 Hi. Good afternoon everybody. Today I'm going to talk about our climate security observatory. A decision support tool supposed to support policymakers in addressing the complexity of the climate security nexus. This presentation includes the work of our team, CGR, but also part of the collaboration with the FAO Epic team as a division. I will be talking about the motivation and research objectives and research questions, but then I will describe the integrated approach that we are using. We have designed to address the complexity of the climate security nexus. I will present some preliminary results for the case of Nigeria and then the next steps in our research. We believe that climate security is a strategic issue for global stability, prosperity and peace. This is because the world is less peaceful, the climate crisis is increasing, and vulnerability and risks such as food insecurity are worsening. About 490 out of the 800 million people facing chronic food insecurity are located in 21 countries affected by conflict and insecurity. Countries with a high level of hunger are also mostly often highly affected and vulnerable to climate impacts. Climate impacts are significantly affecting food availability, food quality, access of food security in general. Then we learned throughout this conference and also from the presentation by John Odin and yesterday that there exists a high level of correlation between food insecurity and conflict. Therefore, these three systems, these three risks are highly correlated, highly interlinked. The climate risks, food insecurity, socioeconomic risks and conflict. So when we study the climate security nexus, we are really facing several challenges. The first is that there is a lack of robust and localised and policy relevant evidence on the specific pathways that link climate to conflict. We also need to understand when studying the climate security nexus, the climate adaptation and climate solutions are not always successful. Maladepation responses to climate change have exacerbated in certain occasions, in certain contexts, marginalisation and exclusions that are commonly understood and recognised as drivers of conflict. Finally, we need to understand that this nexus is incredibly complex. It's not linear. It's not direct. It is highly heterogeneous, both spatially and temporally. So our research really aims to respond and address these research caps, but also to provide policy relevant solutions and answers. Therefore, our research questions are organised across four main areas. We first would like to understand what are the mechanisms whereby climate can affect the intensity and likelihood of conflict, the how question. Then we would like to understand the where question. So where are those areas that are more vulnerable to climate insecurity risks, supporting and helping policy makers in the day targeting a prioritisation of geographical areas? Then the who question. Who are the groups that are more vulnerable to these risks? Again, helping policy makers prioritising and targeting. But then finally, the last question, probably the most difficult one, the what questions. Once we understand that the climate security nexus exists, once we understand that climate can increase the likelihood and intensity of conflict, what should we be doing to mitigate and break the cycle between climate and conflict? So we provide support to policy makers and partners in designing climate security sensitive interventions and also investment plans to prioritise for policy makers. So our integrated approach really builds on these research gaps and these research questions in a way that we want to acknowledge and honour and account for the complexity, nonlinearity and heterogeneity of these nexus. We do so by utilising and embracing complexity and a range of different type of data and approaches and methods. Because our idea and our assumption is that these nexus is incredibly complex, we need to be able to look at it from different perspectives using conventional as well as unconventional data and approaches. Our ambition is to qualify and quantify these nexus. So we start first with the qualification of these nexus, the first step on the top and we use data driven literature review combined with content analysis to extrapolate and define what we call the climate security pathways. Narratives that essentially identify those mechanisms whereby climate can lead to conflict. We then move into the understanding of the policy environment, our second step. This is an important step because it allows us to understand whether these narratives are embedded in the policy actions and policy documents as well as in the policy discussions. So we run some governance coherence assessments, look in the policy documents but also we look at the communications of policy makers in each of the targeted countries to understand whether policy makers are actually aware and they are talking about it. So once the qualification of this nexus is completed, we then move into testing using data driven approaches whether these mechanisms that we have identified are actually relevant from a data standpoint. So we use a combination of networks, spatial analysis and econometric analysis for this. And finally the most important step of it all which is validation in the field. We run a set of field work activities to develop a common vision of climate security directly with the communities and local stakeholders but also we co-design solutions to mitigate this nexus. So now an example from Nigeria. This is an example of our climate security pathways. You don't have to look at all of the boxes here but just focus on the one in yellow. A graph such as this is supposed to really summarize the complexity and interconnections of the three systems, the ecological system, socioeconomic system, so the political system. But in summary what we find for Nigeria is that we can think of three main mechanisms or pathways whereby climate can lead to more conflict and more intense conflict. The first is a resource pathway, resource availability pathway. This pathway essentially is reflective of the farmers-herders conflict. Due to the impact the climate has on natural resources that pushes the forces, parcel-less communities to change the grazing routes and to look for accessing natural resources such as land, water and pasture in other areas. Inevitably conflicting with farmers that are settled in those areas. We have many examples from the Northern area, the semi-arid areas in Nigeria as well as from Central States to the Benu and Azarava states. The second pathway is reflective of the impact the climate has on the erosion of livelihoods and food insecurity. The erosion of livelihoods and lack of other livelihood opportunities in a certain context can also coupled with the weak governance and marginalization lead to conflict and intercommunal tensions. For example, with the rural, urban migration because of agriculture and livestock and fishery losses, we have examples on how the certification and environmental challenges and water and land depletion have actually created the tensions and conflicts in the countries. The third pathway is related to the fossil fuel and environmental degradation and livelihood insecurities. This essentially reflects the idea that the oil industry is impacting, is creating land degradation, water pollution, is affecting natural resources and coupled with weak governance, poor environmental protection framework specifically inequality in a generation in co-generating benefits for the local communities have created tensions and conflict in certain areas. Despite the existence, so overall these three pathways identify the four main mechanisms. A low productivity and agricultural livestock and fishery sector, food insecurity, inequality, immigration. So despite the evidence in the literature and in our documents that we have examined on the existence of these nexus, we also look at the policy documents that we actually find the policymakers are not really talking about it. These narratives are not really present in policy documents nor in the conversation. So we run social media analysis for that. The next step is to really look at data. So what are the data telling us? We use acrylic data to identify first conflict clusters, so areas where we have high moderate limited conflict. We overlay that to the climatic conditions using very, very high resolution data to identify then areas where we have higher level of conflict and harsh climatic condition as well as a range of the combination of these two. And then we link this with other insecurities, those pathways and mechanisms that we have identified in our qualification steps. And what we see is that we can really identify those areas where harsh climatic conditions as well as high intensity of conflict are co-occurring with a set of other insecurities that are affected by climate. This is the case, for instance, of the Wurno and the Quare local authorities where we see high level of migration and inequality risks as well as harsh conflict and harsh climate. And then other risks and insecurities are across the countries in other locations as indicated. Then the next step in looking at the data, what the data are telling us is to really understand whether there exists a statistically significant correlation in some of these mechanisms that we have identified in the climate security pathways. And in this case, we use a three-level variable, three-variable causal mediation model to identify the direct and indirect impact of climate variability on conflict via specific mechanisms for the food insecurity. We use DHS data as well as other data combined with the climate and conflict data and our results show that there exists an indirect effect of climate. Climate is a threat multiplier exacerbating food insecurity. So you see there is a statistical significant correlation in their effect in food insecurity which in turn also affects the number of violent conflict at local level. So we have evidence that this is happening. What are the next steps? One of the issues that I mentioned before is the highly level of heterogeneity, spatially heterogeneity. So we are going to tackle these issues adopting an approach that has been developed by FAO, the epic team that I mentioned before, which is using the random coefficient model. One of the advantages of the random coefficient model compared to other models is that it produces specific coefficients of results that are indicative that are related to the specific sub-administrative unit that under the analysis. So we are really able to identify the effect of climate on conflict and a highly localized level. But also a good advantage of this model is that it allows us not only to identify without the current climate insecurity hotspots, but we're able to also identify whether the future climate security hotspots. So what we call the climate vulnerability, what FAO calls the climate vulnerability hotspot. So we are going to, this is an example from Somalia, but we are going to implement this for our countries with our climate security observatory. Then the final step is the validation. We will use a transformative scenario planning to develop, construct future story, characterize the climate security risks and define actions, solutions to mitigate the impact of climate on conflict directly with the communities and local stakeholders in specific hotspots in each country. The climate security observatory will be in the future and our ambition is to run it to have a global coverage for our analysis. At the moment we have developed analysis for selected countries in Africa, you see those one in gray, seven countries in Africa and we are advancing on our analysis specifically as part of our climber once a jury initiatives in five countries, Guatemala, Senegal, Kenya, Zambia and the Philippines. It will be launched for the first time in Kenya and Senegal in January 2023, then followed by other countries in the remaining years. Thank you.