 the matter. Good afternoon. Welcome, everyone, to this book launch in the afternoon of Friday. I know that's not easy for people in Washington. Thank you anyway. My name is Li Bin. I'm a senior associate of Carnegie-Chinghua Center for Global Policy. Three years ago, we launched a project to study Chinese nuclear thinking. Several foundations, including Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Palosia Fund, kindly provided financial support to this project. We invited 10 Chinese secret experts to write chapters on Chinese ways of thinking, on different nuclear topics, including nuclear deterrence, nuclear numbering issues. We also invited some other Chinese experts to join the discussions and to make their comment. General Yao was leading experts in that group. One year ago, we concluded the first phase of the project. And we published a book in Chinese. And then we received a grant from Naval Grant School for the translation of the book into English. Now you see the English version of the book. I would thank all foundations and all experts who have the project and contributed to the project. Today, we invited four experts who have the project and who contributed to the project and who may have something to say about the book. So my first question goes to Dr. Tong Zhao. Dr. Tong Zhao was a student of Tsinghua University. And he received his PhD from Georgia Institute of Technology. Now he's associate of Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. My question is that as a co-editor of the book, so what kind of suggestions do you have for our readers when they read the book? So what point do you remind them to pay attention to? OK. But first of all, let me say that I'm deeply honored to be able to assist you in editing this book. I have learned a lot during this process. I think firstly, a key objective was to do this project is really to promote a better mutual understanding between China and the international community on nuclear issues. I think we are living in an age of major misunderstandings between major powers. In the case of US-China relationship, both countries embrace significant misunderstandings and misperceptions about each other's strategic intentions. And also true in the nuclear aspect of the bilateral relationship. And I think this misunderstanding on very important nuclear issues has really undermined the overall bilateral relationship, which also has broader negative impact to regional instability and even to international instability, because the nuclear weapons are really the foundation of the security relationship among major powers. Second, today I want to say that this book, it really, we are very honored to be able to invite a very wide range of very distinguished Chinese experts in the field of nuclear and the strategic security. We were able to have very senior military experts, such as General Pan Zhenxiang, Senior Colonel Xu Weidey and Colonel Lu Yin. For instance, General Pan Zhenxiang, he was the one who systematically introduced arms control research to the Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army. And he has had a very long lasting impact to shape the overall thinking and policy on arms control nuclear issues within Chinese military. Also, we were able to invite very distinguished experts from China's defense industry, such as Dr. Sun Xiangli, who is leading the research on nuclear strategy and arms control in China Academy of Engineering and Physics, which is the place where Chinese nuclear weapons were built and maintained, equivalent of the American national labs. We also had the honor to have experts from very distinguished, from very important research institutes and think tanks, like the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and as well as China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. All of these research institutes have very close relationship with relevant government agencies and experts frequently consulted by the government on nuclear arms control policy issues. Again, and I forgot to mention, for instance, with experts such as Sun Xiangli, who work in the nuclear labs, I think they have very accurate understanding of Chinese nuclear thinking and policy because they are the one who received direct instructions from Chinese decision makers on what nuclear weapons to build and for what reasons. So I think they are in a very good position to provide real insight on Chinese nuclear thinking. Also, we have very technical experts, such as Professor Wu Ruiqiang from Jeremy University, who provide a very interesting perspective on the interrelationship between technical factors and the political policy consideration. The reason, I think, we decide to focus on Chinese nuclear thinking is that we do see that China has some very different and unique nuclear thinking and policy from other nuclear weapons states. For instance, China has a relatively small nuclear arsenal. China has a very relaxed nuclear posture, including keeping a very low alert level for its nuclear weapons. Being comfortable with not immediately launching a nuclear retaliation after absorbing the first strike, China hasn't developed any battlefield technical nuclear weapons, so on and so forth. But some experts attribute such Chinese uniqueness to material factors. For instance, they believe the lack of economic resources was the primary reason for Chinese restraint. Some believe that the lack of advanced technology was a major reason behind Chinese practice. However, we believe there are deeper and more fundamental factors that affect Chinese nuclear practice. We believe we have identified important factors such as Chinese strategic philosophy, culture, social values, cognitive attributes, and historical experience. All these soft factors are also very important in shaping Chinese nuclear policy and practice. Without a very deep understanding on those things, we were incapable of really understanding the deep logic behind Chinese nuclear policy. And we won't be able to accurately anticipate future evolution of Chinese nuclear policy. And also, I forgot to mention, besides all the wonderful Chinese experts we are able to invite, we also have the pleasure of having Gregory in providing a very interesting American perspective on US-China nuclear relationship. Gregory has a perfect Chinese speaker, which means he is capable of penetrating the first line of Chinese national defense. And therefore has really deep insight into Chinese nuclear policy. And his expertise on Chinese nuclear issues is also, I think, built upon his overall deep understanding about Chinese culture, Chinese society, Chinese politics in general. So we are very glad to have him as a contributor. In terms of the topics of the book, we have picked some of the most interesting and important aspects of Chinese nuclear thinking and policy. Many of these topics have been widely and heatedly debated between China and Chinese and the foreign experts. We have chapters on issues such as the nuclear conventional relationship, a debate about China's no first use policy, the nuclear transparency, which is another very controversial issue from the Western perspective. We also have a chapter on the Chinese understanding of the concept of strategic stability, which is also very different from the traditional Western concept. So I think, again, we have this chapter on US-China nuclear relationship, which is a very high priority in Chinese overall nuclear planning. Lastly, I want to say that we also recognize that as China continues to open up and its communication with the outside world increases significantly, there is ample evidence that Chinese nuclear thinking and policy and practice is being increasingly influenced by Western nuclear thinking and nuclear doctrine and nuclear practice. I think Gregory pointed out that in some corners of the Chinese military, there were some military experts who seemed to be interested in the idea of China should develop a strategic early warning system and may even should sheet its posture of keeping a very low-level nuclear status during this time to a nuclear posture that emphasizes on launching on warning, which is, again, I think very much influenced by the American and Russian practice of keeping a high level status and being prepared for launch as soon as an early warning. So again, I think what we are trying to achieve here is to try to highlight the very positive elements of China's traditional nuclear thinking. And this could help Chinese decision-makers and strategists to reflect upon our own nuclear thinking and to better appreciate the positive elements in our traditional thinking and to preserve these positive elements into the future. And also, lastly, I think it may also help other countries, the international community, to better appreciate the positive elements of China's traditional nuclear thinking that can contribute better to stability, to self-restraint, and to international cooperation. And hopefully they, after finding these elements useful, may also consider absolve or incorporate some of these elements into their own nuclear thinking and planning. So with that, I guess I will stop. Yeah. Thank you very much. I'm very proud to have told my colleague and co-editor of this book, or he made a significant contribution to the book. Or we, the Chinese authors, propelled our analysis of the Chinese nuclear thinking on different topics of nuclear issues. But we did not know whether or not the American and other international readers would appreciate our effort. So we invited Dr. Gregory Kulaki to read our first draft in Chinese. That's not easy. And he read the water draft, and he contributed a chapter of the comment to this book. And I very much thank him for his contribution. And I also have a question for Gregory. I forgot to introduce him to you. He's director of China Project at the Union of Concerned Scientists. My question to Gregory is that what are your recommendations for the American and other international readers when they use the book? You read the book, you feel some part are useful, some part are not quite useful. So what are your recommendations to the American and international readers? Gregory, please. Well, first I'd just like to thank Professor Lee for inviting me to be here today and for allowing me to participate in this very useful and very important project. And I don't have much to say other than that the problem, I think, for many Americans in lots of areas of study related to China is that we tend to view things naturally with our own historical experience, our own cultural experience, our own background. It's all we can do. We bring that to the information that we consume about China. And we don't have the benefit of the experiences that they have gone through in terms of how it shapes their thinking about what nuclear weapons are, what they're used for, why they have them, why they want to keep them, why they're worried about the other nuclear weapons that other nation states have. It's hard for us to put ourselves in their place. And I first went to China in 1984. I probably spent a grand total of 20 years of my life there. I got married there. My son was born there. I have lots of friends. I have lots of colleagues. And I struggle every day with that same problem of trying to see things from the perspective of the other culture. And it's not an easy problem to solve. In the case of nuclear weapons, it starts from the very beginning with the statement that the Chinese government made in 1964, which is on the day of its first nuclear test, which is the most extensive explanation of Chinese nuclear policy ever made by the Chinese government, and which all of the authors refer back to in the book. And then I compared it to the statement that President Johnson made 10 hours later. And just notice there's an enormous gap between what's communicated in the Chinese statement, which to this day, I don't think many of our policymakers read with a sensitivity towards Chinese perceptions of the issue that might be better if they were able to do that. And I'll give one example of that and then turn it back over to Li Bin. President Johnson tried to assure the American people that we knew what was going on, that we would always be superior. We would always have superior strength. And to reassure our Asian allies that we would always come to their defense despite the fact that the Chinese were developing nuclear capability. And it was all focused. And our policy pretty much since then has been focused on accomplishing these three goals. Keeping a close eye on the technology and the capabilities that China's developing, assuring our Asian allies that we're going to be able to respond to that effectively and maintaining, making sure that we have our own superiority. There was very little thought about why China decided to make this step. Why did they do it? Why did they decide to build the bomb? One of the most interesting things in state department documents that are now declassified that you can find on the National Security Archives of George Washington University, they talk about, for example, China wanting to strengthen its influence among the Afro-Asian nations. And there's an example where there's a huge disconnect between this Chinese statement and the way the Americans were perceiving China's goals in developing the weapons. China paid a price with the Third World, with all the members of the Bandone Conference with India, with Egypt, with Indonesia, who were begging them not to build the bomb. And when you have that in mind and you read the China statement, they're almost apologizing in that statement to their allies in the Third World for taking this step, which they knew the non-aligned governments didn't want them to take. And they basically say we were forced to take this step by the United States, by the threats that the United States made in Korea in the 50s, by the threats we made in 1955 and 58. And I don't think as Americans we appreciate enough what those threats meant to decision makers on the other side and how that motivated their decision to build the bomb and then their decision to craft the arsenal and the policy that they've put in place. So the great value of this book is that it allows you to understand their perception of why they made these decisions and why they maintain the policies that they have. One final thing, I haven't read the English translation yet, but I've been involved with enough translation work to know that it's never good enough. It's never perfect. So as you're reading it, and if you find the language is a little bit awkward or odd or unclear, please be forgiving of the translators, because it's a very difficult thing for them to do, and try to work your way through those language issues a little bit as you try to get to the meat of the arguments that are being made in each one of the pieces. Thank you, Gregory. When we prepared our analysis, we had a difficulty. That is, we did not know which part is important, which part is not important. For many things, we feel that these things are normal. We do not need to explain to the readers because that is our tradition. Gregory has such a cross-cultural experience. He encourages us, look, you feel this is so normal, but not everyone feels the same way. So that's important for us. Thank you very much for your help. My next question goes to General Yao. General Yao is a major general of the PLA's Academy of Mutual Science. She recently retired from her administrative position. So now we can use much more of her time for our work. And I would like to thank her for her support and for her comment on our analysis. In our book, several chapters discuss no-for-use, the core part of Chinese liberal strategy. I would like to invite General Yao to make a comment on the debate in China on this topic. General Yao, please. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Li Bin. And the first I want to send my congratulations to both of you for a mission accomplished. Thank you. And actually, recently I have had quite a few pictures in my WeChat friends' circles. The pictures of books published in English in the United States. And one of them is this understanding China's nuclear thinking. And for me, it was a very encouraging sign that China is making effort to have the international community to have a better understanding of itself. And it's also a good sign that the international community had more interest in knowing China better. And actually, I was on the launching, both launching event. I was also at the panel for the Chinese version of this book. And I'm happy to do it again for the English version, English book launching event here in the United States because I accidentally had a meeting across the street at Brookings. So Li Bin asked me to talk about no-for-use parties. That is the core concept of the Chinese nuclear policy. And one chapter is devoted by Major General Pan Zhenqiang. And just now Zhao Zhong introduced him as one of the pioneers not only in the Chinese PLA, but in the Chinese arms control community who introduced arms control concepts from the West into China and especially into the Chinese military. To be brief, I think the China's no-first-use policy had six elements, five or six elements. The first is unconditioned no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, unconditioned. The second is so that actually limits theoretically China's nuclear target country to other nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT regime and also de facto nuclear weapons states. And the second element is no-first use of nuclear weapons, even against these NPT nuclear weapons states and de facto nuclear weapons states. First use, that is China will only consider, only use nuclear weapons when it had suffered from a nuclear strike by other nuclear countries. And the third element is that China would need only a small arsenal sufficient for its own national homeland defense. And China would not engage in any nuclear arms trees with other countries. And the fourth element is that China would not provide nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence to use more technical or more professional word to provide nuclear umbrella to any other country. So when China, I think you see in the defense white paper of 2006, China qualified its nuclear strategy as a self-defensive nuclear strategy. A defensive and self-defensive nuclear strategy. Defensive means the no-first use. No-first use, we only use it as counter-strike means. And self-defensive, that is, we only have nuclear weapons for ourselves to defend China's territory, not to provide extended deterrence to other countries. And the fifth element is the goal of China's nuclear weapons is to aim at a total complete disarmament of all nuclear weapons. And of course, China's policy position was for the two nuclear superpowers to engage each other in disarmament process. And China would join in when conditions are right. And the last is China would take full responsibility of non-proliferation and abide by all the UN obligations and non-proliferation obligations. So these six elements composed the core, the no-first use policy. But it was decided, it was adopted on the day when China had its first nuclear explosion back in 1964. And it has not changed for more than half a century. However, time has changed. The bipolar system had given way to a multipolar world. And China has the international configuration, I mean the international balance of power, had changed. And nuclear relationships has changed. And especially China has changed. And China has become the second largest economy. And China's military is modernizing itself very rapidly. So this no-first use policy has to face some challenges. I think the challenges are coming from maybe can be summarized in two categories. First is the military technological developments, like the development of conventional procedure, long-range conventional procedure strike capabilities like conventional tipped ballistic missiles, maybe in the future, hypersonic, glides, glides vehicles, and other conventional means to attack China's nuclear facilities. And the second technological development is the emerging of emerging technology, such as cyber technology, when it is used, it has the implication for China's command and control, nuclear command and control capabilities. And the third category might be the development of missile defense technology. And because China has kept a very relatively small arsenal, and the development and also deployment of missile defense capabilities would have very direct implications to the calculation of Chinese nuclear policy makers on how much is enough. And so I think in China, we have debate. Shall we give up the no-first use policy, or shall we make some conditions to the no-first use policy on a certain condition? For example, if China's nuclear weapons facilities are struck by conventional weapons, China would retell it or things like that. But personally, I think, and also I think it's the mainstream thinking, that so far as China has a certain capability, a capability, a assured capability to strike back with nuclear weapons, China would not be very concerned about the first strike, whether it is made, whether it is delivered by nuclear or conventional means. And China's no-first use policy had set a very high standard, a high threshold for nuclear use. So by setting a high threshold for nuclear use, China has contributed to the international arms control and disarmament process by reducing the role, reducing the utility of nuclear weapons. So and also the stake for China to forgo is to give up its no-first use policy would be higher than keeping the no-first use policy and to take some of the risks. It's just to China's no-first use policy. It's not new, but it's also sometimes mentioned inside China, that is, in keeping no-first use policy, China has to be sure the second strike, retiredatory strike, should be counter-value instead of counter-force. The targeting strategy should be counter-value to make sure that the damage by the retiredatory strike is very high and is, in the Chinese words, unacceptable and intolerable. And this caused a moral issue for China. For example, some people would say, why should use nuclear weapons to strike counter-value targets instead of military targets? But in the strategic discourse, counter-value are sometimes defensive and more moral than counter-force because it makes a nuclear war highly unthinkable and highly unlikely, and it stresses the deterrent effectiveness of China's small nuclear arsenal. So although there are different arguments whether we should keep the no-first use policy, I think the mainstream thinking are still that this policy has served China very well for more than half a century. There is no reason or no rationale to change it. And also, it actually set an example for other nuclear countries to follow suit. And recently, there has been talk that President Obama might consider announcing a no-first use policy, but apparently he has dropped that idea because he had strong oppositions. By reading this book and the logic, the justification, the rational behind China's no-first use policy, especially the second chapter by General Pan Zhenqiang, you will have a much better understanding of how has it worked in China's nuclear thinking. And I think it explains better. And maybe the American public and the American policy-making circles would like to learn something from the Chinese thinking. Thank you, General Yao. Now I realize that when we propel our next project, we should invite General Yao. And I'm sure that he will make important contribution to our next project because she has such good ideas and she has time now. Oh, do I? Oh, lastly and most importantly, I'd like to ask a question to Ambassador Xia Zhukong. Ambassador was responsible for China's arms control diplomacy before he became the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations. I worked for Ambassador in the mid-1990s on the CTBT, Comprehensive Nuclear Transfer and Treaty. At that time, I would always ask Ambassador a question. My analysis is useful. And sometimes Ambassador said, yes. Sometimes Ambassador said, no, no, no. Do something useful. Today, I'm going to ask the same question. Is our book useful according to your arm control diplomacy experience? If it is, how? If it is not, what more effort we should make? So please, Ambassador. Well, thank you. My answer is very simple. You have grown up. As you all know, I'm a professional diplomat during the Department of Service in the year 1970 and I retired officially last year. So it's a long journey, over 45 years. But the bulk of my diplomatic career was devoted to the arms control and disarmament. As a diplomat, you all know, they are very rigid. But they are paid to defend their, what we call, national interests. If you don't like it, you can retire. So I was paid to defend China. And sometimes May might have fight a bitter war against my dear colleague from the United States. That's what my job. I really enjoy it. So in my long career on arms control disarmament, even beginning with the chemical weapons, the biological weapons, the nuclear test plan treaty, non-proliferation, missile proliferation, then conventional weapons that they could landmines, all those things. This long period, one issue which really embarrassed me, that it has become sort of pattern. In any negotiations, most difficult issue is always will be there, always between China and the United States. Well, everybody's concern was solved. US concern about China, China concern about US. So it happened. Others will stay enjoying coffee, smoking. And while Chinese ambassador me and US ambassador will be working very hard in a separate room. So this situation, we were landing in such a kind of position. Sometimes asked me myself, how come? Why there is such a gap of understanding or misunderstanding between China and the United States? So I've been living with this kind of queries myself until a few days ago. And I was requested to comment on his book, Frank speaking, since I joined the Department of Service, I really read any book. Not because I don't like it, because I have no time. I read only government documents, policy papers, talking points, analysis considerations of all those things. Now I'm a request of a lead being and a professor lead being. And I said, well, since you have invited me to confront all of you here and you are real experts, I must be very careful. But at the same time, I should do it. So I read the book. Then to my pleasant surprise, Frank Lesbier all treat him as a boy. Now he's grown up, he's one of the very few best armed control disarmament experts in China. You know that I'm very outspoken person. And I never speak lies. And I honestly don't need to agree with me. You can't differ with me, but I always speak the truth. In a very arrogant, proud person, really appraise anyone. Now he's one of the very few boys I like. Well, my government appointed me after a political bureau meeting. I decided to establish a department for arms control disarmament. Very much bordered on your acta, then I started recruiting people. And I don't want to be dictated by people's liberation army like Leiciano. I want to disarmament department in foreign ministry should have independent thinking. And to be independent, to have its independent views, we need experts. Experts covering the range of weapon systems. And number one is nuclear. Deeping is the one I first identified. I can tell you, I have never invited anyone at his age group for lunch or dinner. Noticing, he's the only exception. I invite him, say, boy, come, you're wonderful. Because he has been with me for years. So I identified him. And then over here, for some health reasons, he failed to join my team. And he became a professor. And I don't know whether it's a right choice or not. But it doesn't matter. So until I read his book, I said, wow, wow. You are really grown up. Tell me. You always behave like a boy, the manner, the style. But you are really expert now. I learned a lot from the book. So let me say, this misunderstanding, as Grigori and others have explained, it has been there. It will continue. But with the launching of this book, I'm sure it will be a very useful instrument to help others to understand China's thinking on nuclear issues. I really appreciate your efforts made. And I strongly encourage you to read it, as I have done, as a senior diplomat. Because with the diplomats, we know where I know you. I'm sure your share will agree with me if I say that as a diplomat, we were busy. Busy all the time, implementing, comprehending, implementing the operating government policies. Occasionally, if you forget, you can also give your advises. But we have no time to read. This is so. The book like this, I would recommend to you to read it. And I certainly highly recommend the younger people in China who are interested in joining this field of work to read this book. It is very helpful. I've been talking too long. And let me say, I hope that I believe that the relations between China and the United States is important. And I'm not saying this to please you. I really believe it. Because I used to categorize our relationship as something like that, love and hate relationship. In eyes of the American colleagues, the Chinese diplomats are always not like me. I'm a Chinese diplomat with American style. They're talking. But most of Chinese diplomats are always wearing a mysterious smile, very mild, very amicable, and keep nodding. You don't know what he is thinking or thinking, actually. But this kind of style might have cost some business money as well. I don't like it. They don't like mine style. But so lots of work need to be done to bridge this misunderstanding, to contribute this kind of mutual understanding between the two countries, two countries, China and the United States. On the issue, I can recall a short story or metaphor. You have Kevin Murray as my counterpart in Geneva, on one occasion with the participation at the presence of the UK ambassador, Nick Tom. We discovered a new clear in the US support of Chiang Kai of our Taiwan authorities, Cheng Shui Ping, and a troublemaker. Like I said, I advise the US studio ambassador to inform your administration. Be careful. This is the bottom line. The moment with the encouragement of US authorities, Cheng Shui Ping declared independence, the moment that declared that China People Liberation Army will be landing in Taiwan because we have no choice. No choice. I still agree. And Taiwan is important. No doubt about it. If Taiwan could be independent, Xinjiang may be independent, Mongolia may be independent, China over, finished. So for China, Taiwan is the bottom line. Be careful. Don't touch it. We'll do our job at any cost. Then I know US is a super nuclear country. You can eliminate China many times. So we dare not to use nuclear weapons. But don't corner China. Or issues like this, China could be cornered. We have a bad nasty saying in China. Gojila will tell Chiang Kai. Once the dog is cornered, it will jump out of the wall. Normally, it won't be able to jump. Don't corner Chinese government. We might jump. So this is the story. But then we touched about nuclear weapons. I said, you can eliminate us. Now let me ask you a question. As a guy, what is the difference between the fact that one man was killed 100 times and one time? There's no difference. OK, now let me tell you. You can kill the Chinese 100 times. But we have the ability to kill your once. Or make your life not liveable, perhaps. It's all now. So it's a joke. But it's a conversation. We don't like this. We dare not. We want to live. And we want Americans to live. And the Chinese to live. We have love-hate relationship. It's always about because we are grateful to you. Because we are celebrating the 16 or 65 anniversary ending of the Korean War. We are celebrating the nomads. There are a lot of revelations and stories about how US helped China, particularly the Second World War. We are very grateful in that sense, in a way. And it even helped us to recover the islands in Nansha Island with American worship. We are grateful to you. But at the same time, we are not happy what you are doing there right now. This is mixed feelings. But let's make sure our love will last longer than hate. I don't have ambition to say that we are always our thinking will repeat in the same way of life. But the relationship is good, very important, particularly on this issue of mass, what was the mass destruction and the nuclear problem in particular. So this book, I will help, I think, help all of you, the public, to understand China. Understanding doesn't mean your agreement. Or we don't need to. Thank you very much for being too long. Not at all. Thank you very much, Amadasha. Amadasha just mentioned that 10 years ago, he offered me a job. And he also offered me a lunch. At lunch, I did not take the job. Oh, I apologize. I apologize. 10 years. 20 years ago. When I worked for Amadasha, I was even younger than Paul. So many years have passed. I'm sure that our speakers have a lot to say, but also understand that this is a Friday afternoon. So we do not want to keep our audience here for too long. So now I would like to give the chance to our audience. If you have questions, comments, please raise your hand. Before you ask your questions or make your comments, please identify yourself. Please. Do you have a microphone? The other way. Thank you to the distinguished speakers. My name is Ben Lawson from the US Navy. My question is, what will China do besides writing good and intense papers to increase bilateral nuclear understanding? Thank you. Does anyone? Whom you will address your question? Anyone? General Yang and Dr. Wang. What is the question again? How to? The question is that the book is one way to promote stability or something. And then what else in our mind? There are several, I like to make the first comment and my colleagues may add. We can do a lot. One thing is that China chose the P5 working group on nuclear terminology. That is an effort to promote mutual understanding among the five nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament. Now we have had the book. That book is ready in four languages. So we can do that and many other things. So General Yang, do you want to answer? I actually understand why you ask this question because you have been working in the American Embassy in China and at the Defense Administration Office. And actually, your question is whether we can have the nuclear dialogue. No, no, no. You are asking about the possibility because that has been raised many times during your stay in Beijing. China and the United States had one kind of nuclear weapon dialogue back in 2008. That's an official dialogue between the two militaries. And China and the United States had several 1.5 and the track two dialogues on nuclear-related issues. China and the United States have set up channels to have dialogues on cyber security issues, on missile defense issues. And I think sooner or later, we would have dialogues to cover a wider-ranging strategic which had the implication on the strategic stability of our two countries. Well, let me add how to build upon this kind of understanding. I think that both governments, they should keep talking to each other at all levels, particularly those officials working in this field. That will help they build up the mutual trust. It's very important. But it's not enough. So we need guys, people like Li Bing and Zhao, and we've got all of you, to increase the exchanges and talk to each other, meet each other, meet each other in exchange of views. We can argue. We can agree to disagree. So both official, governmental, and a non-governmental kind of exchanges for the two countries are very important, very important. That's my view, how to do it. Thank you. I'd like to add one more point. I think we need a joint effort between our two countries. If the effort is made by only one country, that is not sustainable. For example, our two countries had cooperation among our nuclear weapon laboratories. However, that dialogue was killed by Cox Report. We lost that. So we need more joint effort to develop more dialogues, to sustain more dialogues. Thank you. Yeah, the gentleman. Thank you very much. My name is Dong Hui Yu with China Review News Agency. I'm the reporter. Ambassador Sha, you mentioned about the bottom line of China. That is Taiwan. And my question for Ambassador Sha and General Yao is how would you evaluate the possible situation or scenario of the nuclear escalation between China and the United States if the United States intervened the military crisis in the Taiwan Strait? How confident you are that China has the capability to fight back or has the enough deterrence in the scenario of nuclear escalation. Thank you. China's no-first-use policy will not change, not only in the Taiwan scenario, but in other scenarios as well. And we have 100% confidence that we can deal with the Taiwan independence issue by peaceful means and, if necessary, non-peaceful means. And at what general, Yao said, at any cost, we'll do the job on our own. And certainly, we wish that won't happen because the US does not have the responsibility to protect the Taiwan because, since you have agreed, it's part of China and it's our domestic affairs. And we have the communication over there. So I wish it would never happen, but it's a wish. But we have to think, you know, the worst scenario. Even this worst scenario appeared and China was calling it, as I said earlier. We had no choice but to do the job at any cost. Thank you. legitimate. Yes. It seemed like there was an implied threat to use nuclear weapons in a Taiwan scenario with China. While China's no first use policy means, you know, general Yao has to explain very carefully, very articulate, in an articulate manner. And general Pan, in his article, you know, also very precisely articulate. So you read it again, and China doesn't, it's not China's wish to have to possess nuclear weapons. You know, we're going to mention three times China lived under the nuclear threat by the United States, beginning from this Korean War. Let me add, another occasion, 1973, President Brezhnev from former Soviet Union proposed to the United States to take surgical operations against China's nuclear weapons. And this was refused by the United States. So this is another case, 1973, because I was working in the press department of my embassy to find out what was happening. Based on the information we got from U.S. friends. So it's already history now, right? It's actually happened. So China is the only country which lived, you know, for quite some time under the nuclear threat. It's real. None of the other countries have that nightmare experience. So China, frankly speaking, never thought of the use of nuclear weapons, you know. And we're only retaining the right for retaliatory purposes. Number one, number two, we don't want to, don't seek to have this kind of nuclear parity with the United States. We think it's a trap, and it's the most stupid to join this arms race, participating in the arms race with the United States. We don't, I don't think we should join this race. So as a matter of policy, we made it very clear and the book will tell you why. You know, escalating better not, and it won't happen. But every means and ways will be explored to ensure that China will have, will maintain the second retaliatory capabilities with the purpose to turn that nuclear weapons may be used against us. That's all. I have to add that Ambassador, if you think Ambassador Shah has implied a threat to using nuclear weapons, when China is losing Taiwan, I think you have mistakenly understood Ambassador Shah. I don't believe that we can't be ever used. No, I don't believe it, you know, it should not be used. Everything should be made, you know. Every effort should be made to stop the use of this. Maybe. Thank you. That is an important issue now where the US and China have different understandings about the missile defense system. So could you talk about China's Chinese expert, nuclear expert thinking on that? Thank you. I invite Dr. Tong Zhao to answer the question. Well, I think that is very complicated, not only policy issue, but also technical issue. I think there is major difference between Chinese and American South Korean experts on what that can do technically, whether that is effective in defending South Korea against the North Korean missile threats and to what extent said poses a threat to China's national security interest. On this key and a fundamental question, there is a fundamental difference of views, completely contradictory to each other. And this divergence of views is the root cause of different foreign policy and political decisions over said. So I don't think I have time to elaborate all the technical details, but I do believe in order to defuse the crisis over said, in order to mend the ties that have been undermined as a result of the sad dispute, we do have to have substantive and comprehensive dialogues among the technical and operational level experts among all relevant countries by to bridge the gap in their understanding of the technical aspects of that. Maybe I can add something. I think the sad system in which is going to be deployed in ROK, China is opposed to it because it's not because of the interceptors, it's because of the radar systems which has a longer, much longer surveillance range than covering only DPRK. It goes far beyond into, far beyond DPRK into China's interior, homeland interior. So that's why China is opposed to the sad deployment. It has implication to China's second strike retaliatory capabilities. So, and also this is another reason is that sad system is not the most effective missile defense system to defend ROK against DPRK. It is effective to maybe to defend the southern part of ROK where the U.S. forces are based and also maybe Japan and Guam, but not necessarily the northern part of ROK, especially the greater soil area. So it's not an effective missile defense system to protect ROK and it has implications to China's retaliatory capability and strategic deterrent capability. So that's why China is opposed to sad. Thank you. Thank you very much. Yes. Thank you. Benjamin Lee and I'm a junior fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment for the Asia program. I was particularly interested in the idea of China having a very firm commitment to nonproliferation and U.N. obligations and I wanted to ask if the, to ask Ambassador Shah and General Yao about whether China believes it has made sufficient commitment to denuclearize North Korea. Thank you. Well, I'm glad to have a response to your questions. As for North Korea nuclear issue, there are two stages. First stage happened in, I think, in the year 1993 and I had a misfortune of handling this matter. I left the job and I went to, I was sent by my government to Geneva in the year 2001 then my good colleague and, you know, Deputy Minister Udawe Tokova. So I had some experience in dealing with this new creation. IPRK violated NPT definitely. As you all know, it acceded to NPT treaty with expectation that they could, under the cover of the membership, they can continue to develop new problems. Those guys did not understand or fail. They didn't, they did not have experts like you or like us to analyze the verification regime by IAEA. They need to declare and based on your declaration they should accept the onsite inspections and also with installation of devices on spot. So one of the IPRK comrades realized that there is a risk to the potential nuclear weapon program. They decided to suspend their membership. Legally, they've never been in agreement, you know, what is legal, not suspending your membership voluntarily as a party to the NPT. Later on, of course, you know, they withdraw from it. So it's a violation. Though you withdraw your membership, but when you are a member of the NPT, you violate it, you refuse the inspections, it's a serious violation. Number one. Number two, you know in the year 1992, if my memory served well, there was a joint declaration or joint statement between the North and the South to declare the Korean Peninsula as a nuclear-free peninsula. If my memory served well, this declaration was deposited to UN, United Nations, which implies that has legal instrument, legal implication, effectiveness. So there is no slightest doubt about the violation of the IPRK against their commitment and obligation. China has a NPT party. We supported the efforts of the international community to do something, and they know what we've been doing, regardless of the best or karma in arms relationship. That's not an omat principle. No, I don't think we'll tolerate that. We'll never accept that IPRK to be a nuclear country. It must be, as three of the conditions, three were the right, but the Korean Peninsula must be de-nuclearized. You know, the question is how? These four means, other means, whatever means. On these issues, we may differ, but on the objective, there is no difference at all. And we have been working together. Now, there is a bit deadlock there. I don't want to go to details. It could take me hours, hours to explain with these exercises, and then tests, like this, it's escalating like this. Anyway, let's wait for the outcome of your general election, presidential election, and I hope that once your government is in place, the president in office, then let's sit down and take it as one of the urgent issues we should address together. Thank you. Thank you. Yes, it's Jennifer here. Jonathan Ward, Oxford University. I have a question. The Science of Second Artillery in 2004 talked about reducing the nuclear threshold in the event that China was losing a conventional war, rather than a conventional war would escalate and the overall strategic situation would change from positive to disadvantages, disadvantages for China. One of the very distinguished scholars in the volume is written in another place that that can be considered a sort of, you know, credible thinking of the Second Artillery. I was wondering, this might be for Tongzhou, how relevant is that in 2016, to go back to that particular point about the potential reduction of the nuclear threshold in the event of losing in a conventional conflict, especially as potential flashpoints proliferate, not just we talked about Taiwan, but also we have the East China Sea, the South China Sea, possibly elsewhere. And we'd definitely like to ask your thoughts on that and also the Ambassador in the General would be interested in commenting too. Thank you. Not sure which source you were referring to. As I said, given the increasing opening up of China, increasing communication, currently there is a diversity of voice within China about Chinese nuclear policies, not rare at all to hear all types of unorthodoxy ideas and proposals. Some are even voiced by a military expert, but by no means, I mean, by no means do they represent government position, as General Yang has clearly mentioned, I don't see any government policy on these very important aspects. For instance, whether China would result to nuclear employment in case of a conventional military failure. I think with that said, China does face some challenge because originally Chinese nuclear thinking was based on very simple assumptions. Even today the existing Chinese nuclear policy is still that as long as China was struck by nuclear strike, China will retaliate with a massive nuclear response. But if now as China, Chinese experts start to read American nuclear writings, there's clearly a gap in this very simple thinking. In case the enemy only strikes China with one or a couple of small low yield nuclear weapons, will China really retaliate with a massive nuclear response? I think China... Yes, we just distinguish nuclear and conventional, not about the yield. Yes, again, so that's traditional Chinese thinking. But I think as some Chinese experts start to really think into this specific scenario, they start to grow a suspicion about whether China should follow the American step by adding some letters in this estimation scenario, and maybe consider a proportional response in certain conditions. That is different from the very traditional Chinese thinking, but I agree that's a challenge that China is facing today. Again, I think it will be very helpful to have persistent and again, very substantive dialogues at all levels among experts, academics and as government officials to discuss these possible crisis scenarios. If only for the purpose of better understanding each other's policy, understanding each other's consideration, other's way to communicate, to signal during crisis, that will at least help contribute to using possible misunderstandings during crisis, to be into our capability to better coordinate and to better manage crisis in a qualitative manner. I think we can certainly work in those areas, virtue, general, Yao, and... I'll just make one comment. The text that you're referring to took me a long time to get my hands on, actually. Get it from anybody in the United States because they wouldn't give it to me. It's now in three university libraries after we published, after we finally did get a copy of it. And the text where they talk about lowering the nuclear threshold was mistranslated in the original version that the strategic command had done for the United States in a way that made it appear as if China would was preparing for launch. But the language actually makes it very clear that it was a signaling gesture that China was going to do to let the United States know that, you know, they'd reached a certain point. But it makes very clear in the text that they're not going to launch. That's as low as they go in terms of signaling. So it was not, the text did not say China would resort to purchase or change its policy. But these translation issues, they really are important to pay attention to. Thank you. Yes, the gentleman. Thanks, Brandon Babin, U.S. State Department. And I know, I think everyone up here, except Ambassador Shah. My question is, and it kind of builds off of my former Ata Sheikh colleague here and some of the comments Tong Zhao made on that. And then I have two other comments. Precinct dialogue. In June of this year, the Chinese and Russian presidents on June 25th signed a joint statement on strategic stability, provided, I guess, the first comprehensive basis in terms of how China might understand this concept officially. This is something I'm trying to inquire about for the better part of a decade. And part of that statement said that it was needed in terms of four enhanced strategic stability was enhanced dialogues. Again, we've only had one track one. Since 2008, the U.S. government has offered multiple times now and unconditionally to give briefings to the Chinese. That, which the Chinese government has refused, resisted or tabled or temporized on. So my question is, what did President Xi mean in terms of what obligations did he or China possibly take on with this joint statement and what might we look forward to in terms of increasing it? And on that, I would comment that at least from a U.S. perspective, we are noting an increase and at least selective transparency from the Chinese, whether it's China Daily, Shenhua in English, English China military online in terms of increasing. And so my other question is, are we seeing sort of a shift now between this book and those publications online in terms of China's transparency as it relates to military issues? And just one point of clarification for those who haven't read Science of Second Artillery campaigns. The meeting editor on it, he's the deputy commander of the Second Artillery or Rocket Force. The other editor was the commandant of the Second Artie Command Academy at the time of publication. The postscript in the documents said it was directed to be written by the Central Military Commission and published and distributed by the general staff department. So I know we keep kind of having back and forth on this text. I did see it was referenced in the publication, but at least on the U.S. government side and those in the U.S. academia and think tank community, it is seen as authoritative. And then one last question for General Yao, you made the comment about China's missiles being for counter value purposes. China only had ICBM started in the 1980s with the DF-5. So who were all those regional MRBMs with nuclear warheads directed against? U.S. bases, Tokyo, Seoul, China continues to build those systems. We have the DF-26 that you all announced in the parade and said that it could have nuclear and conventional capabilities, those praising potentially the possibility for inadvertent nuclear escalation. So are those systems counter value or are they designed to hit U.S. bases or other country bases in countries that do not have nuclear weapons? Thank you. You ask many questions. And you speak too fast. And in the low voice. And I just want to answer your question in Chinese because I'm not a native English speaker. So it's very difficult for me to understand your question very well. So can you ask your question in one sentence? Who is the target of nuclear weapons? It's only after the 1980s. And who was it before? No, it's after the war. Who is the target? Especially the Japanese. The counter value targeting the missiles for second retaliatory strike purposes and it's for nuclear weapons states who have made the first nuclear attack against China. It's not against non-nuclear weapon states. It's against only nuclear weapon states. And we have several wrong China and several far away from China. So it's not for precision strike against silos or military bases. It's against... Its purpose is to destroy, to make damage, to be destructive. Not to deny. It's not to deny. It's to destroy, to punish. Two points. Why is that China and the United States have no targeting agreement? Don't worry. This meeting room is not a target. We do not target it in peace time. In peace time, it's not targeted at any... And I can tell you I drafted this text. Yeah, we have the last question. The gentleman, yes, please. Thank you, sir. I'm Naseh Hafiz from South Asia Studies in Johns Hopkins University. My question is the operationalization of the no first use. In my view, the no first use policy is a costly policy because it needs a defensive mechanism against the first strike that you are going to absorb first and then it also demands that you should have larger arsenals so that you can respond back once you already lose because you have the first strike. So any one of the panelists, can you tell me that, you know, is this a rational choice for any of the nuclear weapons state to have a no first use policy other than just having a moral high ground because operationally is a costly option and it demands more nuclear weapons. So once we are looking for lesser nuclear weapons and, you know, less have these kind of things, so what are your opinions on that? Thank you. If I can start with one thought, you know, it might be a little more costly in some areas, but again, if everyone adopts first use strategy or a strategy that does not exclude first use, everyone is prepared to use nuclear weapons first and very early in the crisis. The danger of nuclear war mistakenly, you know, breaking out due to misunderstandings or bad communication or whatever or incidents, that risk of having a nuclear war, I mean, the cost is much higher than adopting a no first use and taking extra measures to protect your nuclear assets. I think the comparison is very clear. The trade-offs are very clear. And also it does not necessarily the case that having no first use posture is more expensive, right? If you adopt a nuclear posture that increases first use, you need your nuclear weapons to be very accurate, to be very reliable. It puts more requirement on the operational capability of your forces that all, you know, increases the costs. So I'm not necessarily by your assumption there. Yeah, I realized that your assumption is very different from ours. Your assumption is that nuclear weapons must be used. If you cannot use it for retaliation, then you must use it for first strike. That is your assumption. But my assumption is very different. Nuclear weapons must not be used. So, you know, we do not use nuclear weapons first. Therefore, we do not need to use nuclear weapons for retaliation. So these are very two different assumptions. I think our difference comes from two different assumptions. Or, you know, I understand this is a Friday afternoon. I apologize. I do not want to hold you for too long. So I would like to thank our speakers here. I would like to thank my colleagues, my colleagues for putting the meeting together. So thank you all very much. Thank you. Thank you.