 So, thank you. Let me talk about the Indian experience and the story which I am going to tell you is very different from the Chilean experience. What I am going to tell you is that India has never faced any banking crisis still today, including during 2007-2008. So why, what steps we have taken, how we have developed our financial system, that in brief I am going to tell you. The presentation has a lot more material than I can possibly cover in 20 minutes. So I will be skipping through most of it and talking about some of the central issues. Now basically growth with equity, this is the foremost objective of any economy especially for emerging market economies because emerging market economies have a vast population of poor people and also we don't have social security systems. Equity I would like to see in two perspectives. One is equitable distribution which has come in the limelight with Thomas Piketty's book and the other aspect of equity is inclusion, which is something which is very important about any economy, particularly the emerging market economies. So any financial sector policy has to be tuned in to subserve both these objectives. As far as role of finance is concerned, Lemay has already talked about it, a well-developed financial system is very important for promoting growth, even though among economists there are various shades of opinion, but the dominant opinion is that a sound financial system is extremely important. And the fact that a sound financial system is extremely important for a well-functioning economy is proved in a negative sense by the crisis. A malfunctioning financial system is at the core of the crisis. So that proves the point. Now the question is what should be the optimal size of a financial system? To that there are no answers. Even regarding the systemically important financial institutions, there are no absolute measures. These are all relatively speaking. In a broad sense one can say that a financial system should serve the purposes, should serve the objectives of the real economy, should not be oversized. And intuitively it is very easy to understand that if a financial system grows too large it takes away resources, both human technology, etc. from the real economy and therefore beyond a point, and this is the current research going on, beyond a point the financial system development actually takes away from growth. So in this broad perspective, let me now come to the points which are there on the slide. When we talk of importance of financial system, by financial system I mean three components and the development has to address all the three components. One is institution, other is market and third is financial sector infrastructure. So financial system serves many purposes as you can see. It provides intermediation, allocation of resources, risk management, liquidity to the savers, provision of information through disclosures, and thus contributes to overall economic growth. This is a broad indicator of the structure of the Indian financial system. Essentially I would concentrate on the commercial banking system, the public sector banks which are in number 26, which account for 70% of the financial system. Then we have private sector, there are 20, foreign banks 41, but these are most of them are small banks, only five large foreign banks are there. Then we have other varieties of, couple of varieties of banks that you can see over there, I'll talk about them slightly later. Then we have the cooperative sector, we have the non-banking financial company sector which in today's parlance is known as shadow banking. So we have a combination of banks, variety of banks and non-banks as far as credit intermediation function is concerned. So the point here is that we have a diversified banking system or financial system. As far as the institutional structure is concerned for overseeing the financial system, at the top we have financial stability development council, which is headed by the finance minister. This, of course, is a development after the crisis. But at operational level, there is a subcommittee which is headed by the governor RBI and then we have all the other sectoral regulator heads like capital market regulator, insurance regulator, et cetera, who are members of this committee. So this is FSDC, subcommittee of FSDC I have just talked about and these are the four primary regulators. RBI, SEBI is the capital market regulator, IRDA is the insurance regulator and PFRDA is the provident fund, a pension fund, sorry, pension fund regulator. And within RBI we have certain independent committees, both for financial supervision, both for payment and settlement systems. So these are the two large segments which are regulated through these committees, I mean, provide an overall oversight. So let me very briefly talk about what was the situation pre-1991. 1991 was the period when we really, Indian banking system, Indian economy was liberalized. Prior to that we were in a repressed regime. You can see the components of that regime. We had administered interest rates, large amount of preemption from the banking system, extensive micro regulations, et cetera. The consequence was that there was hardly any competition, therefore obviously there were low levels of efficiency and productivity, low capitalization levels in the banking sector and high NPAs that we will see slightly later. Because of large preemption there was credit shortage for private sector and the growth was stunted. In fact, India grew at the rate of what came to be known as Hindu rate of growth. It was 3% for years and years together till we broke free in late 80s and then substantially in late 90s. So banking sector reforms as a part of 1991 reforms. In fact, why did we go for reforms? I said initially that India never faced a banking crisis and it is true that even in 1991 we didn't face a banking crisis. But we did face a huge economic crisis in the sense on balance of payment and that spurred the range of reforms, economic reforms, financial sector reform was a subset of that. So we took a number of sequenced measures, deregulation of interest rates, reduction in preemptions, diversification of ownership in the sense that governments holding, as I said, the public sector banks account for about 70% today. In those days it must have in 80 or more of the banking system. So government ownership was reduced, private investments was brought in, new banks in private sector were allowed, foreign banks entry was made easier and all this resulted into enhancing of productivity and efficiency through competition. Then there was a wave of consolidation in the banking system so that the weaker ones could be weeded out, could be merged or closed. And then we had a number of institutional structures coming in, I have mentioned about these two committees, BFS, BPSS. And the one thing which we did was that we had, we always earmarked ourselves, or rather we converged completely with the international potential norms, whether it was Basel 1, Basel 2 and now Basel 3. Of course we chose our own pace, not that we were slow but occasionally we did, we did have our own pace, sometimes we had to have a carve out, not being in full conformity for various practical reasons but by and large we always implemented the international standards. Now the basic thrust of the banking reforms was financial sector reforms were undertaken early in the reform cycle as I mentioned. Reforms were not driven by any crisis and not an outcome of any multilateral rate. This was, this is the point which I made essentially in the beginning. And let me tell you that the world, I'm sure all of you know, has been going through crisis after crisis. In fact one can say that the period of peace is an intermission between crisis. And even as far as banks are concerned, about 43 countries faced systemic banking crisis during 1980s and 65 or so countries faced systemic banking crisis during 1990s. During all this period, somehow we were aware from that, we were away from that. Even though, as I mentioned earlier that we had a repressive regime, a closed economy, an economy which was not really growing very well but despite that, I think partly because of the simplicity of the system and partly because of the fact that there was a lot of emphasis on regulation and supervision, we did not face any banking crisis. And the two principles that we followed was non-disruptive progress and consultative process. We also undertook a whole lot of financial market reforms. In fact, the entire sequence of reforms did cover all segments of economy, the real economy in terms of budget deficits, in terms of current account balance, in terms of growth. That is we paid a lot of attention to the macroeconomic factors. And along with that, we did banking sector reforms. In conjunction with financial market reforms and when I talk of institutional and market reforms, I must also say, a lot of technological improvements were brought about in the system by leveraging technology, like having reporting systems, order matching systems, central counterparty clearing, information dissemination. The whole process was gradual, cautious and consultative. Financial inclusion that we talked about is something that has been at the core of the policies for quite a long time. In fact, India didn't have public sector banks till 1969. And all major banks were nationalized in 1969 and in a second wave in 1918. Now, what was the reason? The reason was, I mean, economy, the economic thinking also changes with time. In those days, India believed more in central planning. The country had just become independent. There were lots of problems and it was felt and found that credit was being cornered or likely to be cornered by the promoters, by the people who had set up the banks and therefore in order that the credit can be delivered in those directions where it was needed for wholesome development of the country, the banks were nationalized. Then we adopted several other schemes like service area approach, lead bank scheme. These are essentially schemes which look after the, which concentrate on the credit needs of specific geographical constellations. Where banks, where some bank would be made in charge, it will have to coordinate with the other banks. In order to have financial inclusion, we liberalized branch authorization with incentives to open in remote areas. And there is a compulsion. All banks have to open at least 25% of the branches in unbanked rural areas of the branches that they open in a year. Of course, there are certain incentives built into that. But we always had a large debate on whether financial inclusion can be achieved by smaller number of large banks or large number of smaller banks. And our experience with smaller banks was not good enough and therefore we went into large, we went for small number of larger banks, but then opening branches is not easy. It is costly. And apart from that financial inclusion unless the transaction cost can be brought down is something which does not make a business proposition for banks. And therefore we came up with the idea of business correspondent models. These are the agents which bank employ. And essentially the idea is by leveraging technology, by having handheld devices, by biometric identification, et cetera. Then we opening bank accounts because of KYC norms was becoming difficult. So a lot of relaxations were there. I mean, because of constraint of time I cannot really go on explaining. I'll just be telling you the basic points. So this was the supply side in order to increase demand from the people who need to be included. Financial literacy drives were undertaken are being undertaken today with a lot of emphasis. Now while we were into financial sector development, the core was always keeping an eye on financial stability. And these were the approaches that we took. These are some of the steps that we took for ensuring financial stability long before macro potential regulations have become fashionable. In fact, we practiced from 2004 both to contain the interconnectedness as well as to contain the exuberance in the credit markets from 2004 onwards. The method that we adopted was time varying, provisioning and capital requirements for certain segments of the economy which were overheating like your housing markets, commercial real estate, consumer loans and non banking financial sector. So these were the four sectors that were targeted. So potential framework much like what was listed by our Chilean colleague, many things we did. Now this table, I'm not going to be able to explain but I'll just tell you what it is. But before that, let us come to this. This is a graph which tells you the credit boom in the commercial real estate in early stages. On the left side, you can see the red line tells you the movement of capital adequacy requirements. I mean capital requirements for this sector. No, sorry, this red line tells you the provisioning requirement for this sector and the green line tells you the time varying capital requirement for this sector. Now when there was a high boom, then provisioning and capital requirements both were raised and then when the crisis struck both were simultaneously brought down. And then again after some time when they again started overheating both were raised. You can see the effect. There is a sharp decline in the credit growth and this is what was intended to be achieved through a macro potential policy. But when it was reversed, the effect was not the same. So our experience is macro potential policy does not work symmetrically. And the other two slides, the first slide gives you the movement of provisioning and capital requirements with time. And the second slide, this tells you that the monetary policy measures and the macro potential measures were absolutely in alignment. When monetary policy was tightened, macro potential norms were tightened and vice versa. So when the two policies were reinforcing each other, then there was a good effect which you saw over here, but not that we were successful in all segments. We were successful in housing segment, not so successful in NBFC segment. So this could be attributed to calibration issues because those were the early days. Now here is a list of how did we respond to crisis by moving the monetary policy and the macro potential measures. You can go through it later on. It had a combination of fiscal stimulus also by the government. And these are the graphs which tell you the story of the financial sector reforms. The capital adequacy you can see from 2001 onwards. You can see the gross NPA levels, how they have sharply declined. Of course, of late they have shown some increase. In fact, of late, there is some pressure on asset quality. And this one tells you both in absolute amount as well as the percentage. And the most remarkable thing you will find is that from 2003 onwards up to 2007, even the actual stock of not only the percentage, but the actual stock of non-performing assets also came down consistently. These are the figures. This is the story of net interest margin. It hovers around between 2.5 to 3% consistently over a long period of time. Now coming to the current concerns, we have certain concerns now today because India developed our GDP growth rate was 8.5 plus from 2003 to 2008. In the year of the crisis, it dipped. But in the next two years, it rebounded sharply. It again became 8.5%. But after that, the growth has gone down substantially. In this year, it was 4.7. Next year, it is expected to be between 5 and 6 for various reasons, for various macroeconomic and administrative reasons, for which I don't have time to go into. But it has led to deterioration in asset quality when the economy does not perform well. It is bound to happen. It has put pressure on capital adequacy. Basel III issues are there. Capital raising is going to be a substantial problem. In fact, the requirement, as estimated, is about 4.15 trillion rupees. And this is a conservative assessment. It could go much more. And the pressure on equity raising can be much more because the instruments, the non-equity instruments, have certain features under Basel III for which if the market is not there, particularly in emerging market economies, the pressure is going to be on more equity raising. Financial inclusion, a lot of efforts have been made. As I mentioned briefly to you earlier, but even then, the level of exclusion is high. You can see the figures. What is not given over here is that in this MSME sector, that is Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises sector, even today, the financial exclusion is 93%. So this is the story of GDP growth. You can see how we have come down of late because of various reasons which I mentioned. Now how we are tackling all this is we have adopted a five pillar approach, strengthening our monetary policy framework because inflation has become a problem. It has become quite entrenched. Strengthening banking structure through new entry, branch expansion, encouraging new varieties of banks and moving foreign banks into better regulated organizational forms. Here the idea is that we have been following a universal banking model and we find, particularly from financial inclusion perspective, that we need more varieties. Our total reliance on small number of larger banks has yielded results but not to the extent that we want and now we are veering around to the view that we need local feel and therefore we are going to promote small banks, large number of small banks and a variety among them. Broadening and deepening financial markets and increasing their liquidity and resilience, expanding access to finance, to small and medium enterprises, et cetera. Now here are a couple of things which I can mention apart from what is being done for individuals, for SMEs for example, factoring has been is being promoted and then an electronic exchange we are thinking of creating where the small and medium enterprises which get squeezed by the large corporates, they can sell their receivables into the market. And there will be a market for that because those claims are on big corporates, are on corporates. So if they are able to sell it to others who are willing to wait for some time, there should be a market for that and that will substantially ease the problem of SMEs. Improving the system's ability to deal with corporate distress and financial institution distress by strengthening real and financial restructuring as well as debt recovery. A number of very practical steps have been taken which I would not be able to enumerate. Maybe if you ask any questions, I may be able to tell you, but what are the lessons? What are the lessons from this? I have deliberately not put it in the slides because it is for you to draw the lessons. But from my perspective, my perspective what are the policy recommendations? The gains from the reforms in the post-1991 period have clearly shown the high cost the economy had to bear and therefore liberalization of economy and financial sector has great potential and it must be undertaken also to increase the human welfare. As the economy liberalizes domestically and externally, risks in the system increase and they have got to be managed properly and therefore there has to be what we feel is, our own lesson is that a sequenced and a measured pace of reform is far better than a big bank reform. At least this is what we have learned and it has been very useful to us and the reforms cannot be only a financial sector. The reform has to be of the entire economy including the real economy. You have to pay attention to macroeconomic fundamentals also. If you don't do that, then it will spill over into the financial system and the financial sector development will not be complete. Financial stability should be of overarching consideration in designing liberal financial sector policies. The financial sector should develop a diversified range of institutions. The regulatory policy should not stifle useful innovations due to the crisis but at the same time we have to keep an eye on what we call or what is generally known as socially not relevant financial innovation. The regulatory and supervisory institutional framework for the financial sector is of paramount importance so a part of the financial sector reforms has also to address the institutional aspects of there are many questions. Whether regulation and supervision should be with central bank or outside. Should you have a unified regulator or fragmented regulator? If you have many regulators, how do you coordinate? So there are several such issues which need also to be tackled. Thank you.