 It's the next morning after the Tarquio fire shelter deployment staff ride We're back in the Missoula conference room where the managing the unexpected and wildland fire operations workshop is being held It is now time for the staff rides integration phase There's been a lot of a lot of talk about the power lines and can you can you comment on? How the power line situation influenced your strategy and tactics How the power lines influenced our strategy and tactics was that we had to come up with a specific plan to deal with the power lines Did that modify our strategy and tactics toward the fires that were there? Not in my opinion And I'll explain that a most large fires I use what I'll call it's a box theory and I look at trying to first Contain fires within a box you try to establish a side of the box to make sure that box is solid So our first side of the box with these incidents was the highway It had slopped over the highway in a few places, but the initial attack forces had contained those so our first Intention was to stop it from crossing the highway in the river So that was our initial efforts The next efforts if you're thinking about a box is then you want to try to build the sides of the box And then you try to put the lid on the box Well, we had the bottom side of the box the two sides of the box and we're working on the lid of the box when we had the deployment The fact that we had power lines out there in no way shape or form modified that strategy what it did do though is that we ended up spending about a half a million bucks and Actually had a aircraft a retardant aircraft specifically signed to the incident and Our plan was if the fire made a run at the power line was to try to use aerial aircraft To cool the fire down to where it wouldn't actually melt the line And we were best-case scenario hoping to smoke wouldn't arc it and shut it down What happened was When this fire made its run we got about one load of retardant down and a couple bucket drops on it And the and it did arc from the smoke, but it did not melt Did our strategy and tactics cause that? Heck no, I mean the the retardant that we threw at it and the water we threw at it had absolutely no bearing whatsoever on On the fire behavior that afternoon as it came came toward the power line, but that was our plan There was no way we had time at all To try to get in and actually do the fuel reduction work That would have been necessary to have effectively dealt with the fire behavior next to that power line keeps coming back to me that The division soup on that fire that day was that was his first assignment Task Force leader that was his first assignment for that particular area Where was the team's divisions at that day? I mean that was gonna be where it went down that day I mean that was you know You had a spot that did if it wasn't held that day it was gonna It's gonna cause a lot of problems and then that whole division there a lot going on on that division You know and I could say we had a division soup that did Never been on that ground. I won't say never been on that ground He didn't make some right around the fire kind of broad perspective for the day before And then you know and then he was put on what I call the hottest part of the fire And then you had a task force that really never saw them the spot into the inversion lifted So it's hard to bring people all in and make it happen But the way you mitigate that is I'd say the team concept of you know your divisions You know those folks real well putting them on the hottest part of the fire And let them run that for you and let the other ones kind of work in there. Was there an opportunity to do that? I wasn't there. I don't know but I've just asked to kind of have that addressed Great Great question. We wrestle with that as an insider management team a lot And I'd answer it a couple of ways the the first way is that remember back to my box description To me that was not the most important part of the fire The most important part of that fire for me was the first leg of the box we put in Okay, one of the things I really hate to do is back up On an incident so the most important part of that fire is actually the first leg of the box The second most important part of the fire is or the second leg to the box And the least most important part of the fire is the one we're trying to complete Now but the one we're trying to complete as you stated is the most risky and the trick there for me is This is what I've been wrestling with is okay if things started going gunny bag leave And what's interesting and you've heard the conflict a little bit is you had people that day saying hey We get we need to leave but you also had people saying no, we're okay We can pick this thing up. Let's stay now wasn't me saying that that was the people out there on the fire So that's what I've been wrestling with is okay At what point in time do we need to make the decision to go ahead and leave with those people that we've just thrown together Because that's gonna happen every single time And and how do we make that? occur safely with 800 people knowing that we've got multiple escape routes that are out in tough ground and safety zones that are designed For us to re-engage from that's where I end up with it it's really important that we find the ways to bring this these principles and this training to the people that we work with and who work for us and And I'm thinking about this yesterday that the next time one of these workshops is presented I'm really hoping that I can send them like people from like three levels of my organization to this training you know from the bottom the middle and on the top to this and Those people then will be able to help me disseminate these principles throughout our organization because This at least so far has been something that's really tight a lot of the other really high value High-value training together. I guess what I'm gonna take home with me from this conference one of the people in our group the other day Mentioned you know after 20 some years and their career They finally feel like they have the opportunity to create positive changes and it's just kind of dawning on me I guess that even at our level as ground pounders that this is our opportunity and It may take a decade for the fruits of our labor to show but I guess You know if we can start from the bottom The people that will come to follow us in the future will already have those principles to work with Haven't had the pleasure to be a part of the managing the unexpected workshop since the the first I'm still struggling with our ability as an organization to address the very first principle and our group Discussed that at length to the other day and that is a preoccupation with failure In other words our ability to actually get our arms around that and think about this right out of the right out of our hand I was here people operate and manage in highly reliable Organizations assume that each day will be a bad day and act accordingly These systems have been characterized as consisting of collective bonds Among suspicious individuals To consistently entertain the thought that we have missed something and I I'm still struggling With us as an organization to be able to think that way and that's part of the link in the HRO that we're missing so I just want to say a couple things. I'm not in the fire business I was a long time ago, but I want to say thank you to the Forest Service for Being willing to share lessons learned with everybody who wants to participate It's very meaningful So kind of following on this preoccupation with failure and what what some of our folks were talking about is Week signals, you know, I'm sort of fascinated with what are those weak signals in Your day-to-day organization or your day-to-day operations, you know, and I think it was the hella tech Yeah, that said something yesterday about organized chaos. This is always organized chaos and And so where do you sort of start to draw the line and how do you sort of start to use those signals? So I think that we've all got this big big challenge to say in organized chaos or in day-to-day operations that are not organized chaos What are my weak signals? What are my weak signals that things are starting to go haywire and What are my opportunities to do anything differently about it? You know, I kind of want this yesterday. I was looking for this this easy answer Operations the spot fire wasn't getting the air ops that he wanted there were some communications breakdowns There was people not knowing what was going on with the other division, but but seriously at what point do you say? This is still okay. Let's keep fighting the fire or okay. You know what? This is no longer. Okay. We need to really change our strategy or we need to do something differently And and what are those? What are those things you can do when you're in the midst of the organized chaos? So So I'm really fascinated with that and I'm and I'm working on how I bring that back to my area. So Thank you. I think what made the most impression on me this with the staff ride was don't fall in love with the plan and You know, we have these teams in place to give us good plans And we rely on them because we're out there in an unsafe environment And if we didn't rely on them, we might not want to go out there But on the other hand you have to have in the back of your mind that you can't be in love with that plan And you have to be willing to abandon it and do something different and even though in a way It was a failure in The plan because that they had to deploy and they had to deploy in a place That they weren't expecting so it could be looked at as a failure What I loved about the staff ride was we got to Experience a success in the fact that we saw these people just get right down to the business of getting themselves protected and I was on the 30 mile staff ride where that wasn't apparent that people got right down to the business of getting themselves protected And so it's good to have an opportunity to learn the steps you do need to take and see the outcome of success I'd like to take on HRO principle number two I think when we have firefighters showing up on a fire, they're there as guests of the host agencies and as guests They're deserving to receive the the very best of intelligence briefing fuels information fire weather forecast fire behavior forecast and And I think our very tradition and culture sets up a situation where perhaps If things are going well, it's a very simple simplified kind of approach to Interpretation people are given stuff and then they go to work and perform What I'm going to say next is based on a staff ride down at battle meant three weeks ago 1976 fire three people died. We were also at South Canyon with Eric hipki Where 14 people died and also what we saw yesterday And I think in so many of our fire events where we have serious serious problems The simple giving of information to firefighters did not happen People battle meant in that South Canyon were not briefed on the fact of battle that the gambles oak is a life-threatening Fuel type they simply were not given that information At South Canyon there was a very very excellent red flag forecast for a cold front and in high winds To come that afternoon of 30 to 40 or 50 miles an hour that forecast for very Difficult reasons to understand simply was not sent out to the firefighters and I think to bring in this HRO principle of Really seeking and requiring complex interpretations of complex events. It's not just the function of dispatch or the fire behavior Analyst or the fire weather Meteorologist, it's everybody's responsibility And and I guess what I learned most yesterday when we learned from Tammy that a forecast was given a Forecast was made that afternoon in the 10th to update the situation But it never went out to the fire line So I guess the bottom line for me in this HRO principle number two That is that you should expect to receive certain kinds of information But if it's not forthcoming you have an incumbent responsibility As a hot shot crew from the Helena or the low-low or crew from wherever Say hey, wait a minute time out. Where's the briefing on these fuels? What is the situation on this red slash how extensive is it? Where is it? What are the fire behavior implications or where is this fire weather update that I really want to have and so I guess To really measure up to the HRO principle of complex interpretations It's just it's just incumbent on everybody out there if something isn't there if it's not present If you have a gut feeling if your intuition is telling you it doesn't feel quite right We get on the horn and demand As a guest of that host agency that I want to know this and ensure that you get it This third annual managing the unexpected workshop on high reliability organizing and wildland fire operations Including the learning and insights from its Tarkio staff ride has provided its participants with new knowledge and tools Hopefully now these fire management practitioners are introducing and honing their high reliability organizing skills back on their home units in a variety of fire management operations For there is no question that we all need to do whatever we can to ensure that this season and through all future fire seasons Our agencies are successfully and safely implementing this country's high-risk wildland fire programs And now thanks to the wildland fire lessons learn center you too have joined those who traveled back to the Tarkio fire site You can better appreciate why we all must constantly be striving to improve our wildland fire programs by exploring and implementing the principles of high Reliability organizing Please help us spread the all important HRO message