China, we must also manage the threat posed by North Korea. North Korea has vexed both Republican and Democratic administrations for decades. Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula must remain a priority for the Department of Defense, though solving the long-term challenges posed by North Korea will require all elements of national power. Through various intelligence reports, we know that Kim Jong-un used nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against foreign intervention and over time intends to gain international acceptance and respect as a nuclear power. The ultimate goal of U.S. policy remains the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but we are not taking an all-or-nothing approach. Instead, the Biden administration has pursued what is described as a calibrated practical approach to promissive with the North with the goal of eliminating the threat to the United States. This approach will require smart and firm engagement with the North Koreans, but more importantly, it requires coordination with our allies and partners in the region, particularly South Korea and Japan. General Ankama, I would ask for your views on the partnership between the United States, Japan, South Korea and other regional partners in addressing North Korea's destabilizing activity. Similarly, General, the highest priority of any military commander is ensuring the readiness of the forces under their command to perform their mission. I hope you will share your views on how U.S. forces' career can maintain readiness through training and exercises with their South Korean counterparts while avoiding miscommunication or an unintentional escalation intentions with the North. Finally, Secretary Austin announced earlier this week that the Navy's Red Hill bulk fuel storage facility on the island of Wahoo will be closed within the year following a series of major fuel spills. I believe that closing this facility was the right decision, and I would like to know generally what steps are being taken to ensure the safety and health of the military families and civilians in the affected communities. More broadly, the closure of Red Hill is a significant change in our fueling and logistics approach in the Pacific, and that should be recognized by Indo-Pacom Command. Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to your testimonies. Senator Inhofe could not be here today, so I am submitting his opening statement for the record, and with that, let me recognize Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Chairman Reid. Distinguished members of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. I sincerely appreciate your dedicated support to Indo-Pacom, our service members, and their families, and we wish Senator Inhofe well. The People's Republic of China is the most consequential strategic competitor to the United States. The PRC is executing a dedicated campaign that utilizes all forms of national power in an attempt to uproot the rules-based international order to the benefit of themselves and at the expense of all others. In the region, Russia also presents serious risks. As evident from their unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Ukraine, Russia has no regard for international law, its own commitments, or any principles that uphold global peace. Similarly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and violent extremist organizations also pose acute threats to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. To address these threats, Secretary Austin has articulated clear priorities. Defend the homeland, deter our adversaries, and strengthen our allies and partners. These priorities are advanced through integrated deterrence, which is the department's approach to preventing conflict through the synchronization of all elements of national power coordinated with the Joint Force across all domains together with our allies and partners. Indo-Pacom's mission is to prevent conflict through the execution of integrated deterrence, and if necessary, be prepared to fight and win. CESE, the initiative describes Indo-Pacom's approach to accomplish these missions. This approach requires the Joint Force to think, act, and operate differently. We do that by realigning our posture, advancing our war fighting capabilities, providing both the Secretary and the President with options across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. Effective deterrence requires significant investment to defend the homeland, protect the Joint Force, operate in contested space, provide all-domain battle space awareness with an integrated fires network to deliver those effects. These initiatives are incorporated into a theater campaign plan facilitated by Agile Logistics, a robust exercise and experimentation program, and regular and consistent collaboration with our allies and partners to promote peace in the region. We must make concerted efforts to increase our resilience and strengthen our capabilities through sustained investments generated by predictable budgets, a strong industrial base, and reliable supply chains. I am optimistic we will see a strategy-based FY23 budget that takes the appropriate initial steps to address key adversarial challenges and increase our war fighting advantages. The resources we commitment now and in the future will help preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific. It will strengthen our deterrence posture and provide us the ability to fight and win should deterrence fail. Thank you, Chairman. I look forward to the questions. Thank you very much, Admiral-General LaComer, please. Chairman Reid, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I appreciate your leadership and dedication in supporting our total force and our families who work with our Korean allies in the United Nations' sending states in order to maintain a stable and secure environment on the Korean Peninsula. I would also like to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin and Jeremiah for their continued leadership and support, along with Admiral Aquilino, the functional combatant commanders who support us by fellow component commanders and my interagency colleagues. It is easy to stand on freedom's frontier with this tremendous support. Finally, I want to thank our Korean hosts and their professional military. I am pleased to update you on the great work done by our dedicated personnel who serve in the Republic of Korea. They are professionally executing the missions of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea. United States Republic of Korea alliance was forged in the crucible of battle. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to pose multiple threats to regional and international security, this alliance remains the linchpin of the regional stability and has prevented the resumption of hostilities that shredded the peace some 72 years ago. It remains ironclad in our service members, along with the Republic of Korea military, are trained and ready to respond to a provocation or crisis of called upon. Our three commands, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea must remain vigilant, prepared, and ready. Under one commander, these three commands are empowered to maintain a stabilized security environment for the Republic of Korea and our regional allies. We have international legitimacy through the United Nations Command, whose mission is to enforce the 1953 Armistice Agreement, coordinate U.N. sending state contributions, and execute assigned functions directed by the U.S. national authorities through Joint Chiefs of Staff to preserve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. UNC ensures a true multinational effort in support of armistice conditions while maintaining the utmost respect for the Republic of Korea sovereignty. We are proud of the combined teamwork of the U.S. Korean alliance, Combined Forces Command is the combined war fighting headquarters representing the U.S.-Korea bilateral military bilateral partnership. Formed in 1978, it's a unique entity that takes policy, direction, and missions from the combined military committee and is governed by and subject to binational decision-making consensus. We maintain our strong U.S. commitment to Korea. U.S. Forces is the Korea is the premier joint force committed to defending the security of the Republic of Korea. It's disciplined, trained, and ready to fight tonight, respond in crisis, and win in conflict. Central is meeting any threats as resourcing and strengthening our force in best possible care of our families. I'm grateful for your support and leadership in these no-fail tasks. I know you're aware of South Korea's powerful economic, military, and technical standings. No doubt you're aware of the social impact. All of this is part of the hard work, discipline, and dedication of the Korean people, all done under the security umbrella of the U.S.-Korea Alliance. The Republic of Korea is an incredible ally and it's privileged to move into the future together with them in the land of the morning calm. I'm honored to command and serve this dedicated multinational combined and joint force in one of the most significant dynamic regions of the world. Those who serve are committed, capable, and well supported. The force's posture to deter aggression, protect U.S. interests, and if necessary, defeat any adversary. As long as the threat persists, the U.S.-Korean alliance remains vigilant, determined, and steadfast in defense of the Korean Peninsula and across the region. As the commander of these incredible service members, I appreciate this committee's continued support to fully prepare them to fight and win on the most dangerous piece of ground the last 100 meters of land, sea, and air. Finally, it has been an honor to work with the Moon Administration. Congratulations to President-elect Yoon. We look forward to working with his administration to strengthen the U.S.-Rock Alliance and take on regional challenges. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an open statement. I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much, General. Admiral Aquilino, Taiwan has historically purchased expensive platforms rather than asymmetric systems which may be more relevant in an actual conflict with China. And in addition to that, Taiwan has one of the most robust economies in the world. Do you agree that Taiwan should have sufficient budgetary resources to procure the necessary defense systems? Thank you, Chairman. I think I would leave it to Taiwan as to identify the number and amount of resources that they would like to invest. What I think I would say is that the trend is in the right direction for the capabilities that we've seen them invest in. So, for example, the Harpoon missile system is a capability that would provide a viable defensive posture for the people of Taiwan. Additionally, it's the F-16 capability for their Air Force. So, the amount that they would like to invest is part of the calculus of what they invest in. I think they're on the right path. We're in a position to help them facilitate the acquisition of appropriate defense capabilities. And again, they seem to have the resources to be able to support such an effort. Are there opportunities for us to get involved in co-development and co-production of systems that will help them? Thanks again, Chairman. I think there certainly is opportunity there as we operate through the lens and compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act. Anything that we could do to bolster the defensive capabilities would be desirable. Thank you. General La Camara, you were in a very difficult situation with the North Korea right on your front line and China hovering over everything. To what extent do you believe that Chinese are targeting our alliance with Korea and what insights might you share with us in terms of that effort? Thanks Chairman. As you recall, a couple years ago when the FAD protection was put in, there was an economic penalty put against the Republic of Korea for that. And it appears that the Republic of Korea has been able to come out of that. But it's still in the news. It's still a concern of the Koreans and as I meet with my Korean counterparts, it's always a topic of conversation. Their influence is, you know, they are neighbors. There is a diplomatic influence and there's a clearly an economic influence. They also have about 900,000 Chinese that do live in South Korea. So there is an influence there that we have to be paying attention to. Well, thank you very much. And Admiral Aquilino, with respect to force posture, your appropriate testimony states, more distributed combat power increases survivability, reduces risk, and enables the transition from defense to offense quickly should deterrence fail. And what are your top force posture priorities for the region? Thanks Chairman. As we take a look, the Guam cluster is clearly the top priority to provide capabilities as well as improving the posture in that place. Tinian Island, Palau, and the cluster there is highly important. Additionally, Japan is important to ensure we get the DPR-RI right in coordination with our Japanese partners. The Philippines, very strategic terrain and we're working through the EDCA sites that we've coordinated with the Governor of the Philippines to provide additional capability. And Australia is a place that we're focused in as I would articulate the top four. There's a pending presidential election in the Philippines. Is there any, does that represent a potential change in our relationship, be the positive or negative? Chairman, the Philippines are a mutual defense treaty country. They've gone through many different elections as many of the countries in the region. So again, I'm hopeful that we will continue to be able to operate as Secretary Austin went over most recently and was able to solve the visiting forces agreement problem. So the Philippines is certainly on the proper trend and a great partner. Well, thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you, General, for your testimony as Service Senator Wicker Place. Thank you very much. Admiral, the the CNO says we need 31 traditional amphibious warships. That's worldwide. How many do you need in your command? Senator, if it's okay, I'll get back to you on the record for that as a classified event. Okay. Well, let me just say we're learning some lessons these last two or three weeks about reality and about how some of our adversaries view the what you call the rules-based international order. So I'm really asking you to tell us what you need. And I think both sides of the dais here would do everything we can to make sure that happens. Now, let me ask you this. Every September 30th, this Congress, House and Senate, is supposed to send to the president a defense appropriation bill. It's wrapped up in an omnibus bill now and we still haven't had a chance to pass it here in the second week of March 2022. How much of a problem is that for the two of you, Admiral and General, what can you not do? What have you not been able to do for this part of the fiscal year because of the absence of a defense appropriation bill? And have we spent money needlessly because you're operating under a continuing resolution from the previous fiscal year? Thanks, Senator. As I stated in my testimony, your predictable budgets are certainly helpful, both for the industrial base, the companies that support us, and to deliver the capabilities, operations, and things that we need. The critical impact is the loss of buying power. I don't know the exact number that DOD is estimated with regard to the extent of the CR, but that loss of buying power is significant in the billions. It also has a separate effect for me, and I'm not an acquisition authority, but it does have an effect on me, and that is none of the new starts or requests for capabilities are able to be delivered or started, begun, under a continuing resolution. So for my top three priorities, a defensive Guam system, we've been unable to start or support that. The delivery of a mission partner environment, my ability to connect with all of our allies and partners to share information, plan, coordinate, and execute operations, and then the Pacific multi-domain training and exercise capability system. In other words, our ability to link all of the ranges that we have to train at the high end with live virtual and constructive capability, we've been unable to start any of those. Have you had to spend money on things that, once this thing gets passed and the President signs it, really are no longer that important? I'm not aware of any of those, Senator. How about that, General? And the overall question? I agree with everything that Admiral said. I would just add a couple of points. We, I don't know if we've had to spend any money on it. It does affect the buying power. It does affect how much time we have left to spend money. And going forward, at a tangible level, it's impacting some maintenance and it's impacting some new starts with, say, a counter-UAS program going forward. Admiral, what do you think are the lessons the leadership of the People's Republic of China are learning from what's going on now in Ukraine? Thank you, Senator. So there's three that I'm watching very specifically. Number one, the loss of life required to create and execute an illegal war is certainly something that ought to be taken away, both President Putin and President Xi Jinping should learn that lesson. That cost of life is broad extensive and will haunt them both. Second, the international condemnation that we are seeing of like-minded nations coming together to articulate the illegal aspect, the displeasure, and the needless loss of life needs to continue. And then third, the significant economic impacts that the free world can bring together against a nation who would take this type of action. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Worker. Senator King, please. Admiral, thank you. Thank you both for being with us this morning. Admiral, we've learned a lot in the last week or so about nuclear doctrine in Russia, particularly the idea of escalate to de-escalate. What do we know about China's nuclear doctrine? We know that they're vastly expanding their nuclear capability. As I say, could you do we have ideas about what China's assumptions are about the use of nuclear weapons? Senator, thanks. I don't think I'd assume anything and I would defer to my partner Admiral Richards as a Stratcom commander. I think what I would tell you is what do we see happening in the theater? And that is an extensive build-up of nuclear capability articulated and intended to be delivered by the PRC. Right? 700 silo-based or warheads by 2027 and over 1,000 by 2030. This is from a base of almost zero. I mean, their expansion has been dramatic, has it not? Extremely quickly and as Admiral Richards most recently testified. Thank you. China calls itself a near-arctic nation and is becoming more and more active in the Arctic. One of my concerns is the extent to which there may be gaps between Northcom, UCOM, IndoPaycom, given China's activities in these various areas. Reassure me about your integration with your fellow combatant commanders, particularly Northcom where China is operating in that region. Thanks, Senator. And as you know, Northcom is actually the lead for the Arctic. So we coordinate persistently with General Van Herk, General Walters. Some of the examples, when the most recent Russian submarine came from the North Fleet over to the Pacific Fleet, we monitored and watched that as it crossed combatant commander lines. General Van Herk, I support him for the long-range aviation flights or any threats that emit from the Northwestern portion of either from Russia or China as it applies to the Homeland Defense Mission, no matter what path they take. So our cooperation and collaboration is persistent. Well, if part of our new strategy in the Indo-Pacific is dispersal, wouldn't a reinvigoration of ADAC make some sense given its strategic position? Again, it's in Northcom, but it's pretty darn close to Indo-Paccom as well. Yes, Senator. And we've used ADAC most recently in an exercise in about, I think, about a year ago for a combined Navy Marine Corps event from that area. So clearly a strategic location for both Defense of the Homeland and to be able to project power forward. We have to take a look at the length of the runway there for some future operations. Thank you. I hope that's under consideration because we don't want to, again, if dispersal is the goal, we don't want to concentrate everything in Guam, for example. We want to present problems for a potential adversary. General, I've been concerned on an ongoing basis with the relationship between South Korea and Japan. A, where does that stand? And B, does the new administration have any, did they come into this election season, which concluded yesterday with any stated position about strengthening or further weakening the relationship between two countries which are important allies to us? Oh, thanks, Senator. I'm not aware of any specifics, but I think as President Yoon talks about security as a top priority that my best military advice is. And I think the military leaders and my Korean counterparts truly understand the importance of a U.S. rock in a rock-Japanese relationship. And that is one of my top priorities as a commander of USFK and CEC. I appreciate that. And I hope that is a priority to try to foster that relationship and improve it because in a time of conflict, as we've learned, allies are essential. Winston Churchill once said, the only thing worse than fighting with your allies is fighting without your allies. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator King. Senator Rowland, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me begin by just saying thank you very much to you and your families for your years of service to our country. Admiral Aquilino, the space in cyber domains are where we are seeing a lot of activity and pose a real threat to our national security. With seven of the nine nations capable of launching satellites in your AOR, can you explain how you integrate your operations with US Space Comm and US Cyber Comm? Recognizing it provides both opportunities for us, but also some real threats. Yeah, thanks, Senator. As we synchronize our operations together, I have the greatest partners in General Nakasone from Cyber Command, General Dickinson from Space Command. As a matter of fact, I've asked them both to meet me in Australia in about a week and a half to synchronize with our Australian counterparts and continue to work towards improved capabilities in space and cyber. There's processes in our headquarters that, again, you've heard me articulate this Think Act and operate differently. One of the critical aspects of that is how to synchronize all domain effects and that includes space and cyber. I have dedicated people in my headquarters as cyber components and space components that operate in my headquarters every day and I can't be any more synchronized than that. And I also like the fact that it's not just synchronized in multiple domains, but with our allies as well, which I think is a critical part of our long-term prospects in the region. General Nakamura, it's been brought to my attention that our servicemen and women and their families are required to receive a rapid test for COVID for them to return to Korea, but this test is not covered by tricare. I think it's wrong to charge our servicemembers for medical tests that we're requiring them to take. Can you perhaps explain to me what this does to these young men and women and what the costs involved are and perhaps give us some reasoning as to maybe why we should take some action immediately to resolve this? Yeah, thank you, Senator. If they're on official travel orders, that's covered. They can claim that. If they're departing on leave, I'll test them for any requirements leaving the Republic of Korea. But coming back in, there are ways that they can get it from CVS, from, you know, out on the economy. The challenge becomes if they don't get it in time, then they have to pay out of pocket to make sure that they can get back into the country. The requirement is 48 hours right now and it's currently not covered under tricare. And again, it just, you know, so soldiers, sailors, airmemorines, they want to do the right thing. They want to come back in. They're paying out of pocket and currently right now, I believe I do not have the capability to reimburse them. Thank you, sir. I have one more question for Admiral. The Indo-Pacific AOR has been described as the most consequential region of America's future. As such, it would appear to me that we should be working very hard to increase our network of allies and partnerships in the region. The Army Corps of Engineers has done some remarkable work building partner capacity in areas of water and environmental security, disaster risk management, and humanitarian assistance construction projects. The court does a lot of this work from the civil works perspective and in concert with USAID. Can you speak to the effectiveness of these programs in building regional partnerships as opposed to how China does business? Thanks, Senator. So the Army Corps of Engineers is certainly active in the region as well as the engineering corps of all the services. We take on projects that support communities, deliver military warfighting capacity, and support our allies and partners. That is a vastly different model than the PRC is using with regard to bringing in workers, bringing in materials, and then settling in nations. So the models are completely different. I was just in Palau as a part of the CB Corps that's forward deployed in Palau. I met with four interns from the island of Palau that were operating with the CBs to learn skills, trade, and to improve the infrastructure of their island, right? So drastically different models. And I'm confident that the nation sees which of those models they like better and it's the United States model. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rowne. Senator Arrono, please. Thank you. And Admiral Aquilino and General Lockhammer, thank you very much to both of you. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your opening remarks in support of the closure of the Red Hill Facility and the need for us to address the Indo-Pacon fueling needs in alternative ways. Admiral Aquilino, we are going ahead with the safely defueling this massive facility or these massive tanks and we are going to need to provide resources in the out years to deal with the environmental issues related to the closure of this facility. What are your major concerns and priorities with respect to the future fuel storage requirements for Indo-Pacon? Thank you, Senator. Thanks for the continued support. In the set of options, I briefed the Secretary and the decision that he has made with regard to closing it was focused on three critical things. Number one, the top priority was clean, safe water for the people who I service members and their families. Number two was to ensure that we could execute our military mission set. The option that he selected, I believe provides a more diverse, distributed, and effective fuel distribution model that meets all of my requirements. How do you plan to mitigate any potential vulnerabilities that an alternate fuel solution may have? Although, in my opinion, we reduce our vulnerabilities by not having all our fuel in one place. But do you have some concerns about vulnerabilities of distributing this fuel and I don't know, throughout the Pacific, perhaps? I absolutely don't, Senator. Again, I believe, as you articulated, a much more diverse and distributed, both land-based and sea-based is the best model to ensure we can meet our war-fighting needs. The Compact of Free Association Agreement, COFA, between the U.S. and the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Federal States of Micronesia. And I know that you visited Palau, which is one of the other nations that are part of COFA. But as to the other two nations, they are coming up for renewal in 2023. As I mentioned, Palau in 2024, and as you noted in your written statement to the committee, these agreements have significant impact on your ability to advance the priorities of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. I am really glad that you visited Palau and that we are going to be perhaps looking at different ways that we can jointly be supportive, more supportive of these compact nations as we go forward. So I hope you will continue to prioritize our partnerships with these other nations to support our overall strategy in the Pacific. Yes, ma'am, it's absolutely important to get to the appropriate renegotiation of the Compact Agreements. Again, visiting Saipan, Guam, Palau, and Tinian were really, really worthwhile trip for me and got to spend some time with President Whips from Palau. As you know, the negotiation of those agreements are led by State Department, Coordination with Department of the Interior, and Department of Defense has a representative on the team and have articulated my request to negotiate those as soon as possible in a way that's certainly beneficial to the United States as the PRC is looking to infiltrate throughout the region. Exactly, and I think that our country should be paying more attention in a more supportive role and with regard to our compact nations because they're there in large extent because they are very much a part of our national security priorities. Regarding North Korea, for both of you. This year alone, we've seen a North Korea executing nine rounds of missile tests, including a purported hypersonic missile and its first launch since 2017 of an intermediate-range missile potentially capable of reaching Guam. Admiral Acollino and General Acollino, what is your assessment of the credibility of such threats from North Korea? Maybe we'll start with you, General. As I live under that threat, Senator, the threat is real and it appears that he's trying to develop capabilities to defeat our systems. And threaten the peninsula and threaten regional stability. So Admiral Acollino, is this one of the reasons that our protective systems on Guam is your top priority? Or a top priority? Absolutely, the ability to defend the homeland of Guam as well as the military forces that operate there. What I would say, though, is the relationship we have with the South Koreans and the Japanese is critical. General Acollino synchronized with General Wan and General Yamazaki every time there's one of these launches. And if you just recently read, we've increased the readiness level on both the peninsula and in support of the defense of Japan today. And Mr. Chairman, I want to note not to mention the need to protect Hawaii as we develop these missile systems, defense systems in Guam. We do still have the issue of homeland defense radar Hawaii. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Ronald. Senator Cotton, please. Admiral, last year your predecessor, Admiral Davidson, warned that China may invade Taiwan in his words, quote, the next six years. That was a year ago. In your best military opinion, does that forecast still hold? Thanks, sir. I was going to start with who said that? Admiral Davidson. No, I know. I don't even think about that last guy anymore. I think that his articulation was based on a couple of different points, but we'd have to ask Admiral Davidson how he came to that. One of the things that I've watched is President Xi Jinping has articulated and challenged his military to be able to modernize and complete its modernization by 2027. If we look over the past 10 or 15 years, that target date has moved left from 2035-ish persistently. So 2027 is the military task. I can tell you where I am is I see actions that give me concern that the timeline is shrinking. And the mission that I've been given is to be prepared for it. So when you look at the actions of the PRC as it applies to breaking their agreement for Hong Kong, taking physical lethal actions on the line of actual control with India, completely illegal claims for the entire South China Sea and every sea space and airspace inside their self-proclaimed nine-dash line, all of these actions give me concern. The most recent water canoning of Philippine sailors in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal. All of these things give me concern and I can't predict the date, Senator. I just need to know or I just know I need to be ready now. Yeah, I agree, Admiral. They give me a lot of concern as well. Six years, last year is five years now. I think we should be as concerned that it might be five months and be ready for that. One way to be ready for that in the opinion of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who I think is one of the most distinguished statesmen of the region of his generation said that the United States should consider abandoning so-called strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, in which we don't make it perfectly clear that we will come to their defense. Given what we've seen in the invasion of Ukraine and what we understand about China's intentions based on what you just said, should we make it clear to Beijing that we will, in fact, come to Taiwan's defense if Beijing attacks Taiwan? That's it, Senator. As you know, we currently are in execution and support the one China policy. I think what I would say is strategic ambiguity has served us very well for the past 40 years. It served us well under different circumstances when the PLA was not capable of executing this mission and Beijing knew that. I would suggest now that the PLA is capable. The main constraint on China's leaders is America's intentions and that's why we should change from strategic ambiguity to clarity. Admiral, I want to turn to your opening statement. You used the phrase integrated deterrence. The Pentagon defines that as working across war fighting domains, theaters and the spectrum of conflict in collaboration with all instruments of national power as well as allies and partners. That sounds to me like a bureaucratic word salad cooked up in Colin Cole's office. I don't understand what integrated deterrence adds to deterrence. Could you explain to me what you think the difference is between those two terms? Because deterrence is a very simple and longstanding concept that depends centrally on hard military power to include nuclear weapons. Yeah, thanks, Senator. So again, in the lane that I operate in the military lane, again, I believe that that hard power, credible combat power provides a deterrent value through the military sphere. I also believe that there's other forms that actually may be more impactful as we're watching in the Ukraine side the economic impacts clearly have an opportunity. And I do believe synchronizing those with the military lane can really have an impactful ability to deliver deterrence. All dependent though on continued military dominance across all military domains to include our nuclear arsenal, correct? Certainly in the military sphere, Senator, I coordinate with Admiral Richards as we present the entire spectrum of military capabilities to adversaries. So the synchronization of conventional and strategic is critical. And then combining that with the rest is certainly valuable. Yeah. And I want to commend you because you've been very clear-eyed and sober while you've been in this command about the need for military power in the Western Pacific to deter China. I just want to make sure that a bunch of political aparatics in the office of the Secretary of Defense are not going to undermine that military power on which all deterrence is based. Thank you, Admiral. Yeah, Senator, if I could just make one comment. The Secretary has been completely supportive of the approach that we've taken and not once have I been asked to throttle back or do anything different. I didn't say the Secretary. I said the office of the Secretary of Defense, which is large and sprawling and has a lot of political hacks in it. Thank you. Senator Blumenthal, please. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for your service and for being here this morning. There was an announcement in December, as you know, that Australia is planning to build a new naval station on its east coast to base nuclear submarines planned for under the AUKUS agreement. This base could resupply and maintain American nuclear submarines, increasing the capabilities of both countries, Australia and our country, encountering China's influence and threats in the Pacific region. AUKUS allows us to capitalize on one of our greatest advantages in the Pacific, namely the strength and capabilities of our submarine fleet, which is second to none in the world. Sharing this technology with Australia will be a force multiplier, but those submarines are not scheduled to be commissioned for another 10 or more years. There was a lot of hoopla at the time of the announcement, but not so much a realization that there will be some delay. The AUKUS agreement also provides a framework for joint cooperation and integration of cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies. Admiral, as you know, the United States, the UK and Australia currently engaged in an 18-month period of consultation to determine the optimal pathway to nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, what would you like to see come out of this process? What themes of inoperability have you identified for AUKUS moving forward and can the timeline be accelerated? Thanks, Senator. So the AUKUS agreement is really important and everybody goes right to submarines, but as you articulated, it is more broad than that. And we're working immediately to increase our space and cyber capabilities together with the Australians. We're looking at posture options beyond just submarines and naval bases to be able to operate together. And right now, we are completely interoperable with the Australians. On the submarine side, I think the Australians need to see the result of this initial review. They will have some decisions and choices to make. And then I think there's ways to bridge to that development when as they work to get to the infrastructure and then we review the additional basing options that you just articulated. We would love to go as fast as possible. We certainly have to be mindful of the nuclear reactors and the safety of those things as we work this forward. Speaking to the importance of this agreement, would you say it is more significant in light of what we've seen in Ukraine and if so, for what reason? I don't know if I would compare it on the Ukraine side. I think as I look at the theater that we operate in, there's a vast number of basically multilateral relationships that are important when you think about ASEAN, when you think about a trilateral relationship with South Korea, Japan, the United States. This is just another one of those multinational agreements that provide both a military capability and capacity that's important for the region. And do you think there is the opportunity or the potential for accelerating the timeline? I think it will have to see the results of this review. I guess what I would say is this really won't happen quickly. If we can get from 10 years to eight years, boy, that'd be Herculean. And where do you think the submarines will be built? I know the Australians certainly would like to have that industrial capacity, I think having an additional industrial base in another place for us is possible. But as you know, all of the United States submarines are built in Connecticut. I know. Rhode Island. And Rhode Island has a role to play as well. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Orange, please. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair. And again, gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. General LeCamera, let's start with you. We have seen a lot with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it just hammers home how connected the world is and the responses that we see from democratic nations. We've heard a lot about how Yukam and Indo-Paycom are totally different theaters, yet the responses from the Japanese, the Australians, the South Koreans when it comes to Ukraine have surprised a lot of people. What do you think about the allied responses to the invasion of Ukraine, and can you shed some light on how all of these different regions are interconnected? Thank you, Senator. As I sat down with the Minister of Defense before coming to Washington, D.C., and I told them we were paying attention to what's going on there. It's not a blueprint, but it can be instructive to large-scale combat operations on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, and we need to be paying attention to that, boil it down to its fundamental lessons. What I think is discussed already several times, you know, the power, our true asymmetric advantages are our alliances and have in a coalition. And so I think it continues to reinforce the importance of making sure that we have that strategic and international depth, and we can take everybody's capabilities and put it together as an asymmetric advantage. And I think that is well said. There are so many connectivities, ways that we work with allied partners around the globe that just become force multipliers no matter what that theater. So I am going to continue on some of that interconnectivity that we have. I know we were having a fuel discussion earlier, so I'm going to direct this one to the Admiral. In light of the energy crunch that we have now with the Russia invasion of Ukraine, it's my understanding that our military has fuel contracts with the Japanese and South Korean refiners. But much of their oil does come from Iran and others. Have you taken a close look at our DLA's energy contracts for Indo-Paycom? And is that a strategic concern? Thanks, Senator. We certainly keep a look at the refinery capability around the globe and how it might impact. I haven't looked down to the second, third order effects as we coordinate with Japan, Korea, and the host nations. I'd be glad to take that on with DLA to see where those vulnerabilities might be. I would appreciate that because, again, there is so much that goes on under the surface. And if we are relying upon Iran and other adversaries, just as we're seeing in our own economy right now, we're so reliant upon Russia. Russia is using those dollars to fund their war machine. The same could be said of a number of other near-peer adversaries like Iran. The dollars they are generating from their oil then also goes to fund terrorist activities, proxy activities around the globe. So we are all interconnected going back to what General LaCamera said. We have various strategic alliances, but we also need to look at where our adversaries are and how we can rely on partners for solutions rather than just focusing on folks like Russia and Iran and others. Very important that we look at those secondary and tertiary implications. So I'll yield back my time. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst. Senator Warren, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Admiral Ackley, now I want to ask about the impact of defense industry consolidation on our ability to compete militarily and to be able to control costs. So last month, the Department of Defense issued a disturbing report finding that defense mergers and growing concentration is reducing the number of suppliers and creating vulnerabilities in our supply chain. And of course, that's because when only a small number of companies produce components that DOD needs to buy, a pandemic or a single company's decision to cease production can leave us without the parts that we need or instead of ceasing production, those companies can just jack up profits to make jack up prices to make more profits without fear of being undercut by competitors. So let me ask Admiral Aquilina, do you consider hypersonic weapons to be an important priority? Yes, ma'am. Hypersonic weapons is one area where the DOD report is particularly alarming. Warning that vertical integration of those contractors and suppliers, quote, will likely lead to reduced competition and may eliminate it altogether. Do you agree that DOD generally benefits from competition among defense contractors and suppliers? Senator, let me just start by saying I don't have any acquisition authority, but competition is certainly the foundation of our free market. Well, it's not only a foundation of our free market. You're absolutely right, but it's how we assure that we're going to have supply and we're going to have a price that we can afford. That's why I've been concerned that DOD is asleep at the wheel when it comes to mergers and acquisitions. Since the 1990s, we have gone from 51 aerospace and defense prime contractors down to just five today. Controlling costs for hypersonics is going to be a major challenge for the department. The GAO found that the costs of one of the Navy's programs nearly doubled in a single year and that an Air Force program increased by 40 percent in its first year. Look, we're planning to invest about $15 billion through 2024. So those kinds of cost increases add up in a hurry. Overruns in these programs take resources away from other department priorities and other needs across the federal government. And the cost issues are significant enough that the Air Force Secretary Kendall has expressed concerns that they are not, quote, cost effective. So let me just ask you one more question in this general area, if I can. There are a number of factors that drive these cost increases. I realize that. There's complexity, poor planning, weak oversight. But do you think it will be important to prevent further concentration among hypersonics contractors, Admiral? Senator, again, without the not being the person who actually purchases those things, I think what I would say is I need the capability. And I would need and I need it as soon as possible. I encourage any particular way that we can execute that with the most effectiveness for the delivery of the system at the most efficient cost to the taxpayer. I appreciate that. And that's fair enough. I think the department's report makes clear that this needs to be a priority. If we don't have competition in this sector, it's going to be extremely difficult to control costs. And I'm working on legislation to address this right now. So, Admiral, I hope that you and I can work together on controlling costs as we go forward. As you may know, your command submitted the largest wish list of any command, nearly a billion dollars. And these so-called unfunded priorities have become an extremely pernicious tool to boost what is already runaway pentagon spending. So, I'm going to be following up with you with more questions about these lists. But I urge you to be a more responsible steward of taxpayer dollars than your predecessors were and to think carefully about your request for this year. Thank you.