 Mae'r cwmhwys yma yn y bwg wedi'u gweld yn y ffyrdd ymlaen. Mae'r cwmhwys yma yn y ffyrdd yma yn y ffyrdd yma'r cwmhwys yma yn y ffyrdd yma yn eu hunain. Mae'r cyfrifysgol yn 40 cwmhwys. Mae'r 50 cyfrifysgol. Felly mae'n ffantastig cyfrifysgol. Mae'n ffyrdd cyfrifysgol ar y cwmhwys. Mae'n ddweud i'r unrhyw yng Ngwysbeth erbyn, mae'r union yng Nghymru yn ychydig i'r asia. The US already has its pivot towards Asia, its rebalancing of every term, we might talk about. This comes from a Henry Clinton's article in Foreign Affairs in October 2011 when she talked about the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade being locking in a type of an investment of what basically she calls in the article Smart Power in the Asia-Pacific region while of course emphasizing the important relationship with the European Union, which is under a bit of discussion at the moment. So what if we have some US pivot? We also, and I'm happy to talk about this in question time, have an Australian pivot taking place. I live in Melbourne and this is the issue that is being discussed quite a bit in Melbourne. In Australia in general, Australia has issued a paper called Australian the Asian Century. They do not call it the Pacific Century, that is what the Americans call it, but they call it the Asian Century because many people talking about the Asian Century don't necessarily see it as an Asia-Pacific Century. It depends on how you actually look at it. The Japanese perspective has been very challenging particularly under Prime Minister Hattiyana in that regard. So in a sense the decision has to be whether the European Union wishes to actually go all the way with the USA as it were or wishes to show itself to be an independent actor, a coherent actor and a consistent actor and I would put to you very strongly that the European Union is not perceived as a strong, coherent or consistent actor by its Asian interlocutors, its Asian partners. It is working very, very closely on what I call selective opportunistic regionalism. In other words, using interregionalism when it works with ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations but quite often it's signing trade agreements when for instance the EU ASEAN one collapsed in 2008 mostly because of Myanmar but not only because of that. It's now signing bilateral relations, bilateral FTAs. The Korean one is the most famous of course, the Singaporean one most recently and a host of others. So in a sense the question is does the European Union really need to think about its own interests and also what those interests are and how to define them, promote them and protect them in the Asian Pacific context. One of the challenges straight away is the fact that the European Union is not a united actor in the relationship with China but not only in that relationship. Germany, the UK and France dominate the relationship, national interests dominate the relationship consistently and David Sullivan in a talk he gave a few months ago suggests that the EU's value to the Asia Pacific region is as a rules based cooperative security context and I think that that perhaps is, I think is optimistic. I think it's more an expression of hope rather than of achievement and I think David knows I think that. I think then we have to see basically what are the sort of pivots that the European Union sees as the most important ones and who should it be working with. It is partly working with Australia and it's in the middle of a negotiation on something called framework agreement at the moment. It's already under a previous agreement called the partnership framework of 2008 is working very closely on support for development systems for instance working together on humanitarian issues and they signed an agreement on civilian crisis management in the region as well similar to the one that the EU signed with the United States. The US however has also become increasingly a partner of the European Union in the Asia Pacific. I would suggest to you that this brings with it its challenges. The possibilities for the European Union to be regarded as an independent actor, as a potential mediator in disputes such as in the HAA monitoring mission in Indonesia. In these cases I think that there is a challenge for the European Union particularly since the Clinton Ashton declaration of July last year where they expressed their wish to be more involved in the Asia Pacific and to talk about the Asian context and the Asian partners as a sort of less than significant other I think it's a very problematic document. The other issue is that I think the European Union has to be present. There is a history of abstention in terms of turning up to fora in the Asian context and whether it's the Asian regional forum or others or indeed ASEAN itself. It's a question of the European Union having a coherent presence, a coherent vision and a coherent message and it simply did not turn up. It is only in 2012 that you began to see Catherine Ashton turning up to meetings such as the ASEAN regional forum. This matters. It matters to Asian interlocutors because symmetry matters just as much as symmetry for Asian interlocutors and I think this has been a challenge to try and get that message across that it actually does care and counselling meetings in Asia as has been done by Catherine Ashton in the past is not a very good signal to put out to people who are face and showing up for matters. There are also some problems of both coherence and consistency in the European Union's message. Coherence and consistency in terms of whether it's a member state speaking or indeed whether it is the European Union and if so, which part of the European Union is actually talking and I think this is the message from many of the surveys that have been conducted. Really, the message is that the European Union is not regarded as anything other than a trade actor and even they're not necessarily as a trade actor for many of the Asian interlocutors and I'm part of a project that is run by Mybridge-Dwmbrang at Free University of Berlin where we're looking at some of these Asian perceptions of the European Union and I'm going to do a little bit of advertising if I may, excuse me. Mybridge is going to be talking about this conference along with many others and we're very happy for you to come along because Professor Louie Brennan, who is the director of the Institute for International Integration Studies where I am also privileged to be a research associate and he and I are running this conference together please feel free to have a look at this and to come along to a number of sessions and we do ask that you register for catering purposes but we'd be delighted to have you come along. So Mybridge will be talking about some of these issues along with the Australian ambassador to the EU for instance who will give his perspective on them as well. I think that I can't talk for three hours because we've been told we'd have to send out for takeaway ice creams if that was the case. So really I'm going to give you a sort of a, what I'm giving you is a snapshot so I'm happy to deal with issues in more detail afterwards but I think this consistency issue across policy is a problem and I think that to put it very simply trade drives diplomacy in the EU's negotiations and discussions so indeed does China, the issue of China drive any other consideration in the relationship. There is an increasing self-confidence in Asia. Barry Desker from Singapore has argued in a piece he wrote about a week or two ago that there is a danger of smugness among many Asians who are doing extremely well and to be careful of that it may not actually be the Asian century but nevertheless there is a great deal of growth and there is a need for the European Union to treat its interlocutors more in terms of symmetry and parity as partners broader than as recipients of the development assistance alone. And so the EU is in a sense challenged to develop its priorities and indeed its values. It's done this to a certain extent by its East Asia policy guidelines, its foreign policy guidelines which came out in June last year. However that document, very interesting document, very clearly written is really in a sense a listing of the issues that are challenges in the Asia Pacific region and taking adequate note of the important role of both the United States and China role within actually setting out a strategy. There is no way to strategy at the moment for Asia by the European Union. So one of the challenges is there's no coherent strategy on the Asian side either. So sovereignty matters, the embedded into governmentalism in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for instance, means that there are differing commitments to regionalism, differing commitments to something that is held dear in the European Union to democracy and indeed to human rights. There are very differing political orientations as we know. The European Union is very much dominated by its own economic interest agenda by the pursuit of FTAs and by it's concerned about the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership which is in some cases being referred to as the United States equivalent, economic equivalent of an Asia Pacific NATO. So it's quite interesting that that is also being regarded to security terms. I mean if it does come to pass now that Japan still looks like it's going to be and I know that China is at least being discussed as a member that's more problematic, 650 million people approximately within that MTPP. So that's also a challenge and the challenge is also that Asia is crowded. It's crowded with regional entities. There isn't just one major player in town like we have in the European context but you've got ASEAN, you've got ASEAN plus three, you've got APEC which stands for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum though there are some people in Australia who refer to it as a perfect excuse to chat. So what you have is a very much a crowded agenda and then of course a crowded set of hegemons. You've got China, the regional hegemon and or aspiring regional hegemon depending on which perspective you take and you've got the United States, the external hegemon which has its own pivot and which has its seventh fleet which of course the European Union doesn't have. So this challenge of how much autonomy to take from the US strategy is also a problem. One of the ways of looking at it is to reimagine the security in terms of non-traditional security for the European Union to work on what it's really good at and that is non-traditional security, capacity building, disaster management, civilian crisis management, mediation, these sort of issues and here we see also the discussion of the European Union as a type of norms entrepreneur. It sees itself as a promoter of regionalism, of values and a promoter of good governance and this is again very problematic and we've actually got a session on it at our symposium on Thursday and Friday looking at these issues. We've asked the person in charge of this regionalism promotion to come over from the commission to talk about it so we're delighted about that. So the EU in a sense is dealing with rapidly changing issues with the tectonic changes that are taking place in terms of security with the fact that economic regionalism matters in Asia in so many different ways but that security regionalism is a problematic aspect in many ways and it's what Bill Tau calls a web of alliances, of security alliances and of course you've got this hub and spokes approach of the United States towards its interlocutors. Now the European Union can develop its relations with its four strategic partners in the region, China, Korea, Japan and India and one of the ways it can do this is by actually developing a strategic partnership with ASEAN. Now what exactly is a strategic partnership? We could spend a few years on that one but one person has been quoted in the European Union as saying it's a bit like love, you recognise it when you experience it. I'm not so sure that that's tremendously useful for us but really in a sense the strategic framework and context for the European Union in terms of its Asia strategy started actually in trying to develop one in 2001 following on from very much a trade and human rights oriented one in 1994 but what we begin to see is Europe's year in Asia is the term that was used by the European External Action Service for its achievements when Catherine Ashton attended the ASEAN regional forum when Catherine Ashton signed the Treaty of Amity in Cooperation with ASEAN when the EU developed its East Asia foreign policy guidelines and when you also had the signature of this transatlantic agreement on the Asia Pacific but in a sense there's still a danger I think of the European Union being crowded out in this rather crowded Asia regionalism context so David O'Sullivan has said look what we're doing is we're working on our 3Ds Defence Diplomacy and Development and I've come up with 3Ps in response to that and that is presence you have to have presence, it matters whether you turn up and who turns up credibility matters by actually being there you have to show I think a sense of partnership strategically otherwise it doesn't matter whether it's called a reliable partnership or whatever that's terminology that can be fixed up by the relevant people it's got to be a partnership rather than a donor recipient relationship or a China focused relationship only so that partnership is tremendously important and I think that is what is needed is a pivot which doesn't only focus on security because there is no 7th Fleet because the ASEAN regional forum is where Catherine Ashton and others are increasingly called upon to take part and because the East Asia Summit is the summit where Russia attends where the United States attends where all the major East Asian actors attend and where Europe and Australia and India and New Zealand and others but the EU is not a member and the EU has not been co-ordered membership despite quite a bit of diplomatic work in this regard and I think this is partly because presence matters summitry does matter so I'm going to finish by suggesting to you that there is a triple hierarchy problem there is a hierarchy of policies and this is actually true for both sides where trade drives diplomacy except in the case of the Asian side security is up there as a co-equal and the second issue is a hierarchy of interlocutors where China is the major concern in terms of trade in particular and the third is the hierarchy of national interests and indeed the dominance of national interests in the European Union strategy towards Asia and that is why there are so many tensions for instance in the context of the arms embargo in terms of trade access and this is a significant challenge for the European Union to be seen, to be speaking with one voice I think that the problem really is that the European Union needs a strategy coherence or a pivot coherence a coherence of policy, of personality and of tasks and at the moment the European Union is in danger of being a follower rather than a leader in the Asian context Thank you