 Larry Phillips and I were on Highway 190 about 515 that morning when we saw the train coming. Over on the north side of the tracks, the cars began pining up in one knocking pine tree over in front of us. We were about 65 feet from the main explosion. We're lucky we didn't get killed. I was getting ready to go to work Tuesday morning when I heard a large explosion. Quickly I went to the derailment site and got a couple of identification numbers off of the car. According to the reference manual, the materials in the rail cars were caustic and acid. I then radioed state police headquarters for help and lots of it. The Anatomy of a Crisis. This program has been prepared for the cooperative efforts of the EPA out of the state of Louisiana with funding provided by the EPA. On Tuesday, September 28, 1982, at approximately 5.10 in the morning, an Illinois Central freight train with 101 car derailed in the town of Livingston, Louisiana. The derailed cars, many of which contained hazard materials, presented an extremely dangerous threat to human health and the environment. There was an immediate high risk of exposure to flammable and toxic organic substances, as well as acid and caustic. More than 3,000 people were evacuated from the area for 14 days. The derailment proved to be one of the worst chemical transportation actions ever to be experienced by the state of Louisiana. In retrospect, however, this event will be recorded as one of the best managed chemical transportation actions in Louisiana's history. On the morning of September 28, 1982, I was having coffee at my house, listening to the train pass. I heard a series of loud crashes followed a few seconds later by a violent explosion. My son and I went to see what had happened. We could see that the train had derailed and that five cars were on fire. Other people were beginning to gather near the site. After talking with the breakmen of the train and understanding the danger of leaking and burning chemicals, I decided to begin evacuating a small area near the derailment. Shortly afterwards, the state police began arriving in force. I'm Trooper Will Carter of the Hazardous Mutual Unit of the Louisiana State Police. When we were called, according to our previously developed plans, we notified the National Response Center, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, and the Louisiana Department of Agriculture. We also established a security perimeter around the scene. The National Response Center notified the Environmental Protection Agency and other needed federal agencies. Upon arrival, we immediately obtained the train manifest from the conductor to determine what hazardous materials were being carried on the train and began to survey the damage and assess the potential immediate danger. We observed that the accident was in downtown Livingston with business offices and residences within a very few feet of the wreck and there were large fires burning out of control. The smoke plume from the fire was carrying chemical vapors blowing in the direction that required further evacuation. This early gathering, assessment, and evaluation of information was crucial. We found that we needed to expand the evacuation, monitoring of the air quality by Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Louisiana Department of Health, Environmental Protection Agency, and Coast Guard confirmed the area of evacuation. As this was a transportation-related accident, State Police Colonel Grover Garrison named me on-scene coordinator. The incident team supporting me consisted of state police personnel, railroad, industry, and government agency representatives. We established a command post several miles from the scene. This scenario was based on prior training and practice. This team also included Bureau of Explosives personnel from the Association of American Railroads and Hazard Materials Specialist of the Railroad who played a major role in the emergency phase to remove the uninviled portion of the train and contain the chemicals released from damaged cars. Representatives of the chemical industry were also on the scene immediately to provide technical advice on the chemical properties and dangers involved. These were vital sources of response capability and expertise that only industry itself could provide. The state law authorizes state police to be the on-scene coordinator during the emergency phase of any transportation incident. That is the fire and explosion phase. Cleanup. The second period in such an incident is directed by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources. I'm Ross Williams of that department. When we arrived on the scene, we set about working with the OSC, which is the on-scene coordinator, and developing an effective monitoring program to provide the data needed for decisions concerning the evacuation and personnel safety on the scene. The first thing we set up was a 24-hour air monitoring program that lasted throughout the fire and explosion phase. This air monitoring effort, particularly of the evacuated perimeter, was essential because the situation was continuously changing. By monitoring the area with portable instruments and a mobile van, we could be sure the area outside the perimeter was safe. We also began setting up a monitoring program and testing programs for surface water and groundwater. Then we began testing the soil and continued with air monitoring for hazardous chemicals. Representatives of other agencies began arriving on the scene. Bill Labrese, EPA head of the Region 6 response team, had representatives on the scene from day one. The RRT regional response team, as we call it, established by the Superfund legislation, consists of representatives of federal and state agencies involved in emergency incidents. It is the job of the RRT to assist in the pre-incident planning by federal, state, and local agencies, and to offer direct on-scene support to make sure that we know that available capabilities and resources are effectively and efficiently utilized in response to an emergency incident. We offer support and advice to all agencies in order to ensure that response systems exist before the accident occurs and that the right resources are available to the on-scene coordinator. EPA Region 6 on-scene coordinator is Frank Gorey, who arrived at the Livingston scene on day one. We at the EPA emergency response team in Region 6 have the capability to handle an accident and coordinate the response if necessary. In the case of Livingston, the state police assumed the role of the on-scene coordinator and EPA provided support in the environmental monitoring aspects of the operation. When I arrived, EPA immediately began assisting the Department of Natural Resources in their air, water, and soil monitoring. I also called in other resources such as the United States Coast Guard Gulf Strike Team and the EPA's Special Environmental Response Team. The strike team arrived within hours of the beginning of the incident and assisted in sampling and monitoring the air and soil. We also set up perimeter environmental surveys of the area for personnel safety. On day two of the emergency, the fires involving the vinyl chloride cars intensified. An area to the west of the derailment was diked to contain the flow of corrosive acid. The first ground entry to the scene was made by an armored vehicle as we continued to identify the cars and their contents. By the end of day two, only the derail cars were left on the scene. All of the other cars which could be moved away had been taken away by the railroad. A forward command post was established near a grocery about a quarter of a mile from the wreck. This command post was used for staging our reconnaissance operations within the security perimeter where extreme precautions were taken to protect personnel who were observing, taking samples, and operating equipment in the vicinity of the wreck. A decontamination station was established at the forward command post to provide personnel with facilities to put on and take off protective gear and to prevent the spread of chemicals by teams entering the scene. Showers were later added to the station to thoroughly wash chemicals from all personnel. All contaminated water was collected and disposed in a safe manner. The public, particularly the evacuees, needed to be kept informed. One spokesman for the entire incident was appointed for this task. With frequent briefings throughout the course of the incident, we informed the people as to the environmental and health situations on and around the scene. Through him, we were able to transfer information about progress at the site and when the evacuees might be able to return to their homes. It was also learned that the domestic animal and livestock left behind presented a specific problem regarding proper care and feeding. Beginning day three of the Livingston train derailment, we began feeding animals in the area. A special telephone number was arranged so that residents might call in and tell us about their pets and livestock. We fed horses, milk cows, cattle, dogs, cats and chickens. The next and most difficult step in abating the emergency was to try to clear the derail cars. Because of flame impingement on numerous pressure cars which contained volatile organic chemicals, a possibility of an explosion was extremely high. And indeed, on day four, that possibility became a reality. An explosion of severe magnitude did occur. This explosion is termed a blevy. Which means boiling liquid, expanding vapor, explosion. When the explosion did occur, it not only delayed the clearing of the tracks but delayed air, soil and water monitoring as well. It also was a major factor in deciding to extend the evacuation. Large pieces of metal were scattered and thrown for over a thousand feet. The rail tank car was blasted over 600 feet through the forest knocking down trees, fence posts and barns. Such was the power of this force. When the blevy occurred, there was structural damage as far as a half a mile from the site. The occurrence of a blevy was anticipated but could not be predicted. The residents of the area had been forewarned of the expectation and proper precautions were taken. After the explosion, the residents stopped saying, I want to go home. And the credibility of the state police, which had been disseminating warnings, was greatly enhanced. Some companies have emergency response systems. The Illinois Central Gulf Railroad sent their team members who assumed control of their responsibilities. By viewing daily on-scene videotapes, we gained immediate knowledge of the problems and progress without personnel risk. This was extremely helpful in making our plans because the state police could not allow large groups to actually make on-site inspections. And rightly so. The railroad and the chemical industry responded with men and equipment from the beginning but it was day seven when the fire subsided enough to begin clearing the wreckage. We transferred the contents of some of the cars into trailers and moved them off the scene. A serious problem developed when we were trying to move one of the more extensively damaged tank cars. In the process of re-railing the styrene car, an additional crack was exposed and the entire car reignited and was engulfed in flames. Water sprays from the fire department on standby during re-railment protected the workers and there were no injuries. Another resource utilized was Chemtrek, an industry-sponsored source of information on hazardous materials. A conference call with three of the largest manufacturers of styrene was arranged by Chemtrek and it was decided the best course of action would be to vent and burn the car entirely to prevent both hazardous vapors and liquids from permeating the air and ground. State police explosive specialist set the explosive charges on the car in the early morning hours of day eight. The car burned for most of the day until all of the styrene was consumed. Air monitoring was continued by the Department of Natural Resources, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Coast Guard throughout this action. The evacuation was still in effect on day nine. Efforts during day ten continued in the gathering of data and the further elimination of hazards. On day eleven our direct was used to re-rail three cars and move them out of the area. At the same time the oil cars were offloaded and the phosphoric acid cars were moved. More cars were pulled from both ends of the derailment until finally the six vinyl chloride cars were isolated. Railroad personnel and personnel from the Bureau of Explosives began discussing with me explosive venting of all six vinyl chloride cars. After careful deliberation we concluded that it would be safer to intentionally vent and burn the cars so we might control the fires that could otherwise result. The situation involving the six vinyl chloride cars was unique. Several cars were damaged and still burning. There was considerable danger in attempting to move these cars. This was our absolute last resort and I would have never tried to explosively vent the tanks. If experienced personnel from industry had not been there. We had this confidence due to prior planning to rely on each other. The local, state, federal agencies and industry all worked well together. On day 12 a large pit was dug around the six cars. The charges were designed and placed to rupture the cars to allow the vinyl chloride to drain into the pits to burn quickly and safely. The resulting fires burned throughout the night for approximately 12 hours until the vinyl was consumed. On day 13 after the fires had died down the cars were examined and flushed with water to decontaminate them. The contaminated water was collected and treated prior to discharge from the site. The emergency was now under control and the full attention of the team was directed to determining the possibility of allowing the evacuees to return to their homes. During the previous 12 days while the state police was fighting the hazards of fire and explosion the departments of natural resources, health and agriculture along with the EPA and the Coast Guard were testing the soil, surface water, drinking water, air and vegetation. The data collected was used to determine when it would be safe for the area residents to return to their homes and provided assurances that there was no contamination of the areas to be re-inhabited. Because large quantities of hazardous materials had leaked into the ground and air and because potentially harmful byproducts of combustion could result from the fires there was concern about residual contamination of the area. Together the DNR, DHR and EPA designed and implemented a sampling program to answer those questions. Soil samples were taken from the surface and at 6-inch depths. Water samples were taken from ponds and streams. Wipe samples from cars and windows. Vegetation samples from local gardens. And blood and milk samples from domestic animals. Since it was DHR's responsibility to make the decision regarding human health it was essential that DHR be consulted and have input to the design and planning stage of the environmental study. The state health department, after review of the data, made the decision to allow Livingston residents to return to their homes on the 14th day of the incident, the next day, October 12th. The evacuation will be lifted at 8 o'clock in the morning, day 14. The residents may return to the evacuated areas. I think the Department of Health is going to have a pamphlet to hand out to the people as to what precautions should be taken and should be given to them when they go into town. It is the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources responsibility at such an event to evaluate the environmental data, make health-related risk assessments and render decisions regarding human health accordingly. We needed to know when the residents could safely be allowed to return to their homes. Early review and evaluation of environmental testing conducted throughout the incident provided the Department of Health with enough information to make this critical decision. As the emergency ended, the health-related questions began. Questions were handled at the checkpoints and later by telephone by the environmental epidemiology team. I had very mixed emotions about coming back in. I was leery and I was glad. Naturally, I wanted to check on my house and I wanted to make sure it was safe for my grandchildren. But I had a lot of faith in our public officials and our mayor for making the decision and I felt like it was safe to come back in. The Department of Health also distributed letters to the physicians within the area and maintained constant contact with the population through the parish health unit and the mayor's office. We wanted the citizens to know that they were not going to be left alone in the aftermath of this accident. The concerns of the residents were answered whenever possible. Additionally, in effort to allay fears and concerns, all of the state and federal agencies involved in the incident participated in a large town meeting held after the residents returned. A report describing the activities and evaluations of the response teams was distributed to the citizens during this meeting. Questions were answered from the audience as to their health concerns. Mapping of the extensive sampling patterns were provided so the residents could see what had been done by their government agencies. As Colonel Garrison said, this event will be recorded as one of the best-managed chemical transportation disasters in history. This occurred intentionally. It was not by luck but through sound state and federal legislation as well as planning, training and emerging of skills from all levels of government and industry. As of May 1983, more than 55,000 cubic yards of soil, which is the equivalent of 45 football fields one foot deep, have been removed. Over 12 million gallons of contaminated rainwater and liquid waste have been treated or removed from the site. Cleanup of the site in Livingston is continuing until acceptable limits established by the Department of Natural Resources are reached. Extensive water and soil testing will continue to ensure that the cleanup has been effective in meeting the stringent standards set by the state.