 Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Victor Cha. I'm a senior advisor and career chair here at CSIS and professor of government at Georgetown University, and we're very happy to discuss today US career relations, the upcoming summit, Madame Pacquenet, as well as civil nuclear cooperation and the so-called one-two-three negotiations. With us to discuss these issues today are people who I think are familiar to many of you. So I'll go in the order of which they will be speaking. Gary Seymour is the executive director for Harvard Kennedy School's Belfast Center for Science and International Affairs. He served at the National Security Council from 1995 to 2001 and of course more recently just left the National Security Advisor as the senior... Co-ordinator. Senior coordinator. Weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation. Speaking next will be Sharon Squassoni who is a director and senior fellow of the proliferation prevention program here at CSIS. She has advised Congress on these sorts of issues as well as worked at Newsweek and in the executive branch of the government and as well as director of policy coordination and the Nonproliferation Bureau at the Department of State. And then speaking last but not least of course is Ambassador Christopher Hill who is dean of the Corbelle School of International Studies at Denver University is a former career diplomat, four-time ambassador as well as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the head of the US delegation for the six-party talks. So the way we will proceed in the limited time that we have is I've asked each of our panelists to start out with some opening remarks and then we'll have a little bit of back and forth in the group and then we'll go to you in the audience for questions. I think this is being simulcast live. I don't know if we have a Twitter feed up but if we do I guess somebody will let me know. But to get us started please Gary if you could sort of give us your views on where you think things are right now. Thank you. Thanks Victor. Just to remind everybody I'm a private citizen now so I'm giving my own views not the views of the administration. So for over two years now the US and Korea have been negotiating to replace the existing peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement the so-called one two three agreement and frankly the two sides remain very far apart on the essential issue of prior consent whether the US would permit South Korea to process or enrich US origin nuclear material for peaceful purposes. Now the immediate technical issue that the two sides have been debating is whether pyro processing which is a form of reprocessing is a suitable method for South Korea to treat and manage its nuclear waste from its very large nuclear power industry. The US position is that a final decision should await the results of a 10-year joint study that the US and South Korea are conducting and which includes actually building in a small-scale operating pyro processing facility in the United States to test whether the technology is technically and economically viable. The South Korean position is that even though they have no immediate plans to build an industrial scale pyro processing facility they want a commitment or indication from the United States that when the time comes the US will grant prior consent and allow South Korea to treat US origin spent nuclear fuel through this pyro processing process. The South Korean government also argues that as a new nuclear exporter it needs to be able to offer a full suite of nuclear fuel cycle services including enrichment and reprocessing in order to compete with other nuclear vendors in the world all of whom by the way have full nuclear fuel cycle services except for the United States which doesn't have reprocessing. So those are the technical issues but the point I want to make to you is that underlying these technical issues are much more profound issues of policy and politics. The first question centers on a very long-standing debate among the international community on the civil fuel cycle and as you all know reprocessing and enrichment even though it can be used for peaceful purposes it also can be used for military purposes because it produces fissile material that are dual use. So these sensitive facilities at least in US policy have always been very controversial both for nuclear proliferation and for nuclear security reasons. And the US since the Carter administration has generally opposed the spread of enrichment and reprocessing for civil purposes beyond those countries that already possess it. In fact the US has never granted prior consent to any country that doesn't already have reprocessing and enrichment technology. So for example in the one to three agreements the US has with Europe, with Japan, with most recently India we've granted prior consent but those countries already had both enrichment and reprocessing. South Korea if the US were to grant prior consent for South Korea it would be the first time that the US has given prior consent to a country that doesn't already have it and the US is concerned that that precedent would be used by other countries who would also seek prior consent to reprocess or enrich. For example Taiwan has a very extensive nuclear power industry and also faces problem with storage and disposition if it's spent nuclear fuel. So it might try to follow South Korea's example. From the South Korean standpoint they argue that just because they didn't have reprocessing and enrichment 30 years ago they shouldn't be denied the option of developing it now as a leading economic power, as a strong US ally, as one of the most important nuclear power countries in the world and from their standpoint they shouldn't be relegated to a permanent second class status. And obviously the fact that Japan has both enrichment and reprocessing raises particularly important nationalistic reasons in Seoul since the Koreans don't want to be treated differently than Japan. So that's the second issue but I think there's an even deeper issue which is often not fully spoken about among the governments and that concerns the potential spread of nuclear weapons in East Asia. Washington is concerned that if ROK develops enrichment and reprocessing for civil purposes it will give North Korea an excuse to retain its own enrichment and reprocessing for quote-unquote peaceful purposes. Of course it would really be a cover for their nuclear weapons program but it would allow the North Koreans to claim equal treatment and make denuclearization which is already really impossible, much more difficult to achieve. Moreover I think the US recognizes that in the long term if North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons program and its long-range missile program it will inevitably put increased pressure on South Korea and Japan to consider leaving the NPT and building nuclear weapons, building their own nuclear deterrent. Now I want to make clear that despite the the public debate that's going on now in South Korea I don't think the South Korean government is on the verge of going nuclear either asking the US to return tactical nuclear weapons or building their own nuclear weapons but I do think there is an unspoken belief among many South Korean officials that in the long term the development of a civil fuel cycle capability will create a short come to a nuclear weapons option if in the future South Korea feels that the US security guarantees are not sufficient and South Korea needs to deploy its own nuclear forces and obviously if South Korea develops nuclear weapons it's I think it almost impossible to imagine that Japan wouldn't follow suit and the you know security architecture of East Asia would be fundamentally changed which is something the US would not see as desirable. So as I've described the US ROK negotiations over the 1, 2, 3 agreement are much more profound than the narrow technical issues of managing spent nuclear fuel. They involve questions that deal with the global spread of civil civil nuclear fuel technology and fundamentally the potential for nuclear proliferation in East Asia. Given these underlying deeper issues I think it's very unlikely that Washington and Seoul are going to be able to reach agreement on a new 1, 2, 3 agreement in the time remaining. The current agreement expires in March of next year and in all likelihood both the National Assembly and Congress will need to approve an agreement and if you take politics into consideration plus as I've talked about the fundamental issues I think it's unlikely that a new agreement can be can be reached. At the same time the expiration of the current agreement would be unacceptable. It would lead to fundamental disruption in nuclear trade between the US and ROK in nuclear fuel and components and it would disrupt the South Korean nuclear power project in the UAE. So therefore my recommendation is that President Obama and President Pocconi should agree to a simple extension of the current agreement for a couple of years to allow more time for the negotiators to try to work out a compromise. Now this extension would have to be approved by both legislatures but I think both countries could make the case that this is much better than having the agreement break down and doesn't really sacrifice either country's position. Instead it just gives the negotiators more time to try to work out a tough issue. So my recommendation when you're faced with a problem that can't solve is kick the can down the road. Okay, Sharon. Thank you. Thanks for having me. Gary, I think you've said it all but I'm gonna try and build on some of the points you made. Unfortunately I think that these sensitive technologies like uranium enrichment and spend fuel reprocessing have for South Korea become an issue of status and we haven't, you know, we really haven't been able to crack this nut in decades. So not only has South Korea made it into an alliance issue but it's also, gee, Japan has this, why shouldn't we? And in a lot of ways that just defies economics and logic in the case of South Korea. And let me go through a few of those points. Gary, you mentioned that South Korea believes it needs uranium enrichment for its to increase its competitive advantage as a nuclear supplier. Well, it's got one major nuclear contract with the UAE for four reactors. But it got that contract and won that award without having domestic uranium enrichment. And as a matter of fact, the United Arab Emirates did a very smart thing which was to diversify its sources of enriched uranium. So it sent out contracts to Rosatom and Arriva and some other suppliers because guess what? The nuclear industry is all about interdependence. And even though some observers would like to make this debate into, you know, well, gee, it's all about security on the peninsula and it's the US, South Korean relationship and everything else, you know, this basic point about nuclear industry and global competition is there. It's about interdependence. So the ROK needs US vendors as much as US vendors need them. So I don't think there will be a lapse. I think there will be some frantic scrambling when the deadline approaches. But I think in the end, there will be a recognition that some of these big deals, you know, need to move forward. Back to the economics issue. So one is a nuclear supply. There's another argument that South Korea has made and that is that it can enrich uranium cheaper than other competitors. So this is reportedly we've seen this in newspaper articles from South Korean officials. This is based on a reported study that Korean nuclear fuel did. This is extremely speculative. I really do not believe that South Korea could enrich uranium cheaper than Urenko can and certainly not cheaper than the Russians can. So I think we can sort of put that argument aside. And then finally on economics, the economics of the fast reactor fuel cycle, you know, this technology pyro processing is really geared at this point towards making fuel for fast reactors. Well, how many fast reactors in the world are actually providing electricity? You know, BN 600, maybe? They're not and they haven't been for decades and they probably won't for decades. So that economic argument also doesn't hold any water. But the the other point about pyro processing that South Korea makes, which is that this is going to be the solution to its spent nuclear waste. Sorry, it's nuclear waste problem. That's also a really difficult. I mean, it's there in a difficult position as the US is in terms of its nuclear waste. But really, I think it's highly doubtful that this particular technology is going to solve their political problems. You know, we all need to find a solution to long term disposal of nuclear waste. But you know, as other countries have found out, even if you had reprocessing, that doesn't solve your nuclear waste problem, right? You're always going to have to have a repository. I wanted to put this in a little bit of the broader non proliferation context. And it's a funny, you know, when you look at the existing agreement, it's a very funny agreement. I've looked when I worked for Congress looked at every single nuclear cooperation agreement that the US has signed. This agreement dates back the amendment dates back to 1974. This was the year before South Korea joined the NPT. So it would be very nice simply to amend the agreement. But there's a funny thing about the law, the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act in 1978 required the US government to go back and renegotiate all of its existing agreements. And we did that with two exceptions, Taiwan and South Korea. And so, you know, it's possible that it could squeak by. But there are important things in that 1978 law, which just aren't in this agreement. There are requirements for physical protection, there are requirements for full scope safeguards, a whole host of things that I think might be a little bit of a stumbling block. However, I think, you know, members of Congress, if you said, look, we really need to do this. Can you help us out here? I'm sure the best legal minds might be able to find a way. There are two things from the non proliferation world that I think a lot of people forget about. And that is the Simington and Glenn amendments that date from 1976 and 1977. And these were supposed to provide restrictions or actually punishment for countries that acquired enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Now, do I think that these the the kinds of bans on and it's not just military assistance, it's economic military training and education, military credits and guarantees? Do I think that they would be automatically cut off if South Korea got enrichment or reprocessing technology from another country? No, there are ways of getting around it. But those two laws, you know, set sort of what the US was trying to do in the 1970s when non proliferation or proliferation was quite a serious thing. And I think there would be some a little bit of dancing maneuvering that would have to be done if South Korea moved forward separately to acquire these capabilities from other countries. So I'm just going to close my remarks by offering a few solutions to the stalemate. So Gary mentioned one extend the agreement, you know, for five to 10 years. And you could do this perhaps with a rider on an existing piece of legislation, if you could get a piece of legislation through this Congress, that said, not withstanding Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, that that's a possibility. You could simply sign a new agreement that met all the requirements of the current law with a 10 year timeframe and say at the end of 10 years, we'll go back and we'll look at this issue of long term consent when we know a lot more from this 10 year joint study. And then there are variations on that theme, which is you could do an agreement with a longer period, 30 to 40 years and say, okay, in 2024, we'll we'll reassess the consent rights or you could do the trend is to do an indefinite, you know, an agreement with indefinite extensions and do that. Or you could write something in there that says you could have a provision for long term consent in the event that Korea builds a multi nationally controlled facility on Korean soil. Now, there are a lot of precedents for this. And even in the Simington and Glenn amendments, they talk about multinational or multi multi lateral control of when the when that's an option when it's available. But you'd have to be very, very careful about what you actually meant by that. And that's where that option may face some difficulties, because, you know, there's nothing worse than a bad law that creates a lot of loopholes. So I welcome our discussion on when we get to the Q&A session. Great. Thank you, Sharon. Chris. Well, thank you very much. Pleasure to be back here at CSIS have been in this room for a while, but I think, first of all, I think the facts have sort of been made very clear here. And so I think the real issue is what are we, what are we going to do about this right now? And I can't think of a worse time to try to address this issue than the current timeframe. For a number of reasons, I think the North Koreans have, as always come in at a time to make things more difficult, but not only the North Koreans. So I think this is a very difficult time to move ahead with this issue. And I agree with Gary that the likely outcome is going to be to somehow kick this down the road, depending on what can come out of our Congress. But I think there are people who understand that you cannot have an interruption in the 123 agreement. This is for, even though there's only been this UAE agreement, one senses in Korea and from Koreans that nuclear energy is sort of what automobiles were in the 80s, that this is really look to Korea as a strategic export of the kind that will come to play a major role in the Korean economy. If you look at the number of power plants being being built in Korea, I mean, they've got projections out to 2030. We're looking at something on the order of 50 60% of electricity being produced by nuclear nuclear energy. I don't think there's any turning back in Korea's plans to make nuclear energy a main source of domestic electricity production and a main source of export earnings. And so the history of standing, of trying to prevent Koreans from doing something like that in the past is not a very successful history. And so I suspect that UAE is just the beginning of what will be, you know, efforts worldwide. So I think this is because it is so important, I think it does engage sort of a kind of Korean nationalism and the sort of sense that the country has to go forward and do this. Needless to say, however, in the context of polling data that indicates a rise in interest in Korea having its own weaponized nuclear nuclear industry in the context of even some politicians talking that way. This is hardly a good time to be to be talking about the question. We have to see what Japan's nuclear industry is going to look like in the future. That's had a few kind of clutchless shifts and in impetus. I mean, I think now it's kind of on a go basis, but we have to see what that looks like. So I think all in all, this really looks like something that has to be dealt with at some point in the in the future. I don't want to see the issue become a kind of litmus test of the of the relationship, the US ROK relationship. And I fear that that's kind of where we're heading in the current in the current climate. I mean, it's sort of the the FDA of 2013. And I don't think that's good for the for the alliance at this point. At the same time, I think, you know, I think the alliance is strongest when we kind of get a good sense of how the other partner in the alliance is feeling. And right now, these are these are important times in the ROK for a lot of reasons, but not the least of which is this strategic decision basically to go ahead with making nuclear power or nuclear plants a major part of Korea's export profile. So I think we have to be careful about that. And I agree with the argument that there's more, there's probably more smoke than fire here. The idea that Korea is at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis some of the, you know, France or Russia is probably overstated, certainly overstated within Korea. But I just think we need to be careful that this does not look somehow like we are keeping Korea down or keeping Korea in a second echelon position. Because if the concern is somehow proliferation concern, I think that will actually cause those polling numbers to get worse, rather than better. So I think we need to be very, very careful not to be not to be sort of adding to this sort of impetus right now and in in South Korea. Victor, I think we've kind of discussed all the pretty much all the facts. I will mention one aspect of the whole North Korea, the negotiations that we took part in together, which was the issue of should we allow North Korea a light water reactor? And you recall the the North Koreans took this as sort of a God given right that they should be able to develop civil nuclear power. And there they were actually quoting from the NPT on their right to have, I mean, they pulled out of the NPT, but we're still. And so we, I think very carefully came up with some terms of phrase in the September 05 agreement to which kind of acknowledged North Korea as asserting this right. And then, Victor, you recall us being very clear that we would not that we that we could have a discussion of this at an appropriate time. And the appropriate time would be when North Korea is back in the NPT with IEA safeguards, etc., etc., and it come into compliance. So I I think we made it kind of clear on that. But I think probably part of what fuels this current issue is how India was handled. I mean, ironically, the North Koreans raised India. And I remember telling Kim Gagwan, you know, there's not enough time in the world to explain to you the difference between India and your lovely little country. And but I think with respect to South Korea, I think India is a factor in the thinking. And I think it would be a little hard to just kind of dismiss that. So all in all, I think we're looking at, you know, in Gary's turn of phrase, kicking the can down the road. Great. Well, let me follow up with a couple of questions and before we go to the audience. And the first are for Gary and Sharon. Gary, when you say I don't, I mean, I actually agree. I mean, I don't this is it doesn't look like unless they have the two governments have deliberately set our expectations very, very low. I don't see a solution to this in the next couple of weeks. And it's most likely some sort of extension. But I guess in that sense, my question would be, when we say a simple extension, nothing is ever simple. And what are so if you could elaborate on what a simple extension would be, I mean, certainly the Koreans would push for some sort of language that would get at the things that they're looking for. And so that was my question for you. For Sharon, the third of your proposed to leave this long term consent, if there is some sort of multinational control, I mean, so I guess one is how do the Koreans react to something like that in your, your view in your discussions? And then for Chris, I guess the hardest question, which is, if we do end up coming out of the back end of this upcoming summit with something that looks like language leaning in the direction of a simple extension, how does that look from a South Korean from the South Korean president's perspective? Is that is that seen as a win, a neutral or a real loss? And how does that not become her beef issue, if you will? So sure, I think well, there are two different versions of what an extension would look like. One would be to update the existing agreement in those areas that are not particularly controversial, like enhanced provisions for nuclear security, which the two governments have already agreed to that language, frankly. I mean, my concern would be the more that you try to address up the current agreement with new language, the more it will become a political problem for President Pocconi to explain that she hasn't given away the country's nuclear sovereignty in the great value of just taking the existing agreement as inadequate as it is, and just giving it other five years before it expires. Both sides can say this is simply a way to buy more time so the negotiators can work out a solution. And no changes have been made in the existing agreement. I fear, like as in any negotiation, once you try to gild a lily, one side of the other will see that or try to hold it hostage to the other side to other concessions. And I just think that is going to prolong this process beyond the time that we really have. I mean, if it wasn't for the fact that the National Assembly and Congress had to approve, I think we could wait until March 31st. And then the two governments could just issue a statement saying they've extended the agreement for five years. But given the uncertainty of politics in both countries, and this is not just the immediate politics of nuclear cooperation, but as Sharon alluded to, the broader politics of stalemate in this country. And I don't think in the US Congress, I don't think an extension of US ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation would be controversial. I think people would think that's a normal thing to do, but it could become part of a bigger problem. And so I'm nervous that if we wait too much longer, we're going to find ourselves in a situation where we literally can't, according to the lawyers, we literally cannot extend the agreement because we won't have approval by the legislators and the agreement will expire. Sure. Yeah, in response to your question, Victor, you know, it depends on who you talk to, obviously. So the technical folks in Korea will say, multinational, that's great. You mean US Korean, right? To which I always respond, well, not exactly. Some of the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are intrigued by this idea, mostly because it contributes to South Korea's nonproliferation standing, right? I mean, we have talked with the South Koreans for many years, how do you improve your nonproliferation credibility? Because, frankly, there have been some things in the past which have detracted from that credibility. When you get right down to it, I mean, I suppose you could say to South Korea on enrichment, why don't you invite Yurenko to build a facility on your soil and just have it owned by Yurenko. But the business end of that doesn't make a whole lot of sense. Number one, we have enough enrichment capacity in the world. And number two, it's much cheaper for Yurenko simply to add capacity at its own sites. So I think you run into some real, you run into some practical problems with that. And then if you think about, you know, I've even talked to both Koreans and Japanese about, well, how about we multinationalize the Japanese facilities like Rikasho, because now there's a lot of uncertainty about where the Japanese industry is going. And there you run into deep, longstanding political sensitivities. And so I've even heard some Korean officials say, why would we even think of that? So even though it sounds like a useful option, it would take quite a bit of work to get there if you could. Could I just respond just a little bit to something that Ambassador Hill said on the nuclear energy part of it? Yes, I do believe that South Korea thinks of itself as becoming a major nuclear exporter. It's put out figures of yes, we're going to export 80 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years. When you talk to experts in Korea, they'll even say, well, that's a little ridiculous, that number. It happens to be the, you know, represent 20% of the global market. But these were projections before Fukushima. Okay, there is no doubt in my mind that nuclear energy is going to go forward in China. But as to the rest of the world, you really have to take what the nuclear industry itself says with a grain of salt. So there are going to be a lot fewer reactors being built over time. And even though Korea could do quite an adequate job of, you know, getting some of those contracts, even competing against the Russians, these are not real money makers. As a matter of fact, the Korean government had to extend something like 50% in credit or there's a complicated formula for these reactors in UAE. So, I mean, a lot of people think that those reactors are going to be lost leaders. And, you know, you're going to have to sell a lot of these things to actually realize profits. So I think the picture there is murky. But I don't disagree with you how the South Korean government sees that. I think we have to be a little more honest with them about that. Sharon, I completely agree with that point that you've made. I also agree with, I think, a very important point you made, which is the South Koreans have not made the case for competitive disadvantage on this. So I'm completely with you. But I will tell you, if you look at the history of the Korean post-war economy, every single thing they have suggested, they've been told, oh, don't do that. There's no profit in it. There's no future in it. Don't do that. Every single thing. Shipbuilding, you name it. So I realized that the idea of this prediction of 20% of the market, I mean, you talk to people in the nuclear field and no one believes that. But I think the Korean public believes that. And what would be worse is if it doesn't happen, we get blamed for the fact that it doesn't happen. We become the kind of ready-made scapegoat. So all I'm saying is we've got to be kind of careful that this issue doesn't turn into, I mean, Victor said the beef issue. I think it's a broader issue actually of the, you know, one of these tests of the relationship. Because after all, if the issue is over, concerns about reprocessing, and I take your point that there's plenty of reprocessing already. But if the issue kind of morphs into the question of can we trust the Koreans? Well, you know, if you're Koreans, if you can't trust us, who are you going to trust? I mean, out there in the world. India, is that your friend here? Because they've already developed nuclear weapons? So I'm just saying I'm not predicting a train wreck, but I think it's got to be very carefully managed. And I think Gary's point that in trying to sort of fix it up and modernize it, building the lily, we would end up with a situation where people would start looking carefully and go, well, if you did that, why didn't you do this? So I'm of the view that probably a straight up extension, because I'm of the view that it can't be done right now. I mean, I'm there. But I think a straight up extension with some language to the effect that we would put together some working group to address outstanding issues of, you know, and really put that in the context of a very positive special relationship to get us through these very kind of heady times. And I sort of, I mean, Sharon, I completely agree with you on the demand for nuclear power outside of China, but I'd sort of like to know where Japan is going. And I think that's a fair question to be able to address when we look at what this looks like. Because I mean, if the Koreans are left with the impression that Japan can do things that Korean can't do, it's just not a sustainable concept in the bilateral U.S.-Korean relationship. So I just think it's a terrible time to be trying to do this. And it really argues for dealing with it later, but maybe addressing it in the context of, you know, this is one of those things where the U.S. and ROK are going to work closely together on. Great. So with that, we now we'll go to the floor for questions. If you could just raise your hand, come up to the microphones and introduce yourself, Henry. Henry Sikolsky with the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center. First of all, thank you for holding this short notice, but still worth coming to. Baster Hill has made a pretty important point, I think, which is the sustainability of saying yes to Japan and no to South Korea. I mean, maybe you can kick the can for a few years on that, but at some point that is going to literally and figuratively blow up in your face. Has any thought been given to what we should be saying to the Japanese with regard to Rikasho? A. And B, when I explained to some folks at state what 8 tons of plutonium per year was equivalent to, their eyes widened, their jaws slackened, and a little light went off, which was roughly as many bombs worth of material as we have fully deployed in our entire weapons force. Do that every year. Now, the idea that you can do that without perhaps raising an eyebrow in China is an interesting thought, but you can see where I'm going. Can you talk a little bit more than two years, and what you'd have to do to avoid, I guess, the arrogance of Eisenhower, who is reported to have said that when you have a particularly intractable problem, you enlarge it. He was the author of Adam's Repiece. It was a mess. Let's not go on that direction. How do we make it smaller? Thoughts, particularly starting off with Rikasho, which is supposed to open up in October. Well, let me take a crack at it. I mean, I think that at least for the Obama administration post Fukushima and the sort of yo-yo up and down in Japanese policy toward the future of nuclear power, including the future of the Rikosho facility, there was not really any need to focus on that in discussions with the Japanese government because they're looked to be at least a reasonable prospect that Japan would decide on its own for financial and technical reasons that really didn't make much sense to proceed with the facility. And so our focus was very much on nuclear security, which I want to say in the last four years has really tremendously improved U.S. Japanese discussion on safeguarding nuclear materials. Because of course the truth is whether or not Rikosho operates, Japan already has very large stockpiles of fissile material which in theory could be used for nuclear weapons and in theory could pose a potential target for nuclear terrorists. Now it looks like the Japanese government's leaning in the direction that's starting to show up as they claim, whether they really will or not, we've heard this before, whether they really will or not I think is unclear. My personal view is that a direct sort of address from the U.S. government to Japan on this issue is not going to be productive. I do not think the U.S. is in a position to go to Tokyo at this point and say we think this is on wise for you to develop. But we're processing it. You're saying the opposite. Well, even if we took a, if you took a neutral position it clearly is not going to change Tokyo's view. If we took a negative position, I just don't think it would be effective. I mean I think if anything it would arouse Japanese nationalist views. Any more similar stuff. I think Rikosho points to the difficulties you have when you go down this path, right? The Japanese have put $20 billion into a facility that, how many years? It's like a decade over schedule or more. And the difficulty they face it's not just a technical decision for them. Gee are we going to open up our nuclear power plants and therefore we want mox fuel. It is so deeply ingrained in political bargains that they made with AMOQE prefecture, right? So that to take all these things apart is a painstaking process. And so I mean to my mind that argues, you know, we should avoid this at all costs for other countries unless it's absolutely necessary. And I think in the case of Japan which developed its reprocessing capabilities again with the fast reactor fuel cycle, right? This was in the 1970s when we all thought there was going to be a uranium shortage and we now know, well, guess what? No, there isn't. At least not for the next 100 years. You know, it points to that this decision should require a lot more force. I mean in terms of the technical points, the US-Japanese nuclear cooperation agreement has a 30-year expiration, but it then rolls over indefinitely so that at least from the US position, I believe this is correct, we don't have to renegotiate that agreement. By the way, that's something still being debated on some. Well, right. I mean, you know, it's going to be a mutual agreement between US and Japanese officials and I think there's a variety of views on both sides. But just from a technical perspective, we may not have to, you know, reach that decision with Japan. Now, would this stop Korea from continuing to make this comparison? Absolutely not. But I think, Henry, you point, you know, the idea that Rokasha would start back up and produce all of this plutonium without any or with a huge gap between use. I mean, who knows how many of those Japanese reactors will ever come online again? And you can't just make mox fuel and let it sit because, you know, it becomes unusable after a while. So it's a big mess. I guess I would conclude. I don't even want to add, I agree it's a big mess, though. Duyan. Hi, Duyan Kinsman, Center for Arms Control and Implementation. Thank you all for your excellent insights. My question is for Gary, actually, just for obvious reasons, you were just in government, your insights. It's already been reported widely in the press that even before an announcement this week that the two governments have decided on a short term extension at current levels, whether it's two years or three years or whatnot. And that announcement is pending for this week. And if we imagine that nothing else changes and that these reports are true, you did mention that a simple extension might pass fairly well easily through Congress. I was just curious if you could perhaps elaborate more on such prospects because it does not, the current agreement does not meet the 1978 NPA standards. So it does have to get approval from Congress. And if it does pass Congress, curious in your view, what's in the two or three years of that extension, what could possibly change or improve or become different that could narrow the gap between the two allies on the enrichment and pyro processing because that is the biggest sticking point at this time. Thank you. Well, I haven't heard these reports that the governments have already agreed to my recommendation to a short term extension. And in fact, I think there may be a tendency to try to use the deadline as a forcing event to hope that the other side blinks. I think that's a very dangerous game, as I've explained why, because I don't see at this point any likelihood that either side will blink. But I do think that from, I mean, if the two governments agreed to a simple extension of the existing agreement, I think that it would probably be much less controversial in Congress than it would be in the National Assembly. I mean, I defer to others who are more expert, but I think it'd be a very easy selling Congress to say that South Korea is one of our strongest allies. We have very extensive peaceful nuclear cooperation. We've simply run out of time to deal with these difficult issues. And we're asking for a short extension so that the experts can try to work out a compromise. I don't think that's a hard sell at all. I think it might be more difficult for President Park because there would be, well, we know the National Assembly could become another beef for a free trade agreement, could become a big nationalist issue. So I think the question would be to ask the South Korean government whether they think they could manage a simple extension. What the ultimate solution looks like, I really don't know. I mean, I do think that there's a lot of strength to the South Korean argument that they have come a long way in 30 years and should they be held hostage to a policy that we invented during the Carter administration, the world has changed. But I also think that there are some pretty significant, as we've talked about, some pretty significant policy issues. So I don't think there's sort of an obvious solution to deal with it yet. But I want to say I agree with what Sharon said, that from a technical standpoint, there is actually no immediate requirement for South Korea to develop pyro-processing for spent fuel storage. There are other ways of storing spent fuel for decades, even centuries, in above-ground concrete bunkers. And there's certainly no need for the Platonic firmbox or fast fuel cycle. So I think from that standpoint, I don't think it's true that we sort of face an urgent need for a decision. I understand why South Korea is impatient. And as I said, I think there are underlying motivations which are unspoken, but the longer it looks like North Korea is not going to be denuclearized, the more I think there's pressure on the South Korean government to at least pursue a path that creates an option, which Japan already has and has had for many years. Great. I think we have time for one more. Yes, Miles. Miles Pomper from the Monterey Institute. Just wanted to correct a little bit one point you made, Gary, which was you said all the other competitors have full suites of fuel cycle capabilities. That's true of the French and the Russians. It's not true of Westinghouse, for instance. No, I said except the U.S. Exactly. And well, and Toshiba. So that's half. So two companies have full suites, the French and the Russians. Japan has enrichment in reprocessing. But they're not doing it for export purposes, which is the reason the Koreans are... Thank you for correcting. Just wait for the Indians. Yeah. The other, you know, more broadly, I think if you look at this question about what the industry is saying and what the government is saying, if you talk to people in the industry, they don't expect to export 80 reactors. I mean, this is the Korean industry. This isn't the rest of the world's industry. They say maybe 10 nuclear plants. That's the optimistic thing by 2030. They say there's no need for enrichment capabilities that they're better off just doing that in the private market or buying into a Urengko plant. So this is a Korean government national status prestige thing. This is absolutely nothing to do with business or economics. So I just wanted to make that point. There's a question to have a comment. Isn't that right? That doesn't make it easier to answer that. Yeah, that does not. Go ahead, Sharon. Let me make one point. We did, we hosted CSIS in the Asan Institute, hosted a workshop two months ago in Seoul, specifically on Korea as a responsible nuclear exporter. And what came to light was that Korea is building, I don't know, how many six or eight nuclear reactors in Korea. And then it's got the four in the UAE. And they have a huge human resource problem. And so they're actually, they don't have enough experts to go around for all these projects. So they're working, they're planning on shifting their managers. It's kind of this big, you know, operations research chart. Shifting their managers from project to project every couple of years. Now, obviously if they want to, you know, if they're thinking about exporting that many reactors, they're going to have to spend a lot of money to build up that infrastructure. And again, my point about investment, right? Once they do that, it's going to be very hard for them to walk back, right? And, you know, what I've seen actually with the Japanese nuclear industry is, you know, even the premier forging Japan Steelworks, we were talking to them seven, eight years ago and saying, well, the nuclear renaissance, aren't you going to, you know, increase your capacity? They're like, well, maybe by two, you know, ultra heavy forging a year. They were quite conservative because that market is very, it's very difficult to project growth. But I agree, Miles. I think there's, you know, there's a real, there's a gap there between sort of business reality and what we're seeing in the media from the government. OK, well, so we shall see in the coming days. And just because it's on the internet doesn't mean it's true. Whether, how the two countries will deal with it. In the meantime, I want to thank these experts for taking the time for joining us on talking about a very difficult and complicated topic. So thank you very much. Thank you very much.