 Good morning, Gall. Let's adjust the head and welcome to the 8th meeting of the Justice Sub-comittee for Localers. I ask everyone to switch off mobile phones and electronic devices in fear of broadcasting even when they are switched to silent. No apologies have been received. I welcome Roddy Campbell, member of the Justice Committee to the meeting. I'm the subject committees invited to be agreed to consider a work program under item 3. Are you agreed? Felly, rydw i'w adnodr iawn o arm poliws. Felly, rydw i'w adnodr iawn o arm poliws. I welcome to the meeting. The Emory Chair of the SPA and the White SPA board member, Derek Penman, HM Inspector of Constabulary in Scotland. This is your second outing this week. Dr Brian Plastow, lead inspector with HMICS. I thank you for your latest correspondence, providing details of the SPA scrutiny inquiry in which it is assurance review relating to firehorns deployment. As we have the information before us, unless you have anything you additionally want to add, I see nobody has anything additionally want to add, I will go straight to questions from members. John and Graham. First questions to Mr Penman, if I may please. Thanks for all the documentation that has been very helpful. In particular, I like the reference in your document to the wider community impact on human rights legislation that has been incorporated in that making require. That is which is very important. Do you give us an assurance about presumed statements thus far, in one she will receive? That will be challenged not just because the Chief says it. I say that because it is by my understanding that a lot of unhappy officers exist in the culture of unwillingness to challenge decisions or fear of being in charge of paper clips after you do challenge them. I advise some who may be in charge in paper Do you plan to speak to officers other than those listed in your review? There is a number of officers doing operational duties that are not happy that armed officers are appearing on the scene for minor incidents. Who wants to answer that first? Mr Penham? Part of our methodology is to identify officers. They would include the ARV officers from there. I think that we've got flexibility in our programme and I'll be more than happy to include officers who are working alongside the armed officers and also commanders and other officers within the force just to seek the reviews on that, so I'll give you an assurance that we will include that as part of our review. OK, thanks very much. In many respects, Camilla, I think that this is perhaps a bit premature as scrutinising because I think that it's the review that will be interesting. As part of that, Mr Penn, will you be able to bride the committee with a timeline of who took what decisions and when, because I have to say that there has been varying representations of that from Police Scotland? Can I just clarify for me who took decisions and when I want to know on what? A bigger pardon, on the stage change that's seen us move from a situation where initially one, then two, we're told three and then overnight eight all move to a situation of standing authority, so the timeline for that? As part of our review and our methodology, I think that on page 11 we have undertaken to look at what were the legacy force policies and procedures and deployment criteria, and the reason for that is exactly as you point out. I think that it would be helpful to paint that picture for everyone to understand what existed prior to Police Scotland, what changes then took effect, because in many respects I think it was those changes that have triggered the community interest around that. The Police Authority has also asked us to look at the notification processes that Police Scotland did as part of bringing this policy through, and again as part of our methodology we will look at what steps Police Scotland did and how they engage with the authority and report publicly on that. I was going to ask the SP if they want to answer. You have a separate review, haven't you? Do you want to answer that part as well? I was just concentrating on the inspector at the family, please. Okay, thank you partner. Let me not interfere, please, we'll go on. Thank you very much. Again, Mr Penman, when you talk about identifying good practice that can be applied across Scotland, your predecessors in your post had a duty to ensure that all the legacy forces, I believe the term, would have operated efficiently, and they all had different arrangements. So that good practice could be a reversion to some of these arrangements, which clearly got a clear bill of health from your predecessors. There are probably two stages that might be helpful at this stage in our evidence to explain. The first part is the decision by which the chief constable will arrive at the need for a standing authority, and that is effectively whether or not there is sufficient threat intelligence that would justify officers having immediate access to firearms. The second part for me is very much about how having that decision been taken, how are those officers then deployed across Scotland and also the courage of firearms for us. So what we will look at is the good practice in relation to the deployment of armed response officers. That will be caught up as part of the legacy. So what happened previously in Scotland, but I think it's also important for us to look beyond Scotland and elsewhere in the United Kingdom to see what is recognised as good practice here as well and again feed that back into our report. If I may, that leads me into our next two or three questions, and that revolves around the term national guidance. I'm not trying to embroil you in some sort of constitutional discussion, but by national guidance that's meant UK guidance. Yes, absolutely. Section 55 of the Firearms Act 1968 is the legislative framework that allows the chief constable to deploy firearms for a policing purpose. There is then a national guidance that now comes through its approved professional practice from the College of Policing, which is the effect if we hold that doctrine. Scottish policing has been involved over the years in developing that doctrine alongside other UK forces, but it is UK recognised practice in terms of firearms. Without rehearsing the number of documents, which I'm sure you'll be aware of, your predecessor in 2009 talks about compliance voluntarily with those. If that's changed, will your report highlight why that's changed and who decided based on what? We can certainly take that on board and demonstrate what the list of the framework is for that. One of the step changes in order to deploy firearms, there must be accredited training, and the force that provides that training must be accredited to each of the commanders, and firearms officers must be trained and accredited, and that's now done to UK guidance through the College of Policing, so that ties effectively Scotland into that UK framework. We can certainly provide explanations of that in our report. I've previously asked questions about the tactic that was referred to as hard stop, which was applied in the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan. The police commission south of the border made recommendations of that. Is that the sort of background that you'd be looking to see that good practice has been applied and picked up on, because there was a suggestion that it wasn't immediately responded to by forces in England and Wales? The hard stop is one of a number of tactics that would be deployed in armed policing. To be honest, that's not really within the scope of our review at present. What we're interested in is about the standing authority and the deployment of officers who have that standing authority and how they are also linked into local policing, as opposed to looking at all the various tactics that may or may not apply in armed policing that wasn't within the scope of our review. I understand that. It was more with regard to consequences of applying the UK position. There has been criticism of that tactic. I'm not aware of the detail of that criticism. The safeguards do that effectively about the deployment of the firearms as well. There are other checks and balances across Scotland in the form of the perk who would look at that and also be able to comment. In terms of firearms being used, the perk would be involved in doing that, probably in the direction of the crown. I don't see us looking at the tactics of ARV officers as part of our review. Are you able to give the committee an assurance that none of your staff who will be involved in this inquiry have previously been involved in decisions about the standing authorization? I can certainly give the commitment that none of the staff involved in this will have been previously involved in any decisions involving Police Scotland standing authority in relation to that. I'm grateful for that. Graeme Dey, to follow by Margaret Allison and Kevin. Good afternoon and thanks, convener. First thing about the College of Policing authorised professional practice, I checked the site this morning. It indicates in the site that the doctrine has not as yet been extended to Scotland and is still subject to discussions. Is that your understanding? My understanding is that the guidance in there is effectively practised within policing in Scotland because in order to get the accreditation to train and effectively to deploy, that has to be done through the College of Policing. You would accept it that it says on the site this morning that it's not as yet been extended to Scotland and is still subject to discussions. If it's on the site, that might be the case. What we are going to do is work alongside the College of Policing and DCC Simon Chesterman, who is the act polead. We will make sure that all those areas are covered as part of our review. The point is that a lot has been said about authorised professional practice in the various, say, correspondence, as if it's a doctrine which has been fully expanded and examined, and there's now almost law if I could use that term in terms of internal practice, but it's still subject to discussion. The second point that we make is that, just as the committee in 27 November 2012, your predecessor described operational independence as a grey area and was also commented as fuzzy. It was acknowledged during that committee that clarity would be required through the process of discussion. Have you been involved in any formal discussions in relation to operational independence? If you have, can we have copies of the minutes of those discussions so that we can see the direction that's going? The answer is that I have not been involved in any formal discussions around operational independence. Given evidence to justice committee on Tuesday, I took the opportunity to say that one of the areas that requires further work and the timing is right for that is scrutiny. That is a discussion nationally to look at all levels of scrutiny, not just operational autonomy of the key console but accountability to authority and how scrutiny bodies such as myself link into that. I've got to say that it's a matter of regret that, in the intervening almost two years, such an important issue hasn't been subject to discussion and examination given what we're now debating and the amount of concern that's been expressed publicly. In that context, I watched the SPA board meeting where the subject of armed response came up. I've got to say that I was disappointed that, almost from the outset, without any examination of the chief console's position, there seemed to be an acknowledgement that operational independence applied in those circumstances. Other than Mr White, who raised a number of pertinent issues about communication, the discussion thereafter seemed to be post-decision making. Could you tell us what your understanding of operational independence is and whether you believe that it was applied properly in those circumstances? Can you hear me? Well, as you know, the act makes it quite clear that the chief console has operational independence and that is actually intended to be independent from any political influence. There is a maturity of our arrangements with the police as to the extent to which the SPA becomes involved in the decisions that the chief console makes. The scrutiny role that we have is very much after the fact and that is not really my view of governance. I think I've expressed that to this committee various times when we've met previously. We need to move on to a situation where we are consulted in advance of policy decisions being made rather than simply scrutinising those decisions after the fact. I acknowledge that and I recently responded to a letter that you wrote to me expressing that view in my letter to you. Mr White wants to know more about the inquiry that we are carrying out. Some of that inquiry is indeed a scrutiny of the decision-making that is taking place. Our fourth bullet point of our remit of the inquiry is to see what lessons might be learned about how operational decisions and wider strategic or community impact are communicated to national and local oversight bodies and other key interests. We want to improve the way that scrutiny of the chief console and operational decisions is undertaken and some of that, as Vic has said, is about upfront scrutiny and oversight of those decisions prior to policies being implemented. Going back to the comment in 2012, can either of you indicate what discussions you've had since 2012 on the issue of operational independence and who with and could we have access to the minutes of any of those discussions? We haven't had formal discussions that are minited but we have had a growing improvement in our relationship with the police and this is a matter of persuading the police that they need to come forward and consult with the board, particularly on how decisions are communicated amongst the community before those decisions are made. We are maturing that relationship, as I've said to you slowly. We need to mature that because the act can be literally interpreted as being a scrutiny after the fact and that is not a satisfactory situation and I think that we all acknowledge that and we're trying to move to a position where we are involved prior to those decisions being made. Can you indicate when the chief constable first consulted with you as a convener on the issue of extending the use of armed police officers on routine duties? The chief constable communicated with me at the Selkirk board meeting. There is a document that was issued quite a long time ago. You may know, Derek. There was a document that was produced, I think, for the D1 readiness that was presented to the board in which our reference was contained in it. There was a one-line reference in a document of a number of things that were being rolled out in readiness for day one, which, as we all know, went through very successfully. In fact, most of the public didn't actually notice the difference between the legacy forces and Police Scotland, but it was one item amongst a catalogue of items that were communicated at that time. My recollection would be that it was March or April 2013. I think that, if I understand the way that you commented, that one-line reference wouldn't amount to seeking any consent or approval of the current situation. Again, if you read the prospectus of the review that Derek Penman and HMIC are going to carry out, plus the added review of the SPA, that is one of the questions that we want exposed. The nature of a standing authorisation reading the documentation that refers to it indicates officers who are on specific duties and where a risk is identified and demands the requirement for officers to be permanently armed. In the discussions that you had at Selkirk, were you satisfied that it was necessary for officers performing routine duties anywhere in Scotland would require to wear automatic pistols as a normal way of duty? What risk assessment was presented to you at that stage that persuaded you that that was fine? That was not discussed in that level of detail, as you will probably know, because, as you have said, you watched it through. Therefore, there was no risk assessment offered to the SPA in that respect. Did the cabinet secretary speak to you about the issue of the controversy of armed police? Given that the cabinet secretary seems to have been told about this a year ago, were you told an interim period that such a conversation had occurred? The chief constable briefed the cabinet secretary last year. It came from the chamber in a reply in the chamber. The cabinet secretary indicated that the chief constable would brief him on this matter in his office. Can you give us a reference so that we know where it went so that we can put the report? It would be about five weeks ago in the chamber during justice questions. Can you tell me when, if ever, did the cabinet secretary discuss the issue of armed officers on routine patrol in Scotland? I have not discussed that issue with the cabinet secretary. I think that it would be very helpful if you could give us the reference, as that is a very pertinent question, and we have been asked to answer it. I move to Margaret, followed by Alison, followed by Kevin. Good afternoon. The College of Police authorised professional practice. It has been quoted quite a lot. That is for armed policing documents for the UK. It looks at the management command and deployment of armed officers in the rest of the UK. It is very relevant to assess how they deploy their armed officers. It seems to be that it would be high-risk locations engaged in armed response vehicle duties or undertaking protection duties. Can the panel confirm whether they are aware in the rest of the UK, if there is ever a situation where armed forces turn up at incidents that, by no stretch of the imagination, could fall under these three headings? That is the nub of the concern from the public. If I can, the reference to armed response vehicles is effectively those vehicles that are available 24-7 across Scotland and the UK, where officers have access to firearms. The standing authority is effectively to give them the authority to have those weapons on them as opposed to being locked away in the vehicle. The way that those ARVs are deployed will vary across the country. One of the areas that we intend to look at is that, if they are not deployed on ARV duties, are they deployed doing something else? That is some of the work that we will try to gather and bring back in to show how that might vary across the country. Is there a distinction between that and specific high-risk locations, which I would imagine was a case by case, as the situation arose, and undertaking protection duties? The chief constable, in order to give a standing authority, must be satisfied that there is an operational requirement for it. That would be informed by what is called a strategic firearms risk assessment. That would effectively show what is the risk and intelligence that we justify. In the main, that is what we will be involved in looking at how Police Scotland will review that next month. The other areas that you look at would have specific risk assessments done for them at that time. Areas that are required to have protective security would have a specific risk around them at that time. Areas in relation to airports, for example, would also be looked at with a separate risk around them at that time. Our review is very much going to focus on armed response vehicles and the extent to which they are also in support of other duties. Does the panel accept that there is a heightened concern about all of this? We have a single police force. The decision has been taken by one individual under what he has referred to as operational, his competence and his complete control over that. The lack of checks of balances is the thing that we are now hearing from Mr Emery. It is highly unsatisfactory to be informed of something as high profile and as dynamic as this after the event. If any press comments are looked at, it is always referred to as a policy. I have to say that to me it looks very much like a policy. If it barks, it has four legs and a waggy tail, it is a dog and it is a little like that with this particular policy. Are we going to dance and semantics here, or is the panel going to look at and ask Mr Penman? In some of your comments, you seem to have accepted the policy or operational decision. Is the panel on the various reviews going to be looking into the appropriateness? Is there any suggestion, and I certainly would welcome this, given that one armed officer attending a duty where they should not have or be in possession of a gun is one armed officer too many? Is there any possibility of suspending this policy until the reviews are completed? We are looking to December before this is completed, and every single day we have armed officers in Scotland with guns where they should not be. Is it a policy, is it operational, and if it is a policy, is it going to be suspended during your review? The quotes that you referred to were quotes that I had put out earlier in response to an original newspaper. My view at that time was that the decision around understanding authority is an operational decision for the chief constable, and at that time it had followed guidance from that. For me there is also the part there about separating that from the deployment and how the officers are actually used. In terms of our review, we will be involved in the chief constable himself as required under the guidance to review that decision. It is an annual basis, but they have undertaken to do it quarterly, so we will be involved at the next stage to the extent that we will be able to witness the decision making process and evidence that the chief constable has to make that decision. Is it a new review that has not taken place so far given the decision that was made over a year ago? The guidance is for an annual review, but Police Scotland has undertaken to do that on a quarterly basis, and the next quarterly review is on the 16th of September. There are probably four key research questions that we will ask during our work. The first is, was the initial standing authority approved by the chief constable justified by the analysis of threat, risk and harm in the Police Scotland strategic risk assessment at that time? We do not know the answer to that question yet because we have not looked at it, but we will look at it. We will also look at the extra for the current year, so it is a bit about looking back and about looking now. In essence, that is a yes or no answer. The intelligence will either tell us that there was justification or there wasn't. From that, the next logical question is, if the intelligence was there, why was the decision taken to go for avert carriagey weapons and what other options were considered? That should all be documented. We will also want to know what community impact assessment and consultation took place around that. In the last, probably important strand, is around deployment criteria. Having taken the decision to grant a standing authority, having taken the decision to go for avert carriagey, what deployment criteria were put in for officers to immediately rate some of the public concerns that have emerged? I do not know if that answers your question. That is very helpful. Is there any move to review and suspend the decision just now, given the widespread concern? We are not going to be reporting to December. That is an awful long time for police officers to be out in the street with guns where they should not be, in my view, in possession of firearms. The chief constable has undertaken the review on 16 September. That would be the decision by the chief constable then, as to whether or not that would continue. We will be part of that, as Brian has said, in terms of being able to report. We would be looking to provide a report by 21 October. That would allow the authority at their meeting on 29 October to consider that report and any report from the chief constable on his decision around deployment. It might be helpful to say that the SPA inquiry is looking at things in a slightly different way. I think that the complementary nature of the two inquiries is quite innovative in terms of looking at Scottish policing. We are using the relevant skills there, but we will be looking at what the public reaction around that has been and what the public concerns genuinely are. Sometimes in the media it is characterised as a debate about whether there should be specialist armed policing. I think that we all agree that there has to be a small number of specialist armed policing for reasons of threat and risk. On other occasions, it is characterised as the routine arming of all police officers, which is not. Mrs Mitchell's point about the tasking and deployment of those officers once they are armed will be a very critical point that we will be looking into and people's concerns about that. I just pursue those issues a bit further. Mr Penman, you said that you made that statement on the 30th of July, talking about the standing authority, but you did go further than that. You said that using specialist officers to support front-line officers is efficient use of resources. I wonder how you will demonstrate that the assurance review is objective given that statement. Absolutely. My quote was to say that the appropriate deployment was what I had said in that statement. The appropriateness comes to understanding what exactly those officers are being deployed to do from that. Part of our review will be to look at what are the guidelines and policies around the deployment of those officers to non-fire-arm related tasks and the extent to which they support their local colleagues. To be fair, I am not clear across the country what they are. Once we have a picture of that, we also want to look across the UK to see what is recognised best practice around that. I hope that that will give the assurance in terms of a report of what those officers are doing. If you turn to the aim of your review in the paper that relates to that, you have said that the review is scheduled for 16 September and provides an opportunity for HMICES to make an objective professional assessment that the operational decision making by Police Scotland has followed the relevant guidance and that any conclusion is supported. Should that not be whether the operational decision rather than rather sounds as if you have made an assumption at this stage? Absolutely. Perhaps in the drafting of that, using the word assurance, it is not to be read as reassurance. It is about us providing you and authority with assurance around that. The 16th is only one specific part of our review and that is looking at whether or not the intelligence and threat justifies to the chief constable to have a standing authority. That will be done against whatever guidance is there. We will be privy to that information that the chief constable is looking at at that time and will be in a position to say effectively whether that is reasonable under the circumstances. We have also undertaken to go beyond that. It is one thing that the standing authority has been there because people need to have immediate access to firearms. That is an issue that you have to separate. The next bit is to what extent can be used for other things when they are not doing that. That really is the nub of all of this and probably is what is causing the greatest concern among communities. That is an area that we would look to focus on in particular. I think that that is particularly welcome. I wonder if I could ask Mr Emory about operational independence. That is really what is at the heart of the difficulties here. If the chief constable asserts that any matter is an operational one, do you feel obliged to accept that? We make recommendations and ask the chief constable. Normally we see these things after the fact and I think we have been through that today. The act is quite specific in saying that the chief constable is accountable for the operational decisions that he makes. He is accountable to the SPA for doing that. Under the act, we can ask him to give due consideration to our views. You are also responsible for ensuring that the chief constable adheres to the policing principles. That would allow you to investigate things in advance of the fact. We would like to explain to the chief constable what you are thinking about doing and what it would allow you to look into almost any policy matter, given that the policing principles are at the core of all of that. Perhaps the board needs to be able to be a little bit more proactive in terms of where the areas of challenge might come in the future. Given the industrial scale of stop and search and the particular distinct policy change on armed policing, there are two things that very few of us think are operational matters purely and simply. We absolutely need to get to a point where we can better understand what we mean by operational independence. As I understand it, there is no statutory definition of operational independence. People tend to rely on a judgment by Lord Denning, which says that no minister of the crown can tell him that he must or must not keep observation on this place or that, or that he must or must not prosecute this man or that man, nor can I any police authority. There is a long way between that and hiding behind operational independence on policy changes. Do you think that there is some benefit in developing written guidance after much consultation both in civic society and within the police about how we take this forward? We would like to do a piece of work that says what operational decisions do we need to be involved in and which ones do we not need to be involved in. That is a piece of work that we want to go forward to look at. As I have said, it is a developing relationship, it is a maturing relationship, but some of these operational decisions that Chief Constable has made and this one on firearms was actually rolled out over a year ago. Do you wish that, perhaps instead of some of the earlier arguments that we had that there had been a greater focus on this particular issue? As I have said to you, we need to be in advance of the decisions. I think that I have already said that we need to be involved in why the decisions are being made and scrutinise in advance of what is happening rather than post the event. The act can be interpreted and is being interpreted as being after the event. I am glad that you have raised the point about certain operational decisions that may be coming in the pipeline, whether we call them operational or policy, but they are in that difficult area that you would wish to be involved in in advance. From a different point of view, I would be very concerned if the SP and HMICS interfered too much in operational decisions because you are then tying the hands of Chief Constable. From my point of view and I accept what my colleagues are saying, it is a difficult balance sometimes to maintain, but I am pleased to hear that where there are very sensitive issues, as some have been mentioned by the committee members, it would have been prudent. The very laws are prudent for the SP to be involved with the Chief Constable to discuss this in advance and the public at large. Would you concur in that? You are making exactly the right distinction between the two. The SPA is concerned if there is any public alarm or disquiet, which we foresee might happen as a result of a decision, but we do not want to be involved in all of the operational decisions. We are not qualified to do that. I would be most concerned, Mr Penman. As I said on Tuesday, one of the areas that would benefit from further discussion across Scotland would be what are the scrutiny levels around policing 16 months into that as well. I would say that there is a doctrine of constabur independence in relation to the Police and Fire Reform Act. The legislation is absolutely clear that, in under section 2, the authority can hold the chief constable to account for the policing of Scotland. Under section 17, the chief constable has the direction of control, but he is responsible and must account to the police authority. Hex and Balances are there. HMIC has a view, because I am not fettered in any way about what I can look at. I can also feed in terms of the public opinion to what we see at risk. I can then look at and inspect in those areas, provide reports that are public, give opportunities to the authority to provide scrutiny publicly, as are other agencies, including the perk. I think that there is a framework here that allows for the effective governance of policing. I think that there is something there about us just working through 16 months into that, about how that forms together. Thank you. I move on. Kevin, followed by Graeme and then John Finnie again. First of all, I thank you, gentlemen, for the two separate inquiries that you intend to carry out to address the concerns that have been made by members of the public. I think that Mr White says that the two reviews are innovative, and I am glad to hear that that is the case. In some regards, that is much different from what went on before with eight police boards. I think that that shows that the level of scrutiny that there is has increased dramatically since that time. One of the things that I am concerned about is some of the myths that have built up during the course of this debate. I hope that you will be able to bust some of those myths during the course of the review, and I hope that you will be looking into those aspects and be able to reassure the public that we are not moving to an armed police service. Can I ask whether you will be looking at some of the past scenarios in terms of armed policing? I know that, in many cases, arms were locked in vehicles, which often caused difficulty in itself and in access. In terms of your inquiry, you will be looking at what has happened in the past as well as what is happening all over Scotland instead of just the three authorities that had allowed that previously. As I said in response to Mr Finnie's question, part of us is to try and look at what were the legacy arrangements prior to Police Scotland. I think that it is helpful to explain the differences, because the differences were varied across the country, where some people would have overtly standing authority, where others would have dual role armed response vehicles and road policing, where the guns would be contained within a locked cabinet. Officers still had access to firearms, but not immediate access to firearms. When they were out doing their duty, they would not be picked up by members of the public. It varied across the country, so part of our work will be to provide an additive of that, so people will perhaps understand what those differences are. Do you want to comment on that? No, I absolutely agree with Derek Penman. That will form a part of the review going forward. The SPA's part of that is the public concerns and how local communities are affected by some of those decisions. That is the complementary part of the two reviews. You will be looking at the standing authorities that were in place in Strathclyde and Tayside previously. There is a debate about Northern to see how those decisions were taken and what the checks and balances were at that point, too. What we are looking to do is to state the facts of what was there at the time. For example, in Strathclyde, there was a standing authority with ARVs. In other parts of the country, there would have been something different. It was for us to state what was effective for the operational deployment around ARVs, standing authority and the mode of courage. It was not intention to go back in and look at the governance of those previous decisions with previous police boards, but we did feel that there was value in us looking at what was the position prior to Police Scotland in terms of operational fire arms cover. Do the SPA intend to go back to previous decisions, Mr White? I do not think that it is for us now at this stage to review previous decisions, but part of what we wanted to look at was what was the picture around the country. That is the nature of the complementary work that we are doing. We set out a set of issues that we wished to look at. We became aware that Mr Penman's review would look at a number of those. We have allocated the task out to the best scrutiny body to do that work. Where it is about an operational or a specialist policing role, HMICS will do that. Where it is about interaction with the public and gathering the public view and then taking that into account, SPA will do that. I am grateful for that, because I think that one of the other myths that is growing here is that there is a lack of scrutiny and personally having served in a police board myself for 13 years. I think that the scrutiny set up now is much greater than it was then, so I am glad that you do intend to look at that too. The thorny question of operational independence has been one that existed for a very long time. I think that it would be very difficult, as the convener suggested, to come up with a definition. Do you think that in terms of what has gone on here in your reviews, it opens up communication for ensuring that future decisions that are taken are related and communicated to yourselves and also to the public so that we do not get into a situation where certain things become, as I have said previously, a bit of a myth? I share your view again. I think that this is not the first item where we have had communication issues, which has led the public to a wrong conclusion, and it has all been down to communication. We do need to communicate better with the local authorities and the people that live in the areas that will be affected by the decisions that are being made. There needs to be a more mature dialogue between the SPA, HMIC and the police with regard to some of the proposed decisions or changes of direction going forward. In the past, Mr Penman has seen me challenging chief constables before, but it is absolutely right that we ensure that there is not the political interference around about certain areas. Can I ask in terms of the communication with yourself and the knowledge exchange with the SPA? Are SPA members security clearance to get certain information? Yes, they do. In fact, I am what is known as DVD. I am deep vetted, so I can look at... Actually, it was. Anyone who has been through a DV process knows how painful it can be because they go into every aspect of your life. Is it just yourself, Mr Emory, or is that all members of the board? Other members of the board are security vetted, but I am deep vetted so that I can look at some of the covert stuff and some of the high threat risk analysis that gets done. I think because you referred to the... I've managed to get the thing and I'll quote it out. That's all right. I think I've been fair in quoting it. It was Alison McInnes's question, actually, the 20th May this year, column 31153. This is the Cabinet Secretary answering. I was aware that, as we ran into the establishment of Police Scotland, three forces were already operating the procedure that is now the standard procedure in Scotland. Officers in those forces numbered over half of the establishment in Scotland. I repeat from Mrs McInnes's benefit that those forces were strathlide police, Tayside police and Northern Constabulary. I was aware that, as at 1 April, the chief constable was going to ensure that we had a similar regime operating across all Scotland. That puts it... If you're content, that's now on the record, which you're referring to. Can I say to members that it's helpful if you're going to prefer to something to maybe even have the column reference or whatever so that the record can link it up? Thank you very much. I move on now to Roddy, because you've not been in and then up to Graham, John and Alison. Good afternoon, gentlemen. I wanted to move away from just a discussion generally about operational independence and just probe a bit further into the comments that Dr Pasta was making and the methodology, the assessment of whether the Police Scotland's conclusion was supported by prevailing threat, risk and available intelligence. Could you perhaps put a little more flesh on how you're going to go about that? Yes, I'm going to take possession of those documents on Monday afternoon. That's been agreed with Police Scotland and then we'll review the content of those documents, because, as I said previously, the intelligence information will either be there or it won't. Does Emreil switch to comment? Mr Penn? We're conscious that the chief constable has given undertaking that, in addition to the strategic threat assessment, which is a document that's produced to guidance, that he would also take cognisance of views and representations. So one of the areas that we're also interested in is to see what they are and the extent to which they are also considered as part of that decision. Graham? Can I say that I'm trying to move on? I know because it's finished by 2.30, so I'll take Graham. Is that a short question, Graham? It's just a couple that relate to each other. I don't think it should take over a long time. Good, and then I've got Jordan and Alice. Governance means bringing someone to account and knowing the way forward, and policing by consent. Consent can only be offered when people are aware of the policies and have agreed with the content of those policies. My earlier questions indicated that I'm very dissatisfied with the nature of governance thus far and to that extent I have some distance with Kevin in some of the comments that Kevin made earlier. In the current arrangements, we've had the firearms policy in place for more than a year, and there's a requirement for an annual review of that policy. Do we have that review document as HMIC had access to it? My second question was in a comment that HMI, I think, made earlier. He said that, in your view, the chief constable made an operational decision, etc. I wonder how you made your mind up at this stage that it was an operational decision to maintain these officers on armed patrol when we don't have any paper which justifies the situation. Where is the annual review that is required as part of the arrangements? Can we see it when it was published? Secondly, would you roll back on in your view when you're now engaged in a review at this stage and I think you'd be better waiting until you achieve the outcome of that review before you make up your mind about whether it's an operational decision or otherwise? No, thank you for that. In terms of the annual review, as I said, the guidance requires an annual review of that decision. I haven't been cited on the annual review documentation personally. We haven't asked for that. I'm assuming that would have been done a year into the service. The next review is the one that's scheduled for September, and that's the one that we will be involved in. We'll look at the evidence for... Can we, as a board, see the annual review? The annual review, which is now quarterly, it's a quarterly review. The document defines an annual review. That's the principles that are applied to standing authorisation. Have you seen the annual review 15 months into the process? The SPA does not do that review. The police do that review internally, and I have not seen a document as a result of that review. So we haven't fulfilled a requirement in that regard? We don't know if we have or not. The police have said that they do a three-monthly review. But as a board, you would require to ask the chief constable for that annual review, which should have dated from April last year. We would, although we have some assurance in that they are accredited by the College of Policing. As part of that accreditation, they will be required to undertake an annual review. My understanding is to report that to the College of Policing. I'm sorry, convener. Perhaps it's me. I know that I can be a bit garbled on occasions. Indeed. When one starts a standing authorisation, it's agreed that there will be an annual review. That's part of the process and that's part of the principles that apply. April last year, Police Scotland began a standing authorisation, and part of that is that we will give you an annual review at the end of the 12-month period, presumably that's what annual means. I would have expected the board to have been saying, April this year, can we see your annual review so that we know where we are with this policy? That hasn't happened. Maybe Mr Penman can help with that as well. My understanding is that Police Scotland undertook to do an annual review internally. The issue about having an annual review was not reported to the SPA at the time that the information was given to us, the brief information that you highlighted that we discussed in Selkirk. There wasn't a lot of detail about annual reviews or anything at that time. The guidance requires the chief constable to review the decision and the guidance says that it's an annual review. My understanding is that Police Scotland don't do annual review every quarter, so there should have been a number of reviews undertaken since that period. The next one that is scheduled is in September, which is the one where we will see the content in relation to that. I hear you get a point, but I think that I'm hearing about quarterlies and annuals. Do you want to explain further? Perhaps there's one point of clarification around the pre-empting of the operational decision, which is the second part of Mr Pearson's question. The decision to deploy firearms under a standing authority is right with the decision for the chief constable. It's the chief constable under section 55 of the firearms act. It's also in line with guidance that is produced by the College of Policing. Its compliance with that guidance would make it a decision for the chief constable. If I could just clarify my own understanding of that, when I'm saying that it's an operational decision for the chief constable, it's because legislative way and within the guidance is appropriate for the chief constable to take that decision. The chief constable, to my mind, is also accountable for that decision, which is a different matter. When I'm saying that it's rightly a decision for the chief constable, it's based on statute and guidance around that. I'm going to read this later because my head's burling a bit with annuals quarterlies and so on. Now, I've got three members. Can I ask you to just put your three questions and then I'll get them answered in a one or because we have to move on the latest at, say, 2.15. John Finnie a question, Alison a question and Kevin a question, please. Two brief questions. Just say it's one question in two parts and that sounds better. Well, whatever. I thought our job was to scrutinise here. It's for Mr Penman and it's about the very pertinent point that Mr Stewart made about myths and I think there's a myth that needs to be dispelled. It arises in the first response I get. I'm the individual who raises this issue, as you well know, and it's the response I get from ACC's Higgins, which says that part of the rationale for this change was it could take up to 20 minutes for an officer to arm themselves. Now, if it takes an individual 20 minutes to move a firearm from the boot of a vehicle and put it on, then not in my opinion, not only should they not be in charge of the firearm, they shouldn't be in charge of the motor vehicle either, but perhaps you could look at that. Mr Penman, the area that's mentioned in your report that I think could become very pertinent to this and it's alluded to in the information that the convener read out with a term similar regime is the phrase equal access to specialist support and national capacity. Now, as you'll know, to treat people equally, it doesn't mean that you treat them the same, and what's required and governed might be different from Gull's Bay leath from Lerwick. So I want to understand the extent to which that understanding impacts on the geographic deployment, because if there is a rationale for deploying in the greater Inverness area, then why would these individuals find themselves out with that area? So the extent to which that principle, if you like, of the change to the single force impacts on the operational deployment, please. I have a question round about the standing authority. We've not only the policy change to a standing authority, it doesn't just mean that the officers are carrying their guns overtly and their holsters on their hips, does it? It also means that those individual officers are the ones that decide when to deploy them and when to fire them. Is that correct? If that is correct, will Mr Penman in his review consider whether the risk that's been posed or that the chief constable sees justifies the removal of the supervisory oversight of a senior officer? As I understand it, a senior officer would have in the past had to agree that the guns could be used on each individual occasion, and that authority has been devolved directly to the individual officer carrying the guns. That's a clear question, and then Kevin, what's your question now? My question is in a similar vein. I've got a quote here. I think that my officers are the right to be protected and also have a duty to protect the public. That was Graham some years ago when he said that he wanted his officers to carry firearms. In terms of the standing authority, the point that Alison has just made just now is the fact that sometimes officers should have the right to use a taser or a firearm without having gotten that supervisory authority. Are you going to look at incidents that have happened of late, including one in Edinburgh of late, where firearms officers had to use a taser very, very quickly after an officer had been stabbed in the street? I'm going to take those questions first because I know that there's a bit of a debate here between you, but really there's a question here. There's the question about equal access to specialist support. Why should it be the same throughout that's happening throughout the geographical area when it might not be suitable? I think that's what you're talking about. There was a standing authority where we understand you had to get here to phone up a superior officer before you could make use of the firearm and you went to look into the fact that that has changed. I want them to be able to look at incidents like the one that recently took place in Edinburgh to see how any changes to the rulings would affect those circumstances. Can somebody take those, please? In terms of the geographic impact, you raised a valid point. Previously, you would have had eight forces who would each have an individual threat assessment. What you now have is a national threat assessment, and I suppose the question that you're asking is how does that play out across the whole geography of Scotland? That would be one of the areas that we would be interested in looking at. Again, you might still have a need if that need is justified to have immediate access, but there might be issues around the deployment. Again, those are separate issues, as I spoke about, but it's something that we will look into as part of that decision as well. In terms of the standing authority aspect, previously what would happen is that the firearms would be secured within the vehicle. There would be a call for a firearms incident and there would be a commander, usually the control room inspector, who would authorise the officers to deploy and use the firearms. The then becomes a firearms operation, and that operation is then subject to level of command. In the main, that would still happen for the vast majority of incidents that are there. What standing authority covers is effectively for something that would happen almost so spontaneously around there that the officers would have immediate access to firearms, where they're then relying upon probably a very limited set of tactics to deal with something that's happening there and then from them. Again, the officers are trained very highly to deal with those scenarios as well. As you say, the decision on whether to use the weapons or not are absolutely with the individual officers. It hasn't passed everything across to officers now to say that they're now authorised to go and deal with the firearms instance. If a firearms incident happened, it would still be commanded in the main from an inspector in the control room, and if it then grew, it would then be of other firearms commanders attached to that. The standing authority is very limited for an arrow set of circumstances where officers may be required to bring firearms to deal with a situation that they're almost presented with. Just to clarify, they're not locked in the car any more. That bit's gone, but in certain instances they have to call in and say, I think I require to use this. They've got the firearm with them, but they have to get authority to use it. In other instances, using their judgment, they can just use it. That would be an extremist to be fair. If a call came in, it required officers to be armed. They're already armed, so they have the weapon with them. It would still be commanded, as it would have been before, where they would have a command and control situation from a control room. In some cases, they would have a bronze commander and another person who would be involved in commanding that firearms operation. What it is about is having immediate access to that firearm, if required, and the only time that they would use them without going through a chain of command would be if there was something that was almost presented in front of them that required that. Is the carrying of the firearms exacerbating the possibility of that situation arising? Probably that would lead me into dealing with Mr Stewart's point, which is that we can look at all the arm deployments that are reported to the perk, so they would review them on their own merits. As part of the firearms threat and risk assessment that the chief constable would consider, he would also look at the deployments across the previous period, if you like, to see to what extent have firearms been used, because that would inform the threat. There's an element of that being built into the review process within policing, but it's something that we would look at to see effectively how have those weapons been deployed, if at all. I'm sorry, I haven't worked out. When are your reviews going to be concluded if you've got a date for those? You're going to find the report by the 21st of October. Certainly by 17 December, when we held a board meeting, we may have an interim report in October, but part of our report will be influenced by Mr Penman's report, so there will be considerations around that at that stage. Will that interim report be a published interim report? It will be an update to the board at that meeting. It's a public document. I know that it's frustrating the time we have, but we can't sit when the Parliament is sitting. Can I thank you very much? I'm not wanting to have a little spat. No, I'm sorry. Thank you very much. You can take it up with Kevin. It's nothing to do with the witnesses. Can I thank you very much for your evidence and conclude that now and move into private session? Thank you very much.