 Section 6 of Three Dialogues Between Highless and Philonus. Pyle, as for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be planer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with skepticism. This is so plain, there is no denying it. Phil, you mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things. Since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves. Pyle, things, you may pretend what you please, but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses. Phil, what you call the empty forms and outside of things, seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition, that matter is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms, but herein we differ. You will have them to be empty appearances, I, real beings, in short, you do not trust your senses, I do. Pyle, you say you believe your senses, and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure and other sensible qualities perceived all manner of ways? And why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye? Phil, strictly speaking, Highless, we do not see the same object that we feel. Neither is the same object perceived by the microscope, which was by the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas apprehended by diverse senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connection in nature, either with respect to coexistence or succession, all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence, it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes, the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former. But in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together, and the more a man knows of the connection of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable? What if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted, or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else, except it be with your preconceived notion of, bracket, I know not what, close bracket, one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original, while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar merely for convenience and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation. Heil, methinks I apprehend your meaning. Phil, it is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them, or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them, or if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of the mind, nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in nature, the result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned skepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you, first, whether you are referring ideas to certain absolute existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all this skepticism. Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals, and, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them. Thirdly, whether upon inquiry you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the absolute or external existence of unperceiving substances. Lastly, whether the premise is considered, it be not the widest way to follow nature. Trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with a vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses. Heil, for the present I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray, are not the objects perceived by the senses of one likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees and flowers, as I see them, but they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter? Phil, I grant it does, nor have I ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination, but what would you infer from sense? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived because they are perceived by many. Heil, I own I can make nothing of that objection, but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds? Phil, it is. Heil, but the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Does it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? It is not this highly absurd. Phil, if the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain. Bracket, and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain, close bracket, the different persons may perceive the same thing, or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition, and since men are used to apply the word same, where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, several saw the same thing. So they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language or the truth of things. But if the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers who pretend to an abstract notion of identity, then according to their sundry definitions of this notion, bracket, for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists, close bracket, it may or may not be possible for diverse persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language. They would, without question, agree in their perceptions, though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the same thing. Others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of different things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? To which, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term same applied to it. For suppose a house whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place, and that you should call this the same, and I should say it was not the same house. Would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? It would not all the differences consist in a sound? If you should say we differed in our notions, for that you super-added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not, I would tell you, I know not what you mean by the abstracted idea of identity, and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself. Why so silent, Highless? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions abstracted from names? Take this farther reflection with you, that whether matter be allowed to exist or know, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the materialists and me. Heil. I, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to which, referring their several ideas, they may truly be said to perceive the same thing. Phil. And, Bracket, not to mention you are having discarded those archetypes, close Bracket, so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles, external, I mean, to your own mind, though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all things, but then this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind, and I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible. Heil. You have indeed clearly satisfied me, either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point, or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions. Phil. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither. Heil. I acknowledge it. But after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you advance against skepticism, it amounts to no more than this. We are sure that we really see, hear, feel, in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions. Phil. And how are we concerned any farther? I see this cherry. I feel it. I taste it. And I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted. It is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congarys of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses, which ideas are united into one thing, bracket, or have one name given them, close bracket, by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red color, the touch with roundness, softness, et cetera. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real, its reality being, in my opinion, nothing abstracted from those sensations. But, if by the word cherry, you mean an unknown nature distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its existence something distinct from its being perceived, then, indeed, I own neither you nor I, nor anyone else, can be sure it exists. Heil. But what would you say, Philanus, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things in a mind, which you have offered against their existing in a material substratum? Phil, when I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them. Heil. Is the mind extended or unextended? Phil. Unextended, without doubt. Heil. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind? Phil. They are. Heil. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions? Phil. I believe you may. Heil. Explain to me now, O Philanus, how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended, or are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind as books in your study, or that things are imprinted on it as the figures of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? Explain this if you can, and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formally put to me about my substratum. Phil. Look you, Heilus, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them, and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty, and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material substratum intelligible I would fain know. Heil. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it, but are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this? Phil. And at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language hath authorized, nothing being more usual than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language, most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things, as is plain in the terms comprehend, reflect, discourse, etc., which being applied to the mind must not be taken in their gross original sense. Heil. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point, but there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles. Phil, let me know this mighty difficulty. Heil. The scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? Of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you. Phil. Moses mentions the sun, moon and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make no question. If by ideas you mean fictions and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by ideas you mean immediate objects of the understanding or sensible things which cannot exist unperceived or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them ideas, it matters little. The difference is only about a name, and whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth and reality of things continues the same. In common talk the objects of our senses are not termed ideas, but things. Call them so still, provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, of real things, neither is this in the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what I have now said, and would have been evident to you without this. If you had not forgotten what had been so often said before, but as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to show where Moses makes any mention of them, and if they should be mentioned by him or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to show those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for matter, or an unknown quiddity with an absolute existence. When you have proved these points, then bracket, and not till then, close bracket, may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute. Hile, it is vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the mosaic account of the creation and your notions? Phil, if all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do, since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas, and the existence of these I do not deny, neither do you pretend they exist without the mind. Hile, pray, let me see any sense you can understand it in. Phil, why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being. That has become perceptible, in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed to the mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but his creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in his mind. But when things before imperceptible to creatures are by a decree of God perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties, so that whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the holy scriptures, in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of substratum, instrument, occasion, or absolute existence, and upon inquiry I do not it will be found that most plain honest men who believe the creation never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell. Heil. But Philanus, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative and consequently hypothetical being. That is to say, upon supposition there were meant to perceive them, without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the mosaic account? Heil. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, besides men. You will not, therefore, be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first show there was no other order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say, farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced by an invisible power, in a desert where nobody was present, that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable, that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebotch notions of mankind, that it manifests the dependence of all things on God, and consequently hath all the good effect or influence which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I say, moreover, that in this naked conception of things, divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the actuality of absolute existence. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose, but I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon. Heil, I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them, but what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God, did they not therefore exist from all eternity according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this? Phil, and are not you, too, of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity? Heil, I am. Phil, consequently they always had a being in the Divine Intellect, Heil. This I acknowledge. Phil, by our own confession therefore nothing is new or begins to be in respect of the mind of God, so we are agreed in that point. Heil, what shall we make then of the creation? Phil, may we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits, so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures in that order and manner which he then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a relative or hypothetical existence if you please, but so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the mosaic history of the creation, so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article, in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its stead, why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous skeptical humor of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God, for allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits, yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the deity, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all things on him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes? Hile, well, as to this decree of God's, for making things perceptible, what say you, Philanus, is it not plain God did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time, began to will what he had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the deity, which implies a sort of change, and all change argues imperfection. Phil, pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection concludes equally against the creation in any sense, nay, against every other act of the deity discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can we conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. God as a being of transcendent and unlimited perfections, is nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected that any man, whether materialist or immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the deity, his attributes and ways of operation. If, then, you would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme, but from the denial of matter, of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected. Heil, I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the nonexistence of matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right, but I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion, though indeed, where to fix it, I do not distinctly know. Phil, what would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things, the one ectypo, or natural, the other archetypal, and eternal? The former was created in time, the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines, or is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away all possibility of misgivable in the case, do but consider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any hypothesis whatsoever, and if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score, or you are able to conceive it, and if so, why not on my principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or immediately by your senses, or by rashiostination from your senses. Whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mind. If it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all, and so there is no loss of it, and indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of matter that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable cannot serve to make us conceive anything, and I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of matter does not make the creation conceivable, the creations being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence. Hyl, I confess, Philanus, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation. Phil, I would faint know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the mosaic history and immaterialism, but you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylis? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of materialists and the inspired writings? Hyl. And so I am. Phil, ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way? Hyl, in the plain sense, doubtless. Phil, when Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, etc., as having been created by God, think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader? Hyl, I cannot help thinking so. Phil, and are not all ideas or things perceived by sense to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the materialists? Hyl, this I have already acknowledged. Phil, the creation therefore, according to them, was not the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate? Hyl, true. Phil, is it not therefore evident the assertors of matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent, and instead of it, obtrude upon us I know not what something equally unintelligible to themselves and me? Hyl, I cannot contradict you. Phil, Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? Of unknown quiddities? Of occasions? Or substratum? No, certainly, but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them. Hyl, I see you can assault me with my own weapons. Phil, then, as to absolute existence, was there ever known a more Jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it, but allowing matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be clear as light, yet was this ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against the creation that a corporeal substance which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits should be produced out of nothing by the mere will of a spirit hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even diverse modern and Christian philosophers have thought matter co-eternal with the deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things. Hile. I own Philanus, I think it does not. This of the creation is the last objection I can think of, and I must need's own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions. Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the question, can this thing you be anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed, in this respect, I cannot deny the belief of matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education. Hile. I confess it seems to be as you say. Phil. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of a God and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God in the strict and proper sense of the word, a being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which, bracket, notwithstanding the fallacious pretenses and affected scruples of skeptics, close bracket, there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being, than with relation to human sciences. In natural philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions have the belief of matter led men into? To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, etc. Do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies according to the laws of motion? And yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or inconceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another, yet by all their strain thoughts and extravagant suppositions have they been able to reach the mechanical production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colors, or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted by physical principles for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside matter and corporeal causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an all perfect mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the phenomena are nothing else but ideas, God is a spirit, but matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause, God is active and omnipotent, but matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired, God is infinitely wise and provident, but matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in physics, not to mention that the apprehension of a distant deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions, which they would be more cautious of in case they thought him immediately present and acting on their minds without the interposition of matter or unthinking second causes. Then in metaphysics, what difficulties concerning the entity in abstract, substantial form, hyalurchic principles, plastic natures, substance in accident, principle of individuation, possibility of matters thinking, origin of ideas, the matter how two independent substances so widely different as spirit and matter should mutually operate on each other? What difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions concerning these and innumerable other the like points do we escape by supposing only spirits and ideas? Even the mathematics themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy. The most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite extension, which depends on the supposition. But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever that frenzy of the ancient and modern skeptics built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which does not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colors in a pigeon's neck or the appearance of the broken or in the water must be allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed and changeable. However, not change that random, but according to the fixed order of nature, for herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life and distinguishes that which is real from the irregular visions of the fancy. Heil, I agree to all you have now said and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts? What hypotheses? What labyrinths of amusement? What fields of disputation? What an ocean of false learning may be avoided by that single notion of immaterialism? Heil, after all is there anything farther remain to be done? You may remember you promise to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to common sense and remote from skepticism. This, by your own confession is that which denies matter or the absolute existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all. The same notion has been proved several ways viewed in different lights pursued in its consequences and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? Or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false? Heil, I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects but what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full ascent to your opinion and that no unthought of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter? Phil, pray, Heilus, do you in other cases when a point is once evidently proved withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities or the angle of contact of the asymptotes to curves or the like sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration or will you disbelieve the providence of God because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties attending immaterialism there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it but for the existence of matter there is not one proof and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it but where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas you know not where or what they are something which may possibly occur here after if this be a sufficient pretense for withholding your full assent you should never yield it to any proposition how free so ever from exceptions how clearly and solidly so ever demonstrated how? you have satisfied me Philanus Phil but to arm you against all future objections do but consider that which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof against neither whenever therefore any difficulty occurs try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the materialists be not deceived by words but sound your own thoughts and in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of materialism it is plain it can be no objection against immaterialism had you proceeded all along by this rule you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting since of all your difficulties I challenge you to show one that is explained by matter nay which is not more unintelligible with then without that supposition and consequently makes rather against then for it you should consider in each particular whether the difficulty arises from the non-existence of matter if it does not you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the divine prescience as from such a difficulty against immaterialism and yet upon recollection I believe you will find this to have been often if not always the case you should likewise take heed not to argue on a petitional principia one is apt to say the unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things rather than the ideas in our minds and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur as a cause or instrument in the productions of our ideas but is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances and to suppose this is it not begging the question but above all things you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called ignoratio elenchi you talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of sensible things whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am and it is you who doubt I should have said positively deny it everything that is seen felt heard or anyway perceived by the senses is on the principles I embrace a real thing but not on yours remember the matter you contend for is an unknown somewhat bracket if indeed it may be termed somewhat closed bracket which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities and can neither be perceived by sense nor apprehended by the mind remember I say that it is not any object which is hard or soft hot or cold blue or white round or square etc for all these things I affirm do exist though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever think on these points let them be attentively considered and still kept in view otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question without which your objections will always be wide of the mark and instead of mine may possibly be directed bracket as more than once they have been closed bracket against your own notions Hyl I must need's own Philanus nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same mistaking the question in denying matter at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel but upon reflection find there is no ground for it what thank you therefore of retaining the name matter and applying it to sensible things this may be done without any change in your sentiments and believe me it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation words than in opinion Phil with all my heart retain the word matter and apply it to the objects of sense if you please provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived I shall never quarrel with you for an expression matter or material substance are terms introduced by philosophers and as used by them imply a sort of independency or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind but are never used by common people or if ever it is to signify the immediate objects of sense one would think therefore so long as the names of all particular things with the terms sensible substance body stuff and the like are retained the word matter should be never missed in common talk and in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out since there is not perhaps any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards atheism than the use of that general confused term Hile well now villainous since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word matter as I please and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind I freely own there is no other substance in a strict sense then spirit but I have been so long accustomed to the term matter that I know not how to part with it to say there is no matter in the world is still shocking to me whereas to say there is no matter if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind but if by matter is meant some sensible thing whose existence consists in being perceived then there is matter this distinction gives it quite another turn and men will come into your notions with small difficulty when they are proposed in that manner for after all the controversy about matter in the strict acceptation of it lies altogether between you and the philosophers whose principles I acknowledge are not near so natural or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind and holy scripture as yours there is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes or is apprehended to make some part of our happiness or misery but what hath happiness or misery joy or grief pleasure or pain to do with absolute existence or with unknown entities abstracted from all relation to us it is evident things regard us only as their pleasing or displeasing and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived farther therefore we are not concerned and thus far you leave things as you found them it stills there is something new in this doctrine it is plain I do not now think with the philosophers nor yet altogether with the vulgar I would know how the case stands in that respect precisely what you have added to or altered in my former notions Phil I do not pretend to be a setter up of new notions my endeavors tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers the former being of opinions that those things they immediately perceive are the real things and the latter that the things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind which two notions put together do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance Hile I have been a long time distrusting my senses we thought I saw things by dim light and through false glasses now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms and am no longer in pain about their unknown natures or absolute existence this is the state I find myself in at present though indeed the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend you set out upon the same principles that academics, Cartesians and the like-sex usually do and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical skepticism but in the end your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs Phil you see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain how it is forced upwards in a round column to a certain height at which it breaks and falls back into the basin from whence it rose its ascent as well as its descent proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation just so the same principles which at first view lead to skepticism pursued to a certain point bring men back to common sense end of section six and end of the third dialogue end of three dialogues between Hylas and Philanus in opposition to skeptics and atheists by George Barkley recording by Jeffrey Edwards