 Today, I am going to discuss about the Cartesian theory of mind. The Cartesian theory of mind revisited. Dakar, as we know, Dakar is one of the important philosophers in the philosophy of mind. Without Dakar's philosophy of mind, it is very difficult to explain the contemporary issues in philosophy of mind and cognitions. My colleague, Prof. Ranjan Ponda has explained on the Cartesian dualism. But I will be explaining something different from what Prof. Ponda has explained. In these sections, I will be giving much importance on the Cartesian concept of mind and how the Cartesian concept of mind is important. Because Dakar is one of the classical founders of non-computational theory of mind according to him. Because the thought plays vital role in the case of mind. Because the essence of mind is thought and the essence of the body is extensions. And we cannot attribute essence of thought in a body. Because it is opposing each other. And there are strong distinctions between mind and body according to Orin and Dakar's. But Dakar is not denying the existence of body rather than accepting the existence of body. But he is saying that mind is different from the body. The way he is explaining mind, which is completely non-computational and non-mathematical, even non-mechanical. Without a proper understanding of Dakar's view on the mind, it is impossible to discuss contemporary philosophy of mind. In these sections, I will be explaining two important things namely the essence of mind and its nature and how Dakar's idea of mind is non-computational. In the first section, I shall argue that William Hintika, Malcolm and many other philosophers, philosophical arguments will not cope with Dakar's notions of mind. Because the way they are defining the notion of mind is negating the existence of mind and also its nature. Secondly, I shall argue that Dakar's idea of mind is non-computational. In the second section, I shall argue that Dakar's notion of mind is negation because the way Rael, Quine and other functionalists or founder of cognitive scientists define it is completely mechanical or behavioral. And to which the notion of computationality is applicable and the mental qualities are credible to machines. This section is to clarify Dakar's notion of mind from subjective point of view. In the third section, I shall argue that Dakar's notion of mind cannot be explained or characterized in a computationalistic approach. That are the subjective mental states which we can see from the first person perspective of their proper understanding. Let us see the Cartesian mind, its nature. According to Dakar, to know something implies that there is a mind. Of a knowing subject means that there is a mind. Again, he tries to find out through his cogito argument that there is at least one knowing subject that is his own self. He arrives at this truth through his method of doubt. The method lead Dakar to argue that the whole body of knowledge might be mistaken. In Dakar's words, I quote, I will suppose then that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no sense, body, shape, extension, movement and pleasure. In this context, Dakar's raises fundamental questions. From the possible non-existence of the external world and our own bodies. Does it not follow that it is possible that where our self do not exist? Again, he replied to above question is as follows. I quote, No, if I conceived myself of something, then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and coming who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case, I too undoubtedly exist. If he is deceiving and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition I am, I exist is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. Thus, to think that one does not exist, one must exist. Therefore, one's own non-existence is inconceivable. If I deny my own existence, the denying itself presupposes my own existence. For Descartes, cogito ergo sum is an indubitable proposition. Doubting one's own existence presupposes one's existence. Now, the question arises, what is the nature of the statement cogito ergo sum? It is not a syllogistic inference like whatever things exist. I think therefore, I exist for Descartes. It is not a syllogistic inference. It is rather a self-evident truth known by a simple intuition of the mind. Thus, scholars are divided among themselves as to the exact nature of the transitions from cogito to sum. William has shown that there is something unique about cogito, which cannot be replaced by any other verb from instance umbrella. Ambulo ergo sum is not as self-evident as cogito ergo sum. Moreover, unlike William, Hintika argues that cogito ergo sum is not an inference but a performance. He says the function of the word cogito in Descartes dictum is to refer to the thought act through which the existential self verifiability of I exist manifests itself for him. The relation of cogito to sum is similar to the relation of a process to its product. The truth of I exist is revealed to one only when one actively thinks just as there is illumination only when there is source of light exist. The truth of I exist cannot be revealed by any arbitrary human activity such as breathing, etc. But only by thinking and attempt to think one's own non-existence amounts to persuading one's own non-existence. The truth of I exist cannot be revealed by any arbitrary human activity such as breathing, etc. But only by thinking and attempt to think one's own non-existence amounts to persuading oneself to the belief that one does not exist. Though each thought includes the thought of one's own non-existence, the truth of sum is very bad. This self is coming to know its own existence and it is revealed in the act of thought. According to Descartes, the thought act is due to the thinking thing which is the self for him again. The thinking or the self is that which, but what then am I a thing that thinks? What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. The existence of the thinking thing is the same as the existence of the knowing thing. From this statement it follows that there is a mind which has the power of knowing something and if there exists at least one mind it is logically and even if empirically possible that there are other minds. Now the question is if there is, there is or there are minds what is the nature or essence? According to Rene Descartes, thought is the essence of the mind. The essence of a thing is defined as that which is necessarily for its existence and if it has a non-necessary relationship then we cannot accept its existence. Therefore thought is the essence of mind, the similar way. Extension is the essence of the body. Without extensions we cannot imagine a body. If we imagine some kind of extended things is existing in this space and time then we have to predict that something is existing. We cannot think that something is existing which has the properties of extensions but it is not existing in the space which is one of the contradictory statements. Therefore Descartes claims that he has clear and distinct perceptions or awareness that he is a thinking thing and nothing other than thought belongs to his nature. But on the other hand, Malklon argues that in identifying thought as mind's essence Descartes employs the following principles. X is my essence if it is the case that A if I am aware of X then necessarily I am aware of myself and B if I am aware of myself then necessarily I am aware of our 2 X. Thinking satisfies these conditions. Ergos' thinking is my essence. Malklon illustrates how thought along satisfies the single principle that any act of thought for Descartes is identical with the act of consciousness. Consequently if I am aware of anything then I am thinking and so if I am aware of thinking then I am thinking. And if I am thinking I am aware of thinking. In Malklon's view though Descartes does not explicitly maintain that whatever I think therefore I am aware of myself he would be drawn to accept it partly because the best support for his principle I think Ergo I exist is at the same time a support for the principle I think Ergo I am. I am aware that I exist. So thought satisfies the conditions A of the above principles. It also satisfies the condition B as every act of awareness of myself is also an act of awareness of something other than myself. Since acts of thoughts are identified with acts of consciousness it follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts. So far as Descartes concept of mind is concerned because Descartes mind is one of the important aspects of cognitive states and process is their phenomenality. Our perceptions, understanding, judgment and many other mental faculties can be defined and explained only in relation to consciousness according to Descartes. The mind is a thinking substance endowed with various faculties such as sensory perceptions, understanding, wheeling etc. For him it is one and the same mind which wheels understand and has sensory perceptions. Moreover Descartes grant that the mind is associated with body and mind provides metaphysical support to the body. This derives him to the examination of the nature of the body in its metaphysical aspects that is body in the most general sense of the term. The most general concept of mind attained through a clear and distinct perception of the intellect is that it is an extended substance. A continuum with three dimension of length, breadth and height as in the case of the mental substance. The extended substance two is known through its acts or more switch according to Descartes as shape, size, position, motion, rest etc. Therefore this shows that Descartes idea of mind is something non-competitional. Let us see how the Cartesian mind is non-competitional. Till now we have discussed the Cartesian mind and its nature. In the Cartesian scheme of mind there is no place for competitionality because the third act is due to the subjective thinking thing which is the self again. This subjective thinking thing or the self is that which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. The existence of the thinking thing is same as the existence of the subjective thinking thing because it is the subject who thinks all these subjective activities are non-competitional because the subjective activity is not mechanical. If it is a mechanical then we can define it objectively. Therefore Cartesian mind is subjective mind and which we can able to explain from the first person perspective. The mental processes for Descartes are intentional and are the free acts of the thinking subject. Hence they cannot be mapped mechanically in an ergonometric way or ergonometric system. Descartes concept of I think presupposes subjective experience because it is I who experience the world. Descartes notion of I negates the notion of competitionality in the mind. The essence of mind is thought and the acts of thoughts are identified with acts of consciousness. Therefore it follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts but not computational acts. Thus for Descartes one of the most important aspect of cognitive states and processes is their phenomenality because our judgments, understanding, etcetera can be defined and explained in relation to the consciousness not in relation to competitionality. We can only find competitionality in machines and not in the mind which will understand and judge. Descartes dictums I think therefore I am not only establishes the existence of the self who is thinks and acts but also its freedom from mechanistic laws to which the human body is subject. Moreover when Descartes makes the distinction between mind and body he did not say that the idea of the mind is that of a ghost rather than Gilbert Reilly's positing or ascribing that there is a ghost in the mind and there is a ghost in the machines or there is a ghost in the body although he did not say but although Descartes did not say that the idea of the body is that of a machine. Reilly in his book the concept of mind says that Descartes' distinction between mind and body is a myth. He argues I shall often speak of it with deliberate abusiveness as the dogma of the ghost in the machine. I hope to prove that it is entirely false and false not in details but in principles. According to Reilly Descartes' distinction between mind and body commits a categorical mistakes because Descartes is categorizing dividing both mind and body and that division making one kind of categorical mistakes. As Reilly said my destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category mistake is the source of the double life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously encoded in a machines and which derives from this argument because as it is true that a person's thinking, feeling and purpose of doing cannot be described solely in the items of physics, chemistry and physiology. Therefore, they must be described in computer counterpart idioms as the human body is a complex organized unity. So, the human mind must be another complex organized unity though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a different sort of structure or again as the human body like any other part of matter is a field of causes and effects. So, the mind must be another field of causes and effects though not having been placed mechanical causes and mechanical effects. In Reilly's understanding of mind becomes as much mechanical as the body is therefore, not different from the body. However, Descartes refutes the mechanistic reading of mind as we have seen Descartes is a dualist rather than a mentalist. Descartes's argument for the mind which is distant from body needs to be understood as an argument for the logical possibility of their separate existence and not for the fact that they exist independent of each other. The separability argument is as follows. Firstly, I know that everything which clearly and distinctively understand is capable of being created by God or so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence, the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand and one thing apart from another is enough to make certain that two things are distinct since they are capable of being separated at least by God according to René Descartes. The question of what kind of power is required to bring about such a separation does not affect the judgment that the two things are distinct. Thus simply by knowing that I exist and seeing at the same time that absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature or essence exactly that I am a thinking thing. I can infer correctly that my essence consists slowly in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It is true that I may have or I may have or I may anticipate that I have certainly have a body that is very closely joined to me, but nevertheless on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am simply a thing that non-extended thing and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of a body in so far as this is simply an extended non-thinking thing accordingly. It is certainly that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it. Descartes has already proved in the second meditation the existence of a thinking being who has a clear and distinct perception of mind as a thinking non-extended thing. This is a proof of the non-mechanical mind which is different from the body subject to mechanical laws. Similarly in the fifth meditation he has shown that he has a clear and distinct idea of a body as extended and a non-thinking substance. This is to suggest that mechanically existing body is ontological distinct from the non-computational mind. The above distinct between mind and body supposes that there is no ghost in the human body or ghost in the machine. Descartes did not admit the existence of a ghost in the machines. Had Descartes admitted that there was a ghost in the human body, then the mind itself would become computational and there would be no necessary distance between mind and body because the ghost itself is a body but Descartes admits that the distance between mind and body and this shows that the mind is non-computational. It is mind which has the capacity of intelligence and understanding. The Cartesian way of understanding of the concept of intelligence is anti-physicalistic and anti-behavioristic and hence is anti-computational. The human mind is beyond the sphere of computationality because the human mind has innate ideas which are embedded as the innate disposition of the human mind. These ideas are a priori in the human mind and are the basic inborn propensities. Descartes observes my understanding of what a thing is, what thing, what truth is, what thought is, seems to derive simply from my own nature but my hearing and noise as I do now or seeing the sound of sound or feeling the fire comes from thing which are located outside me or so I have heterodoxed. The above observation of Descartes shows that innate ideas are not produced in us by senses if the ideas were conveyed to us by the senses like heat, sound, etcetera we would not have to refer to anything outside ourselves that would be innate for Descartes. The ideas of pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the more innate if on the occasion of the certain corporeal motions our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself for there is no similarity between these ideas and corporeal motions. Here it follows that there is a distinction between innate and advantageous ideas and that innate ideas are universal ideas whereas advantageous ideas are particular ideas as Descartes points out that hearing a noise, seeing the scenes and feeling the fire and all particular ideas again it must noted that the perception of the particular is not possible without the universal innate universal ideas are necessarily required for the cognition of the particular objects in the world. The following Descartes Chomsky establishes that language through is an innate faculty of the human species language becomes the essence that defines what it is to be human. Language is purely a synthetic system according to Chomsky and it therefore has a logical form which is universal and innate world. Language most also have been an essence something that makes language what it is and in years in all languages that essence is called universal grammar. Language does not arise from anything bodily starting the brain and the body can give us no addition insight into language. The basic tenets of Chomsky's linguistic are taken directly from Descartes. The only major tenets of Descartes and Chomsky rejects is the existence of the mental substance different from the Chomsky accept that the human brain embodies the innate grammatical structure like Chomsky. Quine also affirms that there can be no philosophical study of mind outside psychology. Progress in philosophical understanding of the mind is inseparable from progress in psychology because psychology is a natural science studying a natural phenomena that is a physical human subject. Quine argued a dualism of mind and body is an idle redundancy. Quine holds that corresponding to every mental state however fleeting or remotely intellectual the dualist is bound to admit the existence of a bodily state that obtains when and only when mental one obtains. The bodily state is trivially specifiable in the dualist's own terms simply as the state of accompanying a mind that is the mental state instead of ascribing the one state to the mind then we may equivalently ascribe the other to the body the mind goes by the bound and will not be missed. Quine's position is that there are irreducible psychological properties but all explanation is ultimately physical and his account of mental concept emerges as he examines how we acquire them and how we learn. He explains such terms are applied in the light of a publicly observable symptoms. Bodyly symptoms strictly of a bodily state and the mind is as may be someone observes my joyful or anxious expression or perhaps observes my gratifying or threatening situation itself or hears me tell about it. See then applies the word joy or angity. After another such relations or two relations apply to myself applying those words to some of my subsequent states in the in case where no outward signs are to be observed beyond my report itself without the outward signs to begin with mentalistic terms could not be learned at all. Quine opposes the Cartesian dualism and functionalist concepts of mind. He reduces the mental states like beliefs and other propositional attitudes to functional states. If both Chomsky and Quine are right about the nature of mind then Decker's view of mind is wrong that is if that human brain is the cause of the mental states then we cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the mental states are causally computable within a physical system. Chomsky and Quine define the mental qualities in terms of physical qualities. Therefore, they define mind in terms of the computational functions of the brain but in the case of Decker's claim but Decker is claiming that all ideas in the mind are mental representational. In the third meditation Decker gives an extensive account of ideas. He says that thus when I will or I am afraid or affirm or deny there is always a particular thing which I take as the subject of my thought but my thought includes something more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called voluptions or emotions which others are called judgments. The above quotation shows that some thoughts are images of things. For example, they represent things in the world that is they have an object or content by which they are individuated as an idea of this particular thing or being. Decker also considers an idea to refer to form of the any thought. Decker said that I understand this term to mean the form of any given thought, the immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought. Hence whenever I express something in words and I understand what I am saying this very fact makes it certain that there is within me an idea of what is signified by the word in question. The ideas for Decker are thus representational and intentional in character because any ideas whatever we say we express it represents about the facts about the world which are mental as well as physical and in the terms of physical when we actualize those things. Suppose I am feeling hungry and there is some intentional activities to the concept of hungriness and when I get my food then I satisfy my hungriness and here it is completely intentional and representational. But Decker is unlike Hoffs and Gassendi is not a naturalist and keeps the thought content free from naturalizes to which Hoffs and Gassendi are committed. For them thoughts are mechanical process in the brain. In reply to Gassendi Decker says that I realize none of things that the imagination enable me to grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of myself which I possess and that the mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible. On the contrary Decker holds that individual acts of imagination is as much as their experiences are relevant to grasping the nature of the mind because the mind is a thinking thing free from the mechanistic process of the brain. What separates Decker's dualism from the contemporary functionalism and identity theses is not so much his distinction between and immaterial mind and extended material body as his notion of the human being as a unity of a mind and body with the properties not reducible to either mind or body but dependent precisely on their substantial union. Decker holds that thinking cannot be explained mechanically his argument that brute cannot think is equivalent to an argument that machines cannot think. He thinks that no machine could have the capacity of using the linguistic and other science to express thoughts to give appropriate response to meaningful speech and the capacity to act intelligently or rationally in all sort of situation but what is so special about human language use about what does it show that the behavior of any mechanism fails to show a machine could be constructed to utter words corresponding to bodily change in its origin. It could never use spoken words or the science composing them as we do to declare our thoughts to others because it is not conceivable that the machines should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately mechanical answer to whatever is said in its presence as the dualist for man can do. Secondly, if though such machines might do something as well as we do them or perhaps even better they would be inevitable fail in others which could reveal that they were acting not through understanding but only from the disposition of their organs whereas region is a universal instrument which can be used in all kind of situations. Their organs need some particular disposition for each particular actions hence it is morally impossible to have enough different ones in a machine to make it act in all contingencies of life in the way in which our region make us act. What Descartes is drawing attention here is that firstly no machine could have the capacity to use linguistic and other science to express thoughts and to give appropriate responses to meaningful speech. Secondly, machine could not have the capacity to act intelligently in all sort of situations. Here animal communications have not afford encounter evidence to Descartes as mentioned because human language is based on an entirely distinct principle nor has modern language dealt with his observation in various ways. For Chomsky the main lesson to learn from the Cartesian tradition in linguistic are the ideas of an innate universal grammar and the ideas that are study of structure of this argument will reveal the structure of thought or mind. Descartes argument that brute or machine cannot think in the light of the general questions what makes an utterance or a symbolic structure is meaningful. The kind of automatic rule governed computations or symbol processing that a Turing machine instantates and that can be performed by electronic computers would not count as thinking in Descartes sense nor would the mechanical operations of a computer or robot no matter how ingenious or intelligent count as rational behavior as he understand it. Not only it is much a view of if thinking too narrow it is based on the presale the kind of category mistake that really activates to the Cartesians which I have already discussed. But Descartes himself is not guilty of explaining thought in terms of extensions as Pradhan clarifies that Descartes is not a reductionist as he feels that mind cannot be reduced to anything else and it must have an autonomous existence alongside the existence of the material body. The I think of the mental reality does not deny its I exist character in the world rather it is an affirmation of it. In that sense we cannot say that Descartes subjectivized the mental world and thus made it into a private world. He made a brief to keep an objective constraints on the subjective mind and thus he explains that there is a mind and which is distinct from the mind and he has categorically attributes the essence of mind is thought and the essence of body is extensions and this is because Cartesian doctrines of the mind and its inner experience does not assume that we know other minds as much as we know our one. That is the reason why Descartes is the absolute basis of all our knowledge claims about others and also external world. Thus the self or the mind is irreducible not explainable in terms of the body or machines whenever mind or another another's. In view of this we can say that the Cartesian philosophy of mind not bashed on a mistake and that it has shown the right way to understand of the mind. Of course Descartes would not have accepted the idea of mechanical or computational or artificial intelligence model of mind. He may still be considered an important forerunner of cognitive and computational view of mind because the essence of mind is rational thinking and that rational thought or cognition can be studied independently of the other phenomena like sensation and emotions. That Descartes stated that body depends on mental phenomena to which mind refers to consciousness although Descartes did not identify mental thought with consciousness emotions awareness but regarded that all those conditions of mind Descartes talk about that the mind acting in some particular location in the brain to contemporarily literally talk about mental processes as computational activity in the brain. But Descartes would not have accepted the mechanical application of rule on syntactic structure as a sufficient condition for a rational symbolic manipulation the kind of automatic the rule governed computation or symbol process that a Turing machine insensate and that can be performed by elopement computation would not count thinking of the Cartesian point of view because thinking is neither reducible nor understand in the mechanistic way and he has clearly mentioned that consciousness is a necessary condition for the mind to explain thought and mind and it is consciousness which is belongs to the self and it is because of that mind is different from the body and it gives one kind of metaphysical explanation on the mind not a metaphorical explanation on the mind but Cartesian mind is able to understand different from the body. Thank you.