 Members of the President's Special Review Board, ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States. Ladies and gentlemen, please be seated. On behalf of myself and the American people, I want to extend my thanks to Senator Tower, Secretary Muskie, and General Skokar. Whatever this report may say, I am proud to have appointed this distinguished President Board because it fulfills my commitment to get the facts and share them with the American people. This is why I asked Attorney General Meese to conduct his review and why, when that review uncovered unauthorized actions, I ordered full disclosure of what we then knew. It was why I urged the appointment of an independent counsel and why I appointed David Abshire as my special counselor on this matter. And it is also why I ordered full cooperation with congressional inquiries. And it's why I appointed this Board, the Tower Board. The significance of this Board's work is reflected in the size of this volume, which I'm going to carefully study over the next several days. Senator Tower, Secretary Muskie, and General Skokar, in completing the tasks so well you've again demonstrated a willingness, one you've shown all your lives, to help your country to devote yourself to public service. In a highly charged atmosphere, I know it wasn't easy to interrupt your lives, but this was an important contribution to your nation and the American people are grateful to you for it. Now in addition to thanking these distinguished gentlemen, I want to make it clear that I consider their work far too important for instant analysis. I intend to read and digest it first, think carefully about its findings, and promptly act on its recommendations. Next week I will address the nation and give the American people my response to this report. But I pledge to the American people today that I will do whatever is necessary to enact the proper reforms and to meet the challenges ahead. I want to thank the members of the Board again and now John, I'm sure there will be a few questions for you. will Donald Reagan be leaving as your Chief of Staff? The Special Review Board has completed its work. Senator Muskie and General Scowcroft will have their own statements in a moment. But it might be helpful to give you the highlights of this rather lengthy report to the president. Before we begin, I want to note that I have never been privileged to work with two more public-spirited, perceptive, and intellectually honest men than Ed Muskie and Ben Scowcroft. Our working relationship was congenial and collegial. The report represents the collective understandings, evaluations, and judgments of all three of us. There were never any significant disagreements among us. It was incumbent upon us to put aside all partisan or personal loyalties and prejudices in fulfilling this demanding and challenging assignment. I emphasize that it was not our function to make judgments on criminal culpability. I want to express my gratitude to my colleagues for the considerable time they devoted, their dedication, and their sense of purpose. We would be remiss if we did not pay tribute to the small but dedicated, diligent, and highly professional staff that supported us. Under the circumstances of deadlines and our expectations, they put together a product I consider to be remarkable. Now let me discuss this report for a few minutes. Ed and Brent will each expand on this and their own statements at the completion of my remarks. We began our work December 1st of last year, the same day President Reagan appointed us and signed the executive order. The president in the executive order asked all departments and agencies to cooperate with us. When President Reagan appointed us, he urged that all the facts come out on the Iran Contra matter. The president wanted us to examine this matter to find lessons for the future so that it can be put right. We considered the development of the NSC system over time. As part of that review, we interviewed former presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, as well as most of the living secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, directors of central intelligence, national security advisors, as well as two former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, we looked at specific case studies of the NSC system from the administration of President Eisenhower to date in an effort to understand how the system works under stress. The Iran Initiative and Contra Diversion served as the primary case study in our review. The summary of the facts on Iran Contra is located in part three of our report. Here and elsewhere, we have presented these facts as we understand them. Some information we have concluded must remain in the classified domain. No material, I emphasize no material, was deleted on the grounds that it might prove politically embarrassing to this administration. What was left out did not alter the substance of the report. Our conclusion is that there are indeed many powerful lessons to be learned. Part four of our report called What Was Wrong is intended to instruct on those lessons. It is important to emphasize, however, that putting into practice those lessons is not susceptible of quick fixes or easy answers. Our principal recommendation illustrates that point. Let me quote from the report here. Using the process will not always produce brilliant ideas, but history suggests it can at least help prevent bad ideas from becoming presidential policy. Now, the reports you have is a lengthy one. Here are a few points you might keep in mind while reading through it. Mistakes were made, but those mistakes that attract headlines may give a distorted picture of how the NSC really works. We looked at case studies from crises of this and previous administrations. The Iran Contra affair was clearly an aberration. The NSC system is alive and has served us well for the 40 years of its existence. We should profit from those mistakes. The president obviously desires to do so. It is a tribute to President Reagan that he had the courage to invite three outsiders in, give them complete access to sensitive national security files and administration personnel, and deal with the consequences. This act clearly demonstrates the strength and resilience of American democracy with its inherent capacity for constructive self-analysis and self-criticism. To make the NSC system work, it must be used. One of the mistakes made in the Iran Initiative was to ignore the process. Process is no substitute for substance. However, steady and consistent governance has a better opportunity of success if there is an orderly process for decision-making. The president is the ultimate decision-maker in national security. No one can or should pretend otherwise. We could not long endure exercise of executive power by committee. A strong executive with the flexibility to conduct foreign and diplomatic affairs is an essential feature of our form of government. Those who serve as presidential advisers on national security issues. Very much, John. I share John's evaluation of the work that we've done together. I have total respect for both of my colleagues. And I emphasize that this is a unanimous report. And I think it was clear from the beginning that it would be. I would also like to emphasize that the president, after all, appointed us to conduct the study. We wouldn't be here discussing the report, except for that fact. We were given two extensions of time to conclude our work. We were given the kind of access to departments and agencies of the government which he promised us. I will address my remarks, as John has said, to part four of the report, which is entitled What Was Wrong. I commend it to those who would like a summary of our findings. It goes to our mandate to draw conclusions about the NSC system, and it forms the basis of our recommendations. So part four and part three taken together are the meat of what it is that we present. Now, the following are among the conclusions you will find in this section. Item, the Iran initiative was handled almost casually and through informal channels, always apparently with an expectation that the process would end with the next arms for hostages exchange. And of course, it did not. It was subjected neither to the general procedures for interagency consideration and review of policy, nor the procedures for COVID operations. Item, the opportunity for a full hearing before the president was inadequate. Item, interagency consideration of the initiative was limited to the cabinet level and inadequate at that. It was never examined at the staff level where expertise on the situation in Iran, the difficulties of dealing with terrorists, and the mechanisms of conducting diplomatic openings may have made a difference. Item, intelligence analysis could also have provided an independent evaluation of the Israeli proposals. A simple fact about substance. As for our staff who work days, nights, weekends, and holidays, they bring honor to the term staff or bureaucrat, as the case may be. The country owes them a major debt of gratitude. As Senator Tower said, we studied with care the operation of the NSC system over the 40 years of its existence. As far as we know, we're the first such official study to have focused exclusively on this institution. People tend to forget what the National Security Council system is all about. The NSC system, the council itself, the NSC staff, and the National Security Advisor is the president's creature. The president is accountable to the American people for its successes and its failures. It is not just another agency of the executive branch. It is not intended to be subject to the reach of Congress. It is the president's own instrument. It is through this system that he brings his creative impulses in national security to bear on the permanent government, the departments, and agencies. It is one of the few structures in government that is unequivocably his. The National Security Act recognized this by giving the president wide latitude to fashion it to his liking. Each president has done so with the result that over the years there have been many different operational styles, many different organizational modes for the NSC staff and the National Security Advisor. Given its role, there is no ideal structure for the system. It should be sufficiently flexible to be adaptable to the management style and operating philosophy of any president. But there are certain functions which, in some manner, must be performed to provide every president with the tools he requires to do his job. The National Security Council exists for only one purpose, to advise the president in his awesome task of directing the national security policy of the country. It does not make decisions. The agency heads who participate in its deliberations are there not simply to represent their department views. They are there as individual advisors to offer their best judgment to the president. As a manager of this system, the National Security Advisor must ensure, at a minimum, that matters which come before the NSC cover the full range of issues on which a review is required, that a full range of options is considered together with their opportunities and their risks, that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to all the participants, especially the president, and that presidential decisions are fully understood and are implemented in the manner in which the president intended. But the national security all highly competent and experienced in policymaking. It should be able neither to accept in the rarest of circumstances. Even then, that should be done only at the express direction of the we have described in the report a very general model of an NSC system to serve any president. We do not believe any amendment in the provisions of the National Security Act deal. However, this is the president's problem, not that of the Congress. And confirmation would introduce a number of new difficulties which we believe would be damaging. Another is a ban on an operational role for the NSC staff. We are opposed to the staff having such a role. Rather than a legislative prescription, however, we believe that if the objective should be to give him tools which will help and not inhibit the performance of his tasks. Unless the system is flexible enough to serve any president's needs, it will either become an obstacle and a source of frustration to the president or an institutional irrelevance as he fashions an informal structure more to his liking. We believe the recommendations we've outlined provide for a system which can be operated so as to minimize the likelihood of major error in national security policy without destroying the creative impulses of the president. Gentlemen, did the president take responsibility? Are you saying the president made mistakes? Yes, the president made mistakes. I think that's very plain English. The president did make mistakes. A lot of his subordinates made mistakes. I might note that every president has made mistakes from time to time. Some of far greater consequence, strategic opening. Senator, Senator Tower, and I'd like to ask all three of you to answer this, if you will, because you've all had long experience dealing with presidents. If you could put this in comparison to other presidents, you've all had the type of management style of delegating authority. And that style to work means that the president must be surrounded by experts who will act responsibly. At the same time, the president must from time to time monitor the actions of those to whom he delegates authority. Now there are other presidents that have had different styles. Some have gotten heavily involved in the details of operations to the point where they fail to see the big picture. They lose vision and concept, I think, for activity that was going absolutely contrary to the public policy of the United States that was set by the president himself. Can I ask a question? Both of the other gentlemen dance about it. It should be permitted to. Yes, I think the key to this is what the consequences of his pursuing this policy was. Let Senator Muskie comment. Paul, I have a question for each of us. He asked for a whole panel to comment. Well, let me put it this way. The policy was a wrong policy. And it was the president's policy. And there's no question about what he felt deeply about that policy and about its purpose in him. And he reacted strongly. It's clear that he was driven by that compassion for the hostages from beginning to end. So there was this coincidence of presidential interests, which it is appropriate for the president to take. But given his heavy personal and emotional commitment to both objectives, it was then incumbent upon his staff to. Could you point out one more, there have been reports that John Regan had involved in a cover-up. A cover-up. Could you address that, please? Go ahead, Suzanne. What about Regan? Just clarify that report, sir. Whether Mr. Regan was involved in bringing together a false chronology.