 Mr. Constancio, in this year's financial stability review, you are pointing and stressing very much to an elevated risk of a reversal. You mentioned this with a particular focus on emerging market economies. What, how do you explain this and why has this risk, why are you stressing that it has become elevated and is a growing risk? Yes. Well, as you know, for some time now, the yields or market interest rates of bonds have been low. Also the price of equities have been high, more so in the U.S., where the price earnings ratio is around 26, whereas in Europe it's still around 14. But nevertheless, there has been this situation. And then there are factors that may lead to a reversal of this, meaning that the yields of bonds would increase and equities would go down as they have been going down since August. And why is that? Well, two main reasons may trigger that reversal. The first one is that everyone is expecting that the U.S. Fed will increase its monetary policy rates and that will get transmitted to the market rates, including medium-term debt instruments like bonds, and will impact also equities. Also it will have spillovers, external effects in other countries, and in particular in emerging markets. And that's where emerging markets now fit in these possible developments. Why? Because emerging markets have been decelerating in terms of growth for various reasons. So the bond market in emerging markets is a little bit elevated. And there is a lot of borrowing by firms of emerging markets in dollars. And so if the interest rates of dollars goes up, then they have a problem. We expect these indirect effects of these developments. And there is a risk. Why? Because when market interest rates go up, then the price of bonds goes down. And also the price of equities tends to go down. So that leads to capital losses in financial institutions, which affects their profitability and their capital ratios. In the special features of this year's financial stability review, you highlight the interplay between macroprudential policies and monetary policies. There are maybe conflicts, there are lots of synergies. Could you give us a sense of this? Well, I would say that there are always synergies in the sense that in some situations both act in the same direction, for instance a restrictive direction, so they help each other. But also in other situations where monetary policy, as it is the case now, has to be very accommodative with the low interest rates and all the rest of the instruments, then this situation may lead to pressure on asset prices because then investors and financial institutions search for yield and go to invest in financial and real estate assets, pushing up their prices, creating the risk of a boom-bust situation. And to address that, then macroprudential policies can do it, leaving the monetary policy to do its job, its main vocation, which is to care about inflation in the prices of goods and services. So they are in that sense helping each other even when they are acting in different directions. And what we have seen in the past 18 months in Europe is that indeed many countries have adopted macroprudential policies to face these pressures in some asset markets, although there is still not a generalized situation of excess valuations in Europe, in the Euro area in particular, there are nevertheless pockets and segments of asset markets that are showing an increase in valuations, and so macroprudential policies are adequate. There is a joint preparation and decision-making about macroprudential policies, and that is very important to guarantee both price stability and financial stability in the Euro area. In yet another special feature, you discuss the pending introduction of the leverage ratio. And you dismiss more or less the argument that is often made and heard that banks, as a result of the leverage ratio, will be increasing their risk. Now in this special feature, you are somewhat dismissing this argument and saying that the risk you're expecting for banks is not expected to increase very much. How come? Can you explain this briefly? Well, in the first place, the leverage ratio will be a break-off last resort, so normally the banks' expansion of their balance sheet will be limited by the risk-weighted capital ratio as before. But the leverage ratio is important to be there as this backstop. Why? Because before the crisis, many banks had only 2% of capital in relation to total assets, which means 50 times the amount of assets to the capital, a risky situation. And that's why the leverage ratio was introduced. And we show that even if in a bank, the leverage ratio is the binding element, which is not the normal general situation. But if that happens, yes, the bank will tend to increase the risk of its applications, but not by much, we estimate 1.5% to 2% of total assets only. But at the same time, we demonstrate in that special feature that the fact that the bank has more capital and has the limit of the leverage ratio, that lowers the probability of default of the bank. And that then means that the overall balance between risk sensitivity and a control of total capital ensures a more stable situation and more resilient situation for the banks. Thank you very much.