 Okay, ladies and gentlemen, please please take your seats. We'll get ready to start and To begin I need to start off by issuing an apology to those of you who did not receive a bento box We're Always the mic. I think the microphone is on Anyway, I would like to apologize on behalf of Carnegie for those of you who did not get lunch today We had a large number of last minute Sign-ups after our reminder went out and we we went through 140 bentos like that So I apologize, but thank you for sticking with us and we promise to feed you double next time If that if that helps But now it's my pleasure to ask President of the Japan American Society of Washington DC Ambassador John Mellott to come back up here and introduce our keynote speaker for today. Thank you Thank you very much Jim Yoichi Funabashi has a very very extensive bio So I think I'll make this a lot more personal. I've known him for over 40 years. We were both kids then Actually the honor. I mean, there's somebody in this room of so many people in this room who know you know, you know, Yoichi I Think the as of now the longest honor goes to Robin Barrington. We met him in Fukuoka in 1969 or 70 Yoichi had just joined the Asahi Shimbun after graduating from Tokyo University And was assigned down to Kyushu. So that honor goes to Robin asked for me I met him at a party in an American Embassy officer's apartment in Tokyo He had just come back from Harvard where he was a Neiman fellow And we had a joke because I said that's my great grandmother's money except there was a family fight and and her cousin gave it to Harvard University so at least it went to good use To to give a yoichi a year at at Harvard as a Neiman fellow I was very very impressed with him then I think we all were and he was just a junior reporter We expected a lot of great things. So it wasn't surprising to see him come To Washington DC later to serve in the bureau as an economic reporter if I recall he specialized in the Trade Wars. So it's a deja vu all over all over again. Yeah, and then he came back here as bureau chief And then again not to our surprise and then finally not to our surprise He was the editor of the Asahi Shimbun in Tokyo for four years He's the author of countless books recipient of many many prizes and awards a Regular columnist over the years for the New York Times and foreign affairs. He shows up at panels Symposium conferences Davos places all over the world because I think he's regarded As Emma said is one of Japan's wise men and one of the people whose opinion we all greatly Respect And we're very very happy that he's joined us here even happier that he brought his wife Raiko back to Washington To visit with us too. So with that Yoichi, I'd love to turn the platform over to you for our keynote address Well John, thank you very much for your kind introduction. I Let me first I extend my heartfelt Grateful gratefulness for organizer Particularly I would like to express my gratitude for Ambassador of course, but Dr. Jimmy shop and My friend Mark Goodman I particularly am delighted to be back to Washington and to be invited to this Forum I see many familiar faces as John just touched on I was particularly delighted to see Robin Bellington again here Actually, I will I had been stationed in Kumamoto to cover the Minamata Minamata disease for three years and then I moved up to Fukuoka and Robin kindly invited me to a study group which he had he had formed and He also he was at that time director of American Center American Center in Fukuoka There they had a very really good library and they had they had Stock of foreign affairs magazine and I started to read foreign affairs magazine In American Center in Fukuoka in 1970 Since that time I have continued to read foreign affairs magazine. So I All you Robin, thank you Yeah, I covered trade wars throughout 1980s in Reagan era It's curious enough. It's had a lot of commonality Between now and then And at that time the target was Japan I Have been thinking of this As America Changed over the past 30 years or it has not changed at all I Was so struck to Here I read a Trump's Speech during campaigns That campaign is a campaign after all And we are told that Don't take his words literally, but now I think we have to take his words seriously Literally and take him seriously. That's a really troubling He said as all you know With regard to that alliance With regard to the alliance with the with Japan, it's not a fair deal quote-unquote And the congratulations are you'll be defending yourself quote-unquote We talked about this to some extent if Japan would go nuclear it may not be that bad And Japan should pay full cost To maintain the military US military bases in Japan even though Japan has Japan now covers 75% of the cost to maintain US military bases in Japan It's really mind-boggling but I came here last for last Saturday Monday he finally put nails into TPP COVID You know through the signature of Executive order Actually last week I was at Davos I Listened to China's President Xi Jinping's speech It was really Propaganda masterpiece Many Europeans sitting around me so enthusiastic When she talked of something like Denouncing protectionism. He said to the effect. Well, it's like locking yourself in a dark room Which saves cold and water But blocks Light and air it created the huge big applause Then Then Tomorrow British Prime Minister Theresa May will come and meet with President Trump As a first foreign political leader since inauguration I Trump certainly will give special favor and perhaps rewarding Brexit hard Brexit So we are witnessing the revival of a real politic of these days driven by geopolitics and the geoeconomics But it looks like See real politic in my view Really does not make sense But nonetheless that's a reality unfolding before eyes So I would like to Share some of my thoughts with you today What really it's a signifies this Trump phenomenon to the world but particularly to Asia Pacific and and Japan And it's implication for the US Japan relationship and How Japan really should respond to this Radically different Political entity a first I think the immediate risk We will face already facing is a trade war There's no question about Trump's trade policy the nature of that the essence of that that is protectionism Even though some Trump apologist Pains to Argue that this is not protectionism, but we all know it's really it's a protectionism and It will cause trade wars not between just only between the United States and China America first Clashing with China first Xi Jinping China dream. It's China first It was Spill over effect it will spill over into the Asia Pacific Second, I think Trump's teams believe is Bilateralism They are very much hostile to multilateralism And this I think poses very serious risks to the rebel international order free trade and particular Asia Pacific region because we have seen emergence of multiple multilateral and regional free free trade Negotiations and enterprises in the region if Trump administration would Be determined to pursue Bilateralism certainly TPP would Collapse Already actually has collapsed, but PPP signatory countries such as Japan, Australia, Canada and the others I Think they are very much interested in maintaining that TPP a framework boss minus the United States and I think it's 11 should I think maintain this framework my in my view but if Washington Would be opposed to that and they would impose that bilateral deal at the expense of multilateral framework, I think we will see serious tensions between the United States and United States traditional partners and allies Which a member of TPP signatories? Not only TPP is a first casualty But it's almost likely that the ASEAN will be that next casualty ASEAN already has been under tremendous stress as China has put tremendous pressure on ASEAN countries by resulting to the divide and rule More accurately divide and trade On top of that if the United States would apply bilateral measures to each ASEAN countries, I Think ASEAN's integration process would face a huge setback ASEAN is going to celebrate the 50th anniversary From its inception this year There are many many events now in line. I am invited to events myself So This bilateral thrust I Could pose a serious risk to regional order building third we have seen many signs of Interests on the part of Trump administration in giving priority to short-term economic deals over long-term strategic rational imperatives In other words that long-term strategic interests Will be subordinate to the short-term tactical economic deals This if realized if that is the case that also will pose a serious security risks to America's allies and partners second When it comes to alliance management Between the US and Japan Trump administration is very much Decidedly different from the previous US administrations over the past 70 years They seem to believe that Alliance mechanism is transactional object We already have as seen some of that Trump proposals In this area area but Looks like Sound a bit far-fetched comparison, but In 1971 in the summer that year Nixon stopped a linkage of The dollar to gold right and hence cheap in the dollar Which led to the floating exchange racist Up to that point that US and the other IMF countries Maintain that fixed exchange racist So under the floating exchange rate system Every day the currency is sold and bought not dissimilar to this kind of dynamics Alliance mechanism now looks to be sold and bought as if that alliance Mechanism has now it changing from the fixed exchange rate into floating exchange rate is it? It's also transactional then perhaps we may see next that Trump administration being very much interested in Transforming that US role in Asia Pacific from that Stabilizer provider to offshore balancer offshore balancer is That the hegemony country Will try to Play a regional powers against each other And then they will not it will not directly get engaged in that as a scene they Consciously try to distance them themselves from the scene So in order to maximize their leverage vis-a-vis that regional powers If realized I think Japan will suffer greatly and certainly there will emerge Vacuum of power Only to be filled by China so if that Perception would emerge and will start to gel. I think that China would be Emboldened to push for their aggressive posturing to challenge that US based order alliance system included whether it's South China Sea each China Sea Korean Peninsula then As far as the East China Sea is concerned Japan would be forced to feel forced to increase the military presence in Okinawa to defend the islands China in turn would regard it as Evidence of Japan's reminitalization Then getting that cut relationship between Japan and China deteriorating dramatically as a result. So I think that's Offshore balancing strategy If that would evolve under the Trump administration could be very much detrimental to the peace and security in Asia Pacific also we should Perhaps think of China's great game of Geo-economic great game of Eurasia If the United States will push back push back From the sea from the world and withdraw From the world the China's one-built one-road design for instance encompasses 64 countries now designed to connect China Central Asia Middle East and then Europe Deliberately excluding the United States of Japan When I asked the high-ranking Chinese diplomat about this why China Excludes the United States and Japan in The oral OB of your his answer was that well in case of Japan Japan should be advised to form free trade agreement With China and Korea as soon as possible If Japan would be hooked to this eastern part far eastern part of Eurasia as a member of free trade area and Japan would be efficiently entitled and then Japan should be advised to participate in no, no, to be a full member and very much responsible player in our ship regional comprehensive economic partnership Which China is now trying to? Accelerate liberalization at the expense of now defunct TPP and then this should be seen as a part of Maritime Silk Road, okay, which is a part of this One Belt One Road grand strategy. What about the United States? His answer was Why United States has been traditionally extension of Western Europe? So once this one belt one road extends to and encompasses Europe The United States also Should be seen as a part of Europe. So it does not make any sense Only what it make only sense is that the determination to exclude the United States from this Eurasian strategy, and I think this is a part of That great game that we are very much organizing in slow, but appreciating unfolding and China is so ahead and We are Japan and the United States are so behind and Trump administration particularly Seems to be so insensitive. Yes. They do not seem to be interested at all in this wholesale game of Joe political and Joe economic game. They have only focused on Retail micro management of the deals So I think that We are going to be faced With serious risks Joe political and Joe economic risks because we are so much behind finally on on the question of liberal international order and America's soft power Trump administration will Unravel the whole foundation we have benefited so greatly Over the past 70 years that is that liberal international order the US based Britain's system alliance system OECD G7 they are all part of this liberal international order I Referred to Sheepin's speech at doubles and I said that European seem to be very much enthusiastic with that I Felt the keenly they had emerged a huge gap between Myself Perhaps that Japanese in more general terms and the Europeans as To how to see that nature of China's position on globalization Or a global free trade they all have Praise China as if China a champion custodian savior of globalization and global free trade I think globalization is a concept of process and Liberal international order is a principle and value on one noted famous Indian journalist blogged After he listened to she chippin's speech By saying that Well, is China global leader is China does China really believing globalization or free trade? I Then we should think of China Which blocks that global Hightech company such as Google and The Twitter into Chinese market China also creates that types and non-type barriers China rubs and steals Intellectual property rights China vacuum is out All the data from your personal computer and China Hectors and the blowbeats China's neighbors and The Europeans are so enthusiastic China as a global leader and globalization Xavier does not make any sense and I agree to his views so Liberal international order is different from just globalization But group liberal international order is now very much apparel as the United States under Trump administration now Seems to be abandoning on that and I think Japan has developed Since the end of World War since the defeat of that World War two By embracing and being embraced by this building block of Libera into it liberal international order So for Japan the liberal international order is not just a world Institutional mechanism it had the principle and the values has been deeply embedded Into Japanese political belief and Political institutions it's not separable in China Perhaps they can separate that game outside and the game inside But in that among the countries and societies and that that liberal international order that those values and principle are universal So I think we are but now in a very very critical critical juncture As to whether we will be able to uphold this liberal international order or not I think Japan shouldn't can play large role significant role to uphold the liberal international order Together with like-minded countries But first we have to Maintain that free trade Agreement and regime in Asia Pacific Trump administration may not like Japan and like-minded TPP countries to keep forming a TPP or TPP forum But I nonetheless I think Japan should do Form it perhaps 11 countries should change that clause to allow themselves to form TPP and Then that 11 countries minus the United States This may this will not be Platinum standard as once it was described But If we would Maintain this 11 as a sort of caucus or forum within our ship for instance to promote that our ship and Into much better global standard If not gold standard, but silver standard, I think that also would be very much helpful to provide oxygen To the Asia Pacific Trade liberalization Not only perhaps should not be mutually exclusive. So I think we perhaps should explore ways to Forge us Japan free trade agreement bilateral one if the United States and the Trump administration would be very much interested in doing that I think that we should not Refuse that a path I Think it can be compatible and could be Mutually reinforcing in some cases Particularly when it comes to the digital Trade and the others, but I think that Condition Should be that United States should allow that Asian TPP countries To pursue that a multilateral regional Free trade agreement and forum Second, I think Japan should form Concludes I should say Free trade agreement with European Union soon as possible European Union seems to be now intensely interested in forging the FTA with Japan They seem to be in a hurry for good reasons. I think that should be welcome and Because the Europe particularly under the leadership of Germany and Japan should cooperate to Maintain that liberal international order if Melville Be defeated in September election Perhaps this Japan EU in liberal international order axis would not be Tenable not be Sustainable But I think we should Make our efforts to maintain that with between Germany and Japan and EU and Japan and that I think that would also signal a strong message to the American political class Congress particularly and the people as well that United States would be left out from that Free free trade Agreement among the major players. I think US industry Sooner or later, we'll have to voice Against that Trumpian protectionist whether it's agriculture service industry Silicon Valley Boeing and the others many many American Companies which have a competitive edge in export business. There are many many of them they have been very much silent Right now, but I think that if we would give Continue to give a strong signal To the United States. I think that would help those business international business For sort of coalition against that protectionism And then I think we should help ASEAN integrate further Without that Japan and European strong support for ASEAN ASEAN could start to Unravel or even collapse So that's also very much vital because that With regard to that East Asian Regional architecture the most successful and always without exception have been ASEAN based based on ASEAN centrality whether it's APEC EAS and RSIB RSIB ASEAN 10 countries are all members so when I argue for China's divide and trade Tactics being very much detrimental to ASEAN centrality and ASEAN's integration Then the riposte from China's strategist was and still is that well TPP also Could be very much divisive because Ten ASEAN countries are not all of them are not members of TPP. Okay There is some merit in that argument, but I actually responded to say to him by saying that well, but Philippines and Myanmar Have shown interest in participating in TPP. So it's open-ended So we also will welcome all ASEAN countries if they will meet that standard second With regard to how to maintain the alliance system I think that Japan and other countries will Should be advised to explore more autonomous foreign policy a little bit more independent from the United States It should not be full-fledged independent But I think for instance, Japan's effort to provide a civilian Coast Guard capability to for Philippine Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Just one of the examples illustrations of this kind of more autonomous a role that Japan can and should play to Strengthen and maintain that more robust Law enforcement maritime law enforcement capability to counter Measure with China Australia and Indonesia have recently agreed to Initiate that joint patrol maritime patrol in South China Sea The United States are not member of this It's all Asian initiative But it's all in compatible and very much mutually reinforcing with the US Traditionally traditional policy to Strengthen its engagement in the region Also, I think we should perhaps explore Asianizing that defense cooperation and security Collaboration among like-minded Asian countries When Nixon It came up with that Guam doctor in 1969 and Nixon doctor in 1971 That was basically designed to Asianizing that Vietnam war effort But it was the US imposed Approach I Think now we what we need is that Asian Based bottom-up approach to share the burdens and responsibility to enhance that rule-based Law, I'm sorry order in the in the region finally How to uphold and strengthen that liberal international order I Think that's the my fear actually is China's globalization China-driven globalization Why China is so much interested in now pushing for globalization In my view that is because that They took capitalism based It owned enterprise driven globalization Would benefit China most now because they are very much now in stronger position by harnessing mobilizing all those state assets to dominate Seen and impose their rules and norms on the others So I think that Has to be resisted and there has to be we have to Come up with alternative to this China-driven globalization That's that is exactly why TPP has to be maintained and TPP framework now sooner or later Even though it's not the TPP form. I think that American public US political leaders Would come to appreciate how crucial that Asian regional order based on that like-minded countries effort and political leadership and values will be For the US interest. I think for the time being the Japanese government Japan really must articulate That values of the US Japan alliance and then Persuade the American public How valuable that is be that is In other words, I think Japan must make a case For that merits of that alliance to the American public America certainly will Perhaps get more than give Even though Trump said that it's so unfair It's not a fair deal That the others are free riders at the expense of the American taxpayers. That's not the case how to Then make the case first, I think that Alliance mechanism the US Japan US Korea Will enable the United States to project power To the Asia Pacific Marine station in Okinawa Not merely Given the roles and missions to defend Japan proper There they will go Everywhere elsewhere in case whether it's the Middle East or the others Seventh Fleet is also has roles and missions to Ensure its security and peace in South China Sea not only in Pacific and East China Sea So I think the alliance system really ensures that US for deployment and presence and also Ensure enable the United States to project power. Also, I think that the alliance Is the best force multiplier For the United States if that US allies and partners will strengthen their Security arrangement and framework That also would be very much conducive to the United States security. The question is If the US administration and the Trump President Trump will not be interested in project power If they are not interested in developing forward deployment of presence Then they don't have any incentive to Maintain the alliance So I think that I'm not so sure at this point How Trump administration will translate the campaign rhetoric into the actual policy and actions With regard to the trade policy, I think that we see that Already that Enterprise a new initiative I should say Mutating from campaign rhetoric into strategic reality It's so scary to see that but I think it's already has started to unfold But at this point, I'm not so sure whether the Trump administration also equally will be Interested in or determined to Translate the campaign rhetoric into the actions Secretive defense Mattis will visit Japan and South Korea next week One of us his staff Requested me to Having a lunch with him by inviting a couple of strategic thinkers in Tokyo. I certainly Responded to him by saying affirmative. Yes So I'm still hoping that on that National security policy and alliance strategy that transfer the mini Trump administration a Will could make not much so different Difference from that a previous ones Mattis is trip to Japan and South Korea in very early stage I think has a very clear message that Asia first Rather than NATO first so Perhaps that Possibly that Trump administration may maintain some part of element of the rebalancing strategy But I'm still not that sanguine about that prospect at this point and I should stop here and I'm more delighted to Exchange views and no to issue. Thank you very much But the mic on Dr. Funabashi is very happy to take your question. So I will point to people and please wait For the microphone to come to you. So go ahead anyone please Right there Hi, my name is Aiman clean. I'm a Department of Defense But I'm a student at the National War College and looking at Japan. I wondered to what extent you think What Trump has done and with the TPP might be a negotiating ploy and That it's a way to pull out and then order in and to have some leverage to then pursue a bilateral agreement with Japan Based on what they're doing with NAFTA. It looks like the NAFTA tinkering Some of the things that they're looking for are elements that are already in the TPP So the NAFTA rejiggering is it looks more symbolic and for a domestic constituency than Then then what the reality will will bear Yeah, I Think Both Canada and Mexico are a member of TPP So it's now actually linked up to NAFTA too So if the TPP would completely collapse it would have also implication for NAFTA But I think that We can try we should try to maintain some elements of digital free trade and environmental Standards and labor rights standards those WTO extra I think should be maintained in TPP Certainly You should not discriminate against that private sector companies Enterprise Treat them equally that's also another principle this point of Vietnam and Malaysia and exempt from this temporary I think this also very much important Was the reason why I explained that because TPP strategically speaking should resist China's SOE driven mobilization That's that I think the essence of TPP might as far as strategy So I think on this account, I think we really should our Asian countries and Canada and Mexico because as congressman Costello Reminded us China would maximize their effort influence Mexico help Mexico after Mexico will be abandoned by the United States So I think that Mexico Also should be very much important partner for Japan and Straight back the gentleman In Dr. Fudabashi's excellent talk and throughout most of the proceedings today There's been an undercurrent of concern of course regarding the Trump administration policies An implication or even made explicit that there's a pulling back by the US from Asia It seems to me that many of the things that the Trump administration appointees have been saying including the president himself on Taiwan China in the South China Sea North Korea Just kind of the opposite direction that they may be a more assertive US policy in Asia than we've seen up till now I wonder if you would comment Thank you for raising that a Question yes When you take their words face value Actually really Because they really will seem to be determined to Unravel the whole foundation they have so diligently built over the past 70 years on Taiwan for instance as you mentioned Have talked with Taiwan's policy makers in the past couple of months a couple weeks They are deeply fearful Being abandoned by Trump administration They are deeply fearful being used exploited as a pawn just a bargain chip vis-a-vis China So even though the public feels a bit Heartened to see the Taiwan being not paid attention by Washington But policy makers professionals deeply concerned about that so North Korea, I'm not so sure how Trump administration would respond to Kim Jong-un's challenge There is enough we have been very reticent on that my guess is that I think they don't have any choice but to Come up with any contingency planning For the event biggest I think enemy for complacency and I think that The sooner the better For them to come up with a contingency plan, but to make the contingency planning viable I think that's US-Japan alliance and the US ROK Japan tri-lateral cooperation in this pencil But they are not prepared for strengthening those Mechanies at this point But it's very very I think Fragile at this point I will become to be more so Under the very conservative Estimate North Korea will acquire that ICBM capability Eating the west coast of the United States in five years Some have predict focused that they could do that they will do that even this year That'd be too late for them To allow them to do that So we have to do something before that Whether it's let me regime change Peace for evolution from below whatever it is So Whatever they envision strategic options and scenarios It requires That's robust Alliance system particularly between Japan and the United States ROK and the United States that is now very much a question right now Yeah, of course on you very much My name is Atsushi Yamakoshi From Kidan USA. I think you have already answered to my question to some extent, but I'd like to pick up analogy Endo Shusaku the Chimoku became kind of popular movie and I'm afraid we will be presented some Humie, I don't know how to say in stepping plate or something, you know by present Trump and I'm sure that we need to keep If you are international order, you know, we should try our best but sometimes we may face Need to think about transactional response So I'd like to get you a kind of advice suggestion how to deal with President Trump in that situation Yeah, I understand what your point I Don't think we should allow the US Japan alliance to be just reduced to be transactional deal However, I think certainly, you know, we would Perhaps do some business quit pro quo in any deal in any agreement I think Japan With regard to host nation support, I think the 75% perhaps is a limit up a limit Otherwise, you know, it would make the United States troops the mercenary possible, yes, you know troops are not muscle So I think perhaps we should increase our military defense budget And you know, we have to do a lot of things So that's what but I think more importantly, I think we should we and the United States should I think collaborate in defense military technologies AI Based and the others and I think that there is a huge potential on frontier for in this area judging from my conversation with Pentagon officials and so obitual official MLD I think China It's not a big deal, but part of the deal, but I think it may be time for Japan to Recalibrate Japan's China policy some more trans transforming from very hard-aged China policy into more soft edged even though, you know, we certainly remain to be committed and strengthen that Balance of power and deterrence power is a big China But I think at the same time, but I wouldn't say that's in Under the Obama administration, I think the tactically I think I have kept telling them that they're too soft and But When dealing with the Trump administration, I think it could be dangerous if we would you know tell them to Be more confronted to be more tough on China They could they could possibly need to confrontation with China So the worst case scenario for Japan in my view is that US China confrontation US China accommodation at the expense of Japan also is a big risk huge risk We have make utmost effort to avoid that But I think that compared to the US China confrontation. I think it's a little bit better At least that's the you So I think for instance Well, we should the form TPP focus in our ship To try to promote that our ship into more a higher standard Trade liberalization and regional order. I think at one point Japan and China should cooperate India may be more big bigger obstacle to promote that rather than China So and also with regard to the North Korean initial initial question China must be a central player You cannot come up with any A plan even contingents from without China getting China more So I think perhaps it's time to Rethink China policy too Mr. Yamakoshi mentioned the phrase fume for which I don't think there is any translation but to put it up an advertisement for our Japan Bowl, which is the Academic competition that we have for American high school students who are learning Japanese. That was actually a question a couple of years ago It's the act in the Tokugawa era when they banned Christianity in order to prove your loyalty and Approved that you were no longer a Christian you had actually stepped on a picture of Jesus or of the Madonna and child As an active field And yeah, we've run out of time. So thank you also very very much. We will be setting up the stage Thank you Thank you everyone we will reconvene in about ten minutes So don't go too far, but we'll reconvene the final panel of great panel to explore these issues in ten minutes. Thank you Take the Thank you Okay everyone Thank you for sticking with us today those of you who Stayed through to the end get rewarded with a cup of sake to help toast the Japan Society of Washington DC 60th anniversary which kicks off here in 2017 It's And my thanks also to Funa Bush son for for his keynote address, you know that that really is a great Transition and way to set ourselves up for looking at some of the broader international issues Which we'll be exploring today. There's always a little bit of overlap between the panels on domestic and international side Which is which is fine, but today we certainly want to focus a lot on Japan's relationship With the United States in the context of of the Asia Pacific region For that I've left myself a note to remind me to plug My new book Of which there are little cards out outside the hard copies It's already available up online, but the hard copies will be available in another week or two and it's called uncommon alliance for the common good and it traces the post Cold War history of the US Japan Alliance and focus is quite heavily on our Alliance cooperation and engagement in Asia and and what we think would be a good strategy for the Alliance going forward We we will of course also you talk about The view from within the region and we have a great panel of experts to help us Discuss that today. We'll follow follow very much the same pattern as the as the first panel Of course, we have some interesting News items kind of in background. We have the Secretary of Defense Mattis will be heading to Japan and South Korea next week the Omayuri Shimbun reported I saw this morning that Chances are good that Prime Minister Abe may come to Washington around February 10th. At least that's the date being kicked around We also heard during the course of our first panel that Mexico's president has apparently canceled his visit to the United States so all kinds of implications for us Japan relations given the NAFTA of supply chain network foreign direct investment Stock here in the United States and I also just read that I guess this happened late yesterday The management team at the State Department has resigned in mass So well in mass three or four people I think You know the headline really struck me. I was like, you know Images of right people marching out of the the State Department, but but a significant development Nonetheless that I think is relevant for our panel Let me briefly introduce everyone here You have a little bit of information on their bios, but we're so pleased and I'll start in order of our presentations Mr. Satoshi Ogawa on the end here is the Washington bureau chief at Yomiuri Shimbun And very pleased to have him here with us today He began working at Yomiuri in 1994 has covered all the key Areas of interest to us here today the Prime Minister's office the LEP Kometo the foreign ministry the defense ministry beat and was also Here in Washington for an earlier stint also at a time of transition I believe from the Bush administration to to the Obama administration. So it'll be interesting to hear your Perspectives on on things this time around We're also very pleased to be joined by Andrew Betty Betty Who is the White House correspondent for agents France press? And you may notice this is not David Nakamura Who was originally supposed to be with us but had to run off to Philadelphia to follow the Trump train? as The president was addressing the the retreat there So Andrew a real special thanks for for coming to join us on short notice But we thought it would be really important to have someone who's To get both the journalistic perspective of people who are covering and following this transition so closely So so very glad to have you here He's been with AFP since late 2014 before that he's also worked well, you've been at the White House correspondent since 2014 and Has also worked in South Africa Panama in Brussels in addition to another stint Some years ago on economic issues here in Washington Terrific Also very pleased to have Bonnie Glazer here with us a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the China Power Project At CSIS just down the street where she covers a wide range of China and regional Geostrategic security issues, so thank you Bonnie for for joining us today And of course Abigail Friedman trustee of the Japan America Society founder and CEO of the wisteria group Consulting firm and a long-time veteran of the State Department of the US Japan Relationship but also more broadly in Asia and has worked significantly for the last few years at least with the Asia Foundation As well, so very pleased to have have you here So I'm going to ask each panelist to give us a few opening remarks and then I'll Facilitate a conversation on some of the key issues in 2017 and and we'll take it from there. Oh God what's on? Let me ask you to start Thank you shop, Sam for organizing this panel and I'm going to talk about US Japan relations and how Japan is responding to Trump administration But before that I have to Admit that the all argument what I am going to say I That I've never sung cover that all of that but I'm I'm happy if I may be to put some details and atmosphere So first atmosphere Recent Japanese opinion polls found that over half of Japanese people Expect us Japan relations to deteriorate under the Trump administration This week out look stems from President Trump's Remarks past remarks During his campaign where he characterized the US Japan alliance as unfair Calling on Japan to pay the full cost of raising US troops there if it expects the US to continue defending the country He would he also hit it on food with the lower of troops from Japan if such conditions were not met Now if Mr. Trump were to actually implement policies based on these remarks US Japan relations could very well be plunged into turbulence however if he if we were to think that Mr. Trump Was using a negotiation tactic He showcased in his memoir the art of the deal Then he can then we can say a much different future awaits Japan so the two Trump style tactic most relevant here would be Maximize your options maximize your options and use your leverage Which essentially means To play your hand well make the other party worry you might walk away from the negotiation Then gain possession that will reap high returns Oma Defense Minister Ishiba recognized this early on and called Mr. Trump the president of suspense and deal making I Agree with that assessment So what we got me Poland is for the government of Japan and media to know the difference between Mr. Trump's bluffs and His policy and not overreact to every option maximizing option maximizing statement So for example when Mr. Trump said that the US must be prepared to work in Negotiation to get Japan to pay more for US defense The media were quick to fire off stories with hand headlines that with Trump suggests pulling US troops from Japan But this is likely a bluff So really the policy Mr. Trump is ultimately aiming for is for Japan to include their contribution to the cost of stationing US troops in Japan So perhaps I'm wrong that based on careful consideration of confirmation hearing of secretary of state nominee Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Mattis and from what I learned from the interview with the National Security Advisor Michael Flynn Mr. Trump's Perplex comment on US forces with lower from Japan Sound more like a bluff so I believe Japanese senior officials share my views on this so one example on This is a Senkaku issue So Mr. Trump has been reluctant to answer whether The US Japan security treaty would to be applicable if China attempts to attack the island in Japan this has sold the fear with That without clear US commitment Policy proclamation on this issue. China would treat it as a green light to escalate its aggressive posture in near the Senkaku However based on Based on defense secretary Mattis appointment and his tougher stance toward China and South China Sea The Japanese government has gradually gained regain confidence in that US is still committed to the ally Oh, how it's Japan responding rather than simply increasing host nation support It appeared that Japan is looking to meet Mr. Trump's request to by ramping up defense capabilities by increasing its own military budget More more specifically the Japanese are purchasing weapons that would and let us defense US defense industry coffers while considering constitutionally appropriate ways in which Japan could heighten ability to protect the US and its interest Clear card example would be a strengthening missile defense Earlier this month Defense Minister Tomomi Inada visited Guam to inspect the third missile defense system Deployed at Anderson Air Force base as Japan actively consider whether to introduce that US developed defense system if Japan give a green light to purchase the advanced system It will not only be a benefit be a financial gain for the US But also offer a way for Japan to contribute to US national security Darling the presidential campaign. Mr. Trump Complained that Japan would have to do anything. Japan wouldn't have to do anything if the US were under attack If introducing a new asset for Japan's missile defense could effectively send Message strong message to Mr. Trump that Japan is ready to take on burden and expanded lowering addressing the Rapid to growth North Korean threat Another example, I would like to raise is a quiet debut of a new major called asset defense and the Japan's new security legislation effective from last December Asset defense now allows the Japan Japanese self-defense forces to protect US ships including aircraft carriers when Japan's security is at risk or when US ships are Engaged in joint exercises or reconnaissance activities related to threat in the region and And Mr. Trump Will surely welcome those development and steps Japan has taken to shoulder more of the burden But the question is whether The this is enough for Mr. Trump To say that he made good on his campaign pledge to make a life a more for security provided by US forces So the government is Japan is hoping that the Implementation of these steps measures coupled with a modest rate hike for host nation support Will satisfy Mr. Trump However an expert close to the transition team has said to me that Japan will need to increase host nation support so that Mr. Trump has Tangier achievement. He can then regale his supporters with but how much more is more They are in line the real issue so Japanese Asserts that its financial contribution to host nation support is the highest among US allies In fact as who never some mentions the Defense Minister internal calculations have Japan paying up to 75% of the full cost That means Japan is paying for the salaries of base employees from Commissory cashiers to aircraft carrier maintenance engineers So Defense ministry officials have said that even if it were able to increase its burden shelling it would only be a Very small margin and It would only be able to cover utilities, which is only amount to a modest increase So a 100% defense burden shelling would mean that Japan would have US troops on its payroll while also paying for weapons and ammunition Which would be controversial arrangement that would receive fierce domestic oppositions With that I'd like to mention China or Russia or TPP later, but I'm running time so that We will definitely I want to talk more about China after we all get some opening comments And I want to add the Russia piece and some other things in there, too But that's a good place to pause it for now because I would like to turn to Andrew to build on the Trump transition that the the new Trump administration Obviously there are always many variables when you're looking at what's going to happen in the coming year and There's in my mind. There's no doubt that one of the most important variables is exactly how The Trump administration will conduct its foreign policy and we don't know exactly how yet So I want to get your thoughts on that I mean a question that came from the audience earlier is there are aspects of what in the hearings we've heard the confirmation hearings and Trump himself have suggested that that the Trump administration could be even more engaged in in Asia and More deeply involved with with allies in certain ways, but then other comments have taken us in different places So Andrew, let me get your thoughts on what you've noticed so far Thank you very much. I would just start by saying that With the caveat I think everything here has the carries the caveat that Trump's foreign policy might be quite unorthodox Might be quite orthodox until it's very unorthodox But I think you're starting to see a little bit of a bit a little bit about how decision-making is being taken in the White House Fundamentally, I think President Trump doesn't really care too much about foreign policy Except through the prism of domestic policy and and and through the prism of its influence on his image So I put I would put in that category, Mexico Probably China although he hasn't moved yet on the currency issue and so on I would put in that category all kinds of trade This goes for TPP in particular counter-terrorism Israel So apart from those things just from the outset I would expect quite Basically the White Source the White House to outsource Much of its foreign policy thinking to DOD state Who I actually think will be relatively more powerful than they were under the than they were during the last administration There's a couple of There's a couple of other areas in which Where I think the White House will be really involved the aren't really about Trump's Self-image and one is Europe Europeans are extremely worried. They basically see a president who Will be negligent of the relationship But being advised by someone in Steve Bannon who has a very very different idea about transatlantic relations You know he I think that probably the best way of putting Bannon's view would be to to can to he has an idea of building a kind of nationalist populist international So, you know feeding populist movements and nationalist movements across across Europe he's deeply influenced by People like and very close to people like Marie Le Pen Nigel Farage in the UK Dan Hannon in the UK And for obvious reasons, let's make sure opinions incredibly worried because you know we tried nationalism a couple of times and it didn't work very well 20 million people dead So that's one one example. I think another Another aspect of Trump's foreign policy that might be quite interesting is and it might be specifically interesting for diplomats is If you're working on something for two or three years or a year or two years, whatever it is And you can be working along and you can be ready to sign this agreement and suddenly his spotlight Comes on to your thing and he if that damages his reputation in any way or he perceives it as unpopular I think a lot of work will be unraveled very very quickly And it's on on things that Trump doesn't care about I think it's very very difficult to know where the Where the administration is going to go You know the NSC hasn't stood itself up yet That's a pretty charitable way of putting it and used in the last week we've seen responses from the White House on Israeli settlements and such the South China Sea which have been pretty incoherent I Mean, I don't want to I don't want to criticize Sean Spicer too much partially because I'm gonna have to work with him for the next two years, but I know also, you know It's his first couple of briefings. So this is not an easy thing to do But you know He was a naval reserve his mother I think is involved with the East Asia project at Brown He studied international relations. He studied Japanese for a while So the prince that you know the idea of the South China Sea and phone ops and stuff should not be alien to him So the the fact that he gives such an incoherent answer. I think is tells you more about The fact that he's not being briefed by the NSC than it does about, you know And the fact that the NSC hasn't doesn't have a policy yet Just to finish off, I'll just say a little bit about I think There could be a lot is going to depend on How four or five factions within the White House kind of relate to each other? you know, I think You have the kind of orthodox Republicans like Priebus Pence and Spicer as well who have kind of been steering domestic policy so far Or be it with Trump putting up a kind of veneer of quite extreme rhetoric on top of it Then you have Bannon, Kellyanne Conway and and Mike Flynn Who are extremely close to the president So I think their influence might be felt in foreign policy beyond the the issues that we see at the moment as we go down the road And then the unknown quantity I at least for me, I think is Jared Kushner who I think Really has the presidency here Has been active on Middle East policy But has also served as something of a gatekeeper for For foreign governments who are trying to gain access to Trump So where his views on, you know, Latin America, Africa, Asia develop beyond the Middle East It'll be interesting to see. I'll leave it there Terrific. No, thank you, Andrew And I want to come back to you later on with some follow-up questions, but that's very helpful insight Thinking about that variable then another key variable obviously is China US China policy Even though our whole event today is focused on Japan in 2017 and we're trying to look at foreign policy in some sense from a Through a Japanese lens. I don't see how we can separate that from Japan's position is hard to separate from how the US-China relationship will evolve and there's nobody better to ask about this than Bonnie So I want to Thanks, Jim My interpretation so far from what one can divine from what President Trump has said during the The campaign that is true the transition and ours as president is that there really is an effort to try and Reset the US-China relationship in a way that is more favorable to the United States that there is clearly and an assessment that there are Elements of this bilateral relationship that have not worked to America's Advantage and to to the fire speaker's point. This is of course particularly looking at it through the lens of the domestic economy of the United States and So some of what we've we've heard In terms of specifics may not end up getting in fact Implemented we don't know for example whether there's going to be continued adherence to the one China Policy, but it does seem to me that all of what has been said is really aimed at keeping China somewhat off-balance And telling the Chinese that they're going to have to make some compromises on economic issues So whether or not we agree with or people would agree with the approach I think that there has been a growing consensus in recent years that there's many aspects of the US-China economic relationship that is working to China's advantage and Certainly there's been a toughening in the stance even in the last few years by the Obama administration but It seems to me that this is a particularly interesting time in 2017 which is what we're talking about today where we have the Plans for the 19th Party Congress this fall And Xi Jinping under a great deal of pressure to ensure that this party Congress goes the way that he wants it to go Which begins first and foremost with a personnel putting people who are close to him and are like-minded in positions on the Central Committee and the power bureau and the Standing Committee and So I think that the Trump administration sees that this is a good time To try and put this kind of pressure on China because it believes that it can compel China to make concessions And indeed I would say that the Chinese are Willing to bargain on some issues and the question is what issues do you look at trade? There certainly could be some opening up of investment for example For not just of course the United US companies, but foreign companies We've already seen some announcements of restrictions being lifted Because the Chinese certainly don't want to have their investments in the United States become You know more difficult for them to make and and that that was already the discussion I think under the the Obama administration So deals can be made but there are some areas where I believe that the Chinese are Do not want to negotiate and indeed they have used the term non negotiable to refer to the one China policy So if the Trump administration really were to push on on Taiwan I think we could potentially have a great deal more friction South China Sea I agree with the remarks that you made about what we've seen the Trump administration say But I don't think the policy is clear The reality is it's pretty difficult to reverse what the Chinese have created in the South China Sea in terms of their building of artificial islands and military outposts and Denying the Chinese access to those islands could potentially Provoke a military response, and I was really interested I came in late today But at the tail end of Funebashi Sun's remarks about how for Japan The prospect of conflict between the US and China is far more worrisome than the prospect of Cooperation so we've heard for so many years this concern about a g2 and that the US and China might do something at Japan's expense and so now here we are Potentially this is now shifting to the other end of the spectrum that should surprise no one Japan is not alone in wanting to avoid a US China conflict And I wouldn't be surprised if we start hearing this from from other countries in the region Whether or not a Trump administration policy is going to lead to conflict is a big question mark Maybe we will see more dealmaking between the US and China and as I said I would not I would not rule that out Xi Jinping very much wants a stable international environment in this period He has to be seen as managing the US China relationship well And so there there is the potential for dealmaking But he also can't be seen as weak when it comes to sovereignty territorial integrity Clearly these are issues that he's not going to be able to compromise on But this is it is it is an interesting opportunity I think For the Trump administration to see what kind of concessions they can extract from China In this period, I think in in 2017 and the run-up to the party Congress. We're probably not going to see any Very aggressive or provocative Chinese behavior in the region and I would include the Senkakus I would include the South China Sea I think that the Chinese do not want a crisis at this point If there is an aggressive step that's taken against China Along the lines of what Rex Tillerson perhaps said during his his confirmation hearings Then I predict that there will be a tough Chinese response, but I don't think that's actually going to happen So I think that the Chinese are looking for a pretty quiescent neighborhood this year Recently there was just a new Asia Pacific security white paper that came out and The the dog that didn't bark was that there's no Mention of the Asia for Asians security architecture in other words excluding the United States Which Xi Jinping had talked about in in 2014 so That seems to have been put on the shelf But we do see the Chinese I think and we'll see probably more of it this year trying to take advantage of A Trump administration that may be less multilateralist less engaged in some of the Global governance issues Climate change of course being one we've already seen Xi Jinping at Davos give given the speech About in which he essentially says that you know China's the supporter of free trade Any of us that follows the Chinese own domestic economic policy know that China's really not the great advocate of Free trade and and China's plenty protectionist But I guess my takeaway is that Chinese do see a sort of void created by a bit of a pullback By the United States on some of these issues and they will take advantage of it And I think TPP is particularly important Although we can debate whether or not TPP was really good for the United States The Chinese certainly saw that this was going to be a big win at China's expense There's a big strategic move and the fact that the US has now pulled out of this treaty I think has jarred the Chinese in a way that because they they now know that The US is essentially willing to shoot itself in the foot and so now we've got a really from their point of view unpredictable president so Justice China wants to have stable relations with the US. I would say the same is true for having Stable relations with Japan this year. This is not the time for any huge confrontation with with Japan but there is this undercurrent of Continuing and growing concern in in China about Prime Minister Abe's ambitions And including potential revision of the Constitution Increase in defense spending the bolstering of capabilities around the the Sankokas the just the what they see is disputed islands So I think that those tensions although they may not Become a real flashpoint in 2017 that they will still remain and perhaps will grow in in the in the future After the 19th Party Congress and that raises big questions for China if Xi Jinping has Further consolidated his position what that then means for Chinese policy towards the region and Thank you very much Bonnie that's a terrific introduction on those issues brought out Abigail we give you the opportunity and the challenge now to kind of take on all the other issues now Pick on the areas that you'd like to focus on and and and we'll we'll cover the rest in our follow-up discussion Great. Thank you. I think I'd like to make two meta points and then Get back to the topic of Japan Asia and the relationship in 2017 the meta point is I've been listening to all of the speakers today And by the way, this has been a lot of fun for me I think for all of us because we we all have expertise in these areas so this is really an opportunity for thinking about what it all means and One thing that struck me is that we we we keep looking at the Trump presidency as a break Historical break but in terms of foreign policy. I would suggest that actually this is the logical consequence of the the long-standing slow erosion of the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy When I started I was a diplomat for many years and I remember At some point the State Department thought, you know, we ought to have these things called hometown diplomats where diplomats go back to their hometown and talk about foreign policy and Everyone in the Foreign Service thought well, that's a waste of time. Why would we do that? You know what's we're supposed to be out there overseas doing our jobs What's the point of talking? You know if I you know if I'm from Indianapolis, why bother? Today no one would think that and when I look at President Trump and what how his vision of foreign policy is is it foreign policy is domestic policy and You know if if the the the tweets on Mexico, you know If if it upsets Mexico and the Mexican president decides not to come That's too bad for him, but you know the the view is is that His foreign policy actions are a total extension of his domestic policy How his vision of what the domestic public wants? That's a problem when you have you know the American workers are upset that their factories are no longer there. Well, let's do a tweet about Toyota We'll show them, you know, and there are there are huge consequences for those of us who have been doing foreign policy So that's that's one of the meta things the other one is a is a smaller one But I just want to put down a marker. We tend to talk about Asia a lot Independent of the rest of the world and I appreciated that Funabashi son did start talking about Europe and you obviously have tremendous expertise Europe expertise as well But when I hear people talking about I hope I you know the next administration doesn't forget Asia doesn't withdraw from Asia And I hope that they are there totally in Asia I also hope that that isn't at the expense of a focus on Europe that America has to be able to Walk in Chugum. We don't have the luxury of just saying we're gonna focus on Asia and Europe is for the Europeans Because that will come back to bite us in Asia. So that was the other meta one on to the specific topic of Asia and Japan and and how does the rest of Asia look at Japan in the context of the of the new Trump administration? I just the timing is great for me because I just came back from Some trips to Asia working I was working with the Asia Foundation on a report They did Asian views on America's role in Asia and what what the Asia Foundation did was Gather Asian Experts from Northeast Asia did workshops. It was all all Asians know no Americans To talk about how they saw What the US role in Asia should be and then they did the same thing in Southeast Asia and the same thing in South Asia And then there was a US response to that And also a next-generation thing. So that's in there so I had the privilege of hearing a lot of what was being said and one thing that really came through was especially among the Southeast Asian experts and the South Asian experts was This looking to Japan to fill the gap that they saw they saw the US was Well, they saw the unpredictability the US and The idea is Japan will help provide stability in the region The other point that came through that I thought was quite interesting We haven't talked about India yet. And so there's a whole middle power strategy going on with Certainly I can't talk about what the Indian government's position is but certainly among scholars and experts on in India and on India thinking that this is an opportunity for India and Japan the middle powers to step up and provide security and stability for the region We can talk later about whether in fact that is possible What are the limitations to that we know there are limitations to Japan's ability to provide a security? Japan certainly could not provide security in lieu of the US security Could there be more more ASEAN Japan Economic integration certainly, but that would have happened with or without a US presence I think that's pretty much my opening comments Good well, I you have power you have power that I don't understand That should be my microphone That's a Donald Trump microphone, I I want to encourage everybody to jump in on some some kind of rapid-fire questions as I work through some of the key issues And I want to start with China But this and could involve anybody who wants to join in Because the early signals that I see with the Trump administration is mixed. I see If you think about factions within the the the leadership coming in there definitely is a group that is particularly focused on China or views China as primarily as a imminent military threat that that we are in a fierce pending peer-to-peer Geostrategic hegemonic struggle with China and so they are already looking for opportunities. How do we press our strategy against China? Politically diplomatically, but primarily through a military lens I think there is another group that sees it primarily in a trade context in an economic context It's not so much about this big geopolitical game in Asia as much as it is about how do we restore American greatness by defending punishing or otherwise Taking care of our own on the on the trade front and then I guess a third faction would be this China as a deal partner as a potential partner to help us solve a North Korea problem or solve Some kind of a trade problem or something, but it's not viewed as much in the context of a competitor or struggle, but a Big player in the room that has a lot of chips And we've we need to to work with them. I wonder We're forecasting here. You're not gonna be held to anything You think that's a correct assessment of how the incoming Trump administration sees things and which one do you think will win out? And then what are the implications for Japan? I'd like to Train how Japanese people or Japanese government Feel the current situation By Trump administration Japan has two concerns one is Potential conflict I think which Dr. Grazer mentioned and Never stand as well. So I will skip that and another Concern is That US Japan bilateral relation would be neglected and cast aside if mr. Trump and Xi Jinping were to join hand in grand bargain This view is that If Mr. Trump would employ a suspension deal making strategy toward China and Use America's position on the one China policy or South China Sea a tougher position as stick in negotiation Negotiating economic deals a Syria foreign ministry official told me that Link this approach to Nixon shock 1971 71 and called such Situation Trump shock Japan wants to have a stable relationship with China both China and United States, so I think Japan is trying to reach out both leaders Prime Minister Abe is trying to Meet with mr. Trump as soon as possible. Maybe it will be held 10th and that is a Life strategy of Japan the current strategy I'm not sure that I share your view that there are these discreet schools of thought and I think all these views are interconnected I don't really see them as at odds and Generally, there is sentiment which existed in the Obama administration as well I think that the competitiveness of the US China relationship is growing and Some people would say it's cooperative on a few issues, but it there it has been moving in a very competitive Direction and so there is a desire I think to sort of push back and if there had been a Clinton administration I think there also would have been desire to push back, but I see the Trump administration As really as I said being driven by an economics first an America first policy that is in foreign policy and domestic policy in this regard are inextricably linked and So the idea is to use the the pressure and the leverage to try and get China to make some Concessions you can call them deals But to make this relationship work more to the advantage of the United States So I don't I I I haven't heard anybody talk about China as an as an imminent Threat to the United States. I think everybody talks about the various ways in which China is gaining an upper hand on the United States whether you talk about sort of cyber or some Developments in its military but I I I just don't see these as as discreet groups of people with different sets of policy options and I think that First of all, we don't have a lot of officials in key places yet Either at state or or defense and even at the NSC We're just beginning to put people really in in place. So, you know, no real coherent Set of objectives or strategy has yet been Decided on we should be fair. It's only the first week of the administration But the impulse is to try to build Leverage to make this relationship work better for us and to not look weak In, you know places like the South China Sea, but that pushback I think We have yet to see how it's going to be Applied so I don't know. I guess I I just I don't see the framework quite as clearly in the way that you don't know That's okay. I that's fair enough But quickly I wanted to ask then Aren't there things that if you prioritize the trade side first and really engage in a punitive Measures on trade you're you're Weakening your hand to contain or confront China on the military side because you're you're you're you're almost rallying you're forcing people to choose in the region and You don't think American officials will kind of look at who should we prioritize the military containment of China? Or should we prioritize? The trade resolution of trade issues they can pursue both at the same time It's very difficult to posit what the Trump administration is doing at this point But we've heard comments that suggests that they're not going to keep these issues in discreet silos So, you know, there is the discussion about well Maybe the one China policy is somehow up for Reconsideration if there aren't trade concessions So I don't think it's just a whole trade discussion over here that then weakens us over in the military realm but I think it's fair to Encourage everybody to be a little bit patient and see what the actual policy is going to be and the Chinese themselves Have been restrained in their response because they do not want to push this president into a corner and Then end up in a in a position that's even you know worse for them So I see the Chinese is being very careful in their responses Waiting to see what the real policy is going to be quietly I think probably trying to influence it through the various channels They have with individuals in the Trump administration, but I would just encourage all the observers who are Who are watching this unfold to maybe be just be a little bit more patient Try to be patient Any other comments on this might I? Would just say on the military thing If you imagine a situation where Trump is in the situation room with his advisors Mattis Kelly Dunford all Marines are going to be a pretty powerful group of individuals and collectively I would say one other thing on the on the kind of China Japan West Points that was made before I think that you know miscalculation is is obviously a huge risk is one of the People in the previous panel said but I think there's also a risk for Japan in a kind of very transactional politics between the US and China I Think in many ways the Trump administration in China might be on the same might see the world in a similar terms In this regard, I mean many Bonnie knows more about this in me But I can perfectly imagine a situation where Xi Jinping offers, you know Five factories in Iowa in return for dropping the currency issue Which would be a big problem for Japan and Europe both? Thank you moving on to North Korea I could see I have a hard time seeing how Confrontation or tough times in the UN More confrontational policy with China helps with sanctions enforcement or helps with an ability to apply pressure on to North Korea What do we see? With North Korea and potentially the Japan Japanese interests vis-a-vis North Korea in 2017 we basically gonna have a replay of of 2016 slow steady Improvement in North Korea's Military capabilities, but not a whole lot of instability or do you see a much more dangerous dynamic? tenuous situation in 2017 You know had worked on the six-party talks early on And worked on North Korea from when I was at the embassy in Japan And a couple of things that strike me first I think this this strategic patience really hasn't worked That's it's pretty evident in terms of where we are now. So the question is then what what goes in its place I don't have an answer to that. I think two elements that I that I hark back to one is that China really kicked in and engaged to address the North Korea issue when Then President Bush started talking about the axis of evil and there was a real fear that the US was going to do something militarily in North Korea So that is One data point The other data point that I would want to look at is the the role that Russia plays in all of this because I think Russia is always looking to play a greater role in In Asia and on North Korea. So Again, that's another data point. I'm reluctant to then wrap this all up and give you a conclusion and a prediction for the future But but those are the two things that I would look out for Speaking of Russia and I'll I'll end up extending the session probably at least about five minutes or possibly ten minutes because we started Started late. So we will get a chance to get to the audience here But Japan's policy toward Russia Possibly a bit of a setback here at the end of the year Abe at least and and some of his supporters. I think we're hoping for a little bit more Light at the end of the tunnel coming from from their summit meeting, but they're pressing ahead I noticed there was just a little shake-up and now Minister Akiba is heading up a group to Focus on how the economic investment in Russia will move forward What do we expect to see between Japan Russia ties and if anybody wants to talk about kind of the US Russia Link in that I'm I'm open to that as well as Joestar mentions Prime Minister Abe and President Putin held a summit mid-December and There is there was no big breakthrough on Territory issue, but they agree that start talking on Joint economic activities Then the Japanese government and public Appears to have interpreted the summit positively. I'll introduce some Pause now Japanese public appears to understand Prime Minister Abe's new approach 17% in the Yomi Uripo 70% responded that they believe that the Northern Territory issue were on the Oh, I think they 17% only 70% responded that they believe the Northern Territory issue were on the path to settlement while 73% responded negatively however 66% Reported that they supported the summit agreement to begin Discussion on joint economic cooperation with Russia While 24% reported they didn't so I think You can see the public opinion has Shifted quite a bit so Prime Minister Abe is going to Visit Russia in April and in this autumn and I think he's trying to finalize the Agreement on the joint economic activities even though the They he can't get he will not be able to get the Solid commitment from Putin to return those islands But I think Japanese people I'm not sure but I think Japanese people would accept that outcome possibly and one thing I'd like to mention is that the You know the Trump is trying to remake the U.S. Russia relations the how Japan is Feeling You know Japan has mixed feeling about the improvement of U.S. Japan are U.S. Russia relations and the Trump administration so Obama administration frequently warned and Send negative message That not to negotiate with Putin But the that the Trump administration That kind of view will cease So that pain paving the way for further Russia Japan relations That said Japan is put a different position if American Condemnation of Russia's occupation of Crimea sees and they've sanctioned lifted because Japan are here to and strongly emphasize the rule of law and it comes to issue in the eastern South China Sea so Japan has objected strongly to China's unilateral movement unilateral actions in that Eastern South China Sea so if Japan fear that if it for all the U.S. leader and ignore issues of sovereignty and rule of law This may not only benefit China, but it may also Erode Japan's standing as a responsible player. I just wanted to add the point that apart from the northern territories issue I think that the main motivation that Japan had in trying to Improve the relationship with Russia and having the the summit with between Prime Minister Abe and Putin was really to sort of drive a wedge between Russia and China there's been growing concern in Japan about the strategic cooperation between those two countries and a desire to try and prevent Russia's cooperation with China at coming at the expense of Japan and so it is perhaps a little early to say whether that has succeeded there will continue to be meetings between Japan and and and Russia and and we'll see where this goes But we have now what we now see is that this is followed by the potential for a Trump administration to reach out To Russia not necessarily some people think it is in fact strategic and maybe to divide a wedge similarly between Russia and and China, I don't know whether that's the case But I can say that from Beijing's perspective these kinds of trends both of them are really worrisome China has been in the position of having better ties with Russia and the United States than they have had with each other and They do not want to see that position weakened and there is the potential of course if there's a better relationship between the US and Russia Putin wants to Play sort of Trump's game for a while that maybe even Russia Takes on a position that is the most favorable in that triangular Relationship in the future now this may not be realized But at least it's worth thinking about because I can't remember Moscow ever being in the sort of pivotal position in the triangle But China has has had an advantageous position and so I think they worry about Japan's Outreach to to Russia and to Putin and they worry about a potential US outreach to Putin as well Thank you interesting Andrew you wanted to chime in sure just on the kind of To express a point of skepticism about the US Russia bit of this You know obviously everybody Sees that Trump wants to have a better relationship with Putin and he obviously personally respects Putin But there are a number of structural reasons why this is going to be incredibly difficult to achieve First of all public opinion I think a lot of Americans are extremely concerned about the Russians role in the election That's going to constrain what Trump can do and how quickly he can Forge some kind of repression on with with with Putin. Secondly the Republican Party. There's incredible unease in the Republican Party about About Trump's position on this as as one official said the other day, you know, we're gonna get on the right side of this We're not dummies The third point I would say is America's allies in Europe They're gonna be trying some of them are gonna try and engage with Trump in the hope of getting his ear When they if and if they do succeed in that their message is going to be about Russia Because with Dutch French German elections coming up, there's a lot of concern that Russia may interfere The fourth point I would say Which could be an obstacle towards more rapprochement is the Iran piece of the puzzle Russia's relationship with Iran I can't I can't imagine a situation in which people like Flynn Don't demand Russia cool its ties with Iran and as a quid pro quo for Actually improving us Russia relations Good. Thanks Alright quickly. I got two more quick things. I wanted to hit Arsep trade Do you think there will be I think the next meeting is March April or so? Will 2017 see a signing ceremony for Arsep and Does it matter? Whether they do or not is there is is that a is that an issue one way or the other I Will take I would just say, you know from the Southeast Asian perspective And again Funebashi Sun hit on this But I heard the same thing when I was in the region is that we're talking to a lot of these scholars is that you know Arsep Arsep Works fine for ASEAN centrality, you know that TPP was a bit of a problem Because only some of the ASEAN countries were were part of it so And even way before this I remember being in Bangkok and it was like the first time I had heard about Arsep It was barely on the screen and You know, I would have all of these People talking about Arsep and they were telling me well, don't you know what Arsep is? I'd be talking about TPP so Arsep has been kicking around in the region for quite a while What is the US to do with that? What is what does it mean for Japan? Are these two incompatible? You know, I leave that to Matt and your expertise on this But but for Southeast Asia Arsep was seen as a good thing. Yeah, I could see that as key And we'll accept when people raise their hand for questions will accept answers to the questions that I've given My final question big picture question And it relates in part to what Funabash San was talking about as well in Asia, we had been moving toward You know this this liberal international order multilateralist approach through various mechanisms and Dialogues and theories not perfect always came up short in certain ways, but that was the momentum and that was the direction We may be and we don't know it's still too early to tell but we may be moving in in a either pause or or a retreat due to a significant lack of US interest in adding its weight and strength behind that momentum therefore more of a Bilateral transactional might-makes-right Approach do you if this is the case? Do you think this will tend to actually bring countries in Asia together? Whether it's the middle power You know rallying together to fill this void because they see it as ultimately beneficial or or does it? Does it have the potential to tear is it more likely to tear it apart? And pit countries against each other and force people to pick and choose big dogs to stay in their yard. I think I'll I'd just like to reply really what my what my fear is and that is We have seen a number of countries that because they all share some concerns about China's rise and the way in which China has been using its its power Including you know economic pressure and coercion activity in the East China Sea South China Sea and and and this has been widespread throughout the region and the reaction really has been a a And this is varied from country to country But a decision to hedge by moving closer to the United States and so my fear is that that Trend is reversed that if there is a perception that the United States is not going to be a Reliable balancer and it's an if and so I I'm not drawing that conclusion But there are already concerns that the United States may not pay as much attention to Asia and frankly Even if we increase the size of the US military and the number of naval ships from the perspective of most Asian countries, that's not enough Everybody talks more about having its diplomatic engagement and economic peace to that strategy as well It's they don't just want military. So there is the potential for a for countries to then hedge In the direction of of China and we have seen some already I think countries that are beginning to shift in that in that direction. So that's my word. I would just add to that Apparently do territory just announced that the the five bases would he would open five bases in In the Philippines to the US. So, you know, what's interesting to me was on the BBC app What's interesting to me is do territory might be the one person who is like figured out how to play the New US the Trump game, which is you say one thing one day and another thing the other day I actually by the way, don't think that Trump and do territory are similar because their popularity ratings are Dramatically different within the countries but But we are living in a world where people are going to start getting comfortable with people saying one thing one day and doing another thing the other day so the fact that the US military presence in fact is not going to just go home as the Philippines said Only probably less than a month ago or something is a really important piece to this I could see the the the diplomatic piece being picked up by Japan more Japan has been doing a lot with ASEAN That was one of the signature Priorities of Prime Minister Abe when he came into power in 2012, you know He went to all the ASEAN countries. So so will we see some kind of a division of labor where the US is Maintains its engagement militarily and where Japan sort of plays the role of of keeping ASEAN Centrality going of keeping the the diplomatic engagement. I don't know if that's what the future looks like and I also don't know There whether that would be sufficient or I like Just remind you that the Prime Minister Abe visited Philippine and a couple of Southeast Asian country two weeks ago and agree that They would seek International order based on rule-based order and then Prime Minister will visit to United States and I think ask Trump to have the same recognition the Importance of the international order based on the rule So he's reaching both Southeast Asian country and the United States Okay, if I extend just a few minutes to take a couple questions. Okay, people have been very patient. Thank you for your your patients We're gonna start up here in the front, and I know I had a hand in the back at some point During the course of the discussion, so we'll start here, and then we'll move our way Thanks, excellent discussion Excellent discussion. Thanks. Everybody had great thoughts, and I Prompted some further thoughts of my own but but going back to the well everybody talked about the Abigail I think in particular captured this Trump is the logical conclusion of a process going on for a long I've certainly that's been the biggest lesson to me even if the logical conclusion if a slightly Ask conclusion, but it has been something to my arm And I just wanted to endorse that I think that is the big Lesson of Trumpism, but this panel is about international Japan's international agenda So let me ask questions a little unfair because it's oversimplifying very complicated situation But you know Japan's got to be worried about the erosion of the liberal order Heard that from everybody today What What's if you were advising Prime Minister of and I'm really asking everybody If you are advising him what sort of one thing he could do in Asia to reinforce the Not just in my stuff and trade and stuff and it could be that you mean TPP or you know But it could be something else with ASEAN. It could be a coalition of you know in the Something to reinforce the or something what what single thing do you think would be useful that forward and Can Japan do that without the United States sort of? Alongside it which It's always had and in three reasons. I suspect it might not be able to do that one is that Others may not be as receptive to Japan doing this alone without the United States Others may try to secondly try to Play interference run interference and and prevent Japan from doing that and third Japan itself lacks confidence to step out and do this kind of thing so But sorry a lot of stuff in there, but I'd just be interested in what would you advise Abbey to do? It's a okay. I'll be advisors here on the panel I think It's not really a regional point, but I would say talk to the Europeans They're basically in the same boat They're probably Japan and Europe and Southeast Asia probably have the most to get to lose from a collapse of kind of international liberal order the second thing I think is probably continue along the lines of Developing Japan's military Having a free-standing kind of Strategic I'm gonna say something controversial, but I think that Japan needs to get its development house in order that Japan does so much in terms of development gives so much money to the UN and But it's rarely It's rarely attached with the Japan logo in the region And I think Japan needs to be much more visible in terms of what it's doing The high-quality infrastructure That's that's Japan's thing and you can't just sort of wait for the US to be at the forefront of it because the US is Not going to be at the forefront of it. So I think Japan needs to step up in terms of of High-quality infrastructure I admire Prime Minister Abe's willingness to say all of the right things and I wish that there was more Oomph in terms of the execution behind it I'm thinking of womenomics when Prime Minister Abe talked at the UNGA about womenomics is not just in Japan, but it's a global thing But then what happened basically he did what all these governments do right including our own Repackaged a bunch of things and that was kind of the end of it Well, I think I'd like to see the next phase where the real new money going into these these His vision I think that I as I said, I think Prime Minister Abe's vision on the international scene Is something that I have a lot of admiration for but the the execution the implementation is lagging My advice is very simple Show the strength of US-Japan alliance to the world and to the region there is no alternative fact Okay Matt there are obviously many things I think that Japan could do but I would say building on its Relationships with like-minded countries who support, you know the liberal international order Particularly Australia India you these are relationships that are already growing But if the United States is not going to be talking about the rules-based order and the need to strengthen the post-World War to liberal international order and Yes, there's going to be concerned among some countries that Japan shouldn't be doing this all by itself So Japan needs to find partners to do that with and so I would like to see this be a Made in whether it's you know speeches, but also joint statements with with other countries raised in multilateral meetings And that this may be The Trump administration can be brought along over time Even as we've talked about in the economic front We'd like to see the Trump administration over time be brought along to support Multilateral and economic agreements TPP or something similar So I think that you know keeping these very important ideas Alive in the context of relations with other like-minded countries would be my suggestion Yeah, and has been discussed today I mean, I think there are a lot of stakeholders in this country in the government Who share that objective so it's not it's not all on or off There's a lot of people. We've got Glenn Kashyma Center for American Progress. I have a specific question about Trump administration's trade policy During the campaign the Trump Trump candidate Trump talked about 45 percent tariffs on China Chinese products or 38.5 percent tariffs on Japanese cars coming in the United States so that attract a lot of attention but thinking about Bob Lighthizer for you USTR who was deputy when I was in USTR back in the late 80s he was actually quite Engaged with and quite proud of Export restraint agreements. So basically he has Actually written that he's quite proud of the fact that during the Reagan administration The US government got Japan to restrain exports of steel consumer electronics semi-conductors cars and protected Harley Davidson So rather than imposing tariffs which could have some WTO ramifications or presidential authority problems in terms of the level of terror for the duration of terror I think it's quite possible that there will be an attempt not only at market opening, but also export restraints And it's much easier to claim that you're protecting American industry that way and workers And also at least in the 80s many people in Japan thought it easier to restrain exports rather than open the market I'm curious from both the Chinese and Japanese constructives now How much receptivity you think there would be to the notion of negotiating export restraint agreements from China and Japan? like to take that on One thing that's kind of related to this is It would it might be a mistake to see the tariffs as actually kind of End in themselves or to try and solve a problem as it were If you look at the the border adjustment that might come that you need that to pay for tax reform It's not unless you want to explode the budget Which they might decide to do But I would just I would just I'm not sure I would take them on face value that they actually want to reduce To to kind of limit to to readdress the the the trade balance Glenn it actually makes sense to me if you raise the question What kind of a deal could you have if you stay within the sort of trade economic silo with with the Chinese? They want to avoid being labeled a currency manipulator or to see 45 percent tariffs imposed other things that the Trump administration has threatened so The excess capacity issue of steel aluminum. This is big So one I think one could imagine that if that the Chinese would be willing to put something like that on the table Or if the US was looking to get something from from from China That would make sense of course the Chinese then would want to get something in return or at least to avoid some negative outcome so One question that comes into mind and you know more about these trade issues than I do is are these Short-lived agreements or do they have a certain life span? Is there something you agree to for one or two years or or or does it? Right at least for the administration Maybe they perhaps would not want to agree in perpetuity and I'm sure that there's no trade deal that isn't perpetuity in any case I'm not economic guy. So I can't answer directly to that question, but I would like to introduce some interesting Atom sphere in Tokyo, you know Prime Minister Abe emphasized that the TPP is One of our center pillar of the abernum mix third hour But despite the death of TPP Prime Minister Abe's approval rating has risen and There are bully outlook in Economy in Japan so the many people believe that the Mr. Trump's pro-business policy will Positively impact the Japanese economy. So I think the I believe this force forces will sustain Prime Minister Abe's approval rating while creating the political space and time For him to forge something like bilateral FTA Well, ladies and gentlemen, unfortunately, I can't believe I'm denying the president of the Japan-american society a question here Just to put me in a bad position, but I think you know over sake we could continue to have these discussions and So I just want to say thank you as my role to to wrap this all up today first to reiterate my thanks to the Japan-american side of Washington DC and all the partners who put this together and Hope to do this again next year and also please join me in thanking our panel Andrew especially on short notice coming in