 Good afternoon. You're all very welcome to the IAEA, so I am delighted to be welcoming Professor Matthew Goodwin, who is a professor of politics and international relations at the University of Kent. Professor Goodwin is also a visiting fellow at Chatham House and he is a senior fellow with the think tank UK in changing Europe, which perhaps we should rename as changing UK in the changing Europe. Change indeed and change. It might not leave, who knows. Yeah, so the changing tone, the changing language and the changing object of western democratic politics is the object of Professor Goodwin's work and so he's just published a book on the challenge that national populism poses to liberalism. So without any delay I will pass on the floor to Eleanor and before that I would kindly ask you to switch your mobile phones to silent mode and you are nevertheless encouraged to tweet with the hashtag IAEA. Thank you very much and the reason I am here is that I'm representing Trinity Research and Social Sciences and this series on populism and challenges to the liberal order is a joint series between Trinity and the IAEA and it gives me great pleasure to be here to welcome Matthew for the third lecture in this series. I'm not going to delay our speaker any further but just to say that we're delighted to have Professor Goodwin and he will today draw an analysis from his latest book outlining what lies behind the rise of national populist movements and what's likely to happen in democracies across the west. So without Thank you very much. I'm going to set out the core thesis of our book, what we think is going on and where we suspect we may be headed and then we can have a debate and then if you'd like the book I have some copies with me so there you go. I think we are obviously in a very fragile moment when it comes to Europe and North America. I think there's a very lively debate as we know going on about what's behind the current political shocks. I think that debate will continue at pace through the European Parliament elections in the spring through the Brexit negotiations and then we move seamlessly into the 2020 American presidential election. But I do think particularly within the context of Europe our conventional models and thinking are being challenged really like never before in the post-war era. I wanted to start with Sweden because I found the recent election in Sweden particularly interesting for a number of reasons. Sweden reflected three trends that I think apply not to every democracy in Europe but to much of Europe. The first thing that we saw was a decline in support for the centre-left social Democrats who plummeted to their worst results since 1908. The second thing that we saw was the rise of the national populist Sweden Democrats, a party that was rooted in neo-Nazism, a record 18% of the vote, one of the reasons why we still do not have a government in Sweden is because the other parties refused to collaborate with the Sweden Democrats. But thirdly more generally we saw the fragmentation of the Swedish party system. A lot of smaller parties, more ideological distinctive parties doing better than at the last election. The radical left party, for example the Greens, the Christian Democrats, we saw the vote a bit like a balloon full of water when you drop it. We saw the vote spread a little bit more evenly across the political landscape. And those three trends I think are really playing themselves out in many other Western democracies. I want to focus on one of those today which is the rise and impact of national populism. And I think there's going to be a lot of interesting work in political science over the next five years on both the fragmentation process, the rise of the Greens in countries like Germany, perhaps the rise of the radical left in some democracies. And it's upon social scientists that that task is going to fall. But I've been working mainly on national populism and that's why with Roger Eatwell, who was my PhD supervisor, we decided to write this book looking at what's behind the rise of these people. Marine Le Pen, of course, polled 33% in the final round of the French presidential elections in 2017. That was a record high for her movement. The Austrian Freedom Party polled 49% in the Austrian presidential election, a record high result for the Freedom Party. It was then returned to government the following year. Victor Orban in Hungary polled almost half of the vote, one another super majority. Lager in Italy currently, if you look at the opinion polls, is the only political party that's growing. Currently polling 34%. That's a record. Also polling well outside of its traditional northern bastions. Donald Trump, I don't need to say too much about. And of course, then you have this emerging discussion about whether these parties can coordinate at the European level for the EP elections in the spring. National populism is not successful in every democracy. Look at Spain, Portugal, look at Ireland. But the negative cases are increasingly looking like a minority compared to the positive cases. And if you consider four democracies in particular, when I was studying my PhD, as I was just saying over lunch, that the edited volumes would always end with four chapters on democracies that were considered to be immune to national populism. The UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. And if you look at, for example, Gert Wilders, also the forum for democracy in the Netherlands, look at the alternative for Germany now represented in all 16 of Germany's state parliaments, more than 90 seats in the Bundestag. The Sweden Democrats, as I've mentioned, and of course, we had the rise of the UK Independence Party that consequently collapsed after it really got everything that it wanted, a referendum and then the vote for Brexit. And each of those democracies has witnessed considerable political churn. And if you just sort of look at the public debate too, as we've seen, we're seeing the axis of power in Europe shift somewhat in that a year ago, the front page of the Economist was very confident and bullish about the new Macron-Mercal partnership. Whereas only last month the front cover of Time magazine was Matteo Salvini with the story talking about the new so-called alliance between the Southern periphery and Central and East European states, particularly around the issue of the refugee crisis, though not exclusively about that issue. Macron's approval ratings currently 24%. Salvini's are currently around 60%. Indicative of two movements that are at odds with public opinion. And that introduces a whole series of questions, which is, well, how is this going to affect policymaking at the European level? How is it going to affect responses to economic reform, to refugee crisis, to ongoing international relations? And some political movements have unquestionably lost more than others, particularly social Democrats. If you look at the center-left across much of Europe, not all of Europe, but across much of Europe, the decline of social democracy kicked in actually around 2005. So if you look, for example, at Chris Hanretti's work, he's done some really good work on this, mapping the electoral trajectories of center-left social Democrats, it's really actually before the Great Possession and the financial crisis that that decline kicks in. But then accelerates as Europe comes out of the crisis, and we start to see some truly historic results. The SPD in Germany currently polling around 15%, 16% of the vote just polled at the last election. It's lowest level of support since 1933. Were it to poll 15%, 16%, that would be its worst result since the 1890s. The Austrian social Democrats out of power, the Italian social Democrats record low, French socialists collapsed, Dutch left, Dutch socialists also weakened, Czech social Democrats again down, Sweden social Democrats I mentioned earlier on. Now, we can contrast that obviously with the rise of the Greens and some radical left movements that are doing well, but increasingly, to me at least, it seems that the question that is being asked of social democracy is not how can it retain or return to a position of electoral competitiveness, but how can it survive and how can it hold together groups within its electorate that are arguably holding irreconcilable values, particularly on identity issues. How can you hold together blue collar workers on the one hand that are instinctively socially conservative, and how can you hold them together with culturally liberal middle class professionals? One group feels profoundly anxious over European integration and migration. Another group feels pretty relaxed and would like to talk about a lot of other things like environmental reform, or perhaps more EU integration, or perhaps raising the minimum wage, or other such issues. No social Democrat has the answer to that. Lots of social Democrats say we'll look at Jeremy Corbyn, maybe he has the answer. The Hampstead-Hartley pool divide within the Labour electorate is clearly visible. It is just concealed by our first passer post electoral system. So I would warn you against buying into the notion that Jeremy Corbyn has found the cure. My view at least, and we can pick this up in discussion, is that Jeremy Corbyn has been somewhat lucky in that he's emerged amid a very different institutional environment. So the interesting macro question when you look at all of this, at least for me is, and when I talk to a lot of people in business at least, is when they say, well, Brexit, Trump, what's happening in Europe, does this actually signal that we are nearer the end of a period of political volatility and change? Or do these moments, these shocks, actually signal that we're nearer the beginning of a new period of political volatility and change? And that's quite a simplistic framework, but it gets us into some of the arguments that we routinely encounter in our public debate. So if, for example, you think that this is an awkward transition moment as such, as Western democracies effectively leave the immediate post-war era and move into a new period of churn and change, you are probably won over by arguments that this is essentially all about angry old white men who are backlashing against the system and are soon to be replaced by more ethnically, culturally diverse populations as university rates, higher education rates expand and therefore the potential over the long term for national populism will diminish. This is essentially what you read probably weekly in the Economist, probably weekly in the Financial Times. It's a very seductive argument, particularly for those on the Liberal Left, because it implies that we don't really need to do anything about the grievances that this, in effect, is a waiting game and it's essentially all about generational change. Of course, if you just look at the socio-demographics of who's voting for these movements, you quickly realise why that argument is woefully inadequate. If you look across most democracies, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the US, you're often faced with the reality that these movements are typically strongest among the under 40s, if not the under 50s. So if you look, for example, at Austria, the strongest group for the Freedom Party are 30 to 59 year olds. If you look at France, what was interesting about the presidential election that few people noticed, that was the first election in the history of the National Front in France, where the Le Pen brand, if you like, closed the gender gap between men and women. Marine Le Pen was just as popular among young women as young men. Nonna Meyer has a recent paper on this showing how Marine Le Pen actually became noticeably popular among 25 to 49 year olds and 1 in 3, 18 to 24 year olds. Germany, 30 to 54 year olds. Italy, the Lager is drawing its support evenly from across different age groups. There is no real noticeable skew. Sweden, second most popular among 30 to 64 year olds. Even in Brexit, and we forget this, we talk a lot about older voters, the vote to leave was endorsed by half of voters in the 35 to 55 year old gap age group, sorry. So 1 in 2, 35 to 55 year olds voted to leave. And in the US, 41% of white millennials voted for Donald Trump, 53% of white women, by the way. But also more diverse, 2 in terms of ethnicity, 1 in 3 black and minority ethnic voters voted to leave the European Union, 1 in 3 Hispanic Latino voters endorsed Trump, looking at the mid-term results, not much change actually in that respect. So we can see that actually as a movement, there's quite a lot more gas in the tank, if you like. We also conveniently forget life cycle effects. I mean, we are all likely to become more conservative as we age. Usually this is a point where somebody starts shaking their head very aggressively saying, I will never become conservative. But we're all statistically, well, if you believe the work of James Tilly at the University of Oxford, we are all likely to become 0.35% more conservative as each year of our life passes. And in fact, James has a very nice paper with Jeff Evans showing that if you look at the case of Britain across three generations from 1964, basically to where we are today, the probabilities of voting conservative actually hold pretty constant. James reminds me of the argument in the 50s, which was that well, Labour will dominate British elections for decades because of the demographic changes within domestic politics. And of course, actually, often the real world doesn't work that way. A different variation of that argument was Stan Greenberg's book, America Ascendant. Stan Greenberg, prior to Trump's election, argued that the Democrats would control the White House for the next 30 or 40 years because of the population changes and the rise of a new sort of diverse America. And I think what that argument has glossed is the fact that firstly demography is not destiny. It's often exaggerated the pace of that change. But secondly, simply by sending that message out there, what you're effectively doing is galvanizing other groups in society to become more active in politics. Indeed, we have a study looking at Donald Trump's election that now found that if you remind White Americans that they are on course to be a minority by 2042, they not only become more supportive of immigration reform, but they also become more supportive of Donald Trump. So simply by reminding people about how society is changing around them actually can have quite profound political effects. We also are slightly troubled by this public focus on these short-term arguments to make sense of these political changes. And if you look, for example, at how the public debate in general has tried to make sense of Brexit or Trump or what's going on in Europe, there have been a number of misleading arguments that we try and challenge a bit from the perspective of evidence. If you think about the focus in the US on what happened during the campaign with the FBI director letter, if you think about the excessive focus in Europe on the great procession and the financial crash, if we think about, and I'll come back to that because I know there are some economists here, if we think about the referendum campaign, what was written on the side of a bus, who said what? Was it merely a reflection of racism? Doesn't sit easily with the fact that racism within the UK has been steadily declining over the last 50 years? Was it the role of Big Tech and Cambridge Analytica? Was it the resurgence of historic fascism on the more excitable fringes of the public debate? I'm not saying that all of this is not important, but these short-term arguments have been given a level of influence that is wholly disproportionate to their actual significance, and I'll explain a little bit why. If you look, for example, at the takes on Donald Trump, I recently read this book, Hillary Clinton, What Happened? I got to the end and I realized she still doesn't know what happened in the sense that it's almost exclusively focused on the campaign, on what happened between starting the run against Donald Trump and the time that the votes were counted. If you look at some of the work by John Sides, as one example, actually the foundations for Trump were set long before Trump descended the elevator in Trump Tower. If you looked at the advantage or disadvantage for the Democrats among key groups in American society, then what you can see, particularly during the Obama years, is that the Democrat disadvantage, the net disadvantage among white voters with only some college education or white voters with only high school education, their advantage basically falls off a cliff and they become a little bit more supported among whites with degrees, still doing well among minority voters, but it's this key group that is basically disengaging or de-aligning from the Democrats. And we now know from two years of work that those defections were mainly driven by concerns over cultural change and migration, that around one in three white voters that had voted for Obama twice were also opposed to how American society was changing in terms of migration and demography. So the foundations were already set. If you looked at Brexit too, we had this discussion about Cambridge Analytica, not much evidence now, looking at the studies that have come out over the last two years to support that thesis. We also talked a lot about what was written on the side of a bus, but if you looked again at the long-term trends, and one of our key arguments in this book is we really need to take a step back from these short-term takes and look at the long-term trends. If you looked at the National Centre for Social Research and you'd looked at survey evidence, then you would have seen that pretty much since 1996, more than 50% of the population had either wanted to leave the EU or stay in the EU but dramatically reduce the amount of powers that the European Union had, with the exception of two or three years, but otherwise there was a clear majority in favour for that core message of let's leave or let's dramatically reduce the powers that the EU has. And of course we now know that the renegotiation or the deal that Cameron brought back in early 2016 was nowhere near enough in terms of what these voters were expecting in terms of that reduction of power. Something I talked about in my last book that if you look at all the polling, voters clearly wanted Cameron and the EU to have given much more than of course they were able to give. So again the long-term trends were really always favouring leave and bizarrely for obvious reasons confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, we collectively brought into the idea that remain actually were the favourites but there's a lot of good reasons to argue actually that it was opposite. Of course it's always easier to say that with hindsight. So there are two core arguments in the book. The first is actually if you look at the long-term trends, national populism is revolving around four deep-rooted shifts which were a long time coming and have given way to often legitimate grievances about the current settlement. This is probably the bit where I'll start debating with my colleagues. The second is that because of these long-term shifts that are changing our party systems from below and will be with us for a long time to come yet that national populism has serious long-term potential support from a broad alliance of people who share very intense concerns about how their nations are changing. It's unlikely in my view that we are going to slip back into an era of mainstream stable politics if indeed that ever really existed. And what we use as a device because this book is very much aimed at a sort of broader market than academics is what we call the four Ds and these are the four long-term deep-rooted shifts that are in their own ways influencing on voting behaviour today. Distrust, destruction, deprivation and de-alignment. And let me just talk a bit about those. So in terms of distrust there are essentially two arguments. It's no surprise that we if I was to say to you that we have widespread levels of distrust in politics that would not be particularly surprising. But what we argue in the book is actually to make sense of that level of distrust that we have we really need to look at how democracy has evolved pretty much since its formation and over the long haul. And there are two arguments that I think are really important to understanding why we're here. The first is that there has forever really since the dawning of democracy being a long tradition of what we call elite skepticism toward the masses, toward ordinary citizens that has been variously reflected from Plato to elite theory in the 1950s to arguments about democracy that praised apathy and celebrated elites being in control of key decisions and not necessarily giving too much power or too much room for manoeuvre to the people. It's reflected partly in how we've treated referendums. It's reflected partly in the emergence of European integration and democratic deficits within political organizations that are not seen to be sufficiently accountable or democratically transparent. And it's that elitist conception of democracy that has throughout history created room for populists that claim to speak for the people. And what we're living through is not by any means the arrival of populism as we know, but it is merely the latest episode in a long tradition of populist mobilization going all the way back to people like Andrew Jackson, to the US People's Party, to Father Cothlin in the US, to Huey Long, to the French Pujadis, to the progress movements in Scandinavia. Because we're living in it, we assume it's unique to our era. One of the arguments in the book is that the populist tradition is as long, in fact, as democracy itself. And we need to kind of understand that, particularly in terms of appreciating its durability. I'm a big fan of Margaret Canavan, who sadly passed away this year. And Margaret Canavan's work on populism was very influential, at least in arguing that as long as we have democracy, we will have populism of some description, whether on the left or the right, because democracy is by its nature unable to reconcile the competing demands, the competing interests, the competing calls for representation among our increasingly diverse and fragmented societies. But the second element is that actually that tension, particularly what is unique about today, that tension is being exacerbated by the way in which we have a growing representation gap between those in the corridors of power, and not only politics, but also media, and you might argue arts and culture, and ordinary voters. And national populism partly reflects a deep-rooted distrust of elites that can be traced back over decades, but which is now being given a new lease of life by the way in which certain groups in society have good reason to feel that they are not being represented to the same extent as other groups. If you look at the US Congress, and I'll only give you a few examples, obviously the book goes into a lot more detail, the US Congress now has record numbers of women and ethnic minorities representing voters. That should be celebrated. That is a core achievement of liberal society. It has record low numbers of non-graduates and of blue-collar workers. It has record numbers of millionaires, it has record numbers of MA and PhD holders, but it has record low numbers of people who have never gone to college. The UK, the House of Commons, has now the percentage of MPs who have any experience of manual occupations is down to 3%. The percentage who have only ever worked in politics is a record high of 18%. If you look at media, one in two of our columnists today have gone to still, today have gone to one of two universities, and if you look at other party systems, for example, if you look at Macron's cabinet, if you look at Merkel's cabinet, what we're seeing is the rise of what Mark Bovins and colleagues refer to as diploma democracy, the rise of increasingly highly educated, also highly affluent, but also highly socially liberal political representatives who are increasingly dominant across most political systems in the West. This is not just reflecting changes in society because in general our societies have become more highly educated, but this is now moving at a pace that is at odds with overall societal change. Why does it matter? You might ask. It matters for two reasons, particularly in understanding national populism. The first is that we now have still very high levels of voicelessness, you might call it, but a sense among large numbers of voters that voice simply does not count. This is especially high among non-graduates and workers. The euro barometer data that recently came out that was hailed as showing high levels of support for the EU across countries outside of the UK, one finding that was missed in that discussion was that one in two voters in the EU strongly agree or tend to agree with the statement, my voice no longer counts in the European Union, and that's much higher among non-graduates and workers. If you look at Brexit, the canary in the coal mine to some degree was three months prior to the referendum, 45% of workers in the UK said people like me have no say in government. They have good reason to feel that way, to be frank. If you look at how that breaks down just while we're here across the EU, you're looking at almost one in two. It's basically held static since this is the latest data, 2018. Some countries have fallen back, but generally there's been no significant change. But interestingly, if you look at Italy, if you look at Greece, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Latvia, here's the UK, right down the bottom, about 32% are saying my voice counts in the European Union, also very disillusioned before the vote to leave, obviously. But that sense of voicelessness really runs through the populist vote. Over 30 years, almost every study of national populist voters has shown that political distrust is a core predictor of whether or not somebody would vote for these parties. It matters, for one reason, is on the identity axis. Elites, if you want to call them, at Chatham House we did a large survey of about 15,000 voters and elites across Europe. Political, business, media elites, editors, business owners and elected representatives in contrasting them with a large sample of voters. It's on these identity issues, immigration is good for the country, immigrants enhance our cultural life, immigrants make crime worse, immigration is a strain on welfare, ban all further migration from mainly Muslim states, which was the Donald Trump policy. And you can see these, the reason I'm showing this slide is because these are the biggest differences between elites and voters. So this is the whole sample across Europe. If you look at these questions, you're seeing some pretty big differences. Blue is voters, red are elites. The reason that the changes in our political representatives matter is because the value set that is increasingly dominant among our elected representatives is not necessarily the wrong value set by any stretch, but is increasingly at odds with the values of those who are voting for national populism. And I can talk a lot more about that, obviously. The second core concern relates to deep rooted concerns about migration and ethnic change. And this is the most kind of, this essentially is at the core of national populism. And our argument is that throughout history, whenever we've had large waves of migration, they often generated a hostile response from the population. But amid today's unprecedented rates of change, we know that identity issues are now rising up the agenda. We know that large numbers of people feel instinctively negative about how their nations are changing. Not everybody, graduates are pretty relaxed, middle class professionals are pretty relaxed, but non-graduates, workers and traditional conservatives are not. And national populism is really tapping into these concerns. If you look, for example, at the Brexit vote, the overall level of migration with the grey line tracked overall concern among the population with the blue line. If you look at the U.S., overall share of foreign-born people in the U.S., which peaked in the early part of the 20th century, then declines rapidly and is now again on an upward curve. Again, the salience of migration neatly tracks this increase in actual change in Italy too. The refugee crisis over the last 10 years, particularly you see rising rates of immigration tracking also news coverage, but also levels of public concern. Now, obviously different in Central and Eastern Europe, but in Western Europe and the U.S., actual demographic changes are moving in quite close parallel with levels of concern. For Europe, this is a real challenge because the new issue agenda in Europe is very much about these identity issues. If you looked at UGov data earlier this year, they asked voters what are the top two issues facing Europe today, and in every member state except one, the top two answers were immigration and terrorism. The exception was Italy where the answer was immigration and unemployment. This may be a short-term reaction to the refugee crisis, which as we've seen overall numbers have come down. It may be that alternatively we're entering into a period of European political history where actually demographic change and migration are going to remain highly salient to voters, which will increasingly exacerbate those divisions. Central and Eastern Europe is really going to be in the firing line as such in terms of how this plays out with populism because a lot of these states are forecast to depopulate over the next 15, 20, 30 years. If you look at Bulgaria or Lithuania, they're going to depopulate by about 15 to 20 percent. Some estimates are a lot higher. Those states are going to need migration, going to need new workers essentially, or they're going to need to do a better job than they are doing at tempting young people back, but there is no real easy answer to how these states are going to prop up social care systems and welfare over the next 20, 30, 40 years unless they have a big injection of new labor. Those also happen to be the states that are most anxious over the demographic changes that they witness in Western Europe. If you look at the Pew Research Center, we know as well that Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred, and I sat on the government's group looking at anti-Muslim hatred for four years. We know that it's very strongly entrenched, but it's also very strongly aligned with support for national populism, that this is becoming something of a separate issue within the matrix of demography. If you look at the Pew Research estimates of how Europe will evolve even under zero levels of further migration, and obviously this is a sensitive issue that we need to treat very carefully, but if you look at the estimates under zero migration going forward, even then the percentage share of populations of Western Europe that will be Muslim will close to double in some states. Most voters will not feel at all anxious about that. Some voters will feel profoundly anxious about what that change means. So moving swiftly on was because I'm running out of time. The economists in the room would say, what about economics? The third core trend at deprivation, essentially the argument is that historically capitalism was always legitimized by national, by combination of nationalism and religion, whereas today the Golden Age has increasingly made way for inequality, wage stagnation, and the withdrawal of the state. And what matters is not objective deprivation in terms of actual levels of jobs, income, objective conditions, but a sense of relative deprivation that is running throughout large numbers, large percentage of the population, that people are feeling that both they and their wider group are being left behind relative to others, and often they're working in full time and often are on good jobs. I mean they have good reasons to feel slightly hacked off. If you look at overall rates of inequality from the mid 1980s to today, very few states have made progress encountering overall rates of economic inequality. In fact if you'd looked at Sweden prior to the election result you would have seen inequality rates in Sweden rising quite sharply. And also if you'd looked at the overall share of national income going to workers, then today the overall share going to workers is four points lower than it was in 1970. So if you are working class or you're low skilled working in the service sector you've got pretty good reasons to feel that this economic settlement is not delivering for you. Now it's the combination of these economic concerns in this sense of relative deprivation that's about loss, that's about community decline, that's about dignity, a word we don't talk enough about in politics but a loss of dignity and respect. Then actually a lot of these voters have good reason to feel very frustrated with the economic settlement. The share of jobs that are pretty rubbish, temporary, short term contracts, low pay has increased substantially in France, in Germany, in Italy especially and in the Netherlands. So when you're dealing increasingly with national populace who are saying like Le Pen is well it's not just about migration anymore, it's also about savage globalization and we can all talk about the rights and the wrongs of her message and whether it's just manipulation. But increasingly national populace are talking about economic issues as much as they are cultural and that's again where social democrats on the left have a really difficult manoeuvre to pull off because they're now fighting national populace on two fronts, on the cultural front but also on the economic front. And lastly before I get thrown off the stage the final core current is de-alignment and I think most political scientists would probably not have an issue with this, they probably agree with me that if you look at the foundations of politics and how our systems are changing one of the core things that we've known for a while Russell Dalton, Hans Peter Creasy, Peter Mayer who in many ways I wish was here to see what was going on because I think a lot of his analysis was spot on that the foundations of politics over time have become much weaker that the share of voters who now align themselves with the mainstream parties is declining quite rapidly but persistently in many western democracies. If you looked at UK, USA, Germany, France, if you look at the US, record share of independence, mainstream partisans declining, looked at Sweden. Prior to this recent election a percentage who identified with the main parties in Sweden has gone from 63% in the 60s to 27%. So we already have far more fluid volatile electorates that are moving from one party to the next at a much quicker rate than they have previously and that is why we are seeing these much higher rates of volatility that if you look from 1940 to today the overall rate of volatility across, this is across 19 established democracies is now on an upward trajectory. So more people switching their vote than ever before including in the UK. A journalist said to me yesterday, well 80% of people voted Labour or Conservative. It's the wrong stat. Underneath that 2015 and 2017 were the most volatile elections in post-war British history. Lib Dems going Labour, Greens going Labour, Conservative going Labour, particularly middle class Liberal Conservatives, working class Labour going Conservative, UKIP going Conservative. Underneath the surface we have considerable volatility and if you don't believe the thesis then just at least look at where party systems are going today in that we have three comparative studies now looking at the policy direction of political systems. Marcus Fargan and Thomas Meyer from 1980 to today show that increasingly the mainstream parties, centre left and centre right are following national populace from liberal positions to more Conservative and authoritarian positions particularly on migration and integration. That looks like the Sweden social democrat saying let's cut down on welfare. That looks like the Danish social democrat saying let's have a much more robust integration policy. That looks like the German left saying let's completely overhaul how we think about the migration issue. So that's it in a nutshell what brought us here where we're going and obviously I'm a bit more gloomy than most but also of the view that the period of political volatility that we're living in has only just begun rather than is coming to an end. So thank you very much.