 Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Banyan Tree Leadership Forum here at CSIS. I'm Murray Bauer. I'm the senior director. Actually, I'm not the senior director. I'm the senior advisor and the director of the Southeast Asia Program here at CSIS. And it is a rare pleasure this morning to be able to introduce a very good friend who is also one of the most important leaders in terms of foreign policy and foreign policy developments in Asia today. And that is the new secretary of foreign affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, Albert Del Rosario. He is a man who is truly sort of a renaissance man. He's a leader in his country of the business sector, of the social sector, and he has given his time and energy to the public sector. He was the CEO of many companies, the chairman of Think Tank, Strat-Base. He was ambassador to the United States and went back into private practice after that. He was called by President Aquino to become the new secretary of foreign affairs. And when that happened, I knew that the Philippines was going to move up to another level of engagement in terms of the region and in ASEAN and Asia Pacific and also globally. And I also thought this will be a special time for the U.S.-Philippine relationship. And indeed, it only took days in office before those things started to happen. This is a man who has made great bounds forward in the U.S.-Philippine relationship as ambassador. And I think it will be very interesting to see what he will do as foreign secretary. Ladies and gentlemen, I don't want to take any more time. I'm really looking forward to this presentation this morning myself. I hope you'll join me in welcoming our speaker today, Albert Del Rosario, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Thank you, Ernie, for the generous introduction and the very warm welcome. Ladies and gentlemen, it is good to be back in Washington, D.C. As a visitor now, after having been in residence here from 2001 to 2006, when I left Washington, D.C. in 2006, the country was in the midst of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the government had just announced its plan to renew ties with Libya. China was criticizing the U.S. for overreacting to North Korea's launching of missiles, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stepped down that year to be replaced by a former CIA head. I returned to Washington, D.C. well on its way to bringing home its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. The Arab Spring has redrawn the diplomatic map of the U.S. relations with the Middle East, and we are hearing the very significant results of the U.S. engagement with China on the strategic level. Coincidentally, another CIA chief is set to become the Secretary of Defense. Our country and our people have undergone a sea of change in that time. President Benigno Esaquino III, son of the two of the Philippines' democratic icons, was swept into the presidency with the undisputed mandate of the Filipino people. When he assumed the presidency, he stated that our foremost duty is to lift the nation from poverty through honest and effective governance. In pursuit of this commitment, he has entered into a social contract with the Filipino people and set out an agenda for national development and good governance. This social contract underspins the three pillars which will continue to define the course of our foreign relations, promoting national security, enhancing economic diplomacy, and protecting the rights and welfare of Filipinos overseas. Anchored on these three pillars, we have crafted a foreign policy that is focused and deliberate, a foreign policy that advances our domestic interests, fully cognizant of our commitment to our core values, and our responsibilities to the region and the world. Economic diplomacy is among our most important tools in achieving the twin goals of poverty alleviation and job creation, and my department will be more aggressive in engaging with our traditional economic and commercial partners. Yet we are aware that the success of our economic diplomacy relies on our capacity to create a good investment climate in the country, both internally and externally. Within the country, we are taking the necessary measures to build an economy anchored on transparent, stable, and predictable policies that create a domestic condition attractive to foreign investors. To address the concerns of investors, we have initiated a public-private partnership program that will modernize our infrastructure. We have also fostered the conditions for peace, particularly in the southern parts of the Philippines. Externally, we continue to develop stronger bilateral relations and pursue cooperation with our multilateral partners to build a safe and secure environment, not only within the bounds of our territory, but also regionally and globally. ASEAN continues to be a cornerstone in this endeavor as it moves closer to building an ASEAN community by 2015. We will also build upon our strong defense partnership with the United States and will engage China, India, Japan, and other regional partners such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand in mutually beneficial security and defense dialogues. We are also stepping up our cooperation and interaction with the countries in the Middle East and north of Africa and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the Mindanao conflict. As we work on creating more jobs at home, we remain mindful of the President's call to be even more responsive to the needs and welfare of our overseas Filipino workers. We will continue to do what is necessary to send a clear signal that the Philippine government cares for its people wherever they are. Protecting the rights and promoting the welfare of OFWs will continue to be a strong pillar of our foreign policy. So how does the Philippine-U.S. alliance figure in our foreign policy? When I served as Philippine Ambassador to the United States, my worldview put the U.S. Philippines alliance at the center of the universe. Coming back, wearing a different hat, I am constrained to make adjustments to that perspective. To be sure, the United States remains the Philippines' foremost strategic ally. Our relations are enduring, cemented by the sacrifice of those who fought side by side in defense of our common ideals. The United States is one of the Philippines' top two trading partners. Two-way U.S. merchandise trade with the U.S. was at $15.4 billion in 2010, and 11 percent of our imports are sourced from the United States. On the other hand, 15 percent of our exports find its way to the American market. With our population of over 90 million people, we are the U.S. 30th largest export market. The U.S. is also important to the Philippines in terms of official development assistance. Since 2004, the government received close to $1 billion in grant funds for various programs to support economic growth and alleviate poverty. Strengthen democratic institutions and governance, and counter transnational terrorism and insurgency in Mindanao. Strong people-to-people ties strengthen the fabric of our relations. The 2010 census indicates that some 2.5 million Filipinos live in the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Manila, on the other hand, estimates that some 300,000 Americans make their home in the Philippines. Our common commitment to the ideals of democracy provides another underlying thread that fortifies the fabric of our relations. Despite the network of old and new relations, the U.S. is established in the region. It is difficult to imagine any other country who will share as closely with the U.S. the same set of core values and beliefs as the Philippines, and is as committed to the defense and pursuit of these values. Thus, for many years, the Philippines and the United States have soldered on, confident in the strength of our alliance. Yet, the global and regional environment on which we built our alliance did not stand still. It has developed in ways we did not and could not imagine in the 1940s or even when the Cold War ended. The new global and regional architecture demands of each country an introspective assessment of how it relates to the rest of the world. In the post-2011 world, for example, security relations between the Philippines and the United States have been focused heavily on counterterrorism cooperation, and this cooperation has undoubtedly borne much fruit for both countries. But the Philippines' relative success in counterinsurgency, coupled with pressures in the regional environment, compels a reorientation of focus and resources. On the other side of the Pacific, we observe the U.S. renewing its engagement with Asia in very substantive ways, after what has been perceived as a long preoccupation with the Middle East. We also see that fiscal pressures may impact certain aspects of U.S. defense and foreign policies, requiring policymakers to explore new and creative ways of doing more for less at a time of growing challenges in various parts of the world. The recent slump in the global economy has taught both our countries invaluable lessons, and the intense competition for markets and resources are cause for common concern. In an increasingly interdependent global economy, we need to ensure we are well positioned to leverage our relations to produce more trade, more employment, and generally a better life for our people. A reset in the relations has therefore become an imperative to allow the Alliance to continue to meet domestic goals while contributing to global stability. The intersection between our respective domestic imperatives and the current regional and global challenges indicate a momentum for a mutually beneficial recalibration and reset of Philippine-U.S. bilateral relations. We welcome the pronouncements made by the United States on their renewed engagement with Asia and on the importance of relations with the treaty allies. Allow me to share with you our own vision for the United States' continued presence in Asia. The U.S. presence in Asia has been long-standing, and we wanted to endure. We wanted to be premised on a deep-seated recognition of the U.S. role as an Asia-Pacific power, rather than a reaction to perceived challenges to its global leadership. We want the U.S. presence in Asia to build cooperation, rather than it being misconstrued as fermenting divisions. We believe that Asia is in the midst of unprecedented growth and the most serious of challenges. We believe we can best harness these opportunities for growth and address the challenges with unity of purpose underpinned by strong rules based on international system. We recognize the potential of the Alliance to be an enabler for the growth of the region in terms of security, the economy, and people-to-people connections. In our current role as country coordinator for ASEAN-U.S. dialogue relations, we are committed to help the U.S. secure its equitable place in the ASEAN-centered regional architecture. We believe this is also the time to recast the model of our security engagement. The military tenets of the Cold War are no longer valid, and the physical presence of military bases is no longer the foundation of a robust security arrangement. To be clear, we do not expect the U.S. to fight our battles for us, but we count on the U.S. strong and unwavering assistance in building the strength and resources of the Philippine military to meet the new challenges. To this end, we are exploring novel and innovative ways to strengthen the security engagement in ways that will address the challenges, but respect the constraint of each other's domestic environment. The Philippines is well aware that the Alliance is only as strong as the commitment and resources with which both countries are prepared to commit for the pursuit of our common goals. On our part, the Philippines is prepared to step up to our responsibilities to contribute to the security and stability of the region, first and foremost by being able to secure and protect our own territory. Our defense establishment is thus working to improve our capabilities to police and patrol our own maritime domain. The campaign against transnational crime, including piracy, drug trafficking, and human trafficking is also being sustained. We are prepared to take our place in the global supply chain, leveraging the skills and talents of our people, and showcasing an economy where everything works. We resolve to create the best possible environment for business to thrive free from corruption. We will also continue to explore opportunities for mutually beneficial economic linkages, such as the Save Our Industries Act, which Senator Daniel Inouye refiled yesterday at the U.S. Senate. The new model should also embrace a development dimension. The Partnership for Growth is a joint undertaking between the Philippines and the United States, whose principal aim is to unlock the Philippines' potential for a broad base and sustained economic growth. As the only pilot country in Asia, the Philippines was selected on the basis of its track record in partnering with the U.S. government and potential for continued economic growth. We are prepared to assume a more active role in crafting the policy environment of the region and in building stronger networks of cooperation among regional powers through bilateral arrangements and through the mechanisms of ASEAN. We intend to lend our voice and the force of our convictions to the issues that define us. The protection and promotion of the rights of our citizens, the establishment of the institutions of democracy, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. A few weeks ago, I have advocated for the pursuit and promotion of a rules-based international system, which will provide an effective tool for peaceful and fair resolution of disputes. Not since the Panganivan mischief-reef incident in 1995, has the Philippines faced serious challenges in the West Philippine Sea, otherwise known as the South China Sea. For instance, our ownership of the Kalyan Island Group features and our legitimate maritime jurisdictions have been contested by certain nations, even as the Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Kalyan Island Group are firmly grounded on international law. The primacy of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, is the cornerstone on which we define and protect our territory and maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. It is this principle and the requirements of UNCLOS that govern the passage in 2009 of the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law. It is also the same principles that underpin the two vital pieces of proposed legislation defining our maritime zones and archipelagic sea lanes. In the same manner, we are fully committed to the spirit and letter of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China and will utilize all diplomatic means at our disposal to work for a binding regional code of conduct. To reinforce this goal, we offer the framework that transforms the South China Sea from an area of dispute to a zone of peace, freedom, friendship, and cooperation by a segregation of disputed relevant features from the undisputed waters of the South China Sea consistent with UNCLOS. In the words of President Aquino, ZOP-FFC, which is Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation, is a modality for ensuring that what is ours is ours and that what is disputed we're willing to work towards joint cooperation. There should be no room for discourse on what are clearly internal waters. The disputed features, on the other hand, can be transformed into a joint cooperation area for joint development and the establishment of a marine protected area for biodiversity conservation under the zone of peace, freedom, friendship, and cooperation. We are confident that ZOP-FFC represents an important contribution to securing peace, stability, and progress in the South China Sea within a rule of law framework and that the concept deserves serious and favorable consideration by countries with stakes in the South China Sea. The Philippines policy in the South China Sea, both with respect to securing its terrestrial and maritime domain and to advocating dispute resolution and joint cooperation were applicable, is grounded on unwavering adherence to international law. Since international law must be observed, it behooves the Philippines to embrace this imperative to the fullest. Ladies and gentlemen, the immutable forces of geography have predestined for our countries a shared history, but it is the choices we have made through the years that has allowed our relations to evolve and to endure. As we stand at important crossroads, we are called upon again to reshape our engagement in a way that will allow it to meet our mutual needs and grow beyond our expectations. I firmly believe in the strength of our alliance and more so in the dynamism of the ties that bind us. By the grace of God and with the determination of our governments and people, I am confident that we can provide a new impetus to our relations, which will propel us towards our shared aspirations for peace, prosperity and progress. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I would like to welcome all parties to ask questions. The only rules, as usual, are that we ask you to just mention your name and your affiliation and please ask questions, not make a statement if you don't mind. I would like to start with Chris in the front. Thank you very much. Chris Nelson and the Nelson Board. Thank you, sir, for a very far-ranging speech and as somebody who writes every day about both trade and Paul Mill, thank you for talking so much about the economic side of your job. At least we'd ask two questions. Where are you in looking at the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the TPP, that is certainly currently the central U.S. engagement in the Pacific and Asian region? If you could share with us some of your thoughts on how that's going, if you would like to see the Philippines more deeply involved. And you spent a great deal of the end of your speech, of course, on the South China Sea. You probably know that Ernie sponsored it, just terrific, although terrifically depressing conference Monday and Tuesday right in this room, which leads to this question. In listening to our Chinese friends, they flatly stated that China has sovereignty over the South China Sea, not our part of but the, all of it, and that everything China is doing is legal, defense of that sovereignty. In your dealings with the Chinese and what you've heard from them, are there any areas of the South China Sea that they concede are actually Philippine resources, or are they talking to you mainly about sharing your resources while safeguarding theirs? Thank you. Thank you for the question. The Pacific Partnership is an initiative that's currently shared by nine countries. This is the original group and it is intended to develop into an area FDA. That group has considered itself as a close group as far as the first phase of that program is concerned. The Philippines is very much interested in being a part of this, but I think we have been relegated to be part of the second group. And to the extent that we're preparing for that, we are, we have been offered by the United States, a program inclusion which involves only four countries, one country of which is from Asia, that being the Philippines, on this partnership for growth. This is an initiative of the United States, of the White House actually, in order to be able to provide a broad-based economic growth for the Philippines. Essentially the program is, as I said, for four countries, and it's directed towards looking at constraints to moving forward and is also very much into encouraging and looking for ways to foster revenue generation. So this is the preparatory stage, I think, for being part of Trans-Pacific Partnership. Yes, we're very interested in being a part of that, and yes, we are working with the United States and are grateful for this accommodation, because 15 of the U.S. departments will actually work in terms of trying to unleash the full potential of our economy. And the question on the South China Sea. Ah, yes. Actually, your question is, if we were to look at the China claims on the South China Sea, is there a room for anybody to have jurisdiction over anything? The answer is no. No room, because China has two concepts. One is the nine-dash line. On the basis of a historical record, they say that the nine-dash line concept provides total sovereignty for China on the entire South China Sea. Their second concept is their Nanxia concept, which states that the Spratlys belong to them, that they have full jurisdiction of that as well. Yes. Mr. Secretary, Gene Martin with Asia Pacific Strategies. I like your idea of stronger regional networks dealing with the South China Sea. Do you see any opportunity, any chance that the overlapping conflicting claims for parts of the South China Sea would prompt those countries who have claims to join together to try to negotiate with the Chinese? I know the Chinese have always said bilateral negotiation is not multilateral, but since even bilateral negotiation would not resolve the overlapping claims, perhaps a multilateral approach would be helpful among the ASEAN nations. Well, I think the claimant countries, if you exclude China, would reasonably look at international law as a basis for determining the legitimacy of their claim. And if we're able to sell that idea that international law should prevail, particularly the Unclos, then we would be able to establish the legitimate claims. And the proposal that the Philippines is making is that the disputed areas, after you determine legally who claims what, you're left with the disputed areas. Those areas, we believe, should be open for consideration in terms of joint development. Tiger Zhang from the Stimson Center. I noticed your underpinning of the idea of ASEAN centrality in regional development. However, the current regional integration regime was built in a time when the U.S. force was lacking in this area either geopolitically and economically. I mean, at least it was far less focused than today. So given today's situation where the United States is coming back with much larger engagement in this area, why do we have to still stick to ASEAN centrality? Thank you very much. Well, you know, I think that we are building a community among 10 countries in ASEAN. And ASEAN, by the way, is the bedrock of our foreign policy. We believe that ASEAN is a growth opportunity in our region, and we believe that it has a political dynamism in itself. And I think that the centrality question is, if you want to do business with us, you have to allow us to set the agenda. That's what centrality is all about. For example, I think you're referring to, if you're referring to a forum, a regional forum that the U.S. is effectively belonging to or about to belong to, you might be referring to the East Asian Summit. The East Asian Summit is strategic, it is leader-sled, and the next East Asian Summit will actually include the U.S. and Russia for the first time. So President Obama will be coming to attend that meeting, and the centrality of ASEAN is we do have an agenda, but with the entry of Russia and the United States, we have felt that it was appropriate to open that agenda to include other issues that are of interest globally. And to that extent, the original agenda for the AAS as driven by ASEAN was economic energy, education, pandemic and disaster management. And the U.S. felt that the discussion should be extended to political and security issues, and we agreed with that, and so that will prevail. I'm Mitsy Picard of Asia Society. Thank you very much for your comments, Secretary Del Rosario. I have two short questions. Question the strong strategic relations between the Philippines and the U.S. In regards to Osama bin Laden's death, how do you think these defense or strategic relations have been affected? Has the Abu Sayyaf been weakened, and how will this look towards the Balikatan exercises in the future? My second question is the SAVED Act. There's a short timeframe for it to get passed in U.S. Congress. What is your strategy in regards to getting the SAVED Act passed? Will you be going through ASEAN also as an ally for the SAVED Act? Thank you. I think the strategy for focusing on the Abu Sayyaf, I think they have been degraded. They used to number about 1,200. According to the military, they're down to 200. And we believe that what's become of greater import is the need to develop and refocus on our territorial defense. And at the time when we were dealing with the Abu Sayyaf, when they were a significant force, the police force did not have the capability to address that issue. And so we had the military turn to them and to help out. At the end of the day, it was the military carrying the ball, and we feel that that situation should now be corrected. I believe that the police is going to be able to handle the challenge of the Abu Sayyaf. And we will continue to work with the United States in terms of interoperability and joint exercises. We are, after all, a treaty ally. So that will continue. Now with regards to the SAVED Act, I think that we are doing an all-court press, Mitzi, in Congress. I think we must have seen better than, I don't know, I have at least a dozen senators and congressmen on the list that I have to see after having seen maybe that many already. So we did succeed in getting Senator Inouyeh to refile the bill yesterday. And for example, we were able to get John McCain on board. He will be a co-sponsor, I think. But he said yes. It's not sure to what extent. He said yes, I will be part of that. So we are doing what we can. And I'm not sure that ASEAN should be enlisted in this effort. I think this is a bilateral issue and we should try to do this ourselves. A few dozen meetings on the Hill, Ambassador Quisha, you really are, you welcome to Washington, by the way. Amazing job. Let me go to the back and I see Al Santoli back there. Okay. Hello, Mr. Secretary. Welcome back to Washington. Thank you. And thank you, Ernie, for another great meeting. One of the issues that besides the South China Sea and the natural resources of the maritime, including energy, is food and water security. I mean, right now Manila's flooded. Cotabato is under quite a bit of water. And down in the South there wasn't a dry season this year. And last year, the traditional rice belt up in the Cagayan Valley was pretty much devastated. What is the foreign ministries role in terms of trade relations is there's countries from outside of the Philippines and outside of the region even, such as the Arab countries who are running out of food and water. China, Korea are coming in to be able to form business deals and leasing large tracts of land or attempting to lease large tracts of land to protect the Filipinos. In Bukit Nan, we saw that the old Del Monte area, the Filipinos are going hungry while the food is going to China. What can be done to be able to protect the well-being of Filipinos while the agricultural trade moves forward? We have programs to address these issues that you mentioned, Al, not only on a bilateral basis but on a multilateral basis, which we do with ASEAN. We do have programs to address the food, water, and energy security situation that is facing the ASEAN countries. And we're looking into various areas of cooperation and best practices on how we may be able to address these challenges. I'm not sure what the other question was. I think you had two questions. Yeah, I don't know the answer to that. I'll have to get back to you. But, for example, something came to mind when you were asking me that question. One of the problems of food security that accentuates itself when you have disasters. And we have a program in ASEAN where we will be storing food, be it rice or whatever staple food, precisely to respond to areas of disaster as the time requires them. Paul. Thank you. Paul, I heard of the Reuters news agency. In your opening remarks to us, you said that you do not want the United States to fight your battles, but you wanted certain kinds of defense help and other help. Also, you'll be meeting Secretary Clinton later today. And I'm wondering, especially as a treaty ally, what sort of, more concretely, what are you going to ask of the United States in the South China Sea? What sort of concrete follow-up do you want from Secretary Clinton's remarks a year ago in Hanoi? Well, I think that the problem in the South China Sea is not just a Philippine problem. I think that if I can recall what was said in Hanoi and again said again in interventions in the ministers meeting recently for ARF, I believe. There were some, I think we do agree with the United States when it stated that maritime security is essential. And when you have intrusions, you must think about the possibility that freedom of navigation is being threatened. And you really should look for diplomatic ways in order to solve the disputed area problems. And you should look to international law for the solution and you should proceed as fast as you can in terms of finalizing and making concrete the DOC and COC, the code of conduct that remains out there and has not been finalized. I think the problem of, as I said, repeating myself, maritime security is our problem, but it's also your problem. There's been talk in the media, at least, of the U.S. I'm sorry. There's been talk in the media that there may be a question of consulting with the U.S. on the mutual defense treaty when it comes to events in the South China Sea. I think what you've said a couple of times today would certainly lead to that question. Are you thinking about talking about consulting us under the mutual defense treaty? What would it take, do you think, to get to that point? Are we getting close to it? Thank you. Well, I think it's a good question to ask. If you were in my place, I think you would consider asking that question. I don't know what the answer would be, but I can tell you what the circumstances surrounding that have been in the past. We do have a mutual defense treaty. We do have some evidence on what exactly is covered, and as a matter of fact, we have Ambassador Hubbard here who is responsible for clarifying that the Pacific area doesn't mean the Pacific Ocean. It means the area surrounding the Pacific which encompasses the South China Sea. Thank you. I was afraid Chris Nelson would ask all of my questions first. I'm Greg Rushford from the Rushford Report. On the South China Sea issue, does the Philippines have any plans to upgrade its navy, buying more boats or whatever, or helicopters? And on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, I may have misunderstood your reference to that having been a closed organization because I believe at the initiative of Singapore, New Zealand, and others that the United States and Vietnam were welcome to negotiate to join the TPP and the Philippines before you assumed office declined. If that's true, it's hard to see any advantage for the Philippines when Vietnam and even the United States are going to join or are likely to join. With regards to your first question, Greg, yes, we are looking at trying to upgrade our navy. The President has set aside a, what to us is a significant amount of money, 7 billion pesos to see what can be done for an upgrade. But I was at the Washington Post earlier. Okay, so let me share with you what I had said there. Anyway, you're going to read about it tomorrow. We are looking for, as I said, some new ways, for some new ways to do things that we had been doing in the past. For example, the idea of resorting to excess defense articles to be able to upgrade our military capabilities has served us well in the past. But we think that we should be thinking of another way to do it. What seems to have happened, and we're accustomed to this already because we've been beneficiaries of this program for so many years, they try to look for assets that can be reconditioned. We take them out of inventory and then it takes months, maybe a year, maybe a year and a half to recondition this. And the cost of reconditioning comes out of our FMF. Very expensive. And then if you have, it's like buying a used car. If you talk to Senator Inouye, he will create a great analogy for you. He says, you know, the reconditioning doesn't last very long. You know, at some point in time you have great maintenance challenges in terms of that particular asset. What we'd like to do is we obviously need to to refleet, refleet quickly and more thoughtfully and more cost effectively. And we're looking for, I made a suggestion at the interview with the editors of Washington Post today that what we'd like to see is the possibility maybe of an operational lease so that we can look at fairly new equipment and be able to get our hands on that quickly. I think we need to have the resources to be able to stand and defend ourselves. And I think to the extent that we can do that, we become a stronger ally for you. Lady in the back. Hi, Mr. Secretary. Welcome back to Washington, D.C. My name is Sylvana Chan and I'm representing the Human Rights Watch. And I have two questions. The first one. Has the U.S. raised concerns with you doing your time here about the ongoing extrajudicial killings and impunity for these abuses? How has U.S. diplomacy influenced Philippine government policy in practice regarding human rights and particularly accountability for military abuses? My second question. The Philippines sees itself as a human rights leader in Southeast Asia. Why is the Philippines not leading the region in pushing for a commission of inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma when such a commission would help, as Aung San Suu Kyi has said, to find out what human rights violations have taken place and what we can do to ensure that such violations do not take place in the future? Thank you. Yeah, those are essentially two questions, right? As far as the Philippine record for human rights is concerned, we're endeavoring to do what we can in order to develop a climate that obviously promotes that. As you know, our president, President Aquino's father was a victim of extrajudicial killing. And so he knows and appreciates what needs to be done. For example, you speak of the military abuses. I just looked at my notes before I came here and I saw that we have an anti-torture law and the enabling documents, the implementing rules and regulations are being finalized as we speak. In terms of the problem in Burma, in Myanmar, I think you're speaking of the due diligence. To me, it looks like a due diligence of human rights violations there. I think we're not clear yet how we want to side with that issue. My thinking is that there is a democratization quote-unquote process that's being undertaken in Myanmar. They've had elections and we've stood up when we can and as often as we can to say that this democratization process should be more inclusive and that, for example, there are 2,100 political prisoners there and those prisoners to begin with should be released. But we think that that's a very young democracy if they're headed towards democracy and we should give them a chance. I think that this audit, it's due diligence audit, whatever you call it, you may be seeing too many people who are looking backwards and not enough who are looking forwards. That's my concern. I'll be time for one more question in the back. Hi, I'm Marianne from George Washington University. You mentioned your speech about your office's priority to also ensure the welfare of Filipinos abroad and you mentioned the number of Filipinas in the US. I don't know if you have read already but Mr. Jose Antonio Vargas, New York Times reporter, released an article in New York Times regarding his story regarding being an illegal immigrant or undocumented immigrant in the US so I don't know if you have read that and if you have, can I get your reaction to it? And second, I also would like to know if your office or the Philippine government in general has expressed interest in helping Mr. Vargas in his situation and another question to that is as we know Mr. Vargas situation is not unique. We also have teachers in Prince George's County in Maryland who are losing their jobs who are Filipinos also. So in general is immigration also a priority of your office aside from economic and security issues. Thank you. I have not read that article but if the embassy is in a position to help it would be our responsibility to do that. As you know, we have we have assistance to nationals focus when, for example, our people are apprehended all over the world and it's our job to make sure that that person is treated fairly, that he has legal representation and if there is a conviction then we appeal for him. So we do have assistance to national programs in place and we do take care of our overseas Filipinos. Believe me, it was barely 36 hours and I was already in Libya trying to get those Filipinos out there who initially we had 500 out and then we came back and the situation had improved they didn't want to come out and then days later it got worse they wanted to come out so we had to go back in there again. You know, that's our job. Okay, and we do that. Well, Mr. Secretary I would ask all my colleagues to join me in thanking you and thank you for joining us.