 වවස Ku, වවч Cold honour the the brain processes and we have already discussed about it. According to Searle, consciousness is caused by the brain processes and realized in the brain processes referring to this Searle's thesis. That consciousness that is something quite logical and it is produced by the neuro physiological function of the brain processes. So far as this hypothesis is  Nvidia is concerned そう alities to gives a scientific  Скאןt of consciousness Technical Intentionality conceptness We have already discussed about this hypothesis. We have also discussed about the nature of Intentionality as such.  today we are going to discuss the structure of consciousness or the structurearnos and what are the properties that constitute that the intensely state according to, so intension u state is constituted of entirety properties, fs such as We materialize through our features or features of consciousness, whenever we talk about consciousness, we talk about a composite feature of our experience. So, in this context what Direct actual is going to discuss about consciousness that is what we try to look at,  absolutamente czne la chopped tromba . ɛ r r t e w y ɑ qu i t ? .. ɛ r t i l e q i n d thím pa Cyber ogeneous, ____ izations, ____ izations is inter- равств twusierr yai ____ standen ____ standen ____ standen బ్వాంన్న్నారీరుంగింగింఎఆథ్నుంత్రంన్త్నటిన్యంటిన్వరసి. మాంత్నుటాంమున్ంటాకంగిపాతాఠికినూంగినుకదంరుకుత్నాందలినరంపి. , Ilnge están lang flare up den looked at that it is a naturalistic hypothesis jour. He says so has always nutshell coast that he will give up that very important  Tampa, the context it is very important to talk about consciousness and relate consciousness with life. So, when we relate consciousness with life, we try to show how significant this concept is, how complex this concept is. In this context we need to look at Sol's notion of consciousness. So, consciousness the necessity of consciousness. So, consciousness as a concept, as Paul Johnston would try to define referring to Wood-Gonstein in his book, the re-thinking the inner, Johnston writes that to understand the concept of consciousness we do not need to define or to describe it, but to recognize what is involved in saying that someone is conscious,  -... サムオン Rhash ? 쇨  underwear elujah ?  recognizable one diver  hott  personagem 兰  Idee  longest ред living beings in the world, or other cases in the world or other immaterial bodies in the world so that is something very important so consciousness is to be talked and it is to be talked vis-a-vis its relationship with the others. We need to describe and recognize the meaningful aspect of conscious life so then we will be a Aceble to describe  deity                                                                                                                                                                                                                              leaving in time is something very important when we talk about Kant because Kant talks about the change of mental states or thoughts with reference to time whereas the change of any physical object can be explained with reference to both space and time so far as temporality is concerned the concept of time is concerned it is only with reference to thoughts Kant is talking about or Kant can we can always talk about the concept of change in thoughts so this probably sharl is not interested here to bring in so what is sharl interested in sharl is interested in the notion of consciousness and how it is being composed by various other features now once that is told to us we will try to see whether this notion of consciousness that sharl is advocating is analogous to the Cartesian notion of consciousness or not that we one can very well reflect and try to bring some kind of a juxtaposition with reference to Decart or and with reference to Danette or the other functionalist because functionalist notion of of入, it is another functionalist of consciousness. Because it is functionalist of the mental and consciousness! it is not a compositional notion of the consciousness. consciousness is not a compositional fact of different features and which are intrinsically associated with each other. Functionalists would deny this fact, that consciousness is something irreducible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----------------azioni asleep mean iają  asynchronous.  말고 umuz asonable கவ Francis  cocon gle this is very different because consciousness is associated with intentionality and it is the feature of the intentionality that it would always associate itself with the other. It is a binding feature in the sense that it binds the other with itself, it binds the world with itself. So, this binding principle or the unifying principle that Sarleen is talking about is something very significant which . . . . ria ria ria dear yian n WITHRAL recorded reports to me that I am so and so with reference to a particular community or with reference to a day.I may further because, I have a family and in my family my children has given me this identity that, I am a father of ,so and so.This very notion ఎంతి నాసిం�さん ఓిరసిండకం ఆవనంఓ� view వభిసింతిం ఇథబి నిఆస౿ ࠤరి DENNIS మారిన నిం ఎాక్ంచ్తా ఆవఫరం మావెని మాద్వాదాచిల౶ా ఒం తగాసం ఒం. ఇపినిసాయాపిసా. ఎబ౨ి ఆవంచ్నిని పిటంచినా. In the sense that they give me a kind of a social status. So, in their intentionality, my consciousness is located in a specific temporal world, in a sociobiological world, so that is how I am associated with other and others are associated with me. So, consciousness has a biological background and it has also a social background. In a social background, I am identified as a person. Now, let us go back to the first question. The basic idea that how consciousness is composed in Searle's theoretical framework of biological naturalism. Now, Searle talks about a dozen of features. They are finite modalities, unity, intentionality, aspectuality or subjectivity. I mean, for him subjectivity is the basic idea that how consciousness is composed in Searle's theoretical framework of biological naturalism. This notion is called as spectrality and then Searle also talks about a conceptual connection, connection between what is conscious and what is unconscious. Then, Searle also talks about Searle's psychology whenever we perceive something, we perceive at the background of certain things. So, human being's perceptions are always in the mode of a figure and figure is posed against a particular background. That is what he means by the Searle's psychology. He tries to bring Searle's psychology into a particular background. Now, this idea that consciousness always or experiences are always against a particular kind of a background. Now, the other features are familiarity conditions, overflow, center and periphery distinction, boundary conditions, mood, pleasure and unpleasure. So, these are the dozen of features that Searle talks about in order to discuss the structure of consciousness. You can say that the manifestation of consciousness as a biological phenomenon of consciousness, a biological phenomenon will have all these features. Now, let us begin with this first notion called finite modalities. Now, what does Searle mean by finite modalities? Searle writes that human consciousness is manifested in strictly limited number of modalities. In addition to five senses of sight, touch, smell, test and hearing, the sixth sense of balance is the body sensation and stream of thought. Finite modalities are the modalities which talks about or which shows that how do we have sense experiences. Now, our sense experiences are finite. When I see all of you are looking at me, I have the experience of students looking at me. Now, this very experience is confined to the particular classroom, a particular classroom experience. You can call it a perception. You can also bring the other sense experiences that I am hearing your questions. I am looking at your faces, all these. So, all these are part of my experience and these experiences are finite. Searle does not believe in an infinite experiences. Say for example, this experience of infinity in the sense that I am experiencing Brahman. . . . Letse say, uplifted 검ana. Here, for instance, Lasbala as you all know, in Indian context is identified with universal consciousness workers. So spann this kind of conscious experiences are not discused in the framework of the modalities that assault talks about. When a call 말 talks about consciousness it is about our limited notion of consciousness, that whenever, and the fact that I am lecturing to all of you is giving me this impression that I am conscious of this very fact that I am lecturing so this answer I would call kind of expression of the finite consciousness. So, human consciousness are expressed in a finite mode is a finite consciousness. So, human consciousness is expressed in a finite mode, not in an infinite mode. The way it is discussed by the spiritual seekers, that consciousness is infinite and it is universal and it has a universal mode of representation. So, that kind of ideas  Module                   .          fliespan to whether it be expressed when somebody asked a particular question, I must be reason evenly accepting a question when it is thrown to me with a balanced mind. So, this idea of sablu eyansing talks about a rational mind mind which has rational capacities. So, whenever I talk about actions or the manifestation of actions or performance ƒ ƒ  пол ƒ                                          the notion of unity. Now unity is constitute as one of the features of consciousness. That consciousness or consciousness mental states are unified. I have already talked about in my previous classes that all intentional states constitutes a network. is constitute as one of the features of consciousness. That consciousness or consciousness mental states are unified. I have already talked about in my previous classes that all intentional states constitutes a network. So, there is a network of intentional states. There is a network of intentional states. This network are connected and when you talk about experience as a part of this network because the network represents mind. The network as a whole represents the mind. So, if that is the mind then it is interacting with the world then the experiential features or the experiential connective shows that there are two modes in which we try to connect, try to unify these experiences or you try to unify these thoughts or intentional states or representational states. According to shell there are two notions of unity. One is the horizontal notion of unity and another is the vertical notion of unity. The vertical notion of unity as shell says say for example I have a tooth hack and I also experience the vase. I also experience the fragrance, fragrance of a toothpaste. I am also experience this fact that I am sitting on a sofa and brushing my teeth. Very typical. I am suffering from tooth hack. I am experiencing the vase which is kept near the table and the I also smell the fragrance of my toothpaste. These are all coming to me kind of an unified notion of experience and shell will call that now this kind of vertical unity. There is also some kind of unity which he says it is a kind of a universal notion of vertical unity. There is also some kind of unity which he says it is a kind of a horizontal unity. Now what is this idea of a horizontal unity? Now horizontal unity talks about the unity between thought and actions, what I am thinking and what I am doing. That is connected with reference to content. As I said there is a semantic content involved. So whenever a thought is expressed it is expressed with the content and that content is identical with the action which is performed or the act which is I am performing. They are not to separate things. So Kant's notion of a transcendental unity of a perception is something very close to Searle's notion of a horizontal unity. When Kant says that space and time are to a priori say phenomena or concepts they are not certainly categories they are every concepts and when I have a particular experience of something I not only apply the categories but also look at this experience as a part of the space and time and that gives or engenders some kind of judgment. So when I have a particular experience of space and time or engenders some kind of judgment. So a judgment is produced with the application of space and time as an a priori concepts. So space and time are the form of experience according to Kant. They are the form of experience. So similarly in Searle we need to talk about consciousness as a kind of a binding principles as a kind of a unifying principles. Now this binding principle is also analyzed from the point of view of neuroscience. The neuroscience talks about the binding problem how one neuron is connected with the other and so on and so forth. This connection is a causal connection. If x is a neuron and x is connected to C fiber which is another neuron. So whenever I have this experience of pain the C fiber is simulated and therefore it is simulating the x or it is connected with x which is another neuron. Now this kind of causal connectivity or neural connectivity also talks about the unity the unity in the brain processes or what we call the binding processes. The connectivist model will talk about it in a different way and I am sure in your future classes Professor Nath will be talking about the connectionist model of mind and the other representationalist like Fodor would also talk about how the representational states in an artificial systems are connected with each other. This overall gives an idea that each mental state is causally connected with the other. But in Searle the notion of unity that he is talking about is not causally connected. Rather Searle will talk about intentionality. Searle says mental states are in principle intentional. Now when they are intentional they might be having some kind of a intentional relationship and that he defines with reference to mental causation. I have discussed about it in the previous class that when I act I act with an intention so the manifestation of my intention shows that I am intentionally engaged with the other or the with the world and this intentional engagement is not purely causal. At the same time I am also causally related with nature because I am not engaged with the other or with the world. I am a physical being, a biological being and Searle gives this example that the gravitational force is operating whenever I am acting. So for example when I write here it is also this fact that there is a gravitational force which is operating. So I am causally somehow connected with nature at the same time I am able to perform intentional action. So it is this intentionality according to Searle is an essential feature of consciousness. Look at what Searle says. For large number of cases the consciousness is indeed a consciousness of something and the of quote in quote in consciousness of is of of intentionality. Now this of talks about two things. One is the expression of the psychological mode and another is the direction of feed. Now the expression of the psychological mode will talk about the condition of condition of satisfaction and I have discussed about it in the last class that whenever we talk about the performance of like intentional action we also expect certain things. So when the expectation is fulfilled then satisfaction is generated. So the fulfillment condition and the prior intention in which the action is performed are two different things. Things which are intentionally connected with the network. So therefore to talk about that they are intentionally connected Searle brings this idea of intention in action. I think I have also discussed about it in the last class that it is Searle talks about intention in action. It is this which shows the intentionality operating in experience that exhibit the intentionality operating experience. So suppose this is an agent A performing an action B where he performs he experiences it. So for example I am writing, I am experiencing this fact that I am writing and that is what he calls intention in action. What I intended to write and I wrote are two intentional states. If I could succeed in writing something, if I could succeed in telling something to you then it gives me some kind of a pleasure, some kind of satisfaction. So the generation of satisfaction is something which says that intentionality coming from the world and that is what is the direction of fit Searle talks about. So there is a kind of a direction of fit. The direction fit will talk about the connection between mind to the world or the agent who is a conscious being interacting with the world and the world also responding to this interaction. So for example if I request you to bring a glass of water and hearing my request you brought the glass of water then I am satisfied because whatever I was expecting you did that. So when you brought the glass of water for me then it shows that intentionality is from the world to the agent or the world to the mind. So intentionality thus talks about some kind of self-referential which is involved in the expression of my prior intention because when I said bring me a glass of water I also expected I also desired that you would listen to me you listen to my request and offer me a glass of water. So the very fact that you brought a glass of water was part of my desire which is part of my prior intention. So in that sense intentionality always having this feature called direction of fit not only the psychological mode but also the direction of fit. Searle also talks about two other features which are logically associated one is aspectuality or prospectuality. Consciousness according to Searle is prospectual. Now what is prospectuality or when you say that consciousness is prospectual what does Searle mean by that? Now according to Searle my conscious experiences unlike the objects of experiences are always prospectual they are always from a point of view. Now this is very significant they are always from a point of view if I say that my students are most intelligent students of say 2010. Now this I say it because I want to make a point to other that these students of my class SS420 are the most intelligent students of IATB from the base 2010. Now if I say that I make a point to other that is my point of view. So whenever a subject responds to the other or interacts with the other in the form of passing a judgment or making an assertion then the subject or the person represents his or her point of view. So it is the subject's point of view or the it is the first person's point of view this is the case it is from my point of view I say that students of SS420 are the intelligent or the most intelligent students of the base 2010. Now that is what is very significant because that gives a perspective a perspective which tells me that I compare this students with my previous base student I compare this with the other base of students who are associated with me. So this kind of comparison or analysis gives birth to my perspective that this base is a very good base. Now the perspective and points of view are most obvious provision but of course there are features of our sensory experiences as well. So whenever we talk about experiences we reflect that it is very clear according to the case of perception. So when I have a visual experience of a particular object or a thing then the perspective is very clear I look at it from my point of view. Let us give an example of a rose is a flower and ax is a poet the poet looking at this beautiful rose the poet suggest that is the rose is beautiful look at a botanist now when a botanist tries to look at the same rose he look at it from a perspective of biology from a scientific perspective that is the life condition of the rose an ordinary human being who is also a lover is trying to look at rose from a different point of view with a sense of gift probably he would offer it to his beloved. So all this x y z poet botanist and lover are looking at the same phenomenon and looking at the same object from three different perspectives. So in that sense consciousness is perspective because whenever we talk about a visual experience we try to show that there is a perspectivality associated with this experience. So according to in the case of visual experiences that consciousness is perspectival but it could be associated with some other experiences when as I said when somebody is giving a kind of a judgment I judge that x is right and y is wrong. So right and wrong is judged by the perspective or when I appreciate so for example a music a piece of music my appreciation is always from a point of view. So what cell calls it a first person point of view. Now spectrality is also associated with consciousness and it suggests that all in tensionality or all intentional experiences are aspectual say for example when I say see age object from a point of view is seeing it under certain aspects and not others. So when I look at a rose I look at it from a particular point of view I also look at it an aspect of it I do not see the entire probably the entire is imagined and in my imagination I try to comprehend it. Similarly a lover in his imagination try to comprehend this fact that this he would offer to his beloved but what is given to his experience is the only an aspect of it. So what is given whenever we talk about an experience what is given is only an aspect of it. So the the content of experience is constitute from this feature of aspectuality. So and therefore perspectival and aspectual are associated with the subject they are part of the subject they are part of the subjectivity of the essence consciousness or the person's consciousness because what it feels like me or what Thomas Nagel would say what is it like to be a bed you know in his famous paper published in 1974 in philosophical review Nagel suggest that the first person's perspective or the first person's presentation of the reality cannot be ruled out. So whatever may be their objective analysis the analysis which is claimed by the scientist. So for example the kind of analysis which in the case of a botanist will be offering in the case of the life span of the rose. So the scientific explanation would always gives us a kind of a third person perspective. So the perspectivality which is associated with the scientific explanation of an experience is is from a third person's point of view that which can be demonstrated that which can be objectified that which can be disclosed to others as they are is something always be the case in the case of the scientific explanation. But when we talk about philosophical explanation experience we look at it from a first person point of view. So consciousness in this regard will have several other features which we would be discussing in our next class. So today we could only finish some of the important features of consciousness that compose the network or the mind or that structures the intentional consciousness states or experiences. They are the notion of modality which is a finite modality, intentionality, unity and subjectivity which is manifested in this features called perspectival and aspectual. So with that in the next class we will begin with the other features in the next class. Thank you.