 Thank you very much for this warm introduction, ladies and gentlemen. It's a special honor and a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity today to speak to such a distinguished audience. The triangle of jurisdiction between Karlsruhe Luxemburg and Strasburg has been labeled Bermuda Triangle by some commentators has almost become a household term. In the following, I would like to focus on one side of this triangle. And give you, at least, a rough outline of how the Bundesverfassungsgericht, our Federal Constitutional Court, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, or the European Court of Justice, interact, an interaction whose highly topicality showed, again, only two weeks ago when the European Court of Justice conducted a hearing about the questions concerning the European Central Bank's OMT decision, questions which had been referred to it for a preliminary ruling. Before I set out the guidelines on European integration and the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court for you, I would first like to describe the Court's main jurisdiction. I shall try to be brief so that we will have enough time for discussion afterwards. The experience of dealing with a largely ineffective constitution and a self-destructive democracy during the Weimar Republic led the mothers and fathers of the Grundgesetz, our basic law, our written constitution since 1949, to set up the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court acts as an empire watching over the observance of the basic law, which is directly binding upon the state legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. I do not need to explain to you the idea of a constitutional court with the power to reject laws as the Irish constitution explicitly provides for judicial review of legislation. Unlike the Supreme Court of Ireland, so the Federal Constitutional Court is not a court of final appeal, but only deals with constitutional matters. The differences between the standards of education of the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court are the reason why the Federal Constitutional Court has so far only once referred legal questions for a preliminary ruling. Of course, stock-taking cannot stop at the differences between the two constitutional spheres because they are interlinked in different ways and mutually influence each other. In the following, I shall try to explain to you the role of the Federal Constitutional Court in the process of European integration. Ladies and gentlemen, European integration is a constant source of both, unity and conflict. The Constitutional Court has been committed to this process for many years. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the various measures undertaken to combat the European sovereign debt crisis have been the main factors leading a number of new landmark decisions. What has been the dominant threat through these decisions? What limits does the basic law set on integration? Does EU law always have primacy over national law? Who has the last word in relations between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice? In the following, I want to explore these questions with the help of some propositions which also demonstrate the fundamental threats of the Federal Constitutional Court's case law. Good news to start with, and also my first proposition, the basic law is open or, as we say, friendly to European law. We call this the Europarechtsfreundlichkeit. The constitutional task of making a united Europe a reality is expressed in the preamble of the basic law and in Article 23, Section 1, in the so-called Europe article. The preamble states expressly that the German people have adopted this basic law inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe. The Federal Constitutional Court developed from these two provisions, which are quite similar to certain provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution of Ireland, its principle of openness to European law, as stated in its judgment on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. According to this principle, the basic law calls for participation in the process of European integration and in an international peaceful order. But please, do not think that this principle is simply opium, being handed out to European lawyers by the Federal Constitutional Court, as I will show the principle of openness of European law also involves duties. Ladies and gentlemen, while the Federal Constitutional Court and the basic law do not put up flat barriers to stop the tide of European integration, so the famous English judge, Lord Denning, might have welcomed them, the basic law does put limits on integration to preserve the identity of our Constitution. This is my second proposition. In its Lisbon decision, the Federal Constitutional Court established that the basic law does not permit accession to a European federal state. Such an accession would mean relinquishing the state sovereignty of the federal republic of Germany. To do this would mean, in Germany, rewriting of the Constitution, a matter which is subject to the will of the German people. As long as the German Constitution remains unchanged in this regard, the Lisbon Treaty entails the idea of the European Union as a supranational organization, which is to be permanently upheld by the member states as masters of the treaties. The citizens of the member states give the exercise of public authority at European level legitimation through elections and referenda. In Article 23, Section 1, Sentence 3, the basic law expressly establishes a second limit to the transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union. This provisions dates that the fundamental structural principles of our states, such as the democratic, social, federal, and republican principles, and the rule of law may not relinquish. They are the core content of the basic laws constitutional identity. The same is true of the guarantee of human dignity and those fundamental rights, which in short are part and parcel of human dignity. These minimum standards must also be adhered to by the German legislator in adopting amendments to the basic law. This is why we call the relevant provision in Article 79, Section 3 of the basic law the eternity clause. Ladies and gentlemen, we now come to my third proposition, which is the relationship between the federal constitutional court and the European Court of Justice is not one of supremacy and subordination. Instead, it should be seen as a sharing of responsibility within a complex, multilevel cooperation of courts. We call this kind of cooperation the Gerichtsebund. In another speech, I find the picture of a mobile inspired by Kolder and his mobiles. It's not a pyramid. It's something else, and it's a very complex thing. So I think mobile is a good picture for this. The federal constitutional court supports the process of European integration within the material scope of the basic law while the European Court of Justice operates purely according to the yardstick of EU law. This does not rule out of conflicts, but overall we have managed very well so far. Let me outline a few strategies that the federal constitutional court and the European Court of Justice used to work together in this Gerichtsebund in the spirit of a division of labor. In the past decades, different techniques, some of them innovative, have been developed for shaping this cooperation. In the following, I shall try to explain two of these tools. An essential instrument in this process of cooperation and collaboration is the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. This procedure permits the European Court of Justice to preserve the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. National courts of last instance are generally obliged to refer unresolved matters of EU law that are relevant for their decision to the European Court of Justice for the preliminary ruling. The interpretation and application of national law and the final ruling on the case are again a matter for the relevant national court. The federal constitutional court does not stand aloof from this fruitful dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the national courts. It ensures that compliance with the duty of the referral is subject to constitutional review. If a German court arbitrarily violates its obligation under EU law to refer a matter for preliminary ruling, it also violates German constitutional law. Person to the right to a lawful judge under Article 101, Section 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law, the parties have the right to have the issue of European law clarified by the European Court of Justice. A violation of this fundamental right can be the subject of a constitutional complaint to the federal constitutional court. Of course, ladies and gentlemen, also the federal constitutional court is subject to the duty of referral. But so far, it has only once referred legal questions to the European Court of Justice for preliminary ruling. This is the OMT case. What is the reason that the federal constitutional court is not willing to give a lot of legal questions to the ECJ? It's easy to answer this question. We have a lot of federal courts that have the cases with all the material to give it to the ECJ. And of course, it's better they give it to the ECJ as we give to the ECJ a special constitutional case. I think it's a good mixture we have established. And we can share responsibilities now between three levels. So our normal courts, the normal national courts, the constitutional courts, and the ECJ. And I think this is very practical. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, ladies and gentlemen, was a jurist and also otherwise a man of moderate intellect. To him is attributed the quote, trust is good, but control is better. President Ronald Reagan, an American, put it more peacefully, trust but verify. Neither does the federal constitutional court just establish in its case law substantive requirements of European integration and trust that they will be complied with. It is indeed prepared to exercise powers of review, although it should be noted only in exceptional cases. We have just seen this in an area of protection of fundamental rights. Moreover, the federal constitutional court reviews whether the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity is respected when sovereign powers are being transferred. You will recall that I just mentioned that fundamental principles in the organization of the states, such as democracy and rule of law and elementary fundamental rights, may not fall victim to the process of integration. The term used in this connection is identity review. We need to distinguish this identity review from ultra virus review. Ultra virus review means that the federal constitutional court reserves the right to subject legal acts by European institutions and bodies to review to see whether they remain within the limits of the sovereign powers granted to them or whether they go beyond these limits. This ultra virus review also has to take account of the principle of basic laws openness to European law, to which I will come back later. Specifically, this means that before assuming an act to be ultra virus, the federal constitutional court is obliged to give the European court of justice the opportunity to interpret the treaty and rule in a preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation of the act in question. Furthermore, ultra virus review only comes into play if there is an obvious overstepping of competences by European institutions or bodies which results in a structurally significant shift of competences to the detriming of the member states. Once again, we can see that the federal constitutional court does not pursue a cause of confrontation with the European court of justice, but rather one of cooperation. As President Scouris has emphasized repeatedly, the instruments for ultra virus review and identity review developed by many national constitutional courts over the years. I think half of the constitutional courts of the European member states have developed such instruments. I regard it by the European court of justice as something of an imposition. We may even have a certain understanding for this point of view, but there are three things we should not forget. Firstly, no big disagreements have as yet occurred between the European court of justice and the national constitutional courts. The fear that the uniformity of European law would be put at risk by the powers of review exercised by the national constitutional courts have proved to be unfounded. So far, only the Czech constitutional court has handed out a judgment in which it holds that a certain interpretation and application of an EU regulation is a preliminary ruling by the European court of justice was the erroneous and an ultra virus act. The European legal community can and, ladies and gentlemen, must be able to weather such decisions. Secondly, knowing that they themselves are subject to a certain degree of oversight has a beneficial effect on the decision making of judges. I can say this from my own experience as a justice of the federal constitutional court with regard to the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. The multi-level cooperation of courts, the Gerichtsverbund, encourages humility and restrained injustices. And certainly, and finally, these powers of review at the national level create trust with the citizens of the member states. They do not have to see themselves as subjects to the whims of some distant European court, but can take solace and the knowledge that when push comes to shove, the national constitutional identity will be preserved. This, in turn, strengthens their preparedness for integration. Ladies and gentlemen, so much for passers. What is my conclusion? I hope I have been able to demonstrate to you that there is one fundamental idea at the heart of the German constitutional arrangements. For the protection of our citizens within the European multi-level system, the development of political power still needs to be tied to fundamental rules in the form of a national constitution. We believe that's the best way to guarantee adherence to these rules is with the watchful oversight of an independent court. Only on secure constitutional foundations that promote European integration strengthen the idea of Gerichtsverbund and make it possible to preserve national identity can deeper integration be possible. Nobody knows exactly how the process of integration will go in the next few years. But, ladies and gentlemen, one thing is certain. It is only as a legal community with democratic legitimation that Europe has a future. Thank you very much for your attention.