 Welcome to the U.S. Naval War College, the Navy's home of thought. NWC Talks features our world-class experts examining national security matters. We hope you enjoy the conversation. American combatant commands are recognizable military organizations. Most officers in the Joint Force understand that combatant commanders are responsible for the global employment of military force, and that they request those forces from the five service chiefs who organize, train, and equip them. Although our allies and partners might not know the actual name of the combatant commander with responsibility for American military operations in that theater, they will all likelihood recognize the name of that combatant commander. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Ross Coffey, a military professor of national security affairs, and having arrived at Newport after serving as a combatant command staff officer, I'm pleased to present combatant command 101. I thought into a lot about them when I was first assigned to one, but I quickly learned I didn't. One of the first things I was told when I arrived is that the commander will only spend one-third of his or her time in the headquarters, with the other two-thirds equally split between the air of responsibility and Washington D.C. Having spent some time reading the governing joint doctrine prior to my arrival, this came as a surprise. This figure from joint publication one depicts where the combatant command fits in the U.S. military establishment, and this figure shows where he or she would fit into a multi-national arrangement. The organizational structure inside the command seems pretty straightforward as well as how plans are developed, but for all these clean line block charts posted on publicly available websites, they didn't explain the other two-thirds I heard about on day one. So this video will unpack what it took me two years to learn using the commander's time as the means to illustrate the combatant command's role in the theater and among U.S. foreign policy actors. I'll start by describing each of those remaining thirds and then I'll provide some practical application. First, the commander will likely spend one-third of his or her time in the geographic air responsibility, but what exactly consumes the attention of the theater's security decision maker within the air of responsibility? Well, predictably, deployed service members, missions, and operations certainly require the attention of combatant commanders, as depicted by Central Command's General Votel, visiting troops fighting the Islamic State in Syria, General Robinson witnessing Northern Command support to Hurricane Maria recovery efforts, and Africa Command's General Townsend aboard an expeditionary mobile base exercising in Djiboutian waters. Another predictable sphere of influence are allied or partner military counterparts, as evidenced by AFRACOM's General Ward being greeted by Ghanaian Acting Chief of Defense Staff Ruer Admiral Kwashi and Akra. But military contacts and encounters are only part of the picture. U.S. ambassadors represent another major set of counterparts in the AOR. As depicted on this slide, newly appointed U.S. ambassadors receive specific instruction from the President to work with combatant commanders, and the President's unified command plan instructs combatant commanders to assist ambassadors. Typically, the commander's first office call upon arriving in any country is with the Chief of Mission to assure unity of effort between diplomacy and defense, as evidenced by this picture of Southern Command's Admiral Tidd visiting Ambassador Ayalde in the U.S. Embassy in Brazil, or AFRACOM Commander General Wadahouser, meaning Ambassador Yamamoto in Somalia, or combatant commanders and Chief's admission will jointly engage heads of state, such as this photo of Indo-Pacific Command's Admiral Davidson and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Kim meeting with President Duterte. But ambassadors are only part of the commander's sphere of engagement. While foreign policy is inherently an interagency endeavor under the purview of the Department of State, American combatant commands often provide part of that face. Some examples include Admiral Davidson engaging Japanese Prime Minister Abe as an important regional ally, St. Com's General McKenzie discussing the U.S. troop presence in Iraq with caretaker Prime Minister Abdul-Madi, European Command's General Wolters, dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe confirming the NATO alliance's support of Belgium in a meeting with His Majesty King Felipe, and General Townsend highlighting support for American and Ghanaian security cooperation in a socially-distance manner with Ghanaian President Akufo Otto. Depending on the combatant command's role, the combatant command is also interested in the few points of multilateral organizations, such as this picture of Sackier and U. Com's General Scaparati receiving NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. I stress that the U.S. Department of State is responsible for the execution of U.S. foreign policy, and that combatant commanders only represent a piece of that foreign policy. But for the purposes of this video, it's important to understand that the combatant commander is interested in the insights and perspectives of not only the ally and partner military leadership in the theater, but also that of their civilian political leadership. Having discussed where the theater security decision maker spends his or her time in the air of responsibility, I'll pivot to Washington D.C. I'll start from the perspective that most military mid-grade officers and Department of Defense senior civilians know that combat commanders report to the Secretary of Defense to the President, meaning there are no higher military officers in his or her chain of command. I'll flag the basics that U.S. law vis-a-vis Title X, Chapter 6, and a unified command plan provide the legislative and executive direction for these commanders and their command. But the Secretary of Defense in these documents only account for part of the time, much like the combat commander's attention to the interests of U.S. ambassadors, they also seek to maintain an effective partnership with the State Department's Assistant Secretary's estate, leading the regional bureaus roughly aligned with their theaters. An example is Afrikaans, General Rodriguez, and Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas Greenfield jointly hosting a virtual press conference discussing foreign policy and security cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Beyond the executive branch, combatant commanders are also highly attuned to what's referred to as the Four Defense Committees, or the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and the House and Senate Appropriations, Defense, and Subcommittees. These commanders are called to personally testify in front of the Senate before their appointment to their command is approved, such as then Lieutenant General McKenzie testifying to the SASC and what's known as his confirmation hearing. Lieutenant General Richardson, nominated by the 46th President for four-star appointment and command of Southcom, will similarly testify in a Senate confirmation hearing. Beyond these confirmation hearings, though, combatant commanders are annually called to testify before the Defense Committees during Defense Authorization Act deliberations, as this picture of General Walters and this picture of then-PACOM commander Admiral Harris show. Beyond these public hearings and before they occur, commanders will make a point of scheduling one-on-one office calls with committee chairman, ranking members, and other prominent committee members in order to establish a more intimate one-on-one relationship. I also suspect the members of Congress are equally interested in the commander's viewpoint. And in addition to the person-to-person engagements, the combat commander's prepared statements provided to Congress in advance of the hearings are considered matters of public record. In most cases, these so-called posture statements are prominently featured on publicly accessible websites and they represent an unclassified annual statement of both the combat command's theater strategy and an appraisal of its implementation and risks. Beyond elected or appointed representatives and officials, what about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Five Military Services, and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard? Well, those nine four-stars also represent part of the theater's secure decision-makers Washington view, but in ways far beyond military forces. As I provided at the beginning, most officers recognize the service chiefs providing training-ready forces, but there are far more types of combat commander requirements of the defense establishment all informally called demand signals. A few are listed on this slide with forces and personnel being the demand signals that immediately come to mind. Commanders also place demands on funding either directly supporting their headquarters, subunified commands, and doing task forces, or indirectly through one of his or her service components. They place demand on capabilities that have not yet been developed by service but are necessary for execution military operations and their AORs. Looking towards the office of the Secretary of Defense, combat commander drives the demand for footprint, either enduring such as overseas basis camp sensations, forward operating sites or operative security locations, or of a temporary nature such as contingency locations. They also identify where agreements with foreign governments must be concluded such as status of forces agreements, basic exchange and cooperation agreements, or intelligence sharing agreements. Commanders are highly attuned to authorities and not just the standing authorities identified for combat commanders in Title X, but also those permitting employment of military force on an as needed basis as further to Secretary of Defense orders book and transmitted in the Chairman's Executors. Combat commanders are also interested where the Chairman of the National Guard will recommend the establishment of the next National Guard State Partnership within his theater. As you can see from this chart, there is considerable breadth to the commander's demand signal, and while his or her staff are the ones charged with details, the commander's Washington D.C. view goes well beyond military forces. Beyond the U.S. government's foreign policy establishment, the views of combat commanders are also sought by other policymaking actors. This would include think tanks as these pictures of combatant commanders illustrate or the media as these pictures demonstrate. This brief discussion illuminates the constellation of Washington D.C. defense and security actors within the combatant commander's sphere of engagement. Having discussed the combatant commander's one-third in the AOR and the other third in Washington D.C., what does this mean for the newly assigned staff officer or government civilian who will spend all of his or her time in the headquarters? Well, this slide aims to provide some practical recommendations to make sense of what I've just described. The discussion of one-third in the AOR plus the discussion of one-third in Washington D.C. means that in addition to understanding the viewpoints of subordinate components and joint task forces, the new Joint Staff Officer must be similarly cognizant of American civilian viewpoints from elected representatives, political appointees, and career foreign service officers. Joint Staff Officers must also understand the viewpoints of allies and partners in the theater. The combat commander straddles a polynomial divide, so the products developed by his or her staff must account for that divide. If you're preparing something for the combatant commander, be sure to ensure it reflects the viewpoints of these two-thirds I discussed in this video on top of the strict U.S. military view as depicted in the Joint Doctrine Charge I showed at the beginning. The role of the country team is something to be understood. I've already discussed at the top level the close working relationship combatant commanders have with their Department of State counterparts in country and at the State Department. But for all this importance, the misalignment of the Sixth Department of Defense Terrestrial Geographic Combatant Commands and the Sixth Department of State Regional Affairs Bureau's bears mention. From west to east or left to right on the chart, both Northcom and Southcom have equities in the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. AFRICOM has equities in two regional bureaus and there is a separate South and Central Asian Affairs Regional Bureau straddling SENTCOM and INDOPACOM. Depending on your viewpoint, there are either military reasons causing these divergences or there are diplomatic rationales for the misalignment. But the fact remains that the combatant commanders and chiefs of mission working relationship must overcome this challenge. I'll explore the integrating role of the senior defense official as a means of overcoming it. This chart depicts the Washington D.C. foreign policy these entities at the top and some foreign policy implementers at the bottom. RIDO Center is the chief of diplomatic mission with responsibility for the majority executive branch in the country and to his or her right on the chart is the combatant commander with all of the duties responsibility and viewpoints I've described in this video. A key integrator in translating all this guidance and direction from the higher hierarchy is a senior defense official who ranges from a flag officer in a large U.S. mission to a lieutenant colonel or commander on a small U.S. mission. There are several different types of arrangements with the majority of senior defense officials also being militarily accredited as a defense attache or other serving in positions as the commander of the military group the commander of the office of defense cooperation or the chief of the military liaison office. While these military officers are also responsive to other Washington D.C. defense and military offices of varying degrees these officials provide the bridge between the chief of mission and the combatant commander. As the bottom line shows the U.S. country team and its defense attache office play a crucial role in advancing theater strategy conceptually moving out of the AOR and now looking towards Washington and what you're making the case for any of those demand signals is important to frame those in terms of global contributions. The emergence of near period global competitors and transnational threats are primary driving factors but also consider the scope and perspective of the combatant commander's political hierarchy and the legislators he or she will engage. In both situations and now adding the third third of the headquarters itself newly assigned joint staff officers must recognize the breadth of stakeholder equities and advancing a staff action. The commander staff will be made up of military DOD civilians interagency representatives and contractors from all six armed services almost every branch war fighting community and specialty code and as many areas of subject matter expertise necessary to manage the palm ill affairs engage internationally and signals those demands I described earlier. There will also likely be dozens of allied and partner military liaisons therefore the newly assigned officers will advise to embrace this diversity and recognize the opportunities it offers. Last it almost goes without saying that the newly assigned officer should write in a concise manner using plain language in addition to the diversity I just described the commander will spend little of his or her time in the headquarters but the results of his or her staff's work your work will impact senior members of the US government and that of our allies and partners and it's important to communicate an executive level using language that would mean something to another government agency or a head of state. After all you don't know how far your ideas communicated and your written word may go. To close I hope this video helps you better understand the American combatant command and the unique set of circumstances and stakeholders surrounding the theater security decision maker both in their geographic region and among Washington DC foreign policy actors. How the commanders choose to spend their time under the alliance the breadth of the combatant commands they command and while it took me two years to really understand that I hope I've shortened your learning curve and thanks for joining me in combatant command 101.