 This book is intended to present to the reader in the most concise form possible, but yet with historical accuracy, an outline of the history of Napoleon that will convey an adequate first impression of his genius and policy. Without some knowledge of this extraordinary man and of his period, it is impossible to understand the politics, constitution, and general circumstances of modern Europe. But the literature of the Napoleonic period is so vast, probably approaching forty thousand books, that the reader who feels disposed to get some acquaintance with it is frequently unable to find a practicable way through the maze. It may be said without disparagement to their writers that any one of the three or four best general histories of Napoleon, taken alone, is inadequate to convey a sufficient impression of the man and his times. But to Napoleonic literature as a whole, there is no key. A complete bibliography is so vast and undertaking, that even the labours of Baron Lombrusso and Heracurecin appear to offer little promise of completion. The latter's select bibliography is the best available guide, but however valuable for the students, some two hundred pages of bare bibliographical entries cannot be of great service to those not possessing some previously acquired knowledge. It is part of the purpose of the present work to enable the ordinary reader, or the would-be student, safely to take a first few steps in Napoleonic literature, avoiding the innumerable books of little or no authority, and getting some sort of notion beforehand of what those here recommended are likely to give him. As to the narrative itself, the desire to attain conciseness, combined with true proportion, presents difficulties and disadvantages, results in unavoidable gaps. Thus no attempt can be made to narrate the numerous military operations of Napoleon on the same scale. Certain campaigns and battles, Wargrom, Austerlitz, Waterloo for instance, have been treated more fully as being of special importance politically or strategically. Others have been passed over with a bare mention, but not without due consideration for the clearness and continuity of the narrative. Where details and anecdotes have been brought in, it has invariably been for the purpose of illustrating broad issues. To furnish a correct outline of Napoleonic history, and to point the way along which it may be profitably pursued, that, and nothing more, is what this book aims at affecting. This new edition is revised to date in the bibliographies, and is corrected in a few typographical and other slips. Its appearance coincides with that of my French Revolution, of which it forms the continuation. Will the reader kindly note, however, that this is not a short history, as that is, but a short biography. The one book contains the other, but in a different key. Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 1909. End of preface. Chapter 1 of Napoleon is short biography. This is a Librobox recording. All Librobox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librobox.org. Recording by Pamela Nagami M.D. Napoleon, a short biography, by Robert Madison Johnston. Chapter 1 Napoleon Before the Revolution. Birth and childhood, education, appearance and character, the Revolution. In the history of Napoleon Bonaparte we plunge into the characteristic at the very outset, the date of his birth. He was born either in 1768 or 1769, probably but not certainly in the latter year. As late as in 1796 when he married, the date of his birth was given as February 1768. Later it was fixed at the 15th of August, 1769. This is not a matter of vital importance, yet it is not without interest for two reasons. In the first place it is typical of Napoleon's methods that he should have placed the celebration of his birthday at the same date as that of the Assumption which is one associated with rejoicing and merry-making in all Latin countries. Another interesting point in this connection is that in 1768 the island of Corsica, the home of the Bonaparte, was Genoese. A year later it was French. If Napoleon was born in 1768 he was born a Genoese. If in 1769 a Frenchman. However this may be and the point has been the subject of some controversy it is certain that all the circumstances of his birth and youth left him nearly devoid of what might be described as national traditions or feeling, though in his boyhood he was intensely Corsican. The Bonaparte's were a noble but poor family of Italian extraction settled at Ayacho, where Charles Bonaparte, Napoleon's father, exercised legal functions under the Genoese government. He took part in the civil wars that preceded Napoleon's birth in which Pauly became prominent. The Corsican disorders need not be related here. It will suffice to say that Charles Bonaparte transferred his allegiance to France in 1769 when the sovereignty of the island was abandoned by the Genoese. Yet by race neither he nor his son was a Frenchman. The Genoese were a maritime people. Their home was the Mediterranean. Their standards had been carried in triumph at various periods from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosporus and Constantinople. This is worthy of note, for the boy brought up in the Genoese atmosphere and traditions who became emperor of the French had for many years his eyes and his policy constantly fixed on the Mediterranean. At every stage of his career we find that great inland sea around which our civilization took its earliest shape, playing an all important part. Napoleon first crossed it in the year 1779 when his father succeeded in securing his appointment to a free cadetship at the military school of Brienne. Young Bonaparte's school days were not very remarkable. His ignorance of the French language, his lack of fine clothes and fine manners, his innate pride and aloofness kept him solitary. He did not shine in arts and literature but showed conspicuous ability and quickness in mathematics and geometry. In one other respect he impressed several of his teachers, and that was his strong and domineering temperament. In 1784 he was transferred from Brienne to the Military Academy at Paris, and no sooner was he there than he revealed his force of character even more strongly by drawing up a memorandum exposing the numerous shortcomings of the establishment as a military training school and setting out a scheme for its reformation. This did not tend to make the fifteen-year-old Corsican popular with those placed over him. How little could they then foresee that he was fated to carry out this and many other even more important reforms within a very few years. He spent only twelve months in Paris and then received his commission as a sub-lieutenant of artillery. Three years later the French Revolution broke out, and in ten years more the Corsican sub-lieutenant of artillery was the ruler of France. What were the causes that brought about this wonderful rise of fortune? Chiefly too. The extraordinary character of the man, the extraordinary character of the circumstances into which he was thrown. Had not those two great factors coincided with such precision it is quite safe to assume that European history would be without what is perhaps its most wonderful page. It is therefore important before we go further to consider the personality of Napoleon after which a brief view of the origin of the French Revolution must be taken. This will lead us to the events in which the Revolution and the man who was destined to be its heir were both concerned. Napoleon Bonaparte was a short, dark, swarthy man of typical southern appearance. In his early years until 1805 he was extremely thin. It was not until his face filled out that his features could be pronounced handsome, though his nose was salient and mouth well formed. His hands and feet, like those of his brothers and sisters, were beautifully modeled. His head was large, full, and intellectual, but what produced the greatest impression on all who met him was the brilliancy and imperiousness of his steel-blue eyes. They revealed the volcanic energy of the soul beneath. He was given two violent bursts of temper, the occasional outbreaks of a nearly superhuman mental energy and of a temperament easily swayed to passion by personal and selfish considerations. He was perhaps the greatest egotist the world has ever seen. With the result they often applied his indomitable will and magnificent qualities to very low aims. Much tastily and by certain traits alone he might be thought to be little more than contemptible, thus in the matter of veracity. He viewed lying from a strictly utilitarian point of view, and always said just what was convenient, so that his history written from his own statements would be little better than fiction. He played cards as he conducted warfare, obtaining every advantage he could, legitimate or otherwise. But he cannot be called a small man, only a man with small aspects, and if he won by his cheating at cards, he always returned the stakes after the game was over. When found out in his perversions of truth he was prepared to own up, on one occasion Metternich stoutly declined to believe some information published in the Monitor, and at last Napoleon laughed and confessed, Sonobugie periparigini, they are lies for the Parisians. Alongside of this trait was a wonderful largeness of perception, and many in fact have said that it was Napoleon's breadth of view that constituted his genius. It was not so much that, as the perfect combination of breadth of view with attention to the most minute detail. His powerful imagination made him see events in their fullest possible extension. As he said himself, he was always living two years ahead. At the same time his instinct for detail was the nightmare of every colonel in the army, of every functionary in the empire. The memoirs of the period are full of anecdotes illustrating this. Philippe de Segure relates that he was sent on a tour of inspection in which he visited several fortresses, many camps and forts, and numberless earthworks and batteries. On his reporting to the emperor he was cross-examined at great length, but went through the ordeal with flying colors, until at last, asked whether at a particular spot on a small cross-road not far from Antwerp, two field-pieces were still in position. The brain of Napoleon was like a machine, so perfect, so accurate in its working, but the spirit that impelled it was that of a soldier and a gambler. Full perception of chances was instantaneous with him and promptly turned into action with perfect audacity and relentless activity. It was among his soldiers that he was happiest, and few anecdotes told of him are more characteristic than that related in the memoirs of a Polish officer who served in the campaign of Russia. Napoleon had just joined headquarters after three years of peace and was in the midst of the numerous columns converging on the points at which the Russian frontier was to be crossed. In the middle of the night the officers of the staff were awakened by an unusual noise. Napoleon was sleepless and was tramping up and down his bedroom singing at the top of his voice the revolutionary marching song Le Chant du Départ. He was happy once more, he was playing the biggest steak of his life with the biggest army he had ever assembled. It was the satisfaction of the roulette player sitting down at his accustomed chair with a large pile of gold in front of him. But there are yet other aspects of the character of this the most extraordinary man of modern times that must not be omitted in attempting to portray him. Making exception of the rhetoric he so frequently used in addressing his soldiers and occasionally in his diplomatic relations, his correspondence constitutes a wonderful intellectual achievement. In the thirty-two volumes published officially, one might nearly say that there is not a superfluous word, not an embellishment. Conciseness, energy, decision, perception stand out with overpowering force from every page, and it may quite properly be said that the correspondence of Napoleon is a great literary monument. It is safe to predict that it will be read when the names of Chateau-Briand, of de la Vigne and la Martine are well-knigh forgotten. His bombast has been alluded to. However distasteful to Anglo-Saxon ears, it often enough produced its due results. Inspired his soldiers, terrified his enemies. In nothing was Napoleon more an Italian than in his strong dramatic sense, and his public life from the moment he got his foot on the first rung of the ladder of ambition was one long pose. He did his best to create, and to send down to posterity the Napoleonic legend, and even at the present day, when more reasonable views are beginning to prevail, there are many, even among state historians, who are prepared to accept him at his own valuation. Before closing this brief sketch of his personality, it may be as well to add that a view that seems becoming popular in some quarters at the present day, the view that Napoleon was an epileptic, reposes on very slight evidence. It is possible, just as many other hypotheses are, but on the other hand it is certain, if this theory is accepted, that he was a very slight sufferer, and that no epileptic ever showed greater clearness of intellect. Historically speaking, to say that Napoleon was epileptic is probably untrue, and is certainly irrelevant and misleading. Here then, in the year 1789, was a young subliftenant of artillery, from whom great things might be expected. Yet had not his path crossed that of a great political cataclysm, it is certain that he would never have found the opportunities that enabled him to rise to the level of his genius. The misgovernment and ineptitude of the Bourbon had at last been visited with retribution. Although France was fast increasing in wealth, more than half her people knew the pangs of famine, many had died of hunger, Montesquieu Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Diderot, Dalombert had stirred the reason of the thinking class. France had within her all the makings of a great modern nation, as was conclusively demonstrated by Napoleon ten years later. Yet she was degraded by such barbarities as the mutilation and execution of the chevalier de la barre, or the attempt to prevent the burial of Voltaire's body. She was brought to bankruptcy by the criminal folly of the court and its ministers. Retribution followed, the revolution broke out, and reaction swung far in the direction of popular absurdities and horrors. From 1789 to 1794 the complete scale of democratic passions was exhausted. The most excellent reforming zeal, the most exalted sentiments of patriotism and disinterestedness, caught in a rising tide, never read into a world of political disintegration, finally disappeared or made way for mob rule, violence, terrorism, suspicion and anarchy. While in the cities the revolution gradually fell into the hands of gangs of political fanatics or unprincipled ruffians, its best elements found refuge in the armies of the assailed republic. Birth was no longer essential for becoming an officer, and great soldiers like Ney, Masséna, or Murat found their path no longer stopped at the rank of sergeant. Court favor no longer made generals, and a Bonaparte might expect to rise above all his fellows. His first opportunity came in 1793 at the Siege of Toulon, but before coming to that, it will be as well briefly to indicate what had occurred previously and since Bonaparte had entered the army. Chronology 1261, earliest Bonaparte at Florence 1529, Bonaparte's go to Corsica 15th August 1769, Napoleon Bonaparte born. April 1779, he goes to school at Brienne October 1784, proceeds to Military Academy, Paris August 1785, sub-left tenant of artillery, 14th July 1789, capture of the Bastille, French Revolution. End of Chapter 1. Chapter 2 of Napoleon a Short Biography This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Wilson, Ames, Iowa. Napoleon a Short Biography by R. M. Johnston. Chapter 2 Toulon and Vendémière Bonaparte and Corsica, Siege of Toulon. The Terror. Vendémière. Siege of Napoleon and Josephine Boarnet, Army of Italy, Tactics and Strategy in 1796. From 1789 until 1793, during that is the first four years of the Revolution, Bonaparte was striving to improve his prospects in connection with Corsican affairs. He paid several visits to the island, joined the French Democratic Party, but could not succeed either in securing the victory of that party or in bringing to a favorable end a small military expedition he led into Sardinia. In the course of these intrigues and proceedings we catch an interesting glimpse of him noted by his school friend Bourien during a short stay in Paris. The young Corsican officer, whose watch was in pawn and whose dinners were generally provided by his friends, saw among other sights the march of a mob of five hundred men to the Tuileries and Louis XVI complying with their orders by appearing at a window wearing a red frigid cap. Bonaparte was deeply moved at this spectacle and declared with indignation that with a couple of guns he could have dispersed all the scum of the faux bores and taught them a lesson they would never have forgotten. The doings of Bonaparte at this period have no large bearing on history and are in part somewhat obscure, but after the final failure of the French party in Corsica he returned to his occupation as an officer of artillery serving now in the rank of captain, 1793. In August of the same year the French Republic, assailed on every side, received a severe blow by the inhabitants of Toulon proclaiming the king and calling to their help an Anglo-Spanish fleet. The government immediately sent troops to attempt the recapture of the fortress and Bonaparte found himself in command of the small force of artillery collected. His skill and judgment quickly won recognition and he was soon promoted to the functions of a lieutenant colonel. His energy made feasible the only plan that promised success. It consisted in capturing one of the English positions, the Fort de Leguillette, whence the bay and shipping could be commanded. Bonaparte pressed forward the work, but the British fire was severe and the guns of his battery were silenced. He then had recourse to his knowledge of human nature and of the French soldier. A large sign was posted, this is the battery of the men without fear, and a call was made for volunteers. This was well responded to, some severe fighting ensued, finally the British position was breached and stormed. As Bonaparte had foreseen, this success of the French entailed the immediate evacuation of Toulon by the Anglo-Spanish forces. Thus Bonaparte won his first reputation, and before many months passed his services were recognized by promotion to the rank of Brigadier General. It was at the period we have now reached that the revolution attained its extreme of violence. The government of France had been seized by the Jacobin Club and Robespierre. An enthusiastic conformity to their doctrines appeared the only means of escaping the guillotine. Bonaparte, like nearly every other officer of the French army, made show of zeal in support of the terrorists, and was during some months on close terms with Robespierre-Jeune. But in Thermidor, July of 1794, the Jacobin tyranny was broken, and in the reaction that followed, Bonaparte was for a few weeks placed under arrest. After his release, having thrown up his command in the Southern Army, he went to Paris where he probably hoped to find some opportunity of advancement in the turmoil of politics. That opportunity was slow and coming, but he refused the command of a brigade of infantry in the Army of the West rather than leave the capital. At last, in the autumn of 1795, events took place that marked his first step forward in the political world. Since the fall of Robespierre in 1794, a strong movement of reaction had taken place in the capital, partly royalist, wholly conservative. Most of the sections of Paris were hostile to the convention, which aimed at retaining power under a newly framed constitution. And as each section had its battalion of national guards, the movement soon took an insurrectional and menacing aspect. The executive power of the Republic was to be vested in a committee of five, the directoire, among the members of which was Barras, who, as a representative of the government, had known Bonaparte at Toulon and had been struck by his talents. In the last days of September 1795, the movement of the sections became more pronounced, the symptoms of an approaching storm more clear, and the convention charged Barras with its defense and with the command of all the troops in Paris. But Barras was a civilian and needed military assistance. He therefore called to his aid several generals then in the capital. Among them was Bonaparte, who accepted, though not without hesitation. His personality, his decision and promptitude completely turned the scale. At this point, we may pause for one moment to recall an anecdote of those days that is eminently characteristic of the man. The table, a young officer, reported at headquarters and found the newly appointed general seated at a table in conversation. He appeared small, of poor physique, with long, lanky hair and a shabby uniform. He was asking questions of the most elementary character of officers of far greater experience and seniority in military administration. There was an inclination among some of those present to smile at the ignorance displayed by the newcomer, but Thier Bolt admired his complete absence of false pride, the searching character of his inquiries and the rapidity with which he appeared to assimilate the information he acquired. The officers placed under his command were certainly not inclined to think lightly of him for long. On the thirteenth of Vendemière, the revolt came to a head and the sections prepared to march against the assembly. Bonaparte seized all the available artillery owing to the promptitude of a major of cavalry Myra by name. The few thousand troops available were concentrated about the Tuileries and as soon as the national guards began their movement Bonaparte opened with grape along the streets leading to his central position. There was considerable bloodshed, but the insurrection collapsed immediately, as must all insurrections treated in that prompt and uncompromising way. Bonaparte's second successful demonstration of his knowledge of the theory and practice of artillery received large recognition, for he was shortly afterwards appointed to the command of the army of the interior. He was now a rising man in the state, and for this reason succeeded in winning the hand of a lady of rank and beauty to whom he had been paying his attentions for some months. Josephine Tachère de la Pagerie was a beautiful creole who had married the Vicomte de Boarnet, an officer in the French service by whom she had two children, Eugène and Ortens. Boarnet fought for the republic, was unsuccessful, and went to the guillotine one of the last victims of the reign of terror. His widow became one of the beauties of the new fashionable society that centered about the dissipated Barras and his wife. Whether she loved Bonaparte is very doubtful, but it is clear that she felt his magnetic power, and when it was decided that he was to have the command of one of the armies on the frontier, she married him. The marriage took place on the 11th of March 1796, and on the 21st Bonaparte started for Nice to assume command of the army of Italy. It appears not improbable that Josephine's influence with the Barras had been largely instrumental in securing this important appointment. We now have come to the beginning of Napoleon's career as a commander-in-chief, and since his history must be essentially military, since he remains without question the greatest soldier concerning whom we have accurate information, it will be well to examine at this point, before we follow him into Italy, what was actually represented by a movement of troops or a battle in his time. To speak of an advance or retreat of a right or left wing, or of a movement resulting in so many thousands being killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, conveys but the vaguest notion of the evolutions actually carried out. When considering the history of the greatest of captains, it will not be out of place to take a preliminary view of the tactics and strategy of his day, and to attempt to convey some more precise impression of the actual occurrences of the battlefield. When the French Revolution broke out, the art of war was as much trampled by narrow regulations as was that of letters. The methods and traditions were those of Frederick the Great, but dogmatism had supplanted genius. Rigidity of discipline and tactical formalism were the foundation of the system. The soldier was a brutalized individual, skilled in multitudinous attitudes and formations, fighting like a machine under the inspiration of constant floggings. Two opposing lines of infantry, each formed on a depth of two or three ranks, would advance nearer and nearer to each other in the most perfect alignment. Every musket even, every toe turned to the same angle. Even within firing distance, the one whose discipline was the more rigid would generally manage to survive the two or three mechanical volleys that would be exchanged at a range of 50 to 120 yards. With regiments thus drilled, the great aim of every commander was to attain tactical perfection and the conduct of a battlefield became slow and artificial. War was turned into a scientific game with arbitrary rules. France revolutionized war as she had every political and social observance. With promotion thrown open to every soldier, with the doctrine of liberty, equality, fraternity proclaimed, with many of the old officers leaving the country, it became impossible to maintain discipline and in many of the early battles of the Republic, the French army suffered in consequence. The convention declared that corporal punishment should not be inflicted on free men. The sentiment was to its honor but the army was soon reduced to chaotic conditions. From these conditions arose a new army, bolder and greater than the old. It was inspired by ardent patriotism that finest of all the military virtues and made up in dash intelligence and courage what it lacked in science. From these circumstances a new system of tactics was evolved of which the most characteristic innovation may be understood by the following convenient illustration. A body of men marching along a road will naturally form a column, save four abreast. Suppose such a column arrives near a village occupied by the enemy and attempts to take it. What is the simplest, least scientific manner in which this might be accomplished? In the first place the most raw of officers and inexperienced of troops would quickly learn to double up so as to convert a front of four into a front of eight. Then a quick dash, the bayonet, the pressure of the rear ranks on the first would do the rest. This was in its roughest form the usual French system of attack during the wars of the Republic and Empire. The same column deployed or opened up right and left would give an extended front for firing when on the defensive. When attacking the distance the column would have to cover exposed to musket refire will be realized when it is stated that the extreme range of the musket then in use was 200 yards. Effective volleys were generally fired at from 120 down to 60 yards. When a French brigade attacked the usual disposition was for about one quarter of the infantry to be dispersed as skirmishers to draw and divert the enemy's fire. Behind these skirmishers columns would be formed, brought up as far forward as the ground would permit and at the proper moment launched at the enemy's line at the charge. The formation of these columns varied according to circumstances but a front of 16 and depth of 70 men equivalent to battalions of reduced strength may be taken as representing a rough average. The French infantry excelled in offensive evolutions in quickly seizing a hill house or hedge and their celerity of movement and intelligence proved more than a match for the methods of the armies opposed to them. Before many years had passed every country of Europe saved Great Britain alone abandoned the old tactics and copied the new. Similar changes took place in the handling of artillery and especially of cavalry which were now used with far greater boldness especially for completing the destruction of the enemy after a successful engagement. Perfect alignment became a secondary consideration. Strategy changed on the same lines as tactics. Slow methodical movements were checked by rapid marching. The capture of a fortress became an object of less importance than the destruction of an army. Bonaparte fought his first campaign when the new theories of war were just beginning to emerge from chaos, when a number of self-made and excellent officers had won their way to the heads of regiments and brigades. He grasped with a firm hand the instrument fate had placed in his hands and wielded it from the very first instant with the skill of a master. End of Chapter 2. Chapter 3. The Campaign of Italy. 1796-1797. Montenotte, armistice of Cerasco, crossing of the Po, Lodi, Le Petit Caporal, entrance into Milan, Castiglione and Lonato, Bassano, Arcola, Rivoli, fall of Mantua. From the time Bonaparte took command of the army of Italy, he appeared a changed man. He received even his oldest friends, such as Decret, with a reserve that was intended to mark the distance between them and his avowed aspiration to superiority. With the generals over whom he was placed, such an attitude was perhaps necessary. More veterans like Massena, Auguero, and Cérullier were inclined to be restive on finding themselves under the command of the little Corsican whom they styled derisively, Le Général Vendemnière. This feeling soon disappeared, for Bonaparte, unlike most great captains, showed himself the master of his army and an accomplished strategist from the first moment. The French army of Italy numbered some thirty-seven thousand men. It was stationed along the coast of the Mediterranean in the neighborhood of Nice and in the passes of the lower Alps. Across the mountains were two armies, the Sardinian of about twenty thousand men watching the passes and protecting the roads running northeast towards Turin, the Austrian of about thirty-five thousand men occupying Genoa on its left, and then stretching across the Ligurian Alps to join hands with the Sardinians towards Dego and Montenotte. The Austro-Sardinians under Bolu and Coli were thus stretched out on a line of sixty miles through mountainous country. Not only this, but their lines of communications were divergent, that of the Austrians on Alessandria, that of the Sardinians on Turin. Bonaparte framed his plan of operations in accordance with these facts. He concentrated his divisions, first made show of marching along the coast on Genoa, then turned off across the mountains and struck with his whole force at the point where the Austrian right joined the Sardinian left. The isolated divisions opposed to the French were beaten in a series of engagements at Montenotte, Dego and Seva. At Mondovi the Sardinians were defeated. Bonaparte pressed them hard on the road to Turin, and on the twenty-eighth of April after a fortnight's campaign the king of Sardinia was compelled to accept terms. An armistice was signed at Cherasco, highly favorable to the French Republic and leaving Bonaparte free to operate against Bolu. The second part of the French general's operations turned on a similar strategic consideration as the first, that of compelling his enemy to cover his lines of communications. And as this is an essential feature of the strategy of nearly all ages and countries, it may be as well to make clear its precise significance before proceeding further. The reader who has not studied military history is apt to think of an army as a piece on a chessboard that may be moved freely in every direction, but this is not so. An army is a society having special needs that have to be met daily, and it can only be moved in such directions as will enable these needs to be satisfied. Food may be found for a small body in the country operated in, but cities, even of the largest size, cannot supply at a moment's notice large quantities of gunpowder, shot, shell, muskets, boots, and the thousand and one things an army requires. How many small towns could work out even such a trifling problem as the reshoeing of the horses of a brigade of cavalry? Every army consequently has a line of communications running back to its base, along which pours a continuous stream of supplies essential to its continued action in the field, and this line of communications is generally agreed to represent an army's weakest point. Or if it is cut by the enemy, the army becomes powerless as soon as it has expended the supplies actually on hand. Some of the most remarkable operations of war have turned on a clear comprehension of this fundamental principle. We shall see it constantly brought into play in the campaigns of Napoleon. While Bonaparte was driving the Sardinians towards Turin, Boliu had concentrated his army to cover the road to Alessandria. After the signature of the armistice of Cherasco, he retreated to the north bank of the Po, and prepared to oppose the crossing of the river and to defend Lombardy and Milan. Yet Bonaparte achieved the conquest of that rich province and its capital without firing a gun and by methods highly characteristic of his genius. A road runs northeast from Alessandria to Milan, crossing the Po at Valenza in Sardinian territory. It was stipulated in the armistice of Cherasco that every facility should be afforded the French army for crossing the river at that point. Information of this quickly reached Boliu's headquarters, and he took up a strong position on the northern bank whence he commanded the passage. He was confirmed in this disposition by the fact that the French, as they advanced, collected all the boats that could be found upstream from Valenza. But Bonaparte was only fainting. While one of his divisions demonstrated in front of Valenza and formed a screen along the Po, the great mass of the French army pushed along the southern bank to Piacenza, 50 miles east and there crossed over safe from attack, May 7. This great strategic march placed the French army within a few miles of the Austrian line of communications which ran from Milan through Lodì back to Mantua. No sooner had Boliu discovered that only a small part of the French were before him and that he was being outflanked, than he hurriedly retreated and abandoning Milan reached Lodì a few hours before Bonaparte. From Lodì he continued his retreat to Mantua, leaving a strong rear guard to keep the French back. On the 10th of May was fought the Battle of Lodì, of which the interest is more personal than military. At this point the road to Mantua crosses the Adda by a long bridge. At the further end of this bridge the Austrians had established a considerable force of infantry and artillery to cover the retreat. Bonaparte determined to carry the position by storm and a column of grenadiers was formed and sent to the attack. Going down by the Austrian guns and musketry the column recoiled and retreated. Then Bonaparte, followed by Ogero, Lan and other officers, ran in among the men, restored order, reformed the column and, pushing to the front, led the grenadiers once more across the bridge. The Austrian fire was tremendous, but Bonaparte's onset was irresistible and he came out of the melee untouched. Later in life he declared it was on that day that the belief firmly took hold of him that he was destined to accomplish great deeds. That same evening a deputation of sergeants of grenadiers waited on him in his tent and respectfully declared that he had been unanimously elected a corporal in their corps, and for many years afterwards Napoleon was fondly called le petit corporal by his soldiers. It was partly in this respect that he was a great leader, that he knew how to play on the feelings of his men. On his inspections he would pass along the ranks unaccompanied and speak directly to the soldiers who were always at liberty to make known their wants. On one such occasion, during the empire, a grizzled veteran reminded him that one night in the Italian campaign he had shared a loaf of bread with his general. Instantly Napoleon granted him the promotion or pension or medal he coveted and made his heart glad. In his proclamations, that are frequently such difficult reading to the Anglo-Saxon, he played with perfect precision on the sentiments of the men who were to win his victories. In his first proclamation to the army of Italy, he told the soldiers that they were without pay, without clothes, without glory, and that these were all to be found in the rich planes of Lombardy into which he was about to lead them. He redeemed his word, for on the fifteenth of May the army made its entry into Milan. The sight of the republican soldiers produced a curious effect on the Milanese, so long accustomed to the brilliant uniforms and irreproachable drill of the Austrians. The French infantry was dressed in rags and marched with a long slouching step. Many of the subordinate officers, even captains, were without boots. The generals were far from the rigid good breeding and presence of the Austrians, but the drums rolled out the sa ira. The bands played the merseyes, and from the draggled, weary columns there came a breath of fierce, swaggering spirit and patriotism that went far to explain their success. And at their head was a plainly dressed boyish figure, whose deep-set eyes and pale, impassive face proclaimed aloud to those that gazed on him that the spirit and strength of the revolutionary army was directed by pure calculation and intellect. All Europe was soon to learn what the combination of the two could accomplish. After having rested and refitted his army at the expense of Milan, where a provisional republican government was established, Bonaparte marched to the Mincio, where Boliu had taken up his position. A passage was forced on the thirtieth of May. The Austrians retreated into the Tyrol, and the French settled down to besiege the great fortress of Mantua, which Boliu had strongly garrisoned and provisioned. Bonaparte now looked for favourable positions, whence he could oppose the efforts of any relieving army sent by Austria and took possession of the Venetian fortresses of Verona, Leniago and Pesquiera. These together with Mantua formed the most famous strategical position of modern history, the quadrilateral, commanding the north side of the valley of the Po, together with the passes of the Adige. Between June 1796 and January 1797, Austria made four attempts to relieve Mantua, all of which were defeated. In August the first effort was made by Wormser, with 45,000 men, Bonaparte being at that time slightly inferior in numbers. The Austrians advanced from the Tyrol in two bodies, one under Kostanovich to the west of the lake of Garda, the other under Wormser, down the valley of the Adige. Bonaparte, proceeding on an entirely opposite principle, concentrated his whole army between the two Austrian divisions, even withdrawing the blockading corps from Mantua and by rapid marching succeeded in defeating Kostanovich and Wormser one after the other. There was a weeks fighting and marching about the southern end of the lake of Garda, among the principal engagements being those at Castiglione and Lonatto, and finally the Austrians were defeated and retired to the Tyrol after suffering heavy losses. A month later, September 1796, Wormser was ready to attempt the relief of Mantua once more but from a different point. Leaving Davidovic, with 15,000 men to guard the passes of the Adige, he proposed marching from Trent to Bassano with 25,000 men and thence to circle around, approaching Mantua from Leniago. On the same day that Wormser marched from Trent, Bonaparte started north from Verona with about 30,000 men intent on assuming the offensive. He drove Davidovic north towards Trent and on discovering that the principal Austrian force was not in his front but had marched to the east, he followed it without hesitation through the valley of the Brenta, joined and defeated it at Bassano, pursued it through Vicenza and Leniago, and finally drove its remnants into Mantua on the 12th of September. Wormser had lost nearly half his numbers in killed, wounded and prisoners. This was one of the boldest and most effective marches ever performed by Napoleon. The troops had covered 114 miles in eight days. A speed of 14 miles a day may not appear much to the reader not versed in military matters, who does not appreciate the difficulty of moving long columns of heavily laid-in men over narrow roads inevitably blocked at frequent intervals. But the study of military history will show that for periods of more than three days continuous marching in an enemy's country, a rate of 14 miles a day is very nearly an extreme. The American reader may note with particular interest that this is precisely the rate at which Stonewall Jackson's famous marches during his Shenandoah Valley campaign work out. But, of course, this does not negative fact that a small body of troops might in one day cover 30 or 40 miles. Wormser's second failure did not break down Austria and resolve. A new army was collected and placed under the command of Alvinci. Towards the end of October the position was as follows, Alvinci with 30,000 men was on the Piave, threatening an advance on Vicenza. Davidovic, with 20,000 more, was at Roveredo. The main French army was at Verona, and numbered about 30,000. Bonaparte now decided to reverse the operation he had carried out against Wormser to defeat Alvinci on the Piave, then strike back through the valley of the Brenta at the flank and rear of Davidovic. But this time his plan failed. After some desultery fighting, Alvinci crossed the Piave and forced Bonaparte to retreat to Verona. On the 12th of November the two armies met a few miles east of Verona at Caldiero, and the French were severely defeated. Bonaparte's position was now highly critical, for Davidovic had descended the Adige and was only held in check by a division occupying the strong position of Riboli. Only a few miles separated the two Austrian armies, and it appeared as though their junction could not be prevented. But now that the loss of an hour or a single prompt decision might mean all the difference between success and failure, the acute perception and superb audacity of Bonaparte made him more than a match for the slow and cautious generals opposed to him. On the night of the 14th the French army crossed the Adige at Verona and turned eastward. At Tronco the river was recrossed, and thence Bonaparte marched northwards to debouch on the flank and rear of Alvinci. The success of the whole operation turned on the occupation of the bridge and village of Arcola, which the Austrians defended with great courage during the whole of the 15th and 16th. Bonaparte tried to repeat at this point the charge over the bridge of Lodi, but saw nearly all his personal staff killed and wounded and was himself swept by an Austrian counter-stroke into a swamp where he nearly perished. The fighting at Arcola was of a desperate character, but finally on the 17th the French were successful in forcing a passage and Alvinci, finding the enemy in force on his line of communications, decided to retreat. The last Austrian attempt to relieve Mantua was made two months later, January 1797 and under the same commander. Alvinci now concentrated his main force, about 30,000 men, at Roveredo, and marched down the valley towards Verona. At the same time, two smaller columns threatened the lower Adige from Vicenza and Padua. Bonaparte met Alvinci at Rivoli, January 14, and by superior strategy inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austrians who, in two days, lost 13,000 men. As he marched rapidly back to the lower Adige, just in time to prevent the entry of Provera with 9,000 men into Mantua and to force him to capitulate. These utterly disastrous operations of the relieving army sealed the fate of the fortress and two weeks later Bermser surrendered with some 20,000 men. February 2, 1797. Chapter 4 of Napoleon a Short Biography. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Napoleon a Short Biography by R. M. Johnston. Chapter 4 Campo Formio and Egypt. Armistice of Lobin. Fall of Venice. Peace of Campo Formio. Methods of the French armies and of Bonaparte, his relations with the directoir, the eastern question, expedition to Egypt, capture of Malta, battle of the Nile, campaigns in Egypt and Syria, return to France. Two phases of Bonaparte's campaign of Italy have now been reviewed. The first essentially offensive, during which the French swept the Austrians back from the Alps to the Quadrilateral, the second essentially defensive, during which they reduced the fortress of Mantua and foiled every effort to relieve it. The third and last phase was to be offensive once more. A new Austrian army had been formed, numbering about 50,000 men, and had been placed under the command of the young Archduke Charles, who had just begun his brilliant military career. Bonaparte was slightly stronger in numbers and maneuvering with wonderful strategic skill, first through the upper Venetian provinces, then through the Julian Alps. He constantly out-generaled his opponent, won a number of small engagements, and forced him steadily backwards. So relentlessly did he urge on his columns that on the 7th of April he had reached the little town of Lyoben on the northern slope of the Alps, less than 100 miles from Vienna. Then at last Austria acknowledged defeat. An armistice between the two armies was agreed to and the basis for negotiating a peace. Just at the moment when the negotiations of Lyoben were freeing the French army from all anxiety in the north, the inhabitants of the Venetian mainland, long dissatisfied with military rule and rapacity, rose against the invaders. At Verona and elsewhere massacres took place. The excuse was a convenient one for colouring the spoliation of the ancient Republic of Venice, the neutrality of which neither France nor Austria had respected, the spoils of which both had coveted. The Doge and Senate were too weak to offer any resistance, and on the 11th of May the city was occupied by French troops. The long history of Venice had come to an inglorious, nearly unnoticed close. Bonaparte spent that summer at the castle of Montebello near Milan, conducting the peace negotiations with the Austrian commissioners. With the attractive but extravagant Josephine by his side he held an informal court to which many were attracted by the grace and beauty of Madame Bonaparte, but most by a curiosity to see the extraordinary soldier who in a few short months had carved himself a place alongside of the greatest captains of all ages. On the 17th of October peace was signed at Campo Formio. Its chief provisions were those that gave France the Rhine as frontier, that stipulated for the recognition by Austria of the newly formed Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics, Genoa, Lombardy, Modena and Bologna, and that transferred to Austria as a compensation for Lombardy, Venice and her Adriatic provinces. In the account given of the campaign of Italy the military operations have hitherto received nearly exclusive attention. There are a few other matters, however, that deserve passing notice. The French army, unpaid, weak in commissariat, loosely disciplined, followed by a horde of needy and not overscrupulous adventurers, made the people of Italy pay dearly for the introduction among them of the glorious principles of the revolution. Even Bonaparte, who from the point of view of military efficiency, disliked and did his best to prevent license, made the Italian cities disperse largely in return for the measure of liberty he brought them. Enormous contributions of war were imposed, and these took the form in part of a seizure of the treasures of Italian art for the benefit of the French national museums. Bonaparte pushed his odd and inexpensive collecting mania to great lengths, denuded northern Italy of nearly every masterpiece, and was accordingly elected a member of the Institut de France. How complacently he viewed this queerly one scientific distinction may be judged by the fact that, for several years after, he frequently wore the official dress of his new colleagues and generally began his proclamations after the following fashion. Le Citoyen Bonaparte, membre de l'Institut, commandant en chef, etc. Notwithstanding the corruption that attended the contracts for the provisioning of the French army, it seems pretty clear that the fingers of the general-in-chief remained clean. Large profits accrued to him legitimately in connection with prize money, but that was all. The genius of Bonaparte had been felt not by his army alone. The magnetic influence of his superiority had touched the directoire, but for the present there was no obvious jealousy or estrangement between that body and its masterful general. Each felt a need for the support of the other. When in the summer of 1797 there was fear of a new reactionary movement in Paris, Bonaparte gave his uncompromising support to the government, offered to march to Paris with the army, and sent General Augerot to carry out the directoire's mandates for suppressing its opponents. The purging process then carried out in the ranks of the royalists and conservatives is known as the Revolution of Fructe d'Or. What is perhaps most important to note in this connection is the fact that the victorious army had now become the mainstay of the republic. The revolution had swallowed up all that was best fitted to govern in the civil population of France. All the elements of strength and character were now to be sought for in the army alone, and the soldiers led by generals like Jordan, Bernadotte, Augerot, Murat, Victor, Ney, and others, comrades who had carried the musket and risen from their ranks, were democrats to the last man. Towards the close of 1797, France being now at peace, General Bonaparte proceeded to Paris where he met with a triumphant reception. In this connection it may be well to notice an important aspect of his remarkable personality. He not only knew how to win a battle, but also how to make the most of it. At that period newspapers were few and made little effort to obtain news at first hand. There were no special correspondence at General Bonaparte's battles, but he took care in person that they should be duly recorded. His bulletins, written in a rhetorical style suited to the public and military taste of his day, rarely mentioned the general in chief, gave the credit of every achievement to the soldiers, but never failed when expedient to distort and falsify facts to the greater glory and profit of Napoleon Bonaparte. His numbers were always understated, those of his opponents exaggerated, even defeats such as that of Caldero were officially travestied into victories. Thus a perfectly deceptive legend began to come into existence from the first weeks of the campaign of Italy, and thus it was studiously continued, even in the last painful days of the prisoner of St. Helena, even in the last clauses of his will. At the directoire's official reception of the general on his return to Paris in 1797, this talent of his for impressing the public mind was visibly manifested, for he carried in his hand to present to the government a parchment scroll which was the treaty of Campo Formio, and behind him was displayed a large tricolor flag covered with guilt lettering recording the sixty victories of the army he had commanded, the capture of one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, of one hundred and seventy colors, of fifteen hundred canon. The wild enthusiasm displayed by the spectators of this dramatic scene did not lead Bonaparte, as it might have a weaker or more short-sighted man, to bid too openly for popular support. He declined to show himself in public, and, even when he went to the theatre, generally occupied the darkest corner of his box. With him this was all a matter of calculation. He saw no real political opening for the present, or, as he put it, the pair was not yet ripe, and he did not want the Parisian public to take him up like some new toy, and then quickly tire of him. At first Bonaparte's idea appears to have been that he might be brought into the directoire, but the fact that he was only twenty-eight, and that the legal age for belonging to the executive body was forty, served as a good excuse for keeping him out. The question was, how was he, now that the continent was at peace, to keep himself before the public and earn new laurels? The only hope of solving this question lay in the circumstances of the maritime war still proceeding with England. The directoire was as anxious as the young general that he should find some military employment, and he soon left Paris with a small staff personally to inspect the French ports and camps facing the British coast along the Channel. This inspection proved unsatisfactory, and Bonaparte decided that there was nothing in this direction to tempt him. But, as a result of the last war between France and England, there was an attractive theory firmly fixed in the public mind, a theory on which military action might be based, a theory still of considerable moment in world politics. In the war which was closed by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, France had won the honors, and Great Britain had met with many reverses. French fleets had swept the Channel. English commerce had been harried. The American colonies had become the United States. France had made territorial gains, yet within a few months of the peace it was found that British prosperity was greater than ever, increasing by leaps and bounds, whereas France was heading straight towards bankruptcy. What was the explanation of this curious result? It would be out of place here to discuss the economic aspects of this question, to state the opinion then generally accepted in France is all that is necessary. That opinion was that the prosperity of Great Britain was chiefly due to her possession of and commerce with India. Therefore, to deal an effective blow at Great Britain, it was necessary to strike at India. Bonaparte, through all his life, accepted this as sound doctrine. The only question with him was, how was India to be reached? There were at that day, as there are now, three lines of approach from Europe to India, one by sea, one by land, the other of a mixed character. The sea route was that leading from the Atlantic, round the extremity of Africa into the Indian Ocean. The preponderance of England in naval strength placed this line of approach virtually under her control, and although the possession of the Cape of Good Hope did eventually become a matter of dispute, operations on this line were never seriously contemplated by France. The land route was one that should lead from Russia or Asiatic Turkey through Persia and Afghanistan or Belukistan to the valley of the Indus. In the year 1798, it was far removed from any political combination that the French government was in a position to attempt, though ten years later it entered the field of practical politics. The third line of approach, the most rapid and convenient, was that running through the Mediterranean to Egypt and thence either overland or by the Red Sea. Bonaparte was a son of the Mediterranean. His imagination had often evoked visions of oriental conquest. He now eagerly took up the idea of dealing a powerful blow at Great Britain on her line of approach to India. His immediate aim was to establish the power of France in Egypt, his ulterior one not well defined. He probably viewed as possible the eventual marching of an army from Egypt to the confines of India. The directois, pleased at the thought of ridding France of the presence of one in whom they detected a formidable rival, equipped a large fleet, and placed a fine army of 30,000 men under Bonaparte's orders. With these he sailed from Toulon in May 1798. A British fleet under Nelson had been sent into the Mediterranean to watch this great French armament, destined, as many supposed, for the invasion of England. But for the moment, Bonaparte and his admiral, Brouet, avoided meeting the enemy. They reached Malta on the 10th of June and the grand master of the ancient order of Saint John was summoned to surrender his fortress to the army of the Republic. This he did, and the French having garrisoned Malta, sailed once more towards the east, shaping a course for Crete. After sighting this island, admiral Brouet turned southeast and on the 1st of July arrived in sight of Alexandria. Bonaparte now learned that Nelson with the British fleet had been there only two days previously, but had sailed away again to the northeast. He gave orders for immediate disembarkation, took possession of Alexandria and started the next day on the advance to Cairo, the capital of Egypt. In the meanwhile, Brouet moored his 13 line of battleships and frigates as close to the shore as he thought possible and awaited events at the anchorage of Abukir. The British fleet under Nelson had left the Straits of Messina a few days after Bonaparte sailed from Malta. Nelson shaped his course direct for Egypt, crossed that of his opponents so close as nearly to sight them, left them to northwards in the direction of Crete and arrived off Alexandria first. He then cruised in various directions for information and finally appeared off Abukir again on the 1st of August. On sighting the French fleet at anchor, the British admiral immediately took his ships into action, succeeded in getting part of his fleet between the enemy and the shore and battering the motionless French ships from both sides consecutively sank or captured nearly every one of them. The French fought with great courage and obstinacy and admiral Brouet was lost with the flagship Lorian whose magazine exploded. The daring and skillful maneuver that had turned the French line and placed two British ships opposite each French one had decided the result of this great naval battle. Bonaparte and his army were now cut off from the world and that in a country where the stores necessary for a European army could not be procured had Brouet's fleet not anchored at Abukir but sailed back to Malta, to Corfu or even to Toulon, the position would have been threatening for England. As it was, Bonaparte and his 30,000 men were in great jeopardy. He proceeded however with his extraordinary enterprise with an imperturbable self-reliance that inspired all those with whom he came into contact. Egypt was at that time a dependent province of the Turkish empire ruled by a bay and a dominant caste of military colonists who formed a splendid body of feudal cavalry known as the Mamalukes. They proved however no match for the French army and were crushed by the steady firing of the Republican infantry at the battle of the pyramids on the 21st of July. This victory gave Bonaparte possession of Egypt which he now administered and converted into a source of supply in even more relentless fashion than he had treated Italy. During the autumn and early winter months he was actively engaged in matters of administration and prepared to turn Egypt into a firm base from which the next move might be securely made. What that next move might have been is perhaps indicated by the fact that he dispatched a letter to an Indian prince then at war with Great Britain, Tipu Sahib, urging him to new efforts and promising him assistance. But India and even Constantinople were far off and it is best to view as tentative this step of Bonaparte's and to treat as only vague purposes the sayings attributed to him at this period in which he referred to the possibilities of founding a new oriental empire or of returning to France by way of Constantinople. What it is important not to forget is that once in Egypt every one of Bonaparte's movements was perfectly sound from a military point of view. Not one of them was based on any considerations in the least approaching the Romantic. In January 1799 he had to resume active warfare. The sultan decided to drive the French invaders out of his dominions and for that purpose prepared two expeditions. One was to proceed by sea, the other by land through Asia minor. Bonaparte determined not to await this double attack but to take the offensive and deal with his opponents one at a time. Accordingly in January he marched across the desert from Egypt into Syria and after many hardships reached Jaffa, a small port already occupied by a Turkish advance guard. There was some severe fighting, the town was stormed and captured and the French accepted the surrender of some two thousand prisoners. But the question at once arose, what was to be done with these men? The army was short of food and an arduous march through barren country lay before it. If the prisoners consumed rations it would mean deprivation, perhaps even starvation for the army. If they were released they would probably rejoin the Turks or at all events take to the hills and marauding. It was a difficult problem and was resolved in the safest but least merciful way. The Turks were taken out and shot down. This terrible incident has long been one of those most criticized in Bonaparte's career yet modern military writers do not hesitate to justify it on the ground that a general can never sacrifice the vital interests of his army to those of humanity. This may be true but it might also be pertinently asked, was not the unprovoked attack of France on Malta and on Egypt at least as great a subject for reproach? Is it not far more important to award blame for the waging of an unjust war than for what is only a military incident of debatable necessity occurring in the course of such a war? From Jaffa Bonaparte marched northwards to encounter the main Turkish force and at Akra received a severe check. The Turks assisted by Captain Sidney Smith of the British Navy defended the town with the utmost resolution and after a siege of two months the French were beaten off. It was during this siege that a well known incident occurred. Sidney Smith sent into the French camp a challenge inviting Bonaparte to meet him in single combat to which he received the pertinent reply that the French general would accept if the British would produce a moral borrow to meet him. During these two months the French overran northern Palestine and fought numerous engagements against the Turks one of which that of Mount Tabour was a brilliant and decisive victory. On the 20th of May the retreat began and the army after heavy losses and intense suffering owing to lack of food and water and an outbreak of plague reached Cairo a month later. Within a few weeks it was called on to make new exertions for the Turkish fleet made its appearance off Abu Qir and there disembarked some 10,000 troops. Bonaparte collected every available man, marched against the Turks, found them badly posted with their backs to the sea, routed and in great part destroyed them. This was the battle of Abu Qir July 26. Shortly afterwards he gave secret orders to have a small frigate got ready in the port of Alexandria and on the 23rd of August 1799 accompanied by Berthier, Murat and a few others he left the army and sailed for France. After a long journey and several narrow escapes from British cruisers he arrived in the Bay of Régio on the 9th of October. Had he commanded events and dates at the hand of fate he could not have chosen better for the pair was now exactly ripe. One month later he was the master of France. Chapter 5 of Napoleon a short biography. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Napoleon a short biography by R. M. Johnston. Chapter 5 the 18th of Brumaire. French policy and disasters. Sies, Novi and Zurich, landing of Bonaparte, his attitude, episode with Josephine, conspiracy, Bonaparte appointed to command troops in Paris, fall of the directoire. The peace signed at Campo Formio did not prove of long duration. For at the very time that Bonaparte was sailing for Egypt the directoire had proved its incapacity by reversing his Italian policy and giving provocation to the powers. During the course of the Italian campaign Bonaparte had shown an accommodating spirit in his relations with the two southern Italian states, the Papacy and the Kingdom of Naples. He did not wish to weaken himself by carrying on military operations in such an eccentric direction, nor would he associate himself too closely with the extreme anti-religious policy of the directoire. But while the Egyptian expedition was preparing and after its departure the French government successively quarreled with and occupied both Rome and Naples and there promoted the establishment of republics. The jealousy of Austria and Russia was at once kindled and these two powers took up arms. In the spring of 1799 the French were several times defeated in northern Italy by Suvarov while the Austrians threatened the Rhine and an Anglo-Russian army prepared to operate from Holland. This military failure was not all however, for the directoire was as feeble and unsuccessful at home as abroad. In 1798 France became bankrupt. In the spring of 1799 the Jacobin party representing what was left of the terrorist element was successful in the elections and secured nearly one half of the seats in the Council of Five Hundred, lower house. The government had neither money nor administrative system nor moral strength. France was overrun by lawlessness, taxes were unpaid, gold was hoarded and the only thing that prevented the republic from sinking was the general fear of a bourbon restoration. Only all men wanted to keep something of the revolution, but so many political panaceas had already been exploded that there appeared little hope of agreement or salvation. At this crisis in the early part of 1799 an important group of moderate men, anxious to save the republic by means of some administrative or constitutional reform, turned to that eminent statesman Silles, then French ambassador at Berlin. Silles had been a prominent debater from the earliest days of the revolution and had gained the reputation of being the greatest constitutional authority of France. By a prudent course he had weathered the storms of Jacobinism and now a convenient expurgation of the directoire gave him a seat in that body while the best men in the legislative and administrative field rallied to his support and looked to him to effect a constitutional reform that should give stability to the state. Silles thought that to effect a change in the government the support of the army was essential, Bonaparte was in Egypt and the British cruisers intercepted all communications. Under these circumstances Silles decided that General Joubert's should be the arm to deal the necessary blow, but in the summer of 1799 the military fortunes of France had sunk so low that it was thought indispensable that Joubert should first retrieve something of the lost prestige. He was accordingly given all the troops that could be collected and sent into Italy to rally the dispirited remnants of the French army in that country and to bring the Austro-Russians to battle. From his anticipated victory he was to return to Paris and help Silles reform the state. At Novi on the 15th of August, one week before Bonaparte set sail from Alexandria, the two armies met. Suvorov was once more successful. Joubert was not only defeated but killed. This blow placed Silles for the moment in a desperate position and not only Silles but France for the German and Italian frontiers were now both uncovered. Only one French army that of Massena in Switzerland still held the field. For a few weeks after Novi the Republic appeared doomed and then in the last days of September Massena won a series of splendid successes in the neighborhood of Zurich. A thrill of hope ran through France once more and just at that moment Bonaparte landed. It was an extraordinary coincidence of pre-vision, audacity and chance. He had just caught the turn of the tide that carries on to fortune. The feeling that Bonaparte was the only man who could save the state was so universal that no sooner was his frigate at anchor than she was boarded by a mob of excited people who took not the slightest heat of quarantine regulations. The General and his companions landed and proceeded on their journey to Paris every stop, every change of horses being the occasion of enthusiastic demonstrations in honor of the conqueror of Italy of the victor of Aboukir. But Bonaparte knew enough of the necessities of the times of the temper of France not to pose as the ambitious General. Moreau, Juber, Massena, Jordan, Oche had shown themselves fine soldiers. But Bonaparte alone had closed a series of victories by forcing a peace. It was peace France now wanted, and it was the General who had presented the Treaty of Campo Formio to the directoire who was now declaring to those who eagerly pressed about him that the government of France was driving her to ruin, but that he intended that peace should be obtained and that all classes of Frenchmen should enjoy its benefits. As a result of his Italian campaign he declared France had been left prosperous, victorious and honored. He now found her bankrupt, defeated and disgraced. He allowed it to be understood that either with or without the directoire he was prepared to save the country. Bonaparte's return to Paris was marked by an important incident in his relations with Josephine. Probably no great man was ever less influenced in a political sense by women. And for that reason there will be little said on that subject in this book, yet the incident we are now coming to must receive notice because it partly leads up to and explains events of the greatest importance that took place ten years later. Josephine Bonaparte was beautiful and a woman of her period frivolous, charming, extravagant, tender-hearted and perfectly lax in her morality. Bonaparte had loved her intensely, fervently as the letters he wrote to her in the course of the Italian campaign sufficiently disclose. But when in Egypt intercepted correspondence and the tittle-tattle of kind friends had revealed to him that he had ample cause for divorce, Josephine had been hurried from Paris to meet her returning husband on the Lyon Road so as to place her version of affairs before him ere he should reach Paris. But the family feud between the Bonaparte and the Boarnet was already in full force. Napoleon's brothers, Joseph and Lucien, who had now become important political personages in Paris, had determined to overthrow Josephine so that their influence might dominate with their brother. They also hastened to meet him and succeeded in doing so whereas Josephine failed. For several days after his return to his little house in the Rue Chanterein, of which the name had been changed to Rue de la Victoire, Bonaparte refused to see his wife. Finally her lamentations and entreaties with those of her two children, Eugène and Hortense, together with the feeling that an action for divorce would be impolitic at such a crisis, prevailed with Napoleon and a reconciliation took place. The really important question was, how and by what means could a change of government giving power to Bonaparte be effected? There were several ready-formed parties anxious to win his support, but on his first arrival he practically declined all overtures, even those of his own brothers, declaring firmly that he belonged to no party, that he was in favor of no party, but that he was for all good Frenchmen to whatever party they belonged. In fact he would follow no man, but wanted all men to follow him. The directoire was too divided and impotent to take notice of the open challenge involved in the conduct of the Corsican General. He was, in a sense, a deserter from his army. He had come from a plague-stricken port and had violated the quarantine regulations. He openly impugned the conduct and threatened the existence of the government. Yet the directoire dared not order his arrest for his moral strength was far greater than theirs. Public opinion saw in him the only man in France of sufficient ability and of sufficient strength of character to draw the country from the quagmire in which it was sinking. Probably Bonaparte's first intention was to make use of Barras, with whom he had so effectively cooperated in crushing the rising of Vendemnière, 1795. Barras was still a member of the directoire, but was now too discredited with the best section of public opinion to be of any political utility. Between Seyez and Bonaparte, there was at first much coolness, but it was clear to many that, in their cooperation, was the only hope of effecting something useful. A party in which Talleyran, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cambas Serres, Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte were active, succeeded in bringing the two men together. From that moment, the scheme for effecting a revolution proceeded fast. The precise form that should be given to the new constitution was, for the present, left undetermined. What the conspirators were agreed on was that the executive power of the republic must be strengthened and that a committee of three should hold it. Bonaparte, Seyez, and a colleague who followed his lead, Roger Ducault. Few were let into the secret, but there was a vast, tacit conspiracy supporting Bonaparte and Seyez that placed at their beck and call a large number of men in the legislative bodies, especially in the Council of Ancients. Few of them knew exactly what was intended, but most of them were prepared to take up any lead shown them. The cue was soon given. Bonaparte had since his return received many applications to review various bodies of troops quartered in the capital, but had deferred answering. On the night of the 17th of Brumaire, November 8, 1799, he accepted all these invitations and fixed the following morning for the inspection, asking each commanding officer to march his troops to the Garden of the Thulerie. He also wrote personal letters inviting every officer of note in Paris to call at his house in the Rue de la Victoire at an early hour of the morning. During the course of the night, the secretaries of the Council of Ancients, whose support had been secured by the Bonaparte, Seyez faction, wrote and dispatched messages convening the members to a morning session on the 18th of Brumaire. In a few cases where opposition might be expected, these messages were either not sent or failed to reach their destination. Early in the morning, a large assemblage of officers in full uniform gathered in the Rue de la Victoire. At the sight of their numbers, all realized that the long-expected hour had come, though how the change in government was to be affected none knew. All, however, save General Bernadotte, whose sympathies were with the Jacobin party, followed Bonaparte, who led them in a body to the Council of Ancients was already in session. That assembly, on the motion of one of the conspirators and in perfect accord with the terms of the existing constitution, declared Paris to be in a condition threatening to the security of the state, decreed that both the upper and lower house should suspend their sessions and adjourn to St. Cloud on the 19th, and that General Bonaparte should assume command of all the troops quartered in and near Paris. The General was now introduced and harangued the legislators, declaring that he would support them and save the Republic. He then proceeded to the gardens where the troops were assembled and passed them in review, being at all points greeted with tremendous enthusiasm. While a packed meeting of the Council of Ancients was thus placing the power of the sword in Bonaparte's hands, the directoire was rapidly disintegrating. As had been pre-conserted, Silles and Roger Duccault made their appearance before the Council of Ancients and declared that they resigned their functions. Barras hesitated, but on pressure of some private nature being put on him by Talerin, he decided to make a virtue of necessity and signed his resignation. This left only two out of the five directors in office, Moulin and Goyer. Their influence was slight and did not affect the crisis. But there was a third body in the state, one in which the Jacobins were strong, and from which trouble might not unreasonably be anticipated, the Council of Five Hundred. In the enthusiasm created by the return of Bonaparte from Egypt, that assembly had elected his brother Lucien, president, and Lucien was now to play an almost decisive part. The Five Hundred were to assemble at noon that day in the ordinary course of business. No sooner had they done so than Lucien, declining to listen to any motion, declared the session adjourned till the following day at St. Cloud, according to the terms of the perfectly constitutional decree issued by the Ancients. To this ruling the members perforce submitted, and thus every item of the day's program had passed off without a hitch. All Paris appeared to rejoice at the events that had occurred, and unique fact in the history of revolutions, the government stocks rose in the course of the day from eleven and one-quarter to twelve and three-quarters. But the revolution was only half accomplished, and the nineteenth of Brumaire proved as stormy as the eighteenth had been peaceful.