 Fy fawr, a fawr i gwaith i gyd yn gweithio ar gyfer y Gwysigol Cymru yn 2016. Mae ystafell ystafell yn y gynllun iawn o'r llefnodau a'r fforddau cymdeithasol a'r ffirmidau SSI, yn gweithio'r cymdeithasol yng nghymru o'r systemau i Gwysigol Cymru. Mae'n fflemid i gael yn gweithio i gyflawni Annabelle Ewing, Minister for Community Safety a Lleidogol Fawr, i gyd yn gweithio i gyd. Mae'n gweithio i gyd yn gweithio i gyd yn gweithio i gyd. On behalf of the committee, can I congratulate you on your appointment and look forward to working with you and your team in the future, and I'm sure that this will be one of many appearances before the committee. With the minister this morning is Sandra Wallace and Hannah Frobaisham from the Civil Law and Legal System Division and John St Clair, director of legal services with the Scottish Government. Just to remind members, officials are permitted to give evidence under this item but may not participate in the formal debate on the instruments under item 2 on the agenda. Now I refer members to paper 1 and paper 3 in their papers issued and ask the minister if she'd like to make a short opening statement. Well thank you, convener, and it's a pleasure to be here at my first appearance before the committee and indeed I too look forward to working with the committee over the next years in terms of what I think will be a very busy period for all of us. I would like just to start to refer members to my entry in the register of interests where members will find that I am a member of the Law Society of Scotland and do hold a current practicing certificate. I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the suite of fairly technical regulations that will set up the initial structure of the Scottish Tribunals and transfer in the first of its jurisdictions. I will give a brief overview of each of the instruments before you today. First, I refer the committee to the First Year Tribunal for Scotland brackets chambers closed brackets regulations 2016. Those regulations divide the First Year Tribunal into at this stage five chambers and the chambers are to be the mental health chamber, the housing and property chamber, the health and education chamber, the general regulatory chamber and the tax chamber. By separating the First Year into chambers, it protects the specialist knowledge and expertise of the separate jurisdictions. Secondly, I would refer the committee to the First Year Tribunal for Scotland housing and property chamber and Upper Tribunal for Scotland brackets composition closed brackets regulations 2016. Those regulations specify the type of member who will hear cases in the housing and property chamber. That mirrors the existing composition of the two housing jurisdictions that will transfer into the Scottish Tribunal structure in December of this year. The instrument also sets out the composition of the Upper Tribunal when hearing appeals from the housing and property chamber. The regulations allow for a sheriff to hear appeals. Again, that mirrors the status quo as appeals are currently heard in the sheriff court. It will be for the president of tribunals to determine who hears those appeals. The president may also select herself, Lady Smith is the president at this time, the chamber president or indeed the Lord president if felt appropriate. Thirdly, I would refer the committee to the Scottish Tribunals brackets offences in relation to proceedings closed brackets regulations 2016. Those regulations create offences and specify the possible level of fines in terms of imprisonment for committing an offence in proceedings. The aim is to standardise offences across the First Year Tribunal as currently those procedures vary from tribunal to tribunal. For brevity, I will summarise the last four sets of regulations together, which are the First Year Tribunal for Scotland brackets transfer of functions of the private rented housing committee, private rented housing panel, homeowner housing committee and homeowner housing panel regulations 2016. Those four regulations transfer the functions and members of two housing jurisdictions to the First Year Tribunal. They also amend existing housing legislation to replace the various references to the committees and panels with rather references to the First Year Tribunal. The current Tribunal president will transfer into the new structure as the president of the housing and property chamber. In addition, the regulations set out the transitional procedures for cases that are in fact in progress on the date of transfer. As the individual panels and committees are listed separately in the Tribunal Scotland Act 2014, each of those jurisdictions therefore needs to be dealt with by way of separate instruments and hence the four instruments that we have brought to you today. That, in conclusion, gives a brief overview of the regulations and I am, of course, happy to seek to answer any questions that you may have. Thank you very much, minister. That's very helpful. Are there any questions from members? No questions. Minister, do you want to make any closing remarks? We'll move straight to the second item on the agenda today, which is formal consideration of the motions in relation to each of the seven affirmative instruments. Each motion will be moved with an opportunity for a formal debate on each SSI. In practice, I expect that many of the issues will already have been covered, I suppose, but we shall see. Taking each in turn, the first motion, 01516, that the Justice Committee recommends that the First Year Tribunal for Scotland transfer of functions of the private rented housing panel regulations 2016 draft be approved. I invite the minister to speak and to move the motion. Thank you, convener. Having described briefly the instrument in my previous comments, I would like to move the motion forward. Thank you. Are there any comments from members? Does the minister want to make any closing remarks? The question is that motion 01516, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Thank you. The second motion, 01517, is that the Justice Committee recommends that the First Year Tribunal for Scotland transfer of functions of the homeowner housing panel regulations 2016 draft be approved. Minister, do you want to make any opening remarks and move the motion? Thank you. Are there any comments from members? Does the minister want to make any closing remarks? The question is that motion 01517, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Thank you. The third motion, 01518, that the Justice Committee recommends that the First Year Tribunal for Scotland housing and property chamber and upper tribunal for Scotland composition regulations 2016 draft be approved. Do you want to make any opening remarks, minister? No for the comments and I formally move the motion. Are there any comments from members? No. The question is that motion 01518, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Thank you. The fourth motion, 01519, that the Justice Committee recommends that the Scottish Tribunal offences in relation to proceeding regulations 2016 draft be approved. Minister, do you want to make any opening remarks? No for the comments and I formally move the motion. Thank you. Are there any comments from members? No. The question is that motion 01518, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Thank you. The fifth motion, 01523, that the Justice Committee recommends that the First Year Tribunal for Scotland chamber regulations 2016 draft be approved. Minister, can I invite you to make any comments? No for the comments and I formally move the motion. Thank you. Are there any comments from members? No. The question is that motion 01523, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Thank you. The sixth motion, 01524, that the Justice Committee recommends that the First Year Tribunal for Scotland transfer of functions of homeowner housing committees regulations 2016 draft be approved. Minister, do you want to make any comments and to move the motion? No for the comments and I formally move the motion. Thank you. Are there any comments from members? Are there any comments from members? No. The question is that motion 01524, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Thank you. The seventh and final motion, 01525, that the Justice Committee recommends that the First Year Tribunal for Scotland transfer of functions of the private rented housing committees regulations 2016 draft be approved. Minister, do you want to speak and to move the motion? No for the comments and I formally move the motion. Thank you. Are there any comments from members? No. Any closing remarks, minister? No. The question is that motion 01525, in the name of Annabelle Ewing, be approved. Are we all agreed? Yes. That concludes consideration of these affirmative instruments. The committee report will note and confirm the outcome of the debate on all seven affirmative SSIs. It remains only for me to thank the minister and her officials for their opinions before the committee today. Now, before I do that, can I just seek the committee's approval to have delegated authority as a convener to clear the final draft report? Are you content? Thank you very much. I will now spend the meeting briefly to allow the minister and officials to leave. We are just waiting for the witnesses for the... The third item of business today is consideration of two negative SSIs, which are also in relation to the implementation of the new Scottish Tribunals, namely the Scottish Tribunal time limits regulations. 2016, SSI 2.016, oblique 231, and Apple Tribunal for Scotland rules of procedure regulations 2016, SSI 2.016, oblique 232. I refer members to paper 2. Do members have any comments? No comments. Is the committee agreed that it does not wish to make any recommendation in relation to these instruments? Again, I suspend the meeting briefly to allow the next panel to take their seats. The fourth item of business today is consideration of the legislative consent memorandum on the Investigatory Powers Bill. We will be hearing today from Police Scotland and then from the Cabinet Secretary for Justice. Can I remind members that this is to inform a report to Parliament on whether a legislative consent motion in relation to this bill should be agreed? We will consider a draft report next week. I welcome Assistant Chief Constable Steve Johnson and Detective Superintendent Brenda Smith from Police Scotland to the meeting and invite questions from members. John Scott. Good morning and thanks for your attendance. There is always a balance to be struck between pursuit of an inquiry and intrusion into privacy. What options do you consider before you seek some of the authorisations that are available to you? Probably the quick answer would be to say that we seek all options that are available to us. We look for the most least intrusive means of conducting the investigation. That can be everything from normal street patrols and street investigations conducted by our uniform officers, right the way through to covert inquiries using surveillance units, etc. We try to explore all the options available to us. If we don't use an option, it's probably been ruled out because we're deemed that it will actually frustrate the purpose of the inquiry or the investigation in the first instance. There's a whole range of investigative opportunities for us prior to resorting to this tactic. Are you able to explain what significance is afforded to collateral damage and intrusion into other individual's privacy when you make decisions about pursuit of certain courses of action? I think that collateral intrusion is one of those things. The authorising officer for me, one of the key aims that I have, is what is the information or intelligence that we're seeking to identify in this and in terms of the subject of the application. The officers will have to tell me where they believe that collateral intrusion will occur and what the level of that intrusion will be. Perhaps an example would be if I'm the subject and I'm living amongst a wider family and I go and visit my mother and my father, that would be deemed collateral intrusion. If I'm gaining information about my mother and father, they're not subject of the application. I'll be seeking to minimise that by saying that if we know the times and dates where that takes place, we'll concentrate our activity on periods of time where we know we can focus in on the subject of the application rather than have other people involved. We ask the officer to be very specific and very detailed so that we can absolutely minimise the collateral intrusion that we have. That's very reassuring. Nonetheless, information will be acquired that's not necessarily pertain to what you're pursuing. What happens about that? Can I hand you over to Brenda in terms of how we manage, if you like, the deletion of that material? In terms of collateral intrusion, whilst preparing a case for the subject, you're going to prepare a background. Do your due diligence round about that to understand if they have family, who the family are, if they stay with each other in terms of what their lifestyle is, what their activities are. You have a good understanding of what that individual does in terms of criminal activities. Therefore, when you monitor that individual, you will have an understanding of what they do. You can focus in on certain aspects, certain times, to minimise the collateral intrusion against that individual. For instance, if they're at home, you would only monitor when they're at home. However, if you do pick up on collateral in relation to members of their family, you can't unknow what you know, but you do not continue with it. You wouldn't collect it and you wouldn't record it. Do you make a recommendation to the authorising officer when you're saying that you're scoping that background? Yes, in terms of the application process, that would be documented within that, exactly what you've done regarding the background to the individual. Has that ever been an instance where your recommendation hasn't been taken up? No. Never? No. Can I ask Mr Johnson also about relations with the UK-wide agencies and the security services? Are you aware of their activities, if they've sought authorisations that you yourselves can seek? I think that if we're working together with those agencies, we'll consider who is the most appropriate agency to submit an application in terms of what it is that we're seeking to achieve, whether it's in Scotland or whether it's in the broader UK. So we work with those colleagues. Certainly the principles of the Scottish Crime Campus are all liais with those other agencies that have the same powers as us, so that we're not duplicating effort and that we're actually focusing in on the individuals and not looking twice at the same people. That couldn't happen in terms of the way that the application process happens, but we certainly have a dialogue with those agencies as well. But could it be that they would be the lead agency regarding investigation of crime in Scotland? Very much depends on what the investigation is, yes, perhaps, absolutely. The national crime agency or the service could lead in those investigations, and if they do, it will be in consultation with us around those jobs that we are aware of. But for those who are not, clearly they'll put their applications in via their own means. So it is conceivable that there are operations on-going in Scotland that you're unaware of? It's conceivable, but normally, as I would say, through the Scottish Crime Campus and the relationships that we have with those other agencies, we're more likely to know about it than not. Okay, many thanks. I want to just probe how data is dealt with electronically and some of the implications around that. Picking up in particular on what Dr Smith has just said, where we have collateral intrusion, we do not collect and do not record data. I just want to probe what that actually means, because presumably where collateral intrusion is involved in circumstances where the data sought and thus collateral received is electronic, it will have ended up in some form on place computers. Is that first of all a reasonable thing for me to assume? Are we talking about the local intercept or the communications data aspect? Well, in a sense, I could be talking about... It is a more general question, I accept, that goes beyond the bounds of what we're trying to deal with today. So I'm really trying to get some understanding of the operational processes around data, but it is triggered by what's being said in relation to RIP today. Well, any activity that we do is targeted against a specific individual or a group of individuals. Therefore, the authority that we have in place is specifically in relation to the authorised purpose, perhaps murder, abduction, drug dealing, et cetera, against specific individuals. So it is targeted initially, so should there come a set of circumstances where that person is not utilising whatever you are monitoring, then that will be picked up very quickly, and once that's picked up then it is then discarded. As I've said, you can't unknow what you know, but you do not take that further. Right, so just to be clear, what really we are being told is if there is data comes to your attention as a police force, it will not be entered into the indexes and case files, but it nonetheless can be present, apparently transiently, on the computer systems of the police force. Right, okay, that's the point that I wanted to get to, and I want to just explore what you do under those circumstances. And the first of two points that I want to explore is how is that removed from your computer systems, accepting that it has never reached case files or been indexed as such? So in terms of whether there's different types of data, because there's different types of intercepts communications data, in respect of intercept data, for instance, that would be deleted straight away? Can I, just before we proceed on that, what does that actually mean? Sorry, my background is technical, so you will forgive me. In that deletion on a computer system, in essence, involves the removal of the electronic index, but not necessarily the overwriting of the data that might remain on a storage medium. So are you merely using the technology that's available to delete the index, thus leaving the data potentially to be recovered from another part of the storage medium? The data will be deleted from the system? Using the facilities of the system. Yes. So, therefore, the data is not necessarily removed from the electronic medium which it's on. It merely ceases to be accessible. No, it will be deleted from the system. Right, okay. I may come back to that. Let me ask the second part. Given that I'm sure that any professional users of technology would, that you will back up your operating environments? And all the data that will be on the disks and other storage mediums that you have? Thereby, capturing to your backup data, operational data that you may have in a different sense deleted, how do you deal with the presence of data that may be an historic backup of your electronic system that is actually data which you wish to have deleted? I think it's a very highly technical area of business. I think when we have systems in which, if we say we've deleted the information, it's deleted in terms of it's not there visible to the officers or myself in terms of our ability in terms of Police Scotland of using that data, in terms of the technology and the binary and all the widgets that sit behind it, I'm not entirely clear about how all that works. But what I will say is our systems and our processes in that regard are all inspected by IOCCO in terms of they will come and they will assess how we manage that information, what systems we use to manage that information. And they're all been signed off in terms of our use of those systems. So it's not going to be available. Once we have information that we delete, it's not going to be available to any officers to see, I think potentially the suggestion is would it be there for somebody to see if we hadn't deleted that information? It is deleted, it's not there for Police Scotland to use and we certainly wouldn't be using the backup systems to go in and try and find data that was previously deleted. I understand that now, that's quite clear. However, the reason backup systems and backup data files exist is so that in certain operational circumstances they can be restored. How do you prevent the restoration of data from backup undoing the process of deletion that you had undertaken? Again, that's very technical. I don't have that technical detail. Perhaps you might answer that after the committee. Perhaps, if there's something that you want to add to your evidence today, we'd be happy to hear it, but I think that you've given quite a forensic questioning on that particular subject. Oliver Bairona. I wondered if it was possible just to get a bit more general information on your data retention policy, how long you keep things and how you can see that being changed by the proposed bill. Data retention is clearly one of those issues that there's no simple answer to this. In simple terms, if we acquire the data in terms of our eye, the data will be converted into a usable intelligence product and then it's deleted from our systems. We have no other access to that. The intelligence stays on our system for a period of time in terms of the Scottish intelligence database, and that will be there in line with that policy, which is six years. That's not to say that it will get deleted at six years. If that is in relation to a case that has been closed and has been completely dealt with at that six-year point, it will be reviewed and if we can delete it, we will delete it. If that data relates to a cold case or a case that we haven't solved, it's entirely appropriate that we at that six-yearly point take that review and say we need to retain that for a lawful purpose. We hold the data legitimately, but it would be wrong to delete that because that's not going to be available to the detectives that conduct the cold case reviews some years ahead. What we will do is have those regular reviews in date. At the six-year point, we'll do those reviews and we'll extend for a period of time that the investigating officer feels is fit for purpose. Some things will keep for life, but that will depend on the sort of appeals process, so it will be for the whole life of that data. But again, that's very specific offences. We're looking at not the whole provisions of the bill but the devolved aspects as regards the LCM. I think that that's fine. I would like to go back to the warrant question, with regard to the interference of property. Where do you think that there's an urgent need for a warrant? Under what circumstances would you consider not asking for judicial permission? Very often we will deal with situations. Kidnapping extortion is a very good example where you have very quickly collapsed in time scales. In that collapsed in time scale, we will be seeking authority to try and preserve life in terms of our article 2 responsibilities. They're really the only circumstances that I can see where there would be an immediate and imminent threat to life, where perhaps to slow down that process to go through the whole judicial authority, we would seek to get that activity and the information intelligence first hand and then get that judicial oversight after that point. It's similar to what happens now, but for me, from the operational perspective, I've got a life that is imminently at threat and I would seek to preserve that life. So they're the sort of circumstances I would seek to use that power. But again, we'd always want it checked up by that judicial authority at that point. Douglas? It's to follow on Rhona's point. Can I ask what's the timescale for informing the judicial commissioner that you had issued an emergency warrant or an urgent warrant? That's under the bill. So it says, within three days, but as soon as possible within three days? My understanding is what it says is, within three days, the judicial commissioner has to give his view on it. What I'm asking is how quickly do you have to inform the judicial commissioner that you have issued an urgent warrant? Well, that's obviously going to be a new process that will be between Scottish ministers ourselves and the judicial commissioners, and that's still to be determined, I would suggest at this point. But they will be busy with other stuff. We will try and I would imagine to tell them as soon as possible. From an operational perspective and someone that, if you like, is providing that authority as the authorising officer, I'll be seeking that judicial approval as quickly as I can, because we have a compelling reason to ask for this information. We have a life that is at risk. We are, yes, going very, very quickly to try and preserve that life, but, again, the officers are going to have to put the intelligence in and have to put the necessity and proportionality and the due considerations in order to meet that power requirement. So it's not something that I'm going to try and stretch out for the three days to see what data I can get. It's in my interest to get that information and intelligence as quickly as I can, but also in terms of lawfully holding that information and that intelligence that I need. How long can you envisage that ticking? Is it minutes, hours, days? If at 2 o'clock in the morning I get told that somebody's been kidnapped and they're being held at gunpoint in a house somewhere in Scotland, I would love to think that there'll be a judge available at half past 2 in the morning, but there probably isn't. So I can see that being a matter of hours until the morning until we can get that judge and that judicial process kicked off, but certainly we'd expect it to have been started within the first few hours. If it's during office hours things can progress quickly, but again if it's 2 o'clock in the morning on a Saturday morning it might be more difficult to do that. So from a Police Scotland perspective we'll be seeking that authority as quickly as we can possibly get it. What will slow it down is the availability and ability to carry out that second process. Is there any thought process or increased thought process thinking that this would be scrutinised within the three day period that you would look for more information before issuing an urgent warrant or approval rather than just presenting a case to a judicial commissioner to do it? I don't think we'll be asking for any more. Candidly I think that the process that we currently have even prior to the bill I think is a very thorough, very in depth process. It's currently subject to a review from an authorising officer. It's subject to a review from the cabinet secretary. Actually these things are already dealt with as the most serious intrusions that we can take into somebody's privacy. So I would suggest that the applications themselves and for us in Police Scotland very little will actually change and particularly on an urgent we might have limited information and intelligence but we'll still try and build that case in exactly the same way as we do even over the longer period. Thank you. Mary on that point. Can I just ask a follow-up question on that point? If approval is not given for a warrant, does the data and the information that you've collected immediately get destroyed? Given that you've already said that you can't and know what you know, is it all completely destroyed immediately? So that data will have been lovely obtained and we would seek guidance from the new judicial commissioners in relation to that data whether or not they wanted us to retain that data for inspection by the judicial commissioners or whether they were instructing that the data was deleted there and then. And could there ever be an instance that information that you gather even though the warrant has not been approved could lead to another warrant being issued for something else? It would depend on the circumstances. We obtain intelligence as very fluid obviously and you may obtain intelligence during that period that is relevant to something else and we are absolutely duty bound to ensure the safety of the public so we would react to that. And you would need to go through the same process again of asking for judicial permission. There would have to be a second application based on the new intelligence but once the application is turned down or refused everything stops after that point. This will be a new process for ourselves because just now it was to the Scottish ministers and obviously the judicial process is the new part within the bill so there will be a lot of policy and process that has still to be evened out. Just in relation to what you said there will be a lot of new policy and a lot of changes. How confident are you that all the regulations surrounding the new policy will be properly fed down to the officers that will be using it? Absolutely yes. No issue with that. Again in terms of communication those officers that need to know that to do their job they will be informed of that straight away once that has been resolved. I think that part of the problem that we have is that it's not a complete bill so actually Brenda and I both sit on the UK national groups, on the gold group in terms of making sure that once the bill is complete and we do need to cascade that learning across all of our officers and all of our staff that are involved from the strategic sector that's chaired by chief constable Mick Creedon from Derbyshire and Brenda sits on the tactical groups to make sure that in relation to the discrete areas of business, so Ally, EI and CD, we have the appropriate training that we can deliver for our officers to make sure they're up to date. Part of the problem that we have at the moment is that we're all planning for something but we don't know quite what the final version looks like, quite right, but once we do get that we have systems in place to make sure that those officers and if you like starting from the most acute end in terms of those officers that are normally applying for the data right through the broader population of the police service in Scotland. That's encouraging, giving communication is a perpetual problem in the police Scotland. Liam. Aries covered the point that I was going to ask about in relation to the modification of warrants and those instances where the judicial commissioner, I mean, I was going to come back to something that Oliver raised earlier but I think that Mary was wanting in on the back of this line of questions that might be better for her. Yes, Mary. Because to be honest, what the line that Mary had asked was what I was going to go down you. Back to the area that Oliver was exploring earlier on in relation to the retention of data generally in the six-year timeframe that you set out early. Clearly there's going to be instances where cases are resolved well within that period, even complex cases. I think that some of the concerns that we were covering towards the end of the informal briefing a few weeks ago were around why it was that data would simply be retained up until that six-year point where the case had been closed. I think that the concern in a sense that it would almost be part of a phishing expedition for subsequent cases. I think that I'd like a bit of reassurance around those instances where cases have been resolved. The data has proved to be instrumental in leading to the conclusion of that case. But then why it is that Police Scotland would seek to hold on to that data simply to the six-year point when at that point in time there is no real reason for doing so? It's interesting. We keep other information other than data for those time periods so it's sort of one policy. Even if somebody has gone through that judicial process there's potential for appeal so there's no hard and fast rule. What I can say is we're not holding that data and then subjecting, if you like, to speculative searches at some point in the past. It's held in relation to that case file. In relation to LI, all of the data is deleted and all that we have, if you like, is an interpretation of the data that is put onto the Scottish Intelligence Database. The actual data that we get through the product is all deleted at that point so the most sensitive area. Communications data is linked with the case file and it is subject to that review so it isn't something that is going to be speculatively searched. It remains with that individual case and it's not there. But it is exactly the same as other elements of information that we hold in relation to the case file so whether that be paper files and traditional types of information that we hold. For recollection you were talking about information that may be relevant to another case being subject to a separate application and drawing that that's held. I think you might understand why there's a degree of concern that there's a contamination across different processes with the same information that's been gathered for one reason but finds itself being deployed for other reasons. If you have a fairly arbitrary timeframe of six years then in a sense it's not proportionate in a timeframe sense to the case that was used to back up the original application. It's simply being held because six years is kind of the timeframe that you've agreed is the arbitrary timeframe you're going to operate in. That just doesn't seem entirely satisfactory. I'm not entirely sure it's entirely arbitrary in terms of history will tell us that actually the retention periods very often you can be asked for information or in relation to that case or people can actually review that case for other reasons not just Police Scotland. Beyond those dates I can go away and have a look at those retention policies and make sure that they do meet those scrutiny but again our retention policies are part of the subject of the inspection that we have from IOCAD and they're content with it at this stage in terms of that if you like that separate view. Again that could be something for the judicial commissioner in the future to make comment on in terms of how we retain that information but there is no nefarious activity from Police Scotland in relation to the data that we hold. Can I perhaps follow up on that? We've had a submission from EHRC and the quite rightly pointed at the intrusions into the privacy of persons who are not suspected of wrongdoing are unlawful unless absolutely necessary and proportionate. So I suppose question is what specific tests are undertaken to ensure that it is absolutely necessary and proportionate when you're looking into privacy when you're doing an experience. So in terms the first test is necessity so is there a legitimate aim and that is for the prevention and detection of serious crime and once that criteria is met then if you like the responsibility of the authorising officer is to balance that proportionality into the trusion of the person's private life and what he's we're seeking to achieve in terms of the legitimate aim in terms of that prevention and detection of crime and that balance takes it's not a quick process you know each individual subject has different needs has different elements that may impact on them so the size of the family you've asked the question about collateral intrusion if it's a very focused individual application where we have little in terms of collateral intrusion and this is about a subject who is engaging in serious and organised crime potentially human trafficking you know the most serious offences that we have that will be very focused on those individuals and it will be providing intelligence about those individuals and the opportunity for collateral damage is minimised. Again we've already heard of the processes that we can put in place where if collateral intrusion does occur that we delete that information and it's not held any further. So right from the point of the application we're focusing on the individuals that we need and I'll take the balance and decision around the intrusion into their rights and what it is they're doing in terms of their ongoing criminal activity that balances up against the intrusion into their private and family life against the criminality and the harm that they're causing to the community and in the vast majority of those cases it is a balance between an individuals article 8 rights and my article 2 duties in terms of preservation of life. There's a sad fact that a lot of these applications are around people who are involved in human trafficking and they're involved in the importation and supply of class A drugs On average 2 people every day will die in Scotland in relation to drugs related deaths. Now I have to balance that against the intrusion on these people's rights who we know to some degree are importing class A drugs new psychoactive substances and the intrusion into their article right for privacy and yet trying to keep the people of Scotland safe who are dying on average 2 a day in relation to drug related deaths That balance and picture is there and the information is there. I don't use old data, I use the current data that's available to me about those competing demands and I understand that will come under scrutiny both from the Scottish Government and also from the judiciary in the future and I welcome that because it shouldn't be right that I have that right to intrude on people's privacy carte blanche and I take it very seriously. I understand competing rights and clear messages coming out that the necessary and proportionate test is always looked at before a warrant is granted and applied for. Thank you very much. That concludes our questioning and I thank ACC Johnson and Detective Superintendent Smith for attending this morning. I now suspend to allow the next panel of witnesses and the Cabinet Secretary to take their place. I welcome Michael Matheson, Cabinet Secretary for Justice to the Committee. This is also the Cabinet Secretary's first formal meeting with the committee although he has met with us privately. He is accompanied today by Graeme Walk, Defence Security and Cyber Resilience Division and Laurie Mitchell, directorate of legal services Scottish Government. For the record, Laurie is also my niece who I haven't seen for months. She never writes, she never calls so you're doubly welcome here this morning, Laurie. Before I ask the cabinet secretary if he wishes to talk to the LCM, can I just put on record that the committee has received two letters in the last few days from the cabinet secretary addressing recent developments in relation to the UK Investory Powers Bill and the committee has published these letters on its website. Cabinet secretary, do you want to make an opening statement? Thank you, convener. I promise to keep my introductory remarks brief. The Scottish Government has been clear that we fully support law enforcement agencies and the security intelligence agencies having access to the powers that they require, so long as those powers are proportionate and subject to the appropriate safeguards and level of oversight. The areas of the bill that are subject to the LCM are about maintaining the status quo, clarifying existing law and putting in place an enhanced oversight regime in the form of an investigatory powers commissioner supported by a number of judicial commissioners. Those commissioners will all be serving or retired senior judges. I'm aware that concerns have been expressed relating to aspects of bulk powers and I share some of those concerns. However, those are reserved powers and are matters for the UK Government and the UK Parliament. Those are not matters that Scottish ministers or the Scottish Parliament can determine. I provided further information yesterday to the committee on the matter of the technological advisory panel. This is being included in the bill in order to implement the recommendation made by David Anderson QC in his review of the bill's built powers. It is unfortunate that the UK Government's amendments, which extend to Scotland, continue to come forward at this stage of the bill's progress. However, I'm sure that the committee will appreciate that this is a complex piece of legislation. Despite the issues around timing, which are beyond our control, I've been keen to ensure that members of the committee have all the information that they require in order to aid their understanding of the matters that are subject to the LCM. I'm, of course, happy to answer any questions from committee members. I share those concerns that are expressed in the letter about the bulk powers. I know that we may be told that that's not what we're addressing today, but they have an operational effect in Scotland. David Anderson's conclusion is that there is a distinct but yet not yet proven operational case for the powers that have been. Is that where your reservations come for those powers? In part. That's why we reserved our position until the further review had been carried out by David Anderson. He's come forward with the specific recommendation that the technological advisory panel should be established in order to advise and inform the new commissioner on any action that can be taken in order to address some of the on-going technological advances that come about, which reduce some of the potential risks that are associated with bulk powers. That's why it was right to reserve our position until we had the further review carried out by David Anderson on that matter. His recommendation is a welcome one, which, as I've also said in the letter, I'm keen for the technological advisory panel to be able to advise Scottish ministers on those matters. The engagement that we've had so far with the Home Office in taking that forward has been productive and helpful in seeking to make sure that it can also advise ministers on those issues. In the previous evidence session, we heard from ACC Johnson and I asked him about the potential for UK-wide organisations, the security services and others, the national crime agency, to be involved in operations in Scotland that Police Scotland were unaware of. He did talk about the level of co-operation, but he did acknowledge that that could be the same. Have you any concerns about the roles or the function that they might fulfil in Scotland that you would be bypassed the Lord Advocate could be bypassed? In relation to the security and intelligence services— And the crime agency? Yes, and the national crime agency. The national crime agency, in order to be directly involved in operational matters, requires consent from the Lord Advocate, so there is a clear process there for their role in Scotland, given the nature of their jurisdiction. They require the expressed consent of the Lord Advocate in their engagement in crime activities in Scotland. With regard to the security and intelligence services, I should appreciate the vast majority of the work that is undertaken by those services relates to matters primarily which are focused on issues relating to national security. As a result, any authorisations that they require for their work in that area, including in Scotland, would be matters for the Home Secretary. However, were they engaged in work with Police Scotland to deal with the prevention or detection of serious crime, they would require the authorisation of Scottish ministers, including the additional measures around built powers and the way in which they can interrogate some of that information. Part of that will also require authorisation from Scottish ministers. I think that by the extension of some of the responsibilities of Scottish ministers in this area, it will helpfully provide us with a greater oversight of some of the activity that they could be involved in relating to the prevention and detection of serious crime. Do you see benefit in UK oversight rather than specifically Scottish oversight? As in relation to them, national security matters? As in relation to the investigative powers commissioners and their UK wide remit? I think that it is helpful in having... We have the three commissioner system at the present moment. Moving to a single commissioner, I think, is the logical step in drawing together all that single expertise into a single body. I think that it is the right approach. Operating on a UK basis at the present moment is probably the best approach given the nature of the reserved matters that are dealt with in the investigative powers bill. I did probe the police in the previous evidence session about some of the technological issues around how they deal with data that comes to their notice, which is out with what they are allowed to have and to keep. I am not saying that my committee colleagues were, but I was satisfied that, procedurally, the police had appropriate procedures in place to ensure that they did not enter into consideration into files, criminal files and so on and so forth. However, I was left with one technical issue that perhaps might be for Mr War to deal with and perhaps even take away. That is how, in relation to whole system backups, which most computer managers will undertake to ensure that they can restore, in the case of the destruction of whole systems, the unwinding of deletions so that data becomes re-available and what processes that were in place to ensure that that did not happen. I will ask two questions just to get it out of the way. The other question is, given the existence of the technological advisory panel, clearly that will be a source of considerable expertise on a whole range of issues. Will the deliberations and knowledge that come out of that be more widely available to departments in Government who are involved in legal enforcement of a range of issues where, quite outside the RIP, similar issues will arise? Is there an opportunity there that arises from what is happening in the RIP? On your first point, I will certainly bow to your greater IT knowledge than mine and I suspect in fairness to Graham, even his as well, but I understand the point that you are making in terms of the potential to unwind deleted details on the system. I do not know whether Graham wants to say much about that but it may be something that would have to come back to you with some further technical information on if that would be helpful. I am afraid that if I have given you the impression that I know anything about such technical matters, I can only apologise. We can certainly look into it further. I probably wish to please Scotland and come back to the committee on that point. We are going to get too much further on that. I am not trying to be technical, I am really looking for procedural issues. I return to your second point, which is about the technological advisory panel. Yes, there is the potential. Of course, there is a regulation for investigative powers act Scotland, which is utilised by a range of bodies in Scotland that are able to exercise powers through that legislation. For example, it can be used in tackling environmental crimes, where it can use covert means for the purposes of trying to build up intelligence and evidence. It can be used, for example, by local authorities to deal with issues, including matters that could relate to, for example, domestic disturbances, etc. There are governance regulations around that whole process. One of the reasons that I think it would be helpful for the technological advisory panel to be able to advise Scottish ministers as well is that it has a very specific remit. Part of its remit will be to look at technology advances and developments, other ways in which we can still undertake this type of work, but it minimises the risks even further of unintended or unnecessary intrusion as well. Having access to that information could assist us in informing public bodies in Scotland, along with Police Scotland, on some of those alternative technologies as they develop and come forward. The simple answer is yes, and that is one of the primary reasons that I would like it to also be extended to Scottish ministers. Good morning, cabinet secretary. I would like to put on record the serious misgiving that I have about aspects of the bill, particularly in relation to bulk data. Focusing on the areas that we are required to look at under the LCM, there has been a fair bit of discussion about the collateral impact of this sort of surveillance. What reassurances can you give the committee that, in that respect, those who are not the target of any investigation but who may be impacted by some of the provisions in this bill? That that will be minimised and where information, where data is gathered, will be dealt with appropriately, presumably, by deletion in whatever form Stuart probably thinks is appropriate and final. That leads into part of the concerns that we have around some aspects of the bulk pills and how they may operate. The aspects of the bulk pills that will be dealt with by Scottish ministers will be information that has been obtained through the process of utilising the bulk pills. If they wish to examine some of that information relating to a targeted individual, they will require authorisation from Scottish ministers and also from the judicial oversight. That is the element in which we will deal with. When interception wants to be considered at the present time, the whole issue of collateral intrusion is a matter that is considered at the time of application. How can that be minimised? You have already heard from Police Scotland the procedures that they have in place so that they should obtain any information during the course of any type of interception activity that does not relate to the subject that the warrant was dealing with. They have a process in place for dealing with that information and deleting and discarding that information. However, it is a matter that is considered at the very outset when Police Scotland is even applying for the warrant in the first place. It is then an issue that is considered by ourselves once it comes into our officials who deal with these matters within the Scottish Government and then when it is presented to myself as well. It is an issue and the actions that have been taken in order to minimise the risk of that happening as well. It is already part of the process at the existing time to try to minimise that. That goes back to the point that I was making around the technological advisory panel. As technology is developing in advance, there is scope to look at helping to reduce that even further. That is where I think it would be useful for us to have access to that advice as and when that develops. In terms of the judicial approval that you referred to in relation to warrants or the modification of warrants, one of the other issues that has been raised with us is that there may well be instances where Police Scotland feels that they have to act very speedily and the opportunity to gain that prior approval is limited. I think that we can all understand why those circumstances perhaps arise, but what is not entirely clear is the length of time that is likely to be necessary to gain that approval. In those instances where approval is not subsequently granted either in whole or in part for the actions, what the consequences of that are for the investigation and any data that has already been accumulated as a result of the actions that Police Scotland has taken? It depends on what type of work they are applying for. For example, if Police Scotland is applying for an intersection work that requires to come to Scottish ministers under the new system, it will also be considered by a judicial commissioner. If it is an urgent matter, for example, if there is a threat to life and they have to act swiftly, the process at the present time is that they still require ministerial authorisation before they can start to take that forward. We have a process in place at the present time, where if there is a requirement at 2 o'clock in the morning for the police to be able to get a warrant for the purpose of the interception because of an urgent incident developing, we have a process where they are able to contact a senior official within the Scottish Government. A senior official in the Scottish Government would, by and large, come to me for that authorisation to take place. There is a process for dealing with that and then what happens is that the paper trail that goes with that then catches that up as quickly as possible. There is a process for dealing with those types of urgent authorisations, but it still requires ministerial authorisation. The new element will be the judicial commissioner's role in that. As you will be aware, within the legislation, there is a three-day period when the judicial commissioner should be able to consider the matter. Part of that is a new process that is being created. There are still some practical measures that will need to be taken forward in order to make sure that, where there is an urgent request, we are able to get access to one of the judicial commissioners in Scotland as quickly as it can happen. Although the three days is almost a backstop, the principle of operating it will be is for it to be done as quickly as possible, but notwithstanding being able to get access to a judicial commissioner within a couple of others is that they still require ministerial authorisation on interception matters. When it comes to other types of words, whether it be equipment interference or property interference, they do not require ministerial authorisation. Equipment interference requires judicial commissioner authorisation after it is being considered by a senior officer, very often the chief constable, or someone above the rank superintendent, that is authorised to consider those matters. They would then have to go to the judicial commissioner for authorisation in those matters as well. On property interference, those are matters that are dealt with by senior officers within the police service. There is not a judicial authorisation process element to that. There never has been, and it has always been dealt with internally. The issue would be, for example, picking up the concern that you are raising would be that, if the police had an urgent matter where they had to exercise some form of equipment interference on an urgent basis, they would have to go for judicial authorisation on that matter. If they were not able to get it in that time frame, they would have to go for that retrospectively, again if it was a case of a threat to life. An example could relate to a child being abducted or an individual being abducted, where it is very fast moving and they have to move quickly to try and get information, quickly on the matter where that can be followed up. Once the judicial commissioner has considered that issue, they then consider whether the information that they have gained during the period of that time, whether that, if they have approved it, that is fine. If they have not, then the judicial commissioner has a role in determining what happens with the information that they have gathered during that period of time as well. There is a safeguard in there, but it is trying to create a system that is agile enough to be able to respond to very rapid of developing operational matters, while at the same time also trying to provide the right type of oversight to pick up on those matters as and when that is necessary. That is helpful. Clearly, as a result of ACC Johnson's evidence earlier on, there is a clear concern about activities happening at two o'clock in the morning, which I hope both Police Scotland and the Scottish Government are staffed up to deal with. I am sure that you do. The process that you have described, I suspect, covers the vast majority of those instances where, as you say, there needs to be an agility to respond to fast moving events. I think that the concern would be that it begins to look almost like a rubber-stamping exercise, and that the process of either ministerial approval and or judicial oversight in this process is about putting in place a challenge function, if you like. ACC Johnson was candid in saying that, as it should be, there shouldn't be a carte blanche. Even in a fast moving situation, even when the risk assessed by Police Scotland is severe, whether life-threatening or whatever, there still needs to be a reassurance that either ministers or those exercising judicial oversight have concerns about the actions taken by Police Scotland that will have effect. There will be consequences of that for the actions that have been taken leading up to that point of decision by ministers or by judicial oversight. I think that it is also worth keeping in mind that this process has also got the oversight from the Investigatory Pills Commissioner, who will be able to come in and be able to inspect these matters. They will be able to look at the process, a bit like the way in which I co-do at the present time, to go in and inspect the process that Police Scotland has. The process is that we have in government how we handle them as well. I meet them to discuss their approach as well and they report on those issues. There is also that retrospective aspect of it being inspected and ensuring that, where you have a situation that authorisations have been given and there are, as you say, it may feel for some people that it's a rubber stamp process. The first thing that I can assure you of is that I don't act as a rubber stamp when it comes to ones that have come before me. The legislation is very clear that both necessity and proportionality have to be met in order to justify any form of interception because it is a considerably intrusive means of going into someone's private life. The new legislation is very clear about that as well. From our perspective, in applying for it and coming into the team and government in considering it, that's got to be considered. If they don't think that it's being considered properly and there's sufficient information to justify both necessity and proportionality, it will go back and it will be refused on that basis. Once my officials have considered the matter and it's then put to me, I then consider that as well. If I'm not satisfied, it would be refused as well. I've got absolutely no doubt that additional measure of judicial oversight will be considering exactly that similar information. Those are dealing with incredibly serious matters and the authorisation process should not in any way be considered or viewed as any form of rubber stamp. It's a very detailed process that we go through. However, the process when it comes to dealing with urgent matters is dealt with in a much more rapidly way. Nevertheless, the issue of necessity and proportionality as set out in the legislation still has to be met in those circumstances. When it comes to illegal interception of communications as a criminal act, it is within the legislation at the present time and will be within the new legislation. I can offer you that reassurance that it's a very robust process and it's one that is applied very rigorously and is certainly one that we seek to make sure that the safeguards that are in the existing legislation are properly and fully met and that it would be the same with the new legislation. The additional reassurance that you can have of that is the role that I also have at the present time and that the new investigatory powers commissioner will have in being able to have oversight of those matters and how they have been handled. I asked the cabinet secretary about the letter that he sent yesterday and about the amendments that will be put down by the UK Government and I understand his dialogue with you and your officials on that. You add in a sentence in the unlikely event that the amendment was drafted in such a way that contradicted the information that the Government are giving to Parliament, you would reject it. Can I ask if that is just a catch-all sentence that is always put in or are there genuine concerns of contradictions that could be put into that amendment that maybe we as a committee should be aware of? What we have saw is the drafting instructions that have gone to parliamentary council on the amendment that the UK Government intends to introduce to the bill. What we haven't saw is the finalised amendment. The other part is that we have also gone back to them with the suggestion that the technological advisory panel should be able to advise Scottish ministers. If it is going to advise Scottish ministers, then Scottish ministers would have to be consulted on the appointment of that technological advisory panel and that is the discussions that we are having with them at the present time. Given where we are at and the whole process in discussing this with the Home Office, if the Home Office were then to say that we are not going to implement David Anderson's recommendation, given that it was one of the issues that we had concern about and we had reserved our position on, it would seem reasonable that until we have actually saw the amendment that is going to go into the actual bill that we say that we are happy with how things are progressing at the present moment. But once we have saw the final amendment, we will then be in a position to be able to give our consent to that. However, should the Home Office change her position on that, it would seem reasonable that I should then come back to the committee and advise you of any change in their approach. Just to confirm, the contradiction would be not taking forward David Anderson's recommendation on block, or would you say that you would reject it just if Scottish ministers weren't involved? No, it's just to do with the technological advisory panel. The whole thing? Yes, to do with the technological advisory panel and the recommendation that they should be able to advise it. Sorry, that would be unlikely given that they are putting down amendments on that subject. I think that it's highly unlikely and I think that the UK Government has also expressed publicly their position on this matter as well. This is largely purely because we have not saw the actual final draft of the amendment that will go into the legislation. If that was to change, then clearly we would have a view on that matter and that's to give us the opportunity to come back to the committee should there be a change in that position. That concludes our question Cabinet Secretary. Thank you and your officials for attending today. I suspend the meeting and allow the minister and his officials to leave. Is public petitions and I refer members to paper 6. Can I remind members? Sorry, can I remind members that if they wish to keep a petition open they should indicate how they would like the committee to take it forward or if they wish to close a petition they should set out their reasons for doing so. I propose to consider the petitions in the order that they are set out in paper 6. The first is PE1501 and PE1567 investigating unassertained deaths, suicides and fatal accidents. Those petitions are discussed on pages 2 and 3 of the clerk's paper and the committee is asked to consider and agree what, if any, action it wishes to take in relation to the petitions. Options include the committee could close the petition on the basis that the Scottish Government oblique COPFS has made its position clear on the petitions. Alternatively, in view of the fact of the change in leadership of COPFS, the committee could keep the petition open in order to ascertain from new leadership whether there is now any difference in their view on the petitions. However, I seek members' views. I thought the note was very helpful and I confess I've only had a chance to dip into some of the background to this but I was struck by the additional information provided by Stuart Graham, one of the petitioners, in relation to the relative figures for such inquests in a range of jurisdictions. It does appear that Scotland, along with territories in Canada, are markedly out of step with the other parts of the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the states in Australia that are referred to here. From my perspective, I'd be quite interested to get an understanding as to why there is this marked discrepancy. I think that the earlier letter from the cabinet secretary is helpful in setting out what the background of the objective of such inquests actually is in terms of the public interest. Nevertheless, presumably there is a public interest in such inquests in those areas, in those territories and jurisdictions as well. Therefore, from my own perspective, before we make a decision whether to finally close the petition, I would certainly wish to seek from the Scottish Government some better understanding as to why those differences in the numbers are as they are. I take a different view in particular. I refer to the letter from Frank Mulholland on 25 November 2015, which addresses precisely the point that has been raised on page 1, page 8 in our annex A. It precisely describes why there is a difference and acknowledges that there is a difference. I do have some limited personal experience of this, unfortunately, although in fairness in relatively straightforward circumstances in terms of investigation and legality, which I felt worked for myself and my relatives. On the basis that the information that Liam McArthur was seeking is there in the letter from Frank Mulholland, I would personally suggest that the Government's position is clear and we should close those petitions at this time. I take a different view from Stewart and I would like further information. First of all, it is mentioned in, sorry, I am doing it online so I am not sure exactly which page, about the member's bill in the House of Commons that did address some of the concerns that Stewart is raising about the high number elsewhere in the UK. I wonder what was the outcome of that member's bill. Do we have any information on that? I understand that it is the House of Commons. It would be interesting to know whether the position has changed down there as a result of that. I also wanted a bit more information on full disclosure. I am dealing with an extremely complex constituency case at the moment, which is with Police Scotland. However, there are some significant concerns about the disclosure of information. If you read the letter that Stewart Stevenson is very happy to support from the former Lord Advocate, you would think that families are entitled to pretty much everything. The experience that I have had is not the case. Therefore, I think that we need more information about full disclosure. If the new Lord Advocate is of the same opinion as his predecessor, I would be interested to know how often full disclosure is not given to relatives, because that is a way to resolve an issue. However, if we do not have full disclosure, families will continue to come to us with those types of petitions, and I would be keen to get more information on those aspects before we decide how to further conclude this petition. I thought that the letter was very comprehensive. I do not think that it is going to be easy to satisfy the petitioners at all. It is always individual case and individual merits, and that is where the statistics are found. It is not too easy to deal with. I wonder, given that one of the consequences of the work that was done by the committee—indeed Patricia Ferguson with her—was this charter, whether there is an opportunity to perhaps leave the petition open to see what response, if any, there is to the revised charter about relations. It is not specifically going to deal with the concerns raised by the petitions, but it might give us pointers as to whether there are continuing issues. I will be brief, convener, because a shared review was expressed by Liam. I would like a bit more information about the discrepancy in numbers of FAIs that are carried out in Scotland, as opposed to other countries. I have read Frank Mulholland's letter a couple of times. It almost gives us the bare facts. I do not think that he goes into enough detail, and I would certainly like more information to have a better understanding before we make a final decision. I am sort of minded to go down the route that Stuart is discussing, but I think that it would be useful for us to go to the Crown Office to find out what their view on it is, given that it is a new broom there. Before any closure, we should certainly do that, that would be my opinion. I think that the committee is minded to keep it open. I must admit that I shared Stuart's view, probably, to begin with, given that the charter was there and where we are, and then in view of what John said, but I do think that the points raised are valid and there is merit in keeping it open. We agree to continue this and seek the information that has been asked for. The second petition is PE1370, independent inquiry into the McGracky Convention. This is discussed on pages 3 to 5 of the clerk's paper. The clerks have ascertained from Police Scotland that the timetable in relation to operation sandalwood has slipped since the 11 March letter referred to in paragraph 23 of the clerk's paper. Police Scotland recently informed the clerks by telephone that, owing to complex live issues, the report has not yet been completed and passed to the Deputy Chief Constable. The previous committee, where informed in March of the report, was expected to reach the DCC around mid May. The committee has asked to consider and agree what, if any action it wishes to take in relation to the petition, options include the option of closing the petition on the grounds that the Scottish Government has already made its position clear, or keep the petition open if so it might wish to consider writing to Police Scotland seeking clarity on the future timetable of completion of operation sandalwood. I don't think that we can close it until sandalwood is complete. Any other views? It seems that's the majority of the committee. I just wondered just how far the investigation into sandalwood will take, given the inquiry is asking for the Government to hold an inquiry and the Government has made its position clear. Further, I'm not expecting that I would wish to keep it open after we hear that, but I think in all fairness, until we hear what sandalwood. I'm very reluctant for politicians of any character to interfere in the independence of the judiciary to be blunt, but I think that there is a case for keeping it open until we see what sandalwood comes up with. I agree with a lot of what Stephen Stewart says, but the reality is that these are a very unique set of circumstances, and we need to understand the process. Forget the individual whose name is in it, and I know that you've heard me say this many, many times. It is about processes that are unique set of circumstances that are unique inquiry. With us we hear complex and live issues. I think that we need to understand how that inquiry is going to continue and how it's going to go ahead. I take some of the assurance from a change of personnel, certainly at Lord Advocate level, and I imagine that the justice of Ngahee people do too, but we need to understand the process where an aggrieved party has issues with those charged with making important decisions about criminal prosecution goals, and this may be the model that we need to look at for the future. The committee appears to be to keep the petition over until we hear the inquiry from sandalwood. We agreed, we do that. The third and final set of petitions is PE1510 and PE1511, police and fire control rooms. The last two petitions before us today are discussed on pages 6 and 7 of the clerk's paper. Anexes, G&H provide the latest information in relation to proposals for not-of-scotland control rooms. The committee is asked to consider and agree what, if any, action it wishes to take in relation to those petitions. In relation to the one regarding police control rooms, I think that there were insurances given, not least around the controversies and difficulties in other control rooms, that any transfer of staff and operations from Inverness and Aberdeen would only take place once the new premises and operations are done. We are open and functioning in Dundee. I do not think that that is the case. I am led to believe that there are interim provisions for housing some of the staff from Aberdeen and Inverness, and therefore I think at the very least I would want some understanding as to what it is that Police Scotland are doing and why it is that the earlier undertakings not to give effect to this transfer until things had been set up and robust. I think that all handling is going to come up as a result of the M9 incident, and I think that it would need to understand the relationship with that. The additional tasks are going to be allocated to Inverness and I think that it might be helpful to clarify whether they have been allocated. ac mae'n gwybod i yna'r symbolol er fyddai'n cael ei gael. Rwy'n cynnig i gyllidheithio gael gan unrhyw. Stewart Stevenson? Mae hynny'n mynd i'r lawr i'r cyffredinol oherwydd allu iawn. Maes i chi'n gweithio darlton ni'n cwestiynau ei ddych chi ond, a i chi'n sylweddol i'w bwysig i chi'n bwysig i chi'n bwysig i chi ffeyddio amlinellai'r cyfnodau ym mhwyloedd pan ni'n wneud i chi'n dweud i chi'n fawr. Ynw rydych chi'n mynd yn gyhoeddiad i chi. Ynw fyddai jedyn nhw'r gwirionedd ac i'w hefyd iawn. Mae hynny'n iawn eich byw anghytgol, rydych chi'n fawr o'r ysgrifffyr yllanol, mewn ddysgol yn ei fawr, i phob readable yng Nghymru, final erddiol â'r bobyn i'n unig i eich symud i gyntafu cyfan, ac mae wedi amser hynny yich trafnoddau, credu'r ei wneud i'r ffordd. Yswrth, mae'r Ff Batwgau Cymru yn dal i ddifu flynyddoedd, mae'r peth oedd yn ei cynnwys o'r ddifu ffatig o'r ddifu cynnwys. Ar y dyfodach, mae'n ei ddifu llwg gwsag o'r g wrapperfodol, ac mae'n bwysig ei wneud i'ch ddifu llwg gwsig o'r g��.