 Now, let me invite our discussant, Steven Ongina from the University of Zurich. Steven, the floor is yours. Very good. Pleasure to discuss this paper partake on this event. Somebody did a really good job of presenting paper and it investigates, as you by now, the impact of the California cap and trade program, U.S. plans. It's really nice, has plant level data, and basically what's going to find is that it has a good shock as all the ingredients. And what it's going to find is that financial constrained firms are going to shift in missions. And there is a story to that shift in the sense that they're going to do so with national plans that are underutilized. They're going to do that shift to other states that are going to be more lenient. And the real downside is that in the end, unconstrained firms are not going to reduce, or unconstrained firms are actually going to increase their total emissions total. This is really a shifting of those emissions. And to some extent, then negating this impact of this intent, the intent impact of this regulation. As I already said, it's really nice because it uses plant level data. The findings also is interesting, intuitive, well explained in the paper. It's carefully done. There's a number of really nice specifications. Here and there, the R-squares are a bit higher than that. I really don't have a lot to say on this paper also because it was actually recently accepted by general financial economics. And I think that's obviously super nice. And I think to the extent that I could even say that, this is of course rightfully so because it's a really nice paper. Super well done, super great data. So always difficult as a discussion to discuss such a paper that somehow is of course also rounded out. It's there, it's published. So what I'm going to do is I'm going to try to place it a little bit and link it to ongoing work that I'm engaged in also that people in Zurich are engaged in. So, and I'm then going to ask a little bit the question where some of these transition risk are going to go. There's also a question that some of you are asking at the end, which firms and banks are going to focus a little bit more on the banking sector. So I'm going to talk a little bit about, say, a critical exercises where one looks at differences in, in some cases, changes in. Climate regulation. And then to ask the question will be shifting activities, not using the loaded regulatory arbitrage wording but who is going to shift activities well so those that have to those that can and those that want to even though in that case comes maybe So on the vertical axis going to have the real sector and the financial sector, because I'm going to focus a little bit on the world that the financial sector may play. It actually has an interesting this point here in the in the paper because financial constraints are going to matter as you as you heard. And so to this extent there may be also financial sector that could play a role. And then I'm going to on the horizontal axis. There is going to be the short versus the long one. So the paper that you saw presented is basically that some present is basically showing that these capital constraint firms are going to do the shifting. And they're going to do so to the extent that they have excess capacity. So that's the part we were fully undoing the regulation. And let me now go counterclockwise, because actually, a paper that looks at the, the change in the EU, so the cap and trade three, where we actually find, and it's related in the sense that we're going to find that those firms are actually going to buy this firms are going to be able to almost use these permits to lower their own financing cost. And so also again undoing the intended consequences of this regulation so so the, the, to some extent, this permit is now going to be viewed by financiers as therefore these firms are going to obtain lower financing opportunities and thereby actually being able to ramp up their, their activities. Now, in a paper which is not yet in the public domain. So what we're going to look at is how these are getting maybe more importantly, local diesel car restrictions are actually going to change the financing conditions and what we're going to find is that captive banks but actually not only captive banks are going to offer lower interest rates for diesel cars. So what they're going to try to do is of course to promote to stimulate the purchases of these of these cars and again, this is this is potentially a side effect of this type of local diesel car restrictions that was was a bit unforeseen. Banks may not be pricing fossil fuel all that much. And maybe more relatedly here, the banks may also finance fossil fuel in more lax countries so to this extent the country policy stringency may play a role in in the ability to willingness actually of banks to finance and I'll come back to this point in a second, in relating it to to some of this paper. And then finally, I'm going to end on a, on a discussion of where some of the fossil fuel the transition was going to go and they're going to go to very big banks, and that some of these fossil fuel firms are going to be no longer financed as much by bonds as by by very large banks. Here we have, again, using the loaded world regulatory arbitrage by firms. Now this within firm, which Sonka and his quarters demonstrate very, very nicely in the paper may actually be more difficult on a global scale for various reasons. Clearly the financial sector may actually play a role in doing part of the shifting and so maybe firms in other countries may gain because the banks are going to be shifting some of their financing, according to the stringency of regulation so this within firm shifting may may be more difficult on a global scale and of course to be investigated further. Now, one of the takeaway could potentially also be that environmental regulations should not focus so much on on outcomes, but actually more on processes and, and to this extent, that would also partly corner the financiers to do this. Now what is the role of financiers here during transition clearly in the paper, I mean that there's no role in the sense that they are not necessarily mitigating the cap constraints but interestingly, the financiers could have played some beneficial role to the extent that they would have at least partly modulated these constraints and that would have reduced the to reduce the spill overs. But finance me financiers may not always play this role. As I already said, if the firm is actually owning a pollution permit this may actually be used by by firms to lower their own financing costs and thereby increase their polluting activities and the same maybe tool for diesel car loans that are granted by financiers to stimulate actually purchase of cars that would be necessary that would be possibly affected by these restrictions. And then providing more and cheaper financing to fossil fuel firms, especially very large banks seem to be now collecting such exposures. Now, why is this actually that we really see quite a dramatic compilation of collation of fossil fuel from risk on very large banks balance sheets. Partly it could be because to investigate this is very complicated is that there's joint with many other long terms as over time across product across banks and competitions in the case syndications are complex. Maybe the banks have sort of a blank spot for this type of transition with to maybe that bit oblivious to it the short side of conservatist careless, but maybe a better story for for the observation that indeed a lot of these transition with the very large ones and the fossil fuel and, and the very large fossil fuel firms are now being financed by by the largest bank in the world is that basically these banks are politically connected. And possibly they are knowing that at the national level, they, they, they feel they are somewhat shielded, and they're in control of this position is because at the end of the day. All of this comes from the regulatory side and to the extent that these banks do have this sense that they can control this up to a certain point. They may actually be doing the right thing by by starting to finance these these transition with. And of course, related to some of these two big to fail banks also know that their balance sheets are actually too big to strength in the sense that once the once the financing is there. It's going to be very, very, maybe more difficult to bring this banks. This is basically last slide this fossil fuel firm exposure on the blanks bank bank balance sheets may actually make those to big to strength and picture very dramatically actually from Tasmania where these, these mammals were actually not to big to stand them in any case, this is a very nice investigation I really couldn't bring myself to start, you know, picking on estimation details all the ingredients are there, the publication is there. Try to create some value in the context of this conference with a review slightly biased towards some of the things that we're working here in the shop in Zurich I was almost going to say the sweatshop in Zurich because it's really one of these spillover issues. And so a lot of success with the your investigation and future papers looking forward to reading them. I'm sure many of your colleagues have the same opinion. Thank you very much.