 This week has seen a lot of developments in the conflict in Yemen and has also been a very tough time for the people. Recent reports say that the bombing by the Saudi-led coalition has led to a suspension of internet services in the country due to an attack on the city of Hodeida. Similarly, we saw that bombing rates had led to the deaths of at least close to 15 people in Yemen as well. This followed, of course, the attack by the Houthis on Abu Dhabi, an attack which is especially significant as it's the first time that the UAE has been targeted by the Houthis. To know more about the geopolitical context, we'll be discussing this on this week's episode of Wapping Fault Lines. We are with us, Prabir Purkayashta. Prabir, so first of all, I think the question that occurred to a lot of people was that this was in many ways a daring attack, kind of similar to the attack on the Aramco facilities that we witnessed in Saudi Arabia a few years ago. At that point, a lot of people had pointed to Saudi Arabia's vulnerabilities, the same points being made about the UAE right now. So I think the first question would be, how is the UAE suddenly figured in the Houthis plans after all this while and what's happening on the ground? For the last two to three years, the UAE forces who initially were very much a part of the coalition that attacked Ansarullah, the Houthis in Yemen, they had sort of backed off and their main interest seemed to have been in some of the southern ports, essentially Aden being the key one, but their focus seemed to have been on controlling the Red Sea Gulf of Aden bottleneck, which is the Babel El-Mendem Strait. So their focus seemed to have been much more on control of the seaway between Mediterranean and North Africa, and of course into the Arabian Sea, which is what Babel El-Mendem really controls, and Aden is the key facility over there. So they sometime back got forces aligned to them, which is basically a transitional government, as it is being called, to take over Aden, and it really controls Aden and not much bills beside maybe a couple of more ports. So they thought that their stakes are okay if they just control Aden and the port, shall we say, the air, the waterways that connect Mediterranean to Arabian Sea, also Moka, which is another port which they seem to control. So their interests were limited to that, but if Marib falls, it strengthens, of course, Ansarullah Houthis significantly, and therefore because of the failure of Saudis to make much headway against Ansarullah forces, and seem to be in danger of losing Marib, that they have again come back into the coalition with Saudi in terms of a military attack, because if you remember, there were 10 countries who had aligned at that time to attack Northern Yemen or Ansarullah Houthis, and they are now only, effectively only two Saudis and United Arab Emirates, and the UAE were also sort of not getting into direct conflict, direct military action too far. And this is, again, after about two to three years, a major intervention they're making, and if you see the map, it is Marib, which is for them the crucial area. Of course, Marib as a city or as an ancient civilization and context, because it's also, it was the captain of Queen of Sheba, figures in the testaments, figures in various literature. I still remember our old various historical fiction, if you will, which is to have the Queen of Sheba as a very prominent person. So it is that region that we are talking about. So for Yemen, and particularly Northern Yemen, it probably has a much deeper resonance with the people. And that's one of the reasons that you see this intervention, which is now taking place with United Arab Emirates going back into support of the Saudi forces. Of course, the response has been also equally quick. You have missile attacks, drone attacks on United Arab Emirates. And as we know, the Yemenis have shown that they have an enormous ability to attack at a distance. They've attacked Saudi Arabia, Aramco as you said, they've attacked other cities in Saudi Arabia. And this time they have gone even further. And they've attacked United Arab Emirates key facilities. Three people have died, but this is really a warning shot. So they're basically making it clear, if you fight in Yemen, we can hit back. And of course, one of the things that United Arab Emirates forces have shown that they're more disciplined, probably a much better group of mercenaries with them, who therefore are fighting more professionally than the Saudi forces are, who, as you know, have not proved themselves particularly proficient, though they have all kinds of arms, armaments and their support. In this context, of course, we've been hearing a lot of talk about talks in the sense that you keep seeing news about how there are discussions happening. So at one point, you get the sense that, okay, things might be close to resolution. Then again, we have fresh fighting, breaking on the ground, attacks such as these, for instance, multiple bombing raids by Saudi Arabia and its allies, which have caused a massive humanitarian crisis. The toll is unbelievably large. The number of people who, for instance, are close to starvation. So the real question is that is a kind of peace in Yemen even possible, considering the strategic interests. You mentioned UAE's interests. Saudi Arabia has its own interests. And the Houthis have their own ambitions to sort of set up a kind of stable state. So will we, is it like, you know, is fighting going to continue until some kind of a midway path has been reached or how do things look like? The key issue really is the Saudi intervention, because Saudis refuse to back off and come to negotiations with the Houthis with Ansarullah forces. And they were the original instigator of the civil war in Yemen. Of course, Yemen is a whole other historical dimension. There was a North Yemen and a South Yemen. They are two separate states earlier, which merge together. And at the moment, what you have is the Houthis really represent or they're strong in the Northern Yemen. In the Southern Yemen, we don't know what is going to emerge. Saudis seems to be in control of large parts of Southern Yemen. And their interest, as it has been argued by some analysts, is also in bypassing the states of Harbous and building a pipeline to go down to the sea. And therefore, there are ports on the Arabian Sea in that case, which they can access. So they have a different strategic goal, it seems in mind, but their capability militarily do not seem to show that they have the ability to implement any of these goals. So why don't they sit on the negotiating table? A, it doesn't really disturb them too much. Yes, a few attacks have taken place, but they think it's okay. They can survive that. They also feel that as long as they have the oil money, they are sitting on a huge amount of oil money, that they can dictate terms to the rest of the world who needs their money, particularly the western parts who today need to sell. The only thing they sell successfully seem to be arms and aircraft. So that's what they're selling to Saudis. And therefore, with all of that, Saudis feel they should be able to overcome what are essentially forces which are not equipped in the modern sense. The Houthis, in that sense, fight very good fighters. They're almost, if not as good as the Afghan fighters people keep on talking about. They have withstood in the past, for instance, Egyptian forces, modern Egyptian forces, they faced them and they inflicted defeat on them. So they are not to be taken lightly as military fighters. But nevertheless, they have less of a capability than obviously supported by the enormous oil wealth of Saudis. The Houthis were starved of essential commodities, meaning the population they controlled. That was being starved. Now, some openings have taken place. United Nations and others are able to reach foodstuffs. The Hudeida port has come under Houthi control. So through that, the supplies are taking place. So in some sense, Houthis have stabilized and if they take Mareem, they essentially call control northern Yemen. The Saudis fear is that if they do that, then they might say, what about the provinces you lease from us and they really belong to us and ethnically or otherwise maybe they might like to go back to Yemen rather than be with Saudis under which they face a lot of oppression, particularly religious oppression. As you know, the Shias are not particularly liked in Saudi Arabia by the Saudi Arabian, I won't call it even the government, by the king. The principal, they're a kingdom still. They're really not a modern state. So the kingdom doesn't like the Shia subjects. So they might feel more comfortable with the Houthis who are not the same Shia sects as is there in southern Saudi Arabia. They are, in fact, the 12-verse Shias rather than the 5-verse Shias, which is what the Houthis are. So I think that is possibly the reason Saudis don't want to give up at least Marie. They want to fight as long as they can. And unless there is a strategic shift within the forces supporting Saudi Arabian and militarily even today, the US and the UK and the European powers, NATO powers are supporting Saudi Arabia, then there is not much of a reason for Saudis to budge. They lose Marie and then the Houthis become strong enough to then threaten Saudis. Then of course, things could change. And it's to prevent that that the United Arab Emirates has come into the fray. So it also seems to show that UAE, Saudis are also wanting a certain kind of, you know, alliance back again, which had at some point come into a bit of stress. So they seem to be coming together again. So we'll have to see what happens. But I don't think militarily Saudis can win. And I don't think UAE can really change the balance of forces around Marie. So this is in some sense possibly a last-ditch effort to get some, what shall I say, benefits out of a future settlement by which the Houthis will concede some space to Saudis and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen. And I think maybe that's all they're playing for. Otherwise, it's very difficult to see why they're continuing this war, which is certainly not going anywhere from them either. We're finding any quick thoughts on how this kind of affects the regional dynamics as well, considering that of course, we also have the talks around the Iran nuclear deal going on. There have been some signs of discussions between the Saudis and the Iranians, the Emirates and the Iranians, for instance. And of course, the Iranians are considered to also be supportive of the Houthis. So does the regional dynamic also play a part in this? You know, I think what is emerging more and more is that the regional dynamics is now dissociated from what I would call the NATO, the US NATO axis, which till date has controlled West Asia. But this is the first time we see a breach where the players on the region are actually moving on their own and trying to reach, even if it's a military balance, it's a military balance, if it's a diplomatic balance, a diplomatic balance, but they're trying to work out among themselves. Yes, United Arab Emirates and Saudis have ambitions, which go far beyond what they're capable of doing. The ambitions certainly are there. They also want to align with Israel, particularly the Red Sea alignment, the Suez Red Sea alignment, of course, is also United Arab Emirates are part now of the alliance they're trying to build. So there's a lot of regional reorganization, reorientation, re-alignment taking place. Saudis talking to Iranians, the United Arab Emirates talking to Saudis and Iranians. So I think that this region is now a bit of a kaleidoscope. We don't know which way a small shake can put the region in. But one thing is very clear that the Western powers, particularly the United States, which control this whole region for quite some time, is no longer the major player. It's there. It's very much going to be there and can also act as a spoiler. But I think the regional dynamics are now going to increasingly be the pace setter in this part of the world. That is very good. Like in Afghanistan, it's really Iran, Pakistan, India, you have the Central Asian Republics, all of them trying to see how to stabilize Afghanistan with the support of the Chinese and the Russians as well. There may be differences among all of them. But on the question of Afghanistan, they said, hey, let's try and settle it. Are we going to see the same thing in Yemen? That's a key question. And if we do, then I think it will be much better for the world. Instead of running back to the great dictator of the world, the sole hegemon, whoever is the president of the United States, everybody going on their bended knees and say, please tell us what we should do and how we should solve our problems. And of course, the problem solving generally is what is sending US troops, US forces, and then of course taking a cut from all sides as a part of being the settler. And particularly those who have oil and other resources, that of course would remain with the Western powers and of course, the United States taking a major part of the cut. I think that whole neocolonial phase may be weakening in this part of the world as well. And this post-90s sole hegemon, the fall of that is I think something that we are beginning to see in West Asia as well. Thank you so much, Rameer. So Yemen serving is some kind of a, like Rameer said, a kaleidoscope as well as a sign maybe of how things might be panning across the globe as well. Less powerful United States regional players having a much more stronger role. China and Russia also of course playing their part. We'll be following all these developments in future episodes of Mapping Fault Lines as well. Until then, keep watching NewsClick.