 Mae'r dŵr wedi eu bod ydych chi'n mu'r dŵr eithaf. Mae'r dŵr wedi'u gwneud lle gan ein bod yn ysgrifft ddweud. Mae'r dŵr, mae'n fferddol gyda'r dŵr a'r dŵr yn cael ei dgylchain o casu am ei hynny. Mae'n hanes i'r ddyddio'n lle'r dŵr o'r dŵr i ddych mulio. Fy enw i'r byd i gynnig o'r lleidol adrwyddiad. Mae'n mynd i'r byd fymgu yn gwneud yn fydigol. Yn y gallwch chi'n gweld, mae'n ddau y cyffredin honno a'r byd yn cael ei gweithio yn y cyffredin, mae hynny'n gweithio chi yn y sefydliad. Mae hynny'n gweithio i'r byd ac mae hynny'n gweithio i'r byd? Mae'n gweithio i'r byd sy'n gweithio i'r byd? Yn y gweithio, mae'n gweithio i'r byd. ac yn ddesod o'r hynny yn cael yr hyn yn ymlaen nhw. Yn cael rhan o'r rydym. Yn cael rhan o'r rydym o'r rydym, yr rhan o'r hynny o'r cyfwyrdau a'r cyfrifol. Rhaid i'r rhan o'r rhywbeth yn gwybod. Rwy'n cael rhan o'r rhywbeth yn gwybod, ac rydw i'n rhan o'r rhywbeth yn gwybod rhan o'r rhan o'r rywbeth'n gwybod. Ac ydych yn gwybod â'r rhywbeth, ac yw'r hynny yn gwybod â'r amser, ..ifrwys gallu'r amser yn ychynig o'r byd o'r hyn o'r gwahol... ..yna'r ystod, ce'n mynd i'ch ffordd? Ymgyrchol. Ymgyrchol. Mae'n gweithio'r hynny yn ddweud o'r hynny... ..yna'r hynny'n ddweud... ..yna'r hynny'n ddweud o'r hynny'n ddweud o'r hynny. Felly, ymgyrchol o'r hynny... ..yna'r hynny'n ddweud o'r hynny'n ddweud o'r hynny... ..yna'r hynny yw o o'r hynny. Felly, ac yn ystod y bydd ymgyrchol... ..yna'r hynny'n dduod ar ddweud. Felly, mae gweithio'r hynny... ..yna yw wasllol, bwynau mynd i'ch gwestiynau... ..yna'r hynny'n ddweud o'r hynny yw ffordd? Ym mwneud o hynny... ..yna'r hynny'n ddweud o'r hynny... ..yna e'ch mwyn i ddweud o'r hynny.... ..yna ychydig, ddweudr dysgu, debyd? Mae'n gweithio'n ei ddweud yn iawn, felly mae'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio i'w gwylliant i ddweud yn ddemol yma. Mae'n ddweud yn ddweud yn ddweud hynny i ddweud. Mae'n gweithio'n gweithio, ac mae hi'n ddweud yn ddweud yn Ithgeddorffadau, yn arosotl. Farweid e'n gyfèurd i Ffiledd oed yn h Bastodig i'r hunain, mae'n gweithio'n gweithio e'n gweithio'n ddweud. Mae'n meddyliad. Mae'n meddyliad, ond mae'n meddyliad i'r rhan oherwydd mae'r cynhyrchu unig. Mae'n meddyliad i'r meddylfyddiad a'r epistemoligiaethau. Wrth gwrs mae'n meddylfyddiad, ac mae'n meddylfyddiad i'r meddylfyddiad. Rwyf wedi cefnodd iawn i chi, mae'n meddylfyddiad o'r epistemoligiaeth? Mae'n meddylfyddiad. A'r meddylfyddiad? Rydyn ni'n meddylu? Therefore, on loving whatever it is. Is his Majesty a governments mechanism just about completing it? Something that can't be front of nowhere? Do I know? No. That's actually not the case. Metaphysics is to do with truth rather than knowledge. It would be... What's virtual ethics? A realist theory. There can be people who speak French, can write, write or weaving. Do you remember we discussed that? We also looked at if that was so, how would we know whether it was right or wrong? Because, of course, an action could be right and wrong oben in itself demonstrates it is, however we know that it is or wrong if that is. Then finally we looked at the charge that vector ethics lacks a decision procedure. What do I mean by that? Can anyone tell me? Mae'r ffordd gyda'na. Mae'n hyd yn gweud? Mae'n hyd yn mynd. Efallai mae'n gweld amser, rydym fod yn ei wneud bod rheswm ddechrau ar gyfer, Rydym fod, gyda dynnu hefyd, mae'n gweud iddyn nhw, ddim o'r teimlo eich gweithio i chi, roedd iawn gyda'n Chathaf. Mae'n gweithio eich gweithio i chi. Mae'nae arasl defnyddol ar tref, eich gweithio gyda arno. Rydym yn gynrydd os yw'r nhw. Ymwyaf ar y cell y mae'r byd wrthoes? Roedd ymweliadau ei wneud i ar等等i ei hyn o'r amser. O'r rhai oedd o'r byd ddif shiningol. Felly, mae rydw i'w gwirioneddol efallai wedi gwneud, sy'n mynd i'r byd rydw i'r byd. A fra oedd ymweliadau ei wneud o'r amser? A fra oedd o'r byd i'w gwirioneddol efallai. A是我 lofiad. Felly, efallai efallai efallai efallai efallai bod ymweliadau gyda'r gŵr yn ychydig sydd... gyda'r gŵr yw'r gŵr yn yw'r gŵr yn ymddangos, gan oedd y ddyn nhw'n gwybod, mae'n gweithio. Rwyf ddweud hynny. Cynnyddu'n cael ei fod yn ei wneud y ddweud, eich ddweud gydag yw... ...'r olygu. Rwyf yn ymgyrch gyda'r newid ymddangos. Mae'r newid ymgyrch gyda'r newid ymgyrch gyda'r newid ymgyrch gyda'r newid. Again, it's a type of moral theory, although it's traceable to the views of David Hume, there are many modern-day non-cognitivists and David Hume certainly wouldn't have called his theory a non-cognitivist theory, although it's non-cognitivist because it's not to do with cognition, as you'll see in a minute, or it displaces cognition from the centre of the theory. OK, we're going to be looking at all these things. I'll let you read those yourself. OK? If you haven't quite read them, don't worry, we will be going through them. OK, Humean ethics is the view that the right action is that towards which a true judge would feel approbation. And the wrong action is that towards which a true judge would feel disapprobation. Does this remind you of anything? Does it remind you of anything? It reminds you of Aristotle. Why? A true judge might be a virtuous person. OK, so you may think that Hume's theory sounds like Aristotle's theory because if feeling approbation is the same as knowing what's right and true judges are identical to virtuous persons, then it looks pretty identical, doesn't it? It also looks pretty useless, just looked at on the surface like that, a bit like Aristotle's did last week. But actually feeling approbation, as you'll see, is rather different from knowing what is right and true judges are not the same as virtuous people. We can talk later about whether you think they are. OK, there are many modern forms of Humean ethics. They are grouped under the title non-cognitivism, but here are a few more titles. All of these are non-cognitivist theories of ethics. And if you want to look them up and see what's different about them, there's a reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is a fantastic resource for anyone who is interested in philosophy. It's completely free and really very good. OK, well, Hume's ethics was built on his philosophy of mind, which is actually quite a good start because if ethics is centrally to do with action and action is centrally to do with what? Do you remember what's the difference between my tripping over a carpet and my pretending to trip over a carpet? Intention. And what is it that a behaviour has to have if it's going to be morally evaluable? No, not necessarily good intentions. We discuss that next week when we discuss Hume. But it's got to be an action, hasn't it? It's got to be intentional under some description or other. And so immediately mental states are involved, aren't they? So that a theory of ethics should come from a theory of mind is not at all odd. You would expect a theory of ethics to have some sort of theory of mind attached to it somewhere. OK, but it was built on his philosophy of mind and in his particular, his accounts of the nature of mental states and in particular to he called reason and passion. But we might think of as desire and belief and there's reason why we might not think of it as that, but that gives you a good grip on it as you'll see. Hume was arguably the first philosopher of mind. He was arguably indeed the first psychologist. He was the first person to study the mind systematically and to ask things like, well, how do we classify mental states? What is it that makes a mental state a mental state of this type rather than that type or that type rather than this type? So he was engaged in classification, which as you know is something that scientists do. Arguably he was the first psychologist. But let's have a close look at reason and passion. Well, OK, to understand Hume's view at all, never mind properly, we need to get started. We need to understand all these things. OK, so let's start with the difference between reason and passion. OK, first we've got to understand the idea, the difference between ideas and impressions. Hume believed that all mental states fell into one or other of these categories, either they're an idea or they're an impression. And ideas are cognitive states. They represent the world, they admit truth or falsehood and they enter into rational relations. Actually, I'm going to go back because I've gone into passion and reason, whereas I meant to stick with ideas and impressions. OK, here you are, ideas and impressions. I don't want you to think of elephants. OK, you're not thinking of elephants, are you? Actually you are, all of you are thinking of elephants. But what you'll notice is that there isn't an elephant in this room. Is there? No, OK. No, there's not even a hidden elephant, I promise you. OK, now what you're doing is you're exercising your concept of elephant. OK, I want you now to look at this glass. OK, you're now, you are experiencing a percept, a perception, an impression, if you like, of this glass. OK, but if you all close your eyes, you can no longer see the glass, you might be able to hear it, et cetera, but you can no longer see it, so you're not receiving a visual impression of the glass, but you could still exercise your concept of the glass. Could you imagine this glass being yellow? OK, so now you're splitting apart your concept of this glass and transparency and you're putting together your concept of this glass and is yellow. Do you see what I mean? So the fact that human beings can entertain concepts or ideas, what human calls ideas, is a very important thing because without the ability to think about things that weren't, that aren't perceptually present, we couldn't form goals, we couldn't form plans by which to achieve goals, et cetera. So our ability to conceptualise the world and to think about things that aren't perceptually present is very important and that's the difference between an idea and impression. So an impression, there's going to be something perceptually present to you, an idea, it needn't be perceptually present to entertain your concept of that thing. Ideas are cognitive states. They represent the world, they admit truth and falsehood and they enter into rational relations. Beliefs are the most obvious example of ideas. I mean, belief, let's think of the belief that the cat's on the mat. So you all believe the cat is on the mat. Notice your belief represents the world as being a certain way, doesn't it? Okay, it represents the world as such that there is a cat and that cat is on the mat. So there is a cat, there is a mat and the cat is on the mat. So a belief is a representational state and it admits truth and falsehood. So if the world is the way your belief represents it as being your belief is true and if the world isn't the way your belief represents it as being then your belief is false. And it enters into rational relations in the sense that if the cat's on the mat and the cat's been fed, this is a bad idea or something, sorry, I'm clear. You don't know my cat, my ex-cat. But let me think of another one. Okay, if p then q, p therefore q. Do you see there's a set of rational relations here? You can take two beliefs and from them together they entail a third belief. So if you believe if the cat's on the mat and if the cat's on the mat, then it's wanting supper, then what do we know? The cat wants supper exactly. So two beliefs together entail a third or beliefs can be inconsistent with each other. They can't all be true together so the cat can't both be on the mat and not on the mat, for example. And if you believe that, well that's funny, I thought the cat was on the mat and now I look and where's the cat gone? You've got an inconsistency, you've got evidence for falsehood. It can't be the case that both of these beliefs are true. Therefore, if you seem to believe them both, you've got to drop one of those beliefs. So beliefs essentially by virtue of their content, their representational content, they enter into rational relations. Every belief is embedded in a logical space of other beliefs. Okay, so any belief you, I mean just think about it for yourself. Any belief you have now will be justified by certain other beliefs and it will itself justify other beliefs. Do you see what I mean? So that's what it is for a belief to be embedded in logical space and it's what it is for it to enter into rational relations. Lots of different types of rational relations but we've talked about a few. Okay, so Humes calls ideas reason because in virtue of their representational content they are embedded in this web of rational relations with each other. Any questions about that before we move on? Well that's actually, we're not really talking about beliefs in God. Well actually, well why not? We can say God, that belief is actually better expressed in the way I'm talking is God exists. So you represent the, if you believe that God exists, you represent the world as including in it, God. Okay, if you don't believe God exists then you represent the world as being empty of God. Your belief will be true if God exists and false otherwise and if God exists and God is omniscient then God knows what you're going to have for breakfast tomorrow. So from your belief God exists and God is omniscient you can derive the claim God knows what I'm going to have, God knows what I'm going to have breakfast tomorrow. I didn't see that one coming but I rather liked it when it came. Do you see what I mean? Okay, so the reason I rather objected to belief in God is people, if you say you're a believer meaning that you believe in God that's a rather different thing from saying that actually everyone in this room is a believer in the sense that everyone in this room is rational and has beliefs. So belief in God tends to be a belief apart from others in that way. Impressions on the other hand are states like sensations, desires, emotions. There's something that feels like to experience such a state. So there's something it's like to see an elephant for example. There's something it's like to be tickled. There's something it's like to be about to sneeze etc. Now these are not representational states are they? Your feeling that you're about to sneeze doesn't represent the world in any way at all does it? We've got to be a bit careful here because lots of people think of desires as rather belief like. If you want a glass of water you should think of yourself rather as wanting to make the belief there is a glass of water or I can drink a glass of water or something like that true. You want to make that belief true. You have a pro attitude towards the belief there is a glass of water in front of me or I have water I can drink or something along those lines but you see there's something it's like to want a glass of water. But your desire for a glass of water isn't true or false is it? There would be a grammatical error if you said my desire for a glass of water is true whereas my belief there's a glass of water in front of me admits of truth or falsehood but you can't say my desire for a glass of water is true because either it exists or it doesn't exist but it isn't true or false in the way that okay you're all looking puzzled now okay so let's I have a belief there's a glass in front of me and so do you okay you believe that I believe there's a glass of water in front of me so you've got a second order belief but I've got a first order belief um now I've got okay okay the glass my belief is either true or false isn't it? We all think it's true but if if any of you about to wake up any minute and find that you've got to go to that lecture again this afternoon you'll discover that it wasn't true you just thought it was true but you see how that's true or false now if I want there so there isn't usually if I want there to be a glass of water in front of me it's because there isn't a glass of water in front of me it's because I don't believe there is a glass of water in front of me but say I now want a glass of water that want that desire isn't true or false is it? It's not the sort of thing that can be true or false a desire do you see okay yes I can see you getting that a bit so it's not sorry say that again. Is he saying that's a degree or is it a definite distinction? There's a definite distinction because a belief um if you think I can't say of that chair that is loud can I? No. If I said that chair is loud um I'd be you I'd be demonstrating the fact that either I didn't understand what I meant about the chair or about loudness because chairs are just not the sort of thing that can be loud are they? Are you with me? This would be what what grandma people in grandma call a selection mistake uh in the same way I can say of a belief that it's true but I can't say of a desire that it's true. Are you with me? I might say a desire is fulfilled um but I can't say it's true so if if I want a glass of water and then I get one my my desire for a glass of water has been fulfilled but it's still not true because desires are not the sort of thing that can be true. Can you say the fact that you you have a desire for a glass of water is true? Ah yes. A desire might not be true but the fact that you have that it's not the fact it's it's that no that's very good and actually it's quite useful um Marianne wants a glass of water or wants a glass of water remind me of your name Chris believes Marianne wants a glass of water um that admits of truth or falsehood doesn't it it's the content of your belief do you see what I mean but my wanting a glass of water is not the sort of thing that's true or false your belief that I want a glass of water could be true or false my belief that I want a glass of water can be true or false but my wanting a glass of water can't be true or false you with me I can see you all with me now good this nothing I like better than see understanding on people's faces that's lovely okay um so um they're not representational but a desire is a pro attitude towards making a belief true so a pro attitude towards having a glass of water in front of me or having a drink of water or something like that and pro attitudes you you've all had them you have pro attitudes will creed and cream cakes you wish it to stop raining you know you've got pro attitude to the sun coming out ha ha um and and so on so forth we all know what and sometimes your pro attitudes are really quite strong aren't they you really want a cream cake or a cigarette or whatever and other times they're they're fellow you will go to church because your mum wants you to but you know so you have a pro attitude to going to church but it it's not a particularly strong one you you drop it like a flash of your if your mum dropped it too um okay so they're not represental representational they're neither true nor false and they don't enter into rational relations and they can't properly therefore be called reasonable or unreasonable so whereas a belief can be called reasonable or unreasonable to the extent that it's justified by other beliefs um a desire can't be you either have a desire or you don't and whether it's reasonable or not is is just neither here nor there let me explain this to you in a certain way let's let's say you have a child who doesn't want to go to university and you really want them to go to university okay it's your ambition that they should go to university but it isn't their ambition um how are you going to try and persuade them okay now you want to reason them into a desire don't you okay and i've just said that desires can't be reasonable or unreasonable so how do you go about reasoning somebody into a desire okay so you're in this situation how would you try and persuade your your child let's make her a girl how would you try and persuade your daughter to go to university okay so what are you what is that what everyone would do yes okay more i mean there might be different lures but um it'll all be like that okay what are you trying to do here no no that's not what you're doing um no you don't want her to need to go to university that that would be sad uh no that's not it anyway and gendring another desire uh cash that out a little bit you're providing a path to a desire they already have good okay what you've got to find in order to argue someone into a desire is to find a desire they already have and then show them that they can't satisfy that desire unless they um form a desire now if let's say that you've really hit on something that she really does want what she wants to earn lots of money okay she really does want to earn lots of money and you've just told her that there's a necessary condition of going to to university i have to tell you this isn't true i'd just like to point that out that is but yes okay this is fine then okay where were we um okay so she's got a desire to earn lots of money and you're telling her it's a necessary condition of earning lots of money that you go to university and if she poor thing believes you um she she could do one of two things what might she do so she comes to believe that going to university is a necessary condition of earning lots of money uh which belief the belief that she didn't want to go to university well that wouldn't be changing her belief it would be changing her desire wouldn't it she she could come to think oh well if it really is the case and dad tells me so it must be and we all know that that's what children think all the time um must be the case it's true because my dad told me that um therefore i must want you know goodness i must go to university i want to go to university she'll start to want to go to university or um will it be her belief she changes what might she do she might just lose her desire to to make a lot of money she might think oh well if that's true you know i'd rather go um um be a philosopher instead or something like that although it is actually necessary to go to university for that do you see what i mean if if you in order to you we think about arguing people into desires but what we do is we provide them with a belief that desiring one thing or achieving one thing is a necessary condition for achieving something we know they already want and we hope thereby to cause them not reason to cause them to want this other thing but we might become a cropper if they decide actually to drop the first desire rather than adopt the one you want them to adopt do you see what i mean you actually if somebody really does not want something there's nothing you can do to argue them into wanting it because wanting isn't a isn't a rational process you either want something or you don't if she doesn't want to go to university she really doesn't want to go to university then nothing you can say is going to persuade her because it's a desire is not that sort of thing you with me okay so Hume says it's not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my little finger okay do you see what he means if he if that's really what he prefers then there's nothing irrational about it because desiring isn't either rational or irrational it's non-rational are you with me so irrationality is a failure in the house of reason so you can't be irrational unless you're rational and if desires can't be rational they can't be irrational either desires are non-rational okay they fall in between right okay so now do we understand the difference between reason and passion any any questions do we asked about that so reasons are representational states they represent the world in being as being a certain way they admit of both truth and falsehood and they're embedded in a logical space of reasons logical because they're rational relations that pull them together okay so physical space is constructed of physical relations like on top of in between next to and so on a logical space is constructed of rational relations like entails is consistent follows from etc okay and passions or desires as i've been calling rather i mean there are lots of philosophers who would be a bit fed up with me calling passion desire but but it i think it makes it easier to understand desires are not embedded in reasons they're neither rational nor irrational they don't admit truth or falsehood and they're not representational so two totally different types of mental state so this this is remember this is Hume classifying mental states into types so beliefs are one type of mental state and desires are another type of mental state reasons are one type of mental state passions are a different type of mental state and Hume okay we need to know how this fits in to Hume's claims about morality well Hume believes that there are only two types of reasoning as demonstrative reasoning and probabilistic reasoning so when we're engaging in in reasoning when we're trying to derive some beliefs from other beliefs these are the two types of reasoning that we engage in these to exhaust the types of reasoning available so demonstrative reasoning informs of the relations between various ideas so okay uh well i've given you the answer here but can squares be circle circular i should say how do we know this yes okay which we entertain our concept of square and by that i mean we all know we all know remember a cognitive state what it is for something or what it would be for something to be square okay and then we entertain our concept of circle and our knowledge of what it would be for something to be circular and entertaining those two pieces of knowledge we see that actually these two things are contradictory you cannot have something that is both square and circular okay you you we know this don't we we only have to look at look at our concepts to know that um and also um yes i'm no longer sure of these two i'm going to go over those two right um anyway i hope you see what i mean about demonstrative reasoning um if you get if you see that this belief and this belief can't both be true without this belief being true that's demonstrative reasoning deductive reasoning okay um probabilistic reasoning um takes us from one experience to something an expectation if you like about future experience so it's it's informs us about causes and effects so if in your experience doing a has always been followed by the advent of b then doing a you will expect it once again to be followed by b the advent of b okay so so your your either thinking probabilistically or inductively so you're you're going from your past experience to make predictions about your future experience or you're looking at the relations the deductive relations between your ideas okay so only two types of reasoning um but in the absence of a desire for something anything neither of these types of reasoning is going to prompt any sort of action at all isn't is it so so if i engage in deductive reasoning i think okay uh goodness i want a cup of coffee um the best way of getting a cup of coffee from here um um well is to wait for an hour and then go into the common room okay um or i could nip down to the shop just down the road and get one but that will be leaving you okay i want i do want a cup of coffee but i also want to give the rest of this lecture etc um so my reasoning about how i would get a cup of coffee isn't going to move me anywhere unless that wants for a cup of coffee becomes so strong i'm prepared to just leave you lot here and and go off and get one um and in exactly the same way i i can reason as much i like about cause and effect saying doing this will will achieve that um but until i want that the reasoning isn't going to take me anywhere is it and what he was saying is that reason is non motivating we we only act if we have a desire for some end and he claims that reason is the slave of the passions it's the passions that move us around the world all reason does is tell us how to achieve our how to fulfill our desires how to get what we want um so reason is the slave of the passions because all reason does is inform us how to achieve our ends with me you agree you all agree do you good okay that means i'm going to enjoy next week right on the human's account of reason and passion um they play different roles in our psychology um so not only our beliefs and desires reasons and passions distinguished in the ways we've already looked at they also have different functions in our psychology they they play different roles in the production of our behavior um so whereas reason um well if you think of uh desire as lighting the blue touch paper those of you are old enough to know about blue touch papers um that's what desire does and belief is the guidance mechanism it guides the missiles which is where the analogy with fireworks falls down i suppose okay so reason informs us of matters of fact and relations between ideas but passion is what motivates us we don't do anything until we have a desire i'm sorry what's your name peter has just given me another counter example but here's one okay some people say well when i gave up smoking it's not that i wanted to give up smoking my goodness i wanted to carry on smoking i really liked smoking but my reason told me to give it up okay do you see how that's structurally exactly the same counter example as peter's so what peter is saying is is that it was his reason that caused him to send the money electronically if i ask you says no you wouldn't have the same sense of duty would you um yes but surely the reason was they you want to be healthy that's i mean that's you know you desire to be healthy don't you and that's why okay tell you give up smoking erica is absolutely right what what she's suggesting is it's not reason that tells you to give up smoking it's your desire for something that's inconsistent with smoking that your reason tells you is inconsistent with continuing smoking which is you you desire health so you desire that cigarette er or that cream cake or you know choose your own personal um desire but you also desire health fitness slimness whatever um so you've got two desires and reason is is telling you well you can't have both you've got to make this or this decision if you do this you won't achieve this if you do this you won't achieve that and then you've got a second order desire which one do i want most out of health and smoking does that answer your question yeah yeah and it's exactly the same here so so hum would claim that this isn't a counter example what he does do though is he distinguishes between the calm passions and the violent passions um so desires for things such as life health etc are calm whereas desires for things like cream cake and smoking are violent and i think we can see his difference can't we um you know you don't you don't really think of yourself as wanting health it doesn't come into your mind as a desire you have whereas the desire for a cream cake or a chocolate biscuit or whatever whatever really presents itself to you as a desire doesn't it but but we might says hum mistake the calm passions for for um reason because because they're calm there's it's less obvious that there's something it's like to have them um so you may not notice them and just think of yourself as reasoning sure are they are the violent passions stronger than the calm ones there's there's more obviously something it's like to have them if we take smoking as an example i mean most young people nowadays are bound to know that smoking is not good for them yet a lot of them smoke well it doesn't stop them wanting a cigarette um i mean if you're a smoker um i i get the impression that that you can know okay knowledge is the cognitive state so you you there's no doubt whatsoever that you believe smoking is bad for you but it doesn't stop you wanting a cigarette um and that that's the characteristic of a violent passion but of course you want health as well um so here you've got two desires coming into conflict um but there's nothing your reason can do to to adjudicate there um because it depends how strong your desires are as to which one is going to get acted on i'm actually proposing that that calm desires are always to ask things that are good for you and violent are bad for you um not necessarily go on go on can you think of one that isn't and the calm passions they tend to be things that are that are part of the structure of life if i'm jolly hungry cream cakes could be quite good for me that's true yeah yep no that's absolutely fine i mean i'm not going to answer this question because actually you can answer these questions yourselves if you've understood the difference between calm and violent passion if you see what i mean when um or see what human means when he says calm passions can be mistaken for reason whereas violent passions can't be then you can work out yourself whether of a given passion but i mean the desire for life could become extremely violent i should imagine under certain circumstances um the desire for life could it could become absolutely overtaking if if you've got a car coming towards you fast um the desire for life seems a slightly subjective distinction it's a totally subjective distinction because it's it's a distinction between how states of desire seem to a subject i mean there's nothing wrong there are objective facts about subjective states of fair don't don't think oh subjective you know we'll dismiss that it's nothing but subjective you are a subject and you have states that are um that only you as the subject of these states are sorry they are only accessible to you there's nothing wrong with that okay objective is good but there are objective facts about subjective states of affairs okay um so Hume thinks it's easy to mistake calm passions for reasons uh because experiencing them isn't so obviously experiencing a qualitative state having an experience of some kind okay but what's all this got to do with morality that's what means so so far we've been doing philosophy of mind we've been looking at reasons and passions we've been looking at how their how a mental state is classified as a reason or as a passion and we've seen that it's going to have lots of different properties which will put it in one category or another and it's going to play a different role in the production of behaviour which also puts it in a different category or other okay but what's all this got to do with ethics which is what we're here for after all okay well morality is essentially active isn't it uh moral beliefs motivate us essentially it's of the essence of a moral belief to motivate us so do you think that you can believe that doing a is wrong without thereby believing that you shouldn't do a now i'm not saying without thereby believe by thereby not doing a okay all of us have had the experience of doing something we believe we shouldn't have done or not doing something we believe we should have done but then your belief that you shouldn't have done it's going to be manifested in guilt isn't it so to believe that doing a is wrong is to be motivated motivated not to do a isn't it it's to have a reason not to do a isn't that right okay it's to want not to do a even if you don't actually act on that want so so motivation action is absolutely central to morality if your ethics doesn't engage with your behaviour what are we all going to think so you tell me you believe lying's wrong but i catch you lying every five minutes what am i going to think when you say say one thing and do another what do i believe well yes i believe that you're not trust me but but um i forgot what i was going to say actually but you always believe what people do don't they not what they say it's what they do that matters and that's because morality essentially engages with your action and if it doesn't engage with your action then you may be paying lip service to it but it isn't your moral beliefs okay so morality in action go together like that okay i think i've said that okay so to believe lying is wrong is to believe we shouldn't lie that belief we shouldn't lie is intrinsically motivating you can't have that belief without being motivated and this move from is to ought the shouldn't there is is the ought indicates a move from fact to value okay and values are essentially motivating and i'm not saying that there are no facts about values which is something hum might have said but um we can we don't have to address that here um so if beliefs are causally inert okay and what hum takes himself to shown is that beliefs are not implicated in the production of your action or at least they're not they're not implicated as motivators of your action so you can have all these beliefs and not be motivated at all okay so beliefs are causally inert then moral judgments lying is wrong etc can't express beliefs okay so what what's he mean by this okay consider the statement lying is wrong now that looks like an expression of belief doesn't it if if you say lying is wrong then i would usually understand you as expressing a belief a belief about the world in particular a belief about a certain type of action so what you're doing is you're picking out a certain class of actions the class of liings and you're saying these actions are wrong okay so it looks as if you're um there's a representation of the world isn't there there's a representation of the world as a containing the actions of a certain type you call them liings and you're attributing a property to these actions you're saying these actions are all wrong okay but if keeping promises is right again you're picking out a certain type of action and you're saying of actions of that type that they're right again you're attributing a property to a thing so what we surely have a straightforward subject predicate sentence here just as you're saying of the cat that it's on the mat you're saying of a lie that it's wrong so just as being on the mat is a property of the cat so being wrong is a property of lying isn't it i mean surely saying lying is wrong is a belief and what's more um it could be true or false i mean lying is wrong um we probably would all say that that's true at least as a general claim we may want to start quarreling we've seen at the edges and so on and so forth but on the whole you've all brought your children up haven't you to believe that lying is wrong is true so how can this not be a belief it's a representational state it admits of truth and falsehood uh and it's embedded in a logical web of other beliefs what why do you think lying is wrong can you explain to me is it is it just do you have no reason for thinking that lying's wrong ground to a halt yep if everyone lied communication would be impossible yep okay so the perfectly good reason so um if you believe that then you will believe lying is wrong so it's embedded in a logical space as well surely lying is wrong has got all the characteristics of a belief doesn't it you could do um but it's still got the characteristics of a belief hasn't it yeah let out um no um it still looks like a belief and and that's what hum is pointing out we all think that that uh when we express sorry things like lying is wrong we are expressing beliefs but there's a big problem if beliefs are not motivating then that can't be a moral statement it can't be a moral judgment so lying is wrong says you may look like a belief it may seem to admit of truth or falsehood it may appear to be embedded in a web of reasons but as it motivates us and essentially motivates us it must be a desire did you see what i mean when we look or or i think this is where i think passion would have been a better word we look at a lying and we think basically yuck okay or boo um we feel disapprobation when we think about lying that's the core of our moral um sensibility if you like it's not that you see that an action has a property it's rather that the action strikes you in a certain way and that subjective feeling you have of of disliking the action is the core of what morality is about so some have called hum's theory an error theory because it claims that our belief that moral judgments our beliefs is simply false it is an error um morality is not to do with cognition it's not to do with reason it's to do with passion it's to do with our feelings it's to do with um the way things in the world strike us not we're not just looking at an action saying it's got the property of being wrong we're looking at an action and it's causing in us a feeling and that's what makes us think it's wrong not so that it's got a mind independent property of wrongness the thing that's missing seems to be the statement is that we shouldn't do what is wrong i mean lying is wrong in that sense it's just a statement but the the quarry of that is you feel somehow you shouldn't do what is wrong um well that that's was being used by me to show why the the apparent belief lying is wrong is intrinsically motivated but you can't believe lying is wrong can you without believing you shouldn't lie well you could believe that lying is perfectly acceptable presumably no no but we're not talking about that if you believe lying is wrong you will believe you shouldn't lie that's what makes lie the the apparent belief lying is wrong intrinsically motivating but if it is intrinsically motivating says Hume it isn't a belief at all it's it's a passion see what i mean so so very interesting here because Hume's really under undermining our sort of knee jerk thoughts about morality in quite a big way so he thinks that if we think the statement lying is wrong is a description of the world an objective if you like description of the world then we're wrongly projecting our own feelings onto the world actually when we see an action is wrong it's because it strikes us in our feelings and passions in a certain way it's not because the action has a property that would exist independently of us now if we accept Hume's account of mind um and the resulting account of moral judgment um then we've got a problem if we also liked Aristotle and i know that a lot of you liked Aristotle last week so now you've got a problem according to Aristotle when we act morally when we act not only for reasons but for the right reason and if Hume is right reason doesn't come into it does it it's how we feel it's it's um our passions so according to Hume it's not our reason that prompts us to act morally it's our passion um okay well let's let's talk about this for a while so do you do you agree with Hume that moral motivation requires a passion or are you more with Aristotle in that morality requires passion to be overcome by reason what do you think right Eric is Aristotle you're Hume okay well let's have a let's have a quick Hume okay Aristotle oh okay we almost even leave divide but it's possibly Aristotle's got it okay well tell me tell me why you're with Hume Peter well i think because he includes passion which i think Aristotle rather explicitly okay and why do you think passion is important do you think Hume's right about why passion is important i think because you've argued the case that um very well in the sense that actually passion doesn't matter today yeah it was Hume's argument rather than mine sorry yeah yeah yeah thank you all right uh okay anyone else want to um support Hume why why you with Hume in this Hume seems to be saying that i'm really about it that we confuse is with odds and that we therefore what we say the way the world is you're you're actually saying this is the way the world ought to be and that we confuse that therefore we need a passion to make it the odds yes so to a reason to make it a means yes that's right i mean Hume gives an example of a of a sapling that that rises up to to overtop its parents tree thereby killing it so we see exactly the same relations don't we reason tells us it's exactly the same relation is the relation of um matcha side or patcha side um but we don't feel any sense of disapprobation when we see it happening with the saplings whereas we do feel disapprobation when we see it with human beings the the child killing the parent um so he thinks that it's not the relations in the world it's not the properties in the world that are important it's our responses to these properties that's important it's how we feel about them how they strike us um emotionally um in a way also just as additionally he doesn't mean he doesn't say that you don't need reason you do need reason yes you're absolutely right interpret your motivations but it's motivations which are the it's the passions which are the motivations things in the first you're absolutely right um when he says reason is the slave of the passions he's not actually suggesting that reason isn't involved in the in the production of action it is but it is the guidance mechanism not the the lighting of the blue touch paper that that's the difference so both of them both reason and passion are involved in any action at all um if it's an intentional action anyway um but it's passion plays the role of motivating and as moral judgments are essentially motivating they must be passion rather than reason that's that's the idea you can reprogram your passions ah well let's come on to this now because um there's a big problem for you and that is that it seems to commit us to believing that lying is wrong means little more than I don't like lying or when I see lying I feel disapprobation um do you see what I mean lying strikes me as horrible therefore lying is wrong well that seems to be highly subjective view in a in a sense of subjective which is disapproving um because on the whole we don't want our moral beliefs to be subjective or what we think of as our moral beliefs to be subjective um so if if Hume's right that there's nothing more to lying is wrong than that we don't like lying then surely there's something wrong here with his theory of morality well that's because we actually um okay so there's there's a question so is that what his claim is this is a problem for him or it would be a problem if that's what he's claiming so is this indeed what he's claiming um and to see that it isn't we've got to look at his positive view of morality so far we've looked at his negative view of morality um what he thinks morality isn't now let's look at what he thinks morality is um he secures a sort of objectivity for moral judgments by requiring that before an expression of approval or disapproval or approbation or disapprobation as he puts it uh can be deemed moral it must be made by a certain type of person okay so it's not that every person who um looks at something and says whoa that's wicked um is thereby making a moral judgment or should be understood as making a moral judgment the only person who's approval or disapproval is properly moral according to Hume is a true judge and that's where the true judge comes in do you remember we looked at whether this was like Aristotle's virtuous person okay a true judge is a person who's adopted a stable and general perspective on an issue okay so we need to know what a stable and general perspective is um so how do we become true judges how do we adopt this stable and general perspective on an issue or if we're parents how do we encourage our children to adopt a stable and general perspective on an issue and thereby become the sort of people who whose um moral beliefs or beliefs are truly moral passions are truly moral I should say um to become true judges we've got to move from what Hume calls premoral deliverances of sympathy to truly moral attitudes okay so we've got a distinction between premoral deliverances of sympathy uh to truly moral attitudes okay um when we experience or when we empathize with others when when there's a knee jerk immediate feeling of empathy Hume calls that a premoral expression of sympathy if a child cries because her friend is crying for example she's experiencing such a state so you all know what it's like if one child in the nursery starts crying the next thing you know they're all going to be crying and that suggests that there's a natural sympathy between people if if I were to hit somebody very hard you'd all sort of they'd all be an immediate sort of movement back on sympathy on all your parts because actually we're extremely good aren't we at empathizing with other people on the whole we we do feel each other's pain normal human beings do feel each other's pain in all sorts of ways and it takes quite a lot to to knock that out of someone um to become a true judge we need more than the ability to empathize we do need the ability to empathize that that's essential um but we need a great deal of knowledge about the nature of the world and about the causal relations that obtain in the world and about the things like the good for human beings et cetera so I mean we all sympathize when we take a child to have its in have its vaccinations or something and it cries and when we feel for it don't we but we still do it um we still take it in there and and make it have its injections we still take it to school when it doesn't want to go to school we don't allow our empathy to get in a way of what we see to be right about what we're doing so acquiring this knowledge is a natural process um we learn that if we eat a lot of ice cream we'll get sick um so when our child starts screaming because you've said no to it's having an ice cream but it's already had two so perhaps you're at fault already maybe it's just had one but you don't give it another because you know it's going to get fat you know it's going to get high cholesterol you know it's going to get this you get it's going to get that et cetera et cetera um we learn that if we hurt our friends we're going to lose them um we learn that things are not always as they seem you know that appearance and reality can come apart and so on and in learning all these things um we learn um the better to apply our empathy don't we we learn when it's reasonable to sympathise to sympathise and when it's not or when we should act on our feelings of empathy and when it isn't right to act on our feelings of empathy I keep saying reasonable but I I've got to be a bit careful here um because you see what we're trying to do is is merge or not merge but but um educate our feelings of sympathy educate our feelings of empathy um another thing we learn is that we're just one person amongst many um so something that strikes me immediately as as wrong um may actually not be wrong it may be that from everyone else's perspective it's not wrong so the fact that it strikes me immediately with a sense of disapprobation you know oh he's taken my doll um so I start screaming that this is wrong and not fair and da da da but actually you learn that you're one amongst many others and that teaches you that actually maybe it's not right that you're feeling disapprobation is evidence of injustice for example in this case we also learn that we can be wrong so we become true judges only when we've extended our natural ability to sympathise so we acquire the desire to consider every action from the perspective of all of those who are going to be affected by it okay not not just ourselves not just um those who are close to us we we think of everyone who's going to be affected by the action so anyone who doesn't think like that anyone who considers only themselves or only the the immediate people is someone who hasn't yet learned how to adopt a moral perspective on the world um and we also need to um wait to decide whether we approve or disapprove until we've considered it from every perspective and until we've our viewers stabilise because you all know what it's like I mean let's take us an example the giving of votes to prisoners um well when you first read that I bet most of us had quite a strong intuition one way or another did we and and being sensible people we've all been reading the leaders of our newspapers and we've always listening to the radio and we've listened to John Humphries and everyone else and if you're like me you're still I haven't achieved a stable perspective on this yet I I'm almost everything I read I change my mind uh because it seems to me that there are good arguments on each side so I don't claim as yet to be in a position to make a moral judgment about whether or not prisoners should have the votes do you are you with me so what I'm trying to do is put myself in a position where I can claim to have a moral perspective uh it's when my sympathies are have reached a stable and general perspective when I've I've taken in everything that I think I can take in and my sympathies have stabilised um on one side or the other you with me so do you I mean that is too specific but in that particular case do you ever feel you could get to that position I mean I I'm going to have a particular case I could come to I mean I had my own view on it but it would be a pragmatic decision I I think that yes exactly it wouldn't be a moral decision um I think that's exactly so I I think until what what's human would say oh or non-cognitive would say would be until you've reached the point where you feel that you've reached a stable in general perspective you have to hold back from making that moral judgment you're not yet in a position to make the moral judgment you see this I mean you're in a position to say well there's this and then there's this and if this then I say no and if this then I say yes and did I did I but you're not actually yet in the position to make a moral judgment you might be forced to make a decision um and actually I think many of the decisions that are made I mean the government is forced to make decisions all the time isn't it on a pragmatic basis um and probably often usually always perhaps before it's in a position where it can make a moral judgment and and any actually thinking person is going to see that and and see how difficult it is to get into that position because we all know if we're intellectually honest that it's actually very difficult to get into that situation aren't you in danger of using this as an excuse for never making a decision um well as a philosopher I'm inclined to say making decisions is dangerous but I think that one shouldn't make a decision unless one has reason to make that decision unless one's forced to and quite often one is forced to and in life one is certainly forced to I mean if you're facing a moral dilemma if your mum's saying you know what what do you think you've got about 10 seconds to make up your mind between being kind and being honest but I would argue is actually even though you're not forced into making a decision on whether prisoners have the vote or not it really is quite important to come to some sort of decision on the matter so you know but do you think it's important to come to a decision because for pragmatic reasons a decision has to be made there's no doubt whatsoever about that make a decision you can never influence what happens in in government for instance if everybody says I don't know I completely agree and there are very good pragmatic reasons for making a decision even though you haven't made a decision if you see what I mean I mean that's the situation isn't it you you say you've made a decision even though actually you can see both sides and I mean sometimes we do that to a fault don't we we say we've made a decision when actually we're actually quite a long way from making a decision I'm well maybe you don't ever do that I have been known to be very definite about a position that about three minutes later I think actually so to extend that did you consider that true judges actually exist either for a particular case or or is someone who is a true judge and he's got the gold star or is it hypothetical that it's a state which you could imagine but maybe you never ever agree well we and we can ask exactly the same question about Aristotle can't we are are there any people who who are virtuous yeah I mean maybe this is just an ideal state what we're saying is that an action is right if if it would have been performed by a virtuous person if there were any virtuous people an action is right if it would have been approved of by a true judge if there are any true judges maybe all of us are maybe this is like the situation in mathematics when we say we always tend to infinity we never actually get there maybe we tend to true judge them without getting there I'm assuming that both of them didn't actually say that no not that I know of I mean again isn't it also based on universals rather than in what way well rather recognizing that in different cultures different knowledge knowledge will be different knowledge is not absolute we went over that if you remember in the second week or was it the first week when we looked at absolute and relative knowledge sorry absolute and relative truth and you could I mean if moral truth is relative then a true judge would make judgments on that basis and if knowledge is if sorry if moral truth it's absolute then a true judge would make but we're not going to judge that we're not going to prejudge that issue but you might want to go back and have a look at absolute and relative truth that we didn't week one any other questions on that let's move on a bit because we're okay so if we allow bias to cloud our judgment or we neglect to consider somebody our attitudes of approval and disapproval are not going to qualify as moral attitudes and we all know I mean sometimes when when we look at these campaigns to get pedos off the street and things like that we might think that this is an indication of of a pseudo moral attitude and I'm sorry if that offends anyone but do you see why I'm saying that might be a pseudo moral attitude a lot of these knee jerk campaigns it's very difficult to resist the thought that they haven't been thought out that they haven't been looked at from different angles they haven't been looked at objectively we might say if we were just in bar conversations and what was with appealing to here is just we can see why the outrage is caused we can see where the um um disapprobation is coming from but we can also see that it's perhaps misdirected or that it's not being used properly um that it's being misused um and it's that sort of thing we're looking at here um so if and when we do succeed in adopting a stable in general perspective um there are modern humians and Simon Blackburn for example I of whom you may have heard some of you um he calls himself a quasi realist um and he thinks that um non-cognitivism can actually earn the right to think of moral judgments as true or false even though they're not um when their judgments made from the stable and general perspective so um going back to to where hum is so when we say of an action that it's right hum says that we're not saying that that action has a property of being right and it would be right whether anyone was there or not we're if we say that we're projecting our own feelings onto this thing okay and what Simon Blackburn and other non quasi realist is saying is that actually if you've educated your your feelings of approbation and disapprobation properly so you've become a true judge then actually when you look at an action and say that it's right you've earned the right to call your judgment true or false even though it's still uh the application of a passion not a not a reason it's a desire not a belief if you like um you've still earned the right I can see you're not too happy about that and to be honest I'm not either um but many people are and Simon Blackburn's written a fantastic book called ruling passions um it's not like his other books it's not a um um a popular book it's it's a book for professionals but if if you can bear it it's a very good book to read ruling passions it's called um so even though moral judgments are expressions of passion not reasons the passions they express are so informed by reason that they almost attain the status of beliefs and the passion is still central because if it wasn't these judgments wouldn't be motivating and if they weren't motivating they wouldn't be moral at all because we've seen that if in order to be moral a judgment has to be motivating so if moral judgments express passions then right and wrong can't be properties that actions have independently of the way we feel about them but this doesn't mean that Hume isn't a realist okay we're getting onto the metaphysics now and we've we've got a very short time but we're getting onto the metaphysics of non-cognitivism the metaphysics of morality according to Hume he believes that moral properties are so called secondary properties and secondary properties are like colour um for example as opposed to shape shape the shape of an object is a primary quality of an object its colour is a secondary property let's see what we mean by that if you're asked what redness is i should have brought these in and actually asked you without in fact let's okay what's redness now you've had a quick look and now you're not going to be able to bring it out from your intuition because you're trying to remember what I wrote but what do you think redness is redness forget about secondary qualities for a minute just tell me what you think redness is go on it's a it's a surface which reflects light at a specific wavelength okay you you think that it's a surface that reflects light at 650 nanometres um just fill in a bit of detail that I'm very proud of myself about that um no you're thinking of meaning in a metaphorical sense here I I'm actually asking what redness means rather than what it yes because in China it means bridal um whereas here it means danger perhaps uh yeah that's not what I mean but so more it's an experience okay you so you think it's it's a subjective experience the the sort of experience you have when there's nothing red in here yes there you are when we look at what's your name when we look at Ian's thingy me bob we um we have a certain experience and we call that experience red that's what you're saying okay good anyone have any other idea okay well let's see what's wrong with both of those um okay here's here's the three I had so this is yours okay and it's you're saying that redness is an entirely subjective state because actually when when I look at Ian's collar um I might be seeing what you see when you look at my cardigan don't you think okay you think that so to you redness is a totally subjective experience but mostly well okay it's it's an experience and it's one that's private in principle to each of us okay whereas you think that uh the redness is the appearance uh sorry the wavelength of light emitted by objects or or the surface of an object that emits light at a certain wavelength is you have to experience it um okay unless you see you don't have the tone red well you don't you don't have the experience okay let's I've only got 10 minutes so I'm going to cut across both of you um let's see what's wrong with uh the first answer implies that red refers to an experience that's essentially private but notice we've all taught children the meaning of the word red haven't we we all what do we do we point to lots of red things uh and and we hope that the red things are different you know we we don't point to collars every time that would that would be a bad idea uh we point to lots of red things and we say that's red that's red that's red now if redness were the private experience of the child how would we ever know whether the child had the word right because what we then say is is well hang on we then say is that's red we say pointing to a blue thing and hoping the child's going to say no of course it's not mummy um and and then we point to a red thing and we say is that red and we wait for the child to say yes in other words we hope we we're waiting for the child to pick up um the truth conditions of the sentence it's red and so it recognises it's true when it's true and it recognises it's false when it's false well how can we do that when we can't see what it's experiencing we have no idea what the child's experiencing no we would know it was colorblind because then it wouldn't make the distinctions between colors that we do and that's actually what what the what we're going on when that child is saying of the color that we see as red that it's red will say it's right and when it's saying of a color that we experience of not red that it's not red will say it's right again do you see what i mean so it can't be the entirely private experience what we're hoping what we're relying on is that there is an experience there that's that's true we absolutely need that but what the experience is actually drops out of the picture um it cannot because otherwise we can't know whether the child's got it's right or not so redness isn't the essentially private experience although it seems clear that an essentially private experience is needed for someone to to acquire the concept red now let's see why you're wrong sir okay um oh okay i'm sorry go just going on here so um if redness were entirely private experience we couldn't tell whether we're talking about the same color at all could we if if it's only true that it's red when it's that color the color that i see and you can't see how i'm seeing it we wouldn't know we were talking about the same color and we couldn't teach the meaning of the word red to anyone and as we can do both these things this is not the right account of redness now let's see why you're wrong um sorry chris thank you you told me that earlier i'm sorry i forgot okay the second answer implies that we're a cosmic ray to change the wavelengths of light associated with redness um without changing our experiences so overnight something happens to this world so that all these chairs um no longer reflect light at whatever blue is should have looked that up shouldn't i um so they appear red to us but they're still reflecting light um sorry they still appear blue to us but they're still reflecting light at what they um get this wrong let's start again they still appear blue to us but they're no longer reflecting light at the wavelength they're reflecting it today i.e. the one that is normally associated with blue would we say that the chairs were the same color or not i mean this actually occurs if you review certain things i don't care whether it's a we're philosophers here you would say that that is measurably blue because you could do the calculation okay let me ask you again the chair appears the same but it reflects light differently has its changed color or not in other words does the idea of same color go with the way the chair appears to us or the way it reflects light uh no i don't think it does what would the scientists say if suddenly blue chairs started reflecting light differently they wouldn't say they'd changed the color they'd say that the wavelength of light associated with blueness has changed i'm sure they would we don't have time to carry on about this but you think about that um i i think we would color would always go with our experiences but notice you've you've absolutely you've got to have um the objective um property in the object as well the true uh account of color is the um third one redness is the appearance that certain objects have when seen by normal people under normal circumstances so because red things well we would almost certainly think the explanation of why normal people under normal circumstances see um peter's collar is sorry iran's collar in the way we see it is because it's reflecting light at 650 nanometres that's the explanation of why it appears that way to normal people under normal circumstances so redness is something that emerges from the interaction between our visual systems and objects that reflect light in a certain way this other property emerges but you have to have our visual system and the objects and light being reflected in a certain way but once you have those two things you've got a secondary quality um you've got a quality that isn't objectively in the object quite independently of us but it's also not entirely subjective nothing to do with the world out there it's actually to do with the interaction between our subjective experiences and the world as it is in itself and when you get something that emerges out of the interaction between those two things you've got a secondary quality and the and humans answer um hang on i've now lost my way uh i'm going to give up on this um okay so humans thought is that morality is a property that emerges out of the interaction between normal human sympathy or empathy and the way the world is and put the two together and you get morality so morality rightness and wrongness are secondary properties a bit like colours they're not primary qualities they're not in the actions quite independently of our feelings about the actions but nor are they just totally in us independently of the way the world is morality brings both into the picture rather satisfying i think that one yeah is it whoa yeah but i'm just wondering i i saw the sense that there was a problem there oh god because it's socially although socially we may agree that it's blue and you're saying why but it's an interaction with whatever's happening there as well but socially and governments do can make it our best interest to continue to see that even if something else changes the reality changes in the world the world is not absolute i mean we may see some i'm sorry we're we're going i'm i'm not going to go back to absolute and relative do i'm very happy to answer question of that but go back and have a look at what we said in the first week um because i think it's quite important you look at that and then we'll look at it again it might be i mean if you look at the idea that colour is not a subjective property it's a it's as objective as we can get in other words it's inter subjective um redness emerges from normal that the way things appear to normal human beings under normal circumstances so if you're not a normal human being um your colour blind or something then then you don't count in the determination of whether something's red or not and if the circumstances are normal if if i've put red foil or something over a light bulb then again our beliefs about what's red or not just don't count but if you've got normal people in normal circumstances then they will classify the world in the same way as each other they'll put red things in one pile green things in another pile blue things in another pile and it's that sameness that that means they're saying the same colour even if most unlikely but even if actually we all see a different thing we all have a different experience when we look at the red pile um it's we'll never know if that happens and therefore it doesn't matter it just falls out. Wittgenstein says it's um it's a it's not a something but it's not a nothing either the experience. So Hume is a realist though he differs from Aristotle um who believed I think that moral properties exist in the world quite independently of us for Hume they don't exist in the world independently of us but that doesn't make them entirely subjective so this is again your way of testing whether you've understood what's been going on this week this is the reading for next week um and and there's more there than you could possibly do and as usual you don't have to do any of it if you haven't got the time and that's it okay oh what what was the vote for oh yes okay can we take the vote again okay who who's for Aristotle hands up okay and who's for Hume okay we've slightly shifted it it was slightly for Aristotle before it's slightly for Hume now okay and next week I hope you're all going to be for Kent