 Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I want to congratulate Thierry Montréal on the 10th anniversary of the World Policy Conference and say, wholeheartedly, what a privilege it is to be on a panel of this distinction. The political trends in the United States and the West have a direct impact on the Middle East. The upsurge of nationalist, populist, protectionist, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim sentiments and the weakening of the political center are the threaded connections, Brexit, the Trump election, the rise of right-wing anti-EU parties and attitudes in the Netherlands, Sweden, in Germany, in Austria, Poland, and London. And the U.S.-Trump's American first doctrine is and I cannot emphasize this enough from the bipartisan separations that Republicans and Democrats have had since the end of World War II. A consensus that helped build an international world based on international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, OECDs, the World Trade Organization and a whole body of free trade agreements both bilateral and multilateral. What we are seeing is a marked departure with video isolation, a suspicion of alliance with a multilateral agreement. The withdrawal from the long-negotiated 11-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was to be our answer to countering Chaddy's influence in Asia, done unilaterally after three years of negotiations. The threat to withdraw from the United States and the Iran nuclear agreement, the effective withdrawal from the past time of change were our examples of this new attitude. There's a direct opposition to nation-building in the Middle East, whether it's Iraq or Afghanistan. And the President only reluctantly agreed to moderate in the U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. With respect to the Middle East, it seems to me there are very positive views and a number of various, mostly, interestingly in the countries with monarchy. Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision by King Salomon recognizes the need to diversify an oil-based economy to empower women and to encourage for the first time women and foreign investment. The same is true in the United Arab Emirates, which are booming. Under King Hussein Jordan is staying above water, which is saying something when you consider a country of 10 million has had to accept 700,000 refugees with few natural resources. Morocco is doing fairly well under King Hassan. The ISIS has been defeated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, although it remains a sufficient problem for Europe. These are very positive developments and shouldn't be neglected. At the same time, they tend to be overwhelmed by three negative trends. The first is the rise of non-state forces of disintegration, many, although not all, the radical retinos of the original unitary state. The Kurds in Iraq, for example, with their rep-rendum of independence. Really all the political and essential government in Iraq watched their movement, but it was an example of this effort and disintegration of taking unitary strength and dividing. The Syrian civil war, while Assad is now likely to prevail, it is hard to imagine a unitary state emerging after this conflict in many times in the near future. Gaspeline Levin has created a many-state within a state and the Taliban in Afghanistan remains a very dangerous threat to the unity of that country. And this, by the way, is the longest standing U.S. war in the United States, longer than a civil war, longer than World War II, longer than World War I, longer than the Syrian war, longer than the Middle East. Ten years now, in conclusion, still. In Egypt, after defeating the Muslim Brotherhood, a traditional lynchpin in the largest country in the region is facing radical and surging forces in northern Sana'a with sporadic violence that has decimated its economy which has heavily depended on terror. President Sisi has cracked down not only on the Muslim Brotherhood and on other radicals as it should, but unfortunately on moderate and secular forces, a peaceful opposite is no press. A second negative force is the rise of critical Islam. And Iran is the gender cure of that. Marrying Islam to a radical terrorist agenda. I was, unfortunately, there at the creation of the President for a systemistic advisor lived through whole revolution and the hostage crisis. Their nuclear ambition tied to medium-range missile development, their support for Hezbollah and Levin with 100,000 increasingly sophisticated rifles their deep engagement of their revolutionary garden and al-Quds forces in Syria and their plan to have a permanent military base in that country. Their support for Hamas and Gaza is another example. Turkey is unfortunately also an example of a rise of criticalism. Mr. Erdogan is moving sharply in an anti-Western direction increasingly autocratic cracking down on the press and the opposition. And remarkably for two allied countries over a decade, we now have today this moment a dual visa plan to not give a visa from either country going to the other best helping territory. Even Morocco, which is an island and source of stability an Islamic party won election and is part of the government all over the country with close support for Hamas and Gaza. The third negative force, at least from my standpoint, is the resurgence of Russian influence at the expense of the United States in a region in which they were expelled by President Sadat in 1973. This resurgence is the same number of ways. In Syria, Russia picked, it appears, the right horse in Assad and is riding him to some kind of victory. And they did so when he was legally on his knees. And in return, they're securing a permanent naval base in Syria. They sold missiles to Turkey an unbelievable development for a country that is a NATO ally. The notion of introducing Soviet Russian missiles into a country which is a NATO is almost unimaginable, but it's happening. And even with respect to Saudi Arabia, Russia is warning relations with them with arms sales, although they have been our traditional Arab partner. The US policy under Trump has two priorities in this region. The first is the defeat of ISIS with modest help to promote U.S. forces in Syria and support of anti-radical forces in Yemen and ISIS and in Nigeria as well. The second priority of the Trump administration's region is to limit in every way possible short of war Iranian power. The President's recent decision to decertify the Iran nuclear deal with the JCPOA while it does not mean a needed withdrawal. Certainly such a statement because he has laid out a following condition that in order to stay in the JCPOA there has to be a permanent ban on Iran's nuclear development. A long-term ban and other conditions which will be very difficult if not impossible to meet by January 12th and that date is important because that's the date on which the six-month rolling waiver of secondary sanctions will expire. And if those conditions aren't met and it's hard to see how they will be then he would have great difficulty in waving the sanctions and if he re-enforced the nuclear sanctions which were a key part of the JCPOA and the fact that he will have withdrawn and not only that we will have engaged in a major trade war with the EU because those secondary sanctions will be next will be targeted to any company that does business with Iran. In effect we're saying either choose the US market or choose the Iranian market but that's a choice that will be very difficult the EU is already developing this blocking legislation to protect the EU companies and that will be a conflict with Iran and let's remember that the only reason that Iran came to the bargaining table to begin with was not arguing a lot with Iran it's only when we got the European Union to join us on sanctions in terms of defrauding the EU of 16% of their resources that's why they think so here we will be dividing ourselves from our allies and dealing with Iran but that is the prospect of his ruling. The Trump policy places the Middle East peace process between Israel and the Palestinian at best on a second order and this is a priority for the US administration and we need to solve it is very difficult to see for someone who believes as I do in the two state solution any likely one of that being prodded forward with the administration of the cause the administration and the president has alarmed himself with very conservative elements and a generally liberal American government and with a very conservative and they're working with perhaps the most right-wing government we've had which is highly procuring so the conditions are either side the Palestinians agree to some receptors in Israel as a Jewish state and giving up at least significant part of the solution and the Israeli side it's very difficult to see and I can assure you that the president does not want to break any political channel to resolve that impasse likewise there will be very little effort to break the Qatar Saudi priorities so we are left with a mixed picture of our positive elements and the reason those might be but the traditional role of the U.S. as a full as a lever is potentially going to leave an empty vacuum in which negative forces will enter thank you