 Book 3, Chapter 6, Part 1 of On the Education of an Orator by Quintilian, translated by H. E. Butler, this LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 6 Since every cause, then, has a certain essential basis on which it rests, before I proceed to set forth how each kind of cause should be handled, I think I should first examine a question that is common to all of them, namely, what is meant by basis, whence it is derived, and how many and of what nature such basis may be. Some, it is true, have thought that they were peculiar merely to forensic themes, but their ignorance will stand revealed when I have treated of all three kinds of oratory. That, which I call the basis, some style the constitution, others the question, and others, again, that which may be inferred from the question, while Theodorus calls it the most general hen, ke falayon genicotaton, to which everything must be referred. These different names, however, all mean the same thing, nor is it of the least importance to students by what special name things are called, as long as the thing itself is perfectly clear. The Greeks call this essential basis stasis, a name which they hold was not invented by Hermagoras, but, according to some, was introduced by Nocrates, the pupil of Isocrates. According to others, by Topias of Clathomene, although Eskenes, in his speech against Tessiphon, seems to employ the word, when he asks the jury not to allow the Mastanese to be irrelevant, but to keep him to the stasis or basis or case. The term seems to be derived from the fact that it is on it that the first collision between the parties to the dispute takes place, or that it forms the basis or standing of the whole case, so much for the origin of the name, now for its nature. Some have defined the basis as being the first conflict of the causes. The idea is correct, but the expression is faulty. For the essential basis is not the first conflict which we may represent by the clauses, you did such and such a thing, and I did not do it. It is rather the kind of question which arises from the first conflict which we may represent as follows. You did it. I did not. Did he do it? Or you did this. I did not do this. What did he do? It is clear from these examples that the first sort of question depends on conjecture, the second on definition, and that the contending parties rest their respective cases on these points. The basis of these questions will therefore be of a conjectural or definitive character, respectively. Suppose it should be asserting that sound is the conflict between two bodies. The statement would, in my opinion, be erroneous, for sound is not the actual conflict, but a result of the conflict. The error is, however, of small importance, for the sense is clear, whatever the expression. With this trivial mistake has given rise to a very serious error in the minds of those who have not understood what was meant. For, on reading that the essential basis was the first conflict, they immediately concluded that the basis was always to be taken from the first question, which is a grave mistake. For every question has its basis, since every question is based on assertion by one party and denial by another. But there are some questions which form an essential part of causes, and it is on these that we have to express an opinion, while others are introduced from without and are strictly speaking irrelevant, although they may contribute something of a subsidiary nature to the general contention. It is for this reason that there are said to be several questions in one matter of dispute. Of these questions, it is often the most trivial which occupies the first place, for it is a frequent artifice to drop those points in which we place least confidence as soon as we have dealt with them. Sometimes we make a free gift of them to our opponents, while sometimes we are content to use them as a step to arguments which are of greater importance. A simple cause, however, although it may be defended in various ways, cannot have more than one point on which a decision has to be given. And consequently, the basis of the cause will be that point which the auditor sees to be the most important for him to make, and on which the judge sees that he must fix all his attention. For it is on this that the cause will stand or fall. On the other hand, questions may have more basis than one. A brief example will show what I mean. When the accused says, admitting that I did it, I was right to do it. He makes the basis one of quality. But when he adds, but I did not do it, he introduces an element of conjecture. But denial of the facts is always the stronger line of defense, and therefore I conceive the basis to resign in that which I should say if I were confined to one single line of argument. We are right, therefore, in speaking of the first conflict of causes in contradiction to the conflict of questions. For instance, in the first portion of his speech on behalf of Rubirius Postimus, Cicero contends that the action cannot lie against a Roman knight, while in the second he asserts that no money ever came into his client's hands. Still, I should say that the basis was to be found in the latter as being the stronger of the two. Again, in the case of Milo, I do not consider that the conflict is raised by the opening questions, but only when the orator devotes all his powers to prove that Claudius lay in wait for Milo and was therefore rightly killed. The point on which, above all, the orator must make up his mind, even although he may be going to take up various lines of argument in support of his case, is this. What is it that he wishes most to impress upon the mind of the judge? But although this should be the first point for his consideration, it does not follow that it should be the first that he will make in his actual speech. Others have thought that the basis lay in the first point raised by the other side in its defense. Cicero expresses this view in the following words. The argument on which the defense first takes its stand with a view to rebutting the charge. This involves a further question as to whether the basis can only be determined by the defense. Cornelius Celsus is strongly against this view and asserts that the basis is derived not from the denial of the charge, but from him who affirms his proposition. Thus, if the accused denies that anyone has been killed, the basis will originate with the accuser, because it is the latter who desires to prove. If, on the other hand, the accused asserts that the homicide was justifiable, the burden of proof has been transferred and the basis will proceed from the accused and be affirmed by him. I do not, however, agree, for the contrary is nearer to the truth that there is no point of dispute if the defendant makes no reply and that consequently the basis originates with the defendant. But in my opinion, the origin of the basis varies and depends on the circumstances of the individual case. For instance, in conjectural causes the affirmation may be regarded as determining the basis, since conjecture is employed by the plaintiff rather than the defendant and consequently some have styled the basis originated by the latter negative. Again, in any syllogism the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who affirms. But, on the other hand, he who in such cases denies appears to impose the burden of dealing with such basis upon his opponent. For, if he says, I did not do it, he will force his opponent to make use of conjecture and again, if he says, the law is against you, he will force him to employ the syllogism. Therefore, we must admit that a basis can originate in denial. All the same we are left with our previous conclusion that the basis is determined in some cases by the plaintiff and some by the defendant. Suppose the accuser to affirm that the accused is guilty of homicide. If the accused denies the charge, it is he who will determine the basis. Or again, if he admits that he has killed a man but states that the victim was an adulterer and justifiably killed. And we know that the law permits homicide under these circumstances. There is no matter in dispute, unless the accuser has some answer to make. Suppose the accuser does answer, however, and deny that the victim was guilty of adultery. It will be the accuser that denies, and it is by him that the basis is determined. The basis, then, will originate in the first denial of facts, but that denial is made by the accuser and not the accused. Again, the same question may make the same person either accuser or accused. He who has exercised the profession of actor is under no circumstances to be allowed a seat in the first 14 rows of the theatre. An individual who had performed before the preter in his private gardens, but had never been presented on the public stage, has taken his seat in one of the 14 rows. The accuser, of course, affirms that he has exercised the profession of an actor. The accused denies that he has exercised the profession. The question, then, arises as to the meaning of the exercise of the profession of actor. If he is accused under the law regarding the seats in the theatre, the denial will proceed from the accused. If, on the other hand, he is turned out of the theatre and demands compensation for assault, the denial will be made by the accuser. The view of the majority of the writers on this subject will, however, hold good in most cases. Some have evaded these problems by saying that a basis is that which emerges from affirmations and denials, such as, you did it, I did not do it, or I was justified in doing it. But let us see whether this is the basis itself or rather that in which the basis is to be found. Hermagrus calls a basis that which enables the matter in question to be understood and to which the proofs of the party's concern will also be directed. My own opinion has always been that whereas there are frequently different basis of questions in connection with a cause, the basis of the cause itself is its most important point on which the whole matter turns. If anyone prefers to call the general question or general head of the cause, I shall not quarrel with him any more than I have done hitherto if he produced a different technical term to express the same thing. Although I know that whole volumes have been written on such disputes. I prefer, however, to call it the basis. There is the greatest possible disagreement among writers about this as about everything else. But in this case, as elsewhere, they seem to me to have been misled by a passion for saying something different from their fellow teachers. As a result, there is still no agreement as to the number and names of basis nor as to which are general and which special. To begin with, Aristotle lays down that there are ten categories on which every question seems to turn. First, there is ucia, which Plotus calls essence, the only available translation. Under this category, we inquire whether a thing is. Secondly, there is quality, the meaning of which is self-evident. Third comes quantity, which was subdivided by later philosophers as dealing with two questions as to magnitude and number. Next, relation, involving questions of competence and comparison. This is followed by when and where. Then come doing, suffering, and possessing, which, for example, are concerned with a person's being armed or clothed. Lastly comes case tie or position, which means to be in a certain position, such for instance as being warm, standing, or angry. Of these categories, the first four concern basis. The remainder concern only certain topics for argument. Others make the number of categories to be nine. Person, involving questions concerning the mind, body, or external circumstances, which clearly has reference to the means by which we establish conjecture or quality. Time, or cronos, from which we get questions such as whether a child is born a slave, if his mother delivered of him while assigned to her creditors. Place, from which we get such disputes as to whether it is permissible to kill a tyrant in a temple, or whether one who has hidden himself at home can be regarded as an exile. Then comes time, in another sense, called kairos by the Greeks, by which they refer to a period of time, such as summer or winter. Under this heading come problems such as that about the man who held high revel in a time of pestilence. Action, or praxis, to which they refer questions as to whether an act was committed wittingly or unwittingly by accident or under compulsion and the like. Number, which falls under the category of quantity, under which come questions such as whether the state owes the symbolist thirty talents for ridding it of the same number of tyrants. Cause, under which heading come a large number of disputes whenever effect is not denied, but the defense pleads that the act was just and reasonable. Tropos, or manner, which is involved when a thing is said to have been done in one way when it might have been done in another. Under this category come cases of such as that of the adulterer who is scourge with thrones or starved death. Opportunity for action, the meaning of which is too obvious to need explanation or illustration. The Greeks, however, call it ergon a formae. These authorities, like Aristotle, hold that no question can arise which does not come under one of these heads. Some subtract two of them, namely number and opportunity, and substitute for what I have called action, things, or in Greek, pragmata. I have thought it sufficient to notice these doctrines for fear someone might complain of their omission. Still, I do not consider that basis are sufficiently determined by these categories, nor that the latter cover every possible kind of topic, as will be clear to any that read carefully what I have to say on both points. For there will be found to be many topics that are not covered by these categories. I find it stated in many authors that some rhetoricians only recognize one kind of basis, the conjectural, but they have not mentioned who these rhetoricians are nor have I been able to discover. They are, however, stated to have taken this view on the ground that all our knowledge is a matter of inference from indications. On this line of reasoning, they might regard all basis as qualitative, because we inquire into the nature of the subject in every case. But the adoption of either view leads to inextricable confusion, nor does it matter whether one recognizes only one kind of basis or none at all, if all causes are of the same nature. Cognectura is derived from cognichere to throw together, because it implies the concentration of the reason on the truth. For this reason, interpreters of dreams and all other phenomena are called cognictores, conjectures, but the conjectural basis has received more names than one, as will appear in the sequel. Some have recognized only two basis. Archedemus, for instance, admits only the conjectural and definitive, and refuses to admit the qualitative, since he held that questions of quality take the form of what is unfair, what is unjust, what is disobedience, which he terms questions about identity and difference. A different view was held by those who likewise only admitted two basis, but made them the negative and juridical. The negative basis is identical with that which we call the conjectural, to which some give the name of negative absolutely, others only in part, these latter holding that conjecture is employed by the accuser, denial only by the accused. The juridical is that known in Greek as dikaiologikos, but just as Archedemus would not recognize the qualitative basis, so these reject the definitive which they include in the juridical, holding that in these questions we have to inquire whether it is just that the act with which the accused is charged should be called sacrilege or theft or madness. Pamphilus held this opinion, but subdivided quality into several different species. The majority of later writers have classified basis as follows, involving, however, no more than a change of names, those dealing with ascertained facts and those dealing with matters where there is doubt. For a thing must either be certain or uncertain. If it is uncertain, the basis will be conjectural. If certain, it will be some one of the other basis. Epilodorus says the same thing when he states that a question must either lie in things external, which give play to conjecture, or in our own opinions. The former he calls pragmatikos, the letter Perienoias. The same is said by those who employ the terms aproleptos and proleptikos, that is to say doubtful and presumptive, by this letter term meaning those facts which are beyond a doubt. Theodorus agrees with them, for he holds that the question is either as to whether such and such a thing is really so, or is concerned with the accident of something, which is an admitted fact. That is to say, it is either periusias or perisumbebecoton. For in all these cases, the first basis is conjectural, while the second belongs to one of the other classes. As for these other classes of basis, Epilodorus holds that there are two, one concerned with quality and the other with the names of things, that is to say, a definitive basis. Theodorus makes them four, concerned with existence, quality, quantity and relation. There are some two who make questions of identity and difference come under the head of quality. Others who place it under the head of definition. Poseidonius divides them into two classes, those concerned with words and those concerned with things. In the first case, he thinks that the question is whether a word has any meaning. If so, what is its meaning? How many meanings has it? And how does it come to mean what it means? In the latter case, we employ a conjecture, which he calls catastesin or inference from perception, quality, definition, which he calls cactenoian or rational inference and relation. Hence also comes the division into things written and unwritten. Even Cornelius Celsus stated that there were two general basis, one concerned with the question whether a thing is, the other with the question of what it is. He included definition under the first of these, because inquiry may equally be made as to whether sacrilege has been committed when a man denies that he has stolen anything from a temple and when he admits that he has stolen private money from a temple. He divides quality into fact and the letter of the law. Under the head of the letter of the law, he places four classes, excluding questions of competence. Quantity and intention, he places under the head of conjecture. There is also another method of dividing basis into two classes. According to this, disputes are either about substance or quality, while quality is treated either in its most general sense or in its special senses. Substance is dealt with by conjecture for an inquiring into anything we ask whether it has been done, is being done or is likely to be done and sometimes also consider its intention. This method is preferable to that adopted by those who style the conjectural basis a basis of fact, as though we only inquired into the past and what has actually been done. The consideration of quality under its most general aspect rarely comes up in the courts. I refer to questions such as whether that is honorable, which is generally praised. With regard to the special aspects of quality, questions sometimes occur about some common term, such as whether sacrilege has been committed when a man has stolen private money from a temple, or about some act with a definite name, when there is no doubt either as to the commission or the nature of the act. Under this heading come all questions about what is honorable, just or expedient. These basis are said to contain others as well because quantity is sometimes concerned with conjectural basis as in the question whether the sun is bigger than the earth and sometimes with qualitative basis as in the question what reward or punishment it would be just to assign to some particular person. While questions of competence undoubtedly are concerned with quality and definition with questions of competence, further contradictory laws in the racial, sedative basis or syllogism and the majority of questions dealing with the latter of the law and intention are based on equity with the exception that this last question sometimes admits of conjecture as for instance concerning the intentions of the legislator. Ambiguity, however, must always be explained by conjecture because as it is clear that the words admit of two interpretations, the only question is as to the intention. A large number of writers recognize general basis. Cicero adopts them in his orator and holds that everything that can form the subject of dispute or discussion is covered by the three questions, whether it is what it is and of what kind it is. The names of these three basis are too obvious for mention. The same view is asserted by Patrick Lees. Marcus Antonius stated that there were three basis in the following words. The things which form the ground of every speech are few and are as follows. Was a thing done or not done? Was it just or unjust? Was it good or bad? But since when we are said to have been justified in doing anything this does not merely mean that our action was legal but further implies that it was just. Those who follow Antonius attempt to differentiate these basis with greater exactness. They therefore call them conjectural, legal and juridical, a division which meets with the approval of Virginia's as well. These they then subdivided into species placing definition under the head of the legal basis together with all others which are concerned with the letter of the law such as that of contradictory laws or antinomia, that which rests on the letter of the law and on meaning or intention which the Greeks call catareton caidianoian and metallepsis to which letter we give various names styling it the translative, transumptive or transpositive basis. The syllogism which we call the racial synative or deductive basis and those which turn on ambiguity or amphibolia. I mention these because they are called basis by most writers though some prefer to call them legal questions. Atheneas laid down that there were four basis the protrepti che stasis or parore meti che that is the hortitive which is peculiar to deliberative themes the synteli che which is shown to be the conjectural not so much from the name itself but from what follows the hypalacti che or definitive for it consists in a change of terms and the juridical to which he gives the name employed by other Greek writers for as I have said there is a great variety in the names employed. There are some who arguing from its meaning of change hold that hypalacti che is the translative basis which is concerned with competence. Others, Sicilius and Theon for instance hold that there are the same number of basis but make them of a different kind mainly those covered by the questions whether a thing is what it is of what kind it is and how great it is. Aristotle in his rhetoric states that all inquiry turns on the questions whether a thing is of what kind it is how great it is and of how many parts it consists in one place however he recognizes the force of definition as well saying that certain points are defended on the following lines I took it but did not steal it I struck him but did not commit an assault Cicero again in his retorica makes the number of basis to be four namely those concerned with facts, names, kinds and legal action that is to say conjecture is concerned with fact definition with names, quality with kinds and law with action under this letterhead of law he includes questions of competence but in another passage he treats legal questions as a species of action end of book 3 chapter 6 part 1 book 3 chapter 6 part 2 of On the Education of an Orator this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org On the Education of an Orator by Quintilian translated by H. E. Butler book 3 chapter 6 part 2 some writers have held that there are five basis the conjectural, definitive, qualitative, quantitative and relative Theodorus also as I have said adopts the same number of general heads whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is, how great it is and to what it refers the last he considers to be chiefly concerned with comparison since better and worse, greater and less are meaningless terms unless referred to some standard but questions of relation as I have already pointed out enter also into translative questions that is questions of competence since in cases such as has this man a right to bring an action or is it fitting that he should do such and such a thing or against this man or at this time or in this manner for all these questions must be referred to a certain standard others hold that there are six basis conjecture or genesis, quality, particularity or idiotes by which word they mean definition quantity or axia, comparison and competence for which a new term has been found in metastasis I call it new when applied to a basis for Hermagoras employs it to describe a species of juridical question others think that there are seven while refusing to recognize competence, quantity or comparison in place of which they substitute four legal basis completing the seven by the addition of those three which they call rational others again make eight by the addition of competence to the above mentioned seven some on the other hand have introduced a fresh method of division reserving the name of basis for the rational and giving the name of questions to the legal as I mentioned above since in the former the problem is concerned with facts in the letter with the letter of the law some on the contrary reverse this nomenclature calling the legal questions basis and the rational grounds questions but others have thought that there are only three rational basis covered by the questions whether a thing is what it is and of what kind it is Hermagoras is alone and thinking that there are four namely conjecture, particularity, competence and quality to the letter he appends the phrase catacimbibecos according to its accidents illustrating his meaning by putting a case where it is inquired whether a man happened to be good or bad he then subdivides quality into four species first that which is concerned with things to be sought or avoided which belongs to deliberative oratory secondly those concerned with things in general without reference to persons and may be illustrated by questions such as whether he is free who is claimed as a slave and waiting the trial of his case whether riches beget insolence and whether a thing is just or good lastly there is the juridical species under which practically the same questions arise but in relation to certain definite persons as for instance when it is asked whether that particular man has done well or ill I am aware that another explanation is giving my sister in the first book of his retorica of the species known as practical where he says that it is the department under which we consider what is right according to civil usage and equity this department is regarded by us as the personal sphere of the lawyer but I have already mentioned what his opinion was about this particular word the retorica are simply a collection of school notes on rhetoric which he worked up into this treatise while quite a young man such faults as they possess are due to his instructor in the present instance he may have been influenced by the fact that the first examples given by hermagers of this species are drawn from legal questions or by the fact that the Greeks call interpreters of the law pragmatikoi but for these early efforts Cicero substituted his splendid de oratory and therefore cannot be blamed for giving false instruction I will now return to hermageris he was the first rhetorician to teach that there was a basis concerned with competence although the elements of this doctrine are found in Aristotle without however any mention of the name the legal questions were according to hermageris of five kinds first the letter of the law and its intention the names which he gives to these are cataheton and hypoxirisis that is to say the letter of the law and the exceptions there too the first of these classes is found in all writers but the term exception is less in use the number is completed by the raciocinative basis and those dealing with ambiguity and contradictory laws Albusius adopts this classification but eliminates competence including it under the juridical basis further he holds that in legal questions there is no raciocinative basis I know that those who are prepared to read ancient writers on rhetoric more carefully than I have will be able to discover yet more on this subject but I fear that I may have been too lengthy even in saying what I have said I must admit that I am now inclined to take a different view from that which I once held it will perhaps be safer for my reputation if I were to make no modification in views which I not only held for so many years but of which I expressed my open approbation but I cannot bear to be thought guilty of concealment of the truth as regards any portion of my views more especially in a work designed for the profit of young men of sound disposition for Hippocrates the great physician in my opinion took the most honorable course in acknowledging some of his errors to prevent those who came after from being led astray while Cicero had no hesitation about condemning some of his earlier works in books which he published later I refer to his condemnation of his Locullus and Catilus in the books of rhetoric which I have already mentioned indeed we should have no justification for protracting our studies if we were forbidden to improve upon our original views still none of my past teaching was superfluous for the views which I am now going to produce will be found to be based on the same principles and consequently no one need be sorry to have attended my lectures since all that I am now attempting to do is to collect and rearrange my original views so that they may be somewhat more instructive but I wish to satisfy everybody and not to lay myself open to the accusation that I have allowed a long time to elapse between the formation and publication of my views I used to follow the majority of authorities in adhering to three rational basis the conjectural, qualitative and definitive and to one legal basis these were my general basis the legal basis I divided into five species dealing with the letter of the law and intention contradictory laws, the syllogism, ambiguity and competence it is now clear to me that the fourth of the general basis may be removed since the original division which I made into rational and legal basis is sufficient the fourth therefore will not be a basis but a kind of question if it were not it would form one of the rational basis further I have removed competence which I called species for I often asserted as all who have attended my lectures will remember and even those discourses which were published against my will included the statement that the basis concerned with competence hardly ever occurs in any dispute under such circumstances that it cannot more correctly be given some other name and that consequently some returations excluded from their list of basis I am however well aware that the point of competence is raised in many cases since in practically every case in which a party is said to have been ruled out of court through some error of form questions such as the following arise whether it was lawful for this person to bring an action or to bring it against some particular person or under a given law or in such a court or at such a time and so on but the question of competence as regards persons times, legal actions and the rest originates in some pre-existent cause the question turns therefore not on competence itself but on the cause with which the point of competence originates you ought to demand the return of a deposit not before the preter but before the consuls as the sum is too large to come under the preter's jurisdiction the question then arises whether the sum is too large and the dispute is one of fact you have no right to bring an action against me as it is impossible for you to have been appointed to represent the actual plaintiff it then has to be decided whether he could have been so appointed you ought not to have proceeded by interdict but to have put in a plea for possession the point in doubt is whether the interdict is legal all these points fall under the head of legal questions for do not even those special pleas in which questions of competence make themselves most evident give rise to the same species of question as those laws under which the action is brought that the inquiry is really concerned with the name of a given act with the letter of the law in its meaning or with something that requires to be settled by argument the basis originates from the question and in cases of competence it is not the question concerning which the advocate argues that is involved but the question on account of which he argues an example will make this clearer you have killed a man I did not kill him the question is whether he has killed him the basis is the conjecture but the following case is very different I have the right to bring this action you have not the right the question is whether he has the right and it is from this that we derive the basis for whether he is allowed the right or not depends on the event not on the cause itself and on the decision of the judge not on that on account of which he gives such a decision the following is a similar example you ought to be punished I ought not the judge will decide whether he should be punished but it is not with this that the question or the basis is concerned where then does the question lie you ought to be punished for you have killed a man I did not kill him the question is whether he killed him I ought to receive some honor you are not does this involve a basis I think not I ought to receive some honor for killing a tyrant you did not kill him here there is a question and a basis as well so too you are not entitled to bring this action I have involves no basis where then is it to be found you have no right to bring this action because you have been deprived of civil rights in this case the question is whether he has been so deprived or whether loss of civil rights debars a person from bringing an action here on the other hand we find both questions and basis it is therefore to kinds of causes not to basis that the term competence applies other kinds of cause are the comparative and the recriminatory but it is urged the case I have a right you have not it's similar to you have killed a man I was justified in so doing I do not deny it but this does not make it a basis for these statements are not propositions until the reasons for them are added if they were propositions as they stand the case could not proceed Horatius has committed a crime for he has killed his sister he has not committed a crime since it was his duty to kill her for mourning the death of an enemy the question is whether this was a justifiable reason and the basis is one of quality so too as regards competence you have no right to disinherit since a person who has been deprived of civil rights is not allowed to take legal action I have the right since disinheriting is not a legal action the question here is what is legal action and we shall arrive at the conclusion that the son's disinheritance is unlawful by use of the syllogism the case will be similar with all the rational and legal basis I am aware that there have been some who placed competence among rational basis using as illustrations cases such as I killed a man under orders from my general I gave devotive offerings in a temple to a tyrant under compulsion I deserted owing to the fact that storms or floods or ill health prevented me from rejoining that is to say it was not due to me but some external cause from these writers I differ even more widely for it is not the nature of the legal action itself which is involved in the question of competence but the cause of the act and this is the case in almost every defense finally, he who adopts this line of defense does not thereby abandon the qualitative basis for he states that he himself is free from blame so that we really should differentiate between two kinds of quality one of which comes into play when both the accused persons act are defended and the other when the accused person alone is defended we must therefore accept the view of the authorities followed by Cicero to the effect that there are three things on which inquiry is made in every case we ask whether a thing is what it is and of what kind it is nature itself imposes this upon us for first of all there must be some subject for the question since we cannot possibly determine what a thing is or of what kind it is until we have first ascertained whether it is and therefore the first question raised is whether it is but even when it is clear that a thing is it is not immediately obvious what it is and when we have decided what it is there remains the question of its quality these three points, one ascertained there is no further question to ask these heads cover both definite and indefinite questions for no legal problem can be settled saved by the aid of definition, quality and conjecture those however who are engaged in instructing the ignorant will find it useful at first to adopt a slightly less rigid method the road will not be absolutely straight to begin with but it will be more open and will provide easier going I would have them therefore learn above all things that there are four different methods which may be employed in every case and he who is going to plead should study them as first essentials for to begin with the defendant far the strongest method of self defense is if possible to deny the charge the second best is when it is possible to reply that the particular act with which you are charged was never committed the third and most honorable is to maintain that the act was justifiable if none of these lines of defense are feasible there remains the last and only hope of safety if it is impossible either to deny the charge or justify the account we must evade the charge with the aid of some point of law making it appear that the action has been brought against us illegally hence arise the questions of legal action or competence for there are some things which although not laudable in themselves are yet permitted by law witness the passage in the twelve tables authorizing creditors to divide up a debtor's body among themselves a law which is repudiated by public custom there are also certain things which although equitable are prohibited by law witness the restrictions placed on testamentary disposition the accuser likewise has four things which he must keep in mind he must prove that something was done that a particular act was done that it was wrongly done and that he brings his charge according to law thus every cause will turn on the same sorts of questions though the parts of plaintiff and defendant will sometimes be interchanged for instance, in the case of a claim for a reward it will be the plaintiff's task to show that what was done was right these four schemes or forms of action which I then called general basis fall into two classes as I have shown namely the rational and the legal rational is the simpler as it involves nothing more than the consideration of the nature of things in this connection therefore a mere mention of conjecture, definition and quality will suffice legal questions necessarily have a larger number of species since there are many laws and a variety of forms in the case of one law we rely on the letter and others on the spirit some laws we force to serve our turn when we can find no law to support our case others we compare with one another and on others we put some novel interpretation thus from these three basis we get three resemblances of basis sometimes simple, sometimes complex but all having a character of their own as for instance when questions of the letter of the law and its intention are involved for these clearly come under conjecture or quality or again where the syllogism is involved for this is specially connected with quality or whether contradictory laws are involved for these are on the same footing as the letter of the law and intention or yet again in cases of ambiguity which is always resolved by conjecture definition also belongs to both classes of questions namely those concerned with the consideration of facts and those concerned with the letter of the law all these questions although they come under the three basis yet since as I have mentioned they have certain characteristic features of their own required to be pointed out to learners and we must allow them to be called legal basis or questions or minor heads as long as it is clearly understood that none of them involve any other questions than the three I have mentioned as regards questions of quantity, number, relation and as some have thought comparison the case is different for these have no connection with the complexities of the law but are concerned with reason only consequently they must always be regarded as coming under conjecture or quality as for instance when we ask with what purpose or at what time or place something was done but I will speak of individual questions when I come to handle the rules for division this much is agreed to by all writers that one cause possesses one basis but that as regards secondary questions related to the main issue of the trial there may frequently be a number in one single cause I also think there is at times some doubt as to which basis should be adopted when many different lines of defense are brought to meet a single charge and just as in regards to the complexion to be given to the statement of the facts of the case that complexion is said to be the best which the speaker can best maintain so in the present connection I may say that the best basis to choose is that which will permit the orator to develop a maximum of force it is for this reason that we find Cicero and Brutus taking up different lines in defense of Milo Cicero says that Claudius was justifiably killed because he sought to wail a Milo but that Milo had not designed to kill him while Brutus who wrote his speech merely as a rhetorical exercise also exalts that Milo has killed a bad citizen in complicated causes however two or three basis may be found or different basis for instance a man may plead that he did not do one thing and that he was justified in doing another or to take another similar class of case a man may deny two of the charges the same thing occurs when there is a question about something which is claimed by a number of persons who may all of them rely on the same kind of plea for instance on the right of the next of kin or may put in different claims one urging that the property was left him by will another that he is next of kin now whenever a different defense has to be made against different claimants there must be different basis as for example the well-known controversial theme wills that are made in accordance with law shall be valid when parents die interstate their children shall be the heirs a disinherited son shall receive none of his father's property a bastard if born before a legitimate son shall be treated as legitimate but if born after a legitimate son shall be treated merely as a citizen it shall be lawful to give a son in adoption every son given in adoption shall have the right to re-enter his own family if his natural father has died childless a father of two legitimate sons gave one in adoption disinherited the other and acknowledged the bastard who was born to him later finally after making the disinherited son his heir he died all three sons lay claim to the property Notros is the Greek word for a bastard Latin as Cato emphasized in one of his speeches has no word of its own and therefore borrows the foreign term but I am straying from the point the son who was made heir by the will finds his way borrowed by the law a disinherited son shall receive none of his father's property the basis is one resting on the letter of the law and intention and the problem is whether he can inherit by any means at all can he do so in accordance with the intention of his father or in virtue of the fact that he was made heir by the will the problem confronting the bastard is twofold since he was born after the two legitimate sons and was not born before a legitimate son the first problem involves a syllogism are those sons who have been cast out from their own family to be regarded as though they had never been born the second is concerned with the letter of the law and intention for it is admitted that he was not born before any legitimate son but he will defend his claim by appealing to the intention of the law which he will maintain to imply that the bastard born when there was no legitimate son in the family should rank as legitimate he will dismiss the letter of the law pointing out that in any case the position of a bastard is not prejudiced by the fact that no legitimate son was born after him and arguing as follows suppose that the only son is a bastard what will his position be? nearly that of a citizen? and yet he was not born after any legitimate son or will he rank as a son in all respects but he was not born before the legitimate sons as it is impossible to stand by the letter of the law we must stand by its intentions it needs to disturb no one that one law should originate two bases the law is twofold and therefore has the force of two laws to the son who desires to re-enter the family the disinherited's first reply is even though you are allowed to re-enter the family I am still the heir the bases will be the same as in the claim put forward by the disinherited son since the question at issue is whether a disinherited son can inherit but the disinherited and the bastard will object you cannot re-enter the family for our father did not die childless but in this connection each will rely on his own particular question for the disinherited son will say that even a disinherited man does not cease to be a son and will derive an argument from that very law which denies his claim to the inheritance namely that it was unnecessary for a disinherited son to be excluded from possession of his father's property if he had ceased to be one of the family but now since in virtue of his rights as son he would have been his father's heir if he had died interstate the law is brought to bar his claim and yet the law does not deprive him of his position as son but only of his position as heir here the basis is definitive as turning on the definition of a son again the bastard in his turn will urge that his father did not die childless employing the same arguments that he had used in putting forward his claim that he ranked as a son unless indeed he too has recourse to definition and raises the question whether he said bastards are not sons thus in one case we shall have either two special legal basis namely the letter of the law and intention with the syllogism and also definition or those three which are really the only basis strictly so called conjecture as regards the letter of the law and intention quality in the syllogism and definition which needs no explanation further every kind of case will contain a cause a point for the decision of the judge an essential argument for nothing can be said which does not contain a reason something to which the decision of the judge is directed and finally something which more than ought else contains the substance of the matter at issue but as these vary in different cases and are as a rule explained by writers on judicial causes I will postpone them to the appropriate portion of my work for the present I shall follow the order which I prescribe by my division of causes into three classes end of book three chapter six book three chapter seven of on education of an orator by quintillion by H. E. Butler this little box recording is in the public domain chapter seven I will begin with the class of causes which are concerned with praise and blame this class appears to have been entirely divorced by Aristotle and following him by theophrastis from the principal side of oratory which they call pragmatique and to have been reserved solely for the delectation of audiences which indeed is shown to be its peculiar function by its name which implies display Roman usage on the other hand has given it a place in the practical tasks of life for funeral orations are often imposed as a duty on persons holding public office or entrusted to magistrates by decree of the senate again the award of praise or blame to a witness may carry weight in the courts there is also a recognized practice to produce persons to praise the character of the accused further the published speeches of Cicero directed against his rivals in the election to the consulship and against Lucius Paizo, Claudius and Curio are full of denunciation and were not withstanding delivered in the senate as formal expressions of opinion in the course of debate I do not deny that some compositions of this kind are composed solely with a view to display as for instance, Panagics of Gods and Heroes of the past a consideration which provides the solution of a question which I discussed a little while back and proves that those are wrong who hold that an orator will never speak on a subject unless it involves some problem but what problem is involved by the praise of Jupiter capital Linus a stock theme of the sacred capital line contest which is undoubtedly treated in regular rhetorical form however, just as Panagic applied to practical matters requires proof so too a certain semblance of proof is at times required by speeches composed entirely for display for instance, a speaker who tells how Romulus was the son of Mars and reared by the she-wolf will offer as proofs of his divine origin the fact that when thrown into a running stream he escaped drowning that all his achievements were such as to make it credible that he was the offspring of the god of battles and that his contemporaries unquestionably believed that he was translated to heaven some arguments will even wear a certain semblance of defense for example, if the orator is speaking in praise of Hercules he will find excuses for his hero having changed Raymond with the Queen of Lydia and submitted to the tasks which legend tells us she imposed upon him the proper function however of Panagiric is to amplify and embellish its themes this form of oratory is directed in the main to the praise of gods and men but may occasionally be applied to the praise of animals or even of inanimate objects in praising the gods our first step will be to express our veneration of the majesty of their nature in general terms next, we shall proceed to praise the special power of the individual god and the discoveries whereby he has benefited the human race for example, in the case of Jupiter he shall extol his power as manifested in the governance of all things with Mars we shall praise his power in war with Neptune his power over the sea as regards inventions we shall celebrate Minerva's discovery of the arts Mercury's discovery of letters Apollo's of medicine Ceres of the fruit of the earth Bacchus of wine next, we must record their exploits as handed down from antiquity even gods may derive honor from their descent as for instance is the case with the sons of Jupiter or from their antiquity as in the case of the children of chaos or from their offspring as in the case of Latona the mother of Apollo and Diana some again may be praised because they were born immortal others because they won immortality by their valor a theme which the piety of our sovereign has made the glory even of these present times there is greater variety required in the praise of men in the first place there is a distinction to be made as regards time between the period in which the objects of our praise lived and the time preceding their birth and further in the case of the dead we must also distinguish the period following their death with regard to things preceding a man's birth there are his country, his parents and his ancestors the theme which may be handled in two ways for either it will be creditable to the objects of our praise not to have fallen short of their fair fame of their country and of their sires or to have ennobled the humble origin by the glory of their achievements other topics to be drawn from the period preceding their birth will have reference to omens or prophecies foretelling their future greatness such as the oracle which is said to have foretold that the son of fetus would be greater than his father the praise of the individual himself will be based on his character his physical endowments and external circumstances physical and accidental advantages provide a comparatively unimportant theme which requires variety of treatment at time for instance we extoll beauty and strength in honorific terms as Homer does in the case of Agamemnon and Achilles at times again weakness may contribute largely to our admiration as when Homer says that ideas was small of stature but a good fighter fortune too may comfort dignity as in the case of kings and princes for they have a fairer fuel for the display of their excellences but on the other hand the glory of good deeds may be enhanced by the smallness of their resources moreover the praise awarded to external and accidental advantages is given not to their possession but to their honorable employment for wealth and power and influence since they are the sources of strength are the surest test of character for good or evil they make us better or they make us worse praise awarded to character is always just but may be given in various ways it has sometimes proved the more effective course to trace a man's life and deeds in due chronological order praising his natural gifts as a child then his progress at school and finally the whole course of his life including words as well as deeds at times on the other hand it is well to divide our praises dealing separately with the various virtues fortitude, justice, self-control and the rest of them and to assign to each virtue the deeds performed under its influence we shall have to decide which of these two methods will be the more serviceable according to the nature of the subject but we must bear in mind the fact that what most pleases an audience is the celebration of the deeds which our hero was the first or only man or at any rate one of the very few to perform and to these we must add any other achievements which surpassed hope or expectation emphasizing what was done for the sake of Julius rather than what he performed on his own behalf it is not always possible to deal with the time subsequent to our hero's death this is due not merely to the fact that we sometimes praise him while still alive but also that there are but few occasions when we have a chance to celebrate the award of divine honors posthumous votes of thanks or statues erected at the public expense among such themes of pedagogy I would mention monuments of genius that have stood the test of time for some great men like Menander have received ampler justice from the verdict of posterity then from that of their own age children reflect glory on their parents cities on their founders laws on those who made them arts on their inventors and institutions on those that first introduced them for instance, Numa first laid down rules for the worship of the gods and Publicola first ordered that the Lictor's rods should be lowered in salutation to the people the same method will be applied to denunciations as well but with a view to opposite effects for humble origin has been a reproach to many while in some cases distinction has merely served to increase the notoriety and unpopularity of vices in regard to some persons as in the story of Paris it has been predicted that they would be the cause of destruction to many some like Thracidus and Iris have been despised for their poverty and mean appearance others have been loathed because their natural advantages were nullified by their vices poets for instance tell us that Nairias was a coward and Placenace a debauchee the mind too has as many vices as virtues and vice may be denounced as virtue may be praised in two different ways some have been branded with infamy after death like Melius whose house was leveled with the ground or Marcus Menlius whose first name was banished from his family for all generations to come the vices of the children bring hatred on their parents founders of cities are detested for concentrating a race which is a curse to others as for example the founder of the Jewish superstition the laws of Gragas are hated and we abhor any loathsome example of vice that has been handed down to posterity such as the criminal form of lust which a Persian is said to have been the first to practice on a woman of psalms and even in the case of the living the judgment of mankind serves as a proof of their character and the fairness or foulness of their fame proves the orchard's praise or blame to be true Aristotle however thinks that the place and subject of panegyrics or denunciations make a very considerable difference for much depends on the character of the audience and the generally received opinion if they are to believe that the virtues of which they approve are preeminently characteristic of the person praised and the vices which they hate of the person denounced for there can be little doubt as to the attitude of the audience if that attitude is already determined prior to the delivery of the speech it will be wise too for him to insert some words of praise for his audience since this will secure their goodwill and wherever it is possible this should be done in such a manner as to advance his case literature will win less praise at Sparta than at Athens endurance encouraged more among some races the life of a free booter is accounted honorable while others regarded as a duty to respect the laws frugality might perhaps be unpopular with the civil rights whilst luxury was regarded as crying by the ancient Romans similar differences of opinion are found in individuals a judge is most favorable to the orator whose views he thinks identical with his own Aristotle also urges a point which at a later date Cornelius Celsius emphasized almost to excess to the effect that since the boundary between vice and virtue is often ill-defined it is desirable to use words that swerve a little from the actual truth calling a rash man brave a prodigal generous a mean man thrifty or the process may if necessary be reversed but this the ideal order that is to say a good man will never do unless perhaps he is led to do so by consideration for the public interest cities are praised after the same fashion as men the founder takes the place of the parent and antiquity carries great authority as for instance in the case of those whose inhabitants are said to be sprung from the soil the virtues and vices revealed by their deeds are the same as in private individuals the advantages arising from sight or fortifications are however peculiar to cities their citizens enhance their fame just as children bring honor to their parents praise too may be awarded to public works in connection with which their magnificence, utility, beauty and the architect or artist must be given due consideration temples for instance will be praised for their magnificence walls for their utility and both for their beauty or the skill of the architect places may also be praised witness the praise of Sicily in Cicero in such cases we consider their beauty and utility beauty calls for notice in places by the sea in open plains and pleasant situations utility in healthy or fertile localities again praise in general terms may be awarded to noble sayings or deeds finally things of every kind may be praised panigerics have been composed on sleep and death and physicians have written eulogies on certain kinds of food while therefore I do not agree that panigeric concerns only questions regarding what is honorable I do think that it comes as a rule under the heading of quality although all three bases may be involved in panigeric as it was observed by Cicero that all were actually used by Gaius Caesar in his denunciation of Cato but panigeric is akin to deliberative oratory in as much as the same things are usually praised in the former as are advised in the letter End of Chapter 7 Book 3, Chapter 8 of Anzi Education of an Orator by Quintilian translated by H. E. Butler this LibriVox recording is in the public domain Chapter 8 I am surprised that deliberative oratory also has been restricted by some authorities to questions of expediency if it should be necessary to assign one single aim to deliberative I should prefer Cicero's view that this kind of oratory is primarily concerned with what is honorable I do not doubt that those who maintain the opinion first mentioned adopt the lofty view that nothing can be expedient which is not good that opinion is perfectly sound so long as we are fortunate enough to have wise and good men for counselors but as we most often express our views before an ignorant audience and where especially before popular assemblies of which the majority is usually uneducated we must distinguish between what is honorable and what is expedient and conform our utterances to suit ordinary understandings for there are many who do not admit that what they really believe to be the honorable course is sufficiently advantageous an arm is led by the prospect of advantage into approving courses of the dishonorable nature of which there can be no question witness the nomen team treaty and the surrender of the Codine forks nor does it suffice to restrict deliberative oratory to the basis of quality which is concerned with questions of honor and expediency for there is often room for conjecture as well sometimes again definition is necessary or legal problems require handling this is especially the case when advice has to be given on private matters where there is some doubt of the legality of the course under consideration of conjecture I shall speak more fully a little later on returning to definition for the moment we find it in the question raised by the Mostonese whether Philip should give or restore Hellenesis and to that discussed by Cicero in the Philippics as to the nature of a tumultus again does not the question raise in connection with the statue of Servius Cilpiceus as to whether statues should be erected only in honor of those ambassadors who perish by the sword bear a strong resemblance to the questions that are raised in the law quarts the deliberative department of oratory also called the advisory department while it deliberates about the future also inquires about the past while its functions are twofold and consist in advising and dissuading deliberative oratory does not always require an exordium such as is necessary in forensic speeches since he who asks an orator for his opinion is naturally well disposed to him the commencement whatever be its nature must have some resemblance to exordium for we must not begin abruptly or just at the point where the fancy takes us since in every subject there is something which naturally comes first in addressing the senate or the people the same methods apply as in the law courts and we must aim as a rule at acquiring the goodwill of our audience this need cause no surprise since even in Panagyric we seek to win the favor of our hearers when our aim is praise pure and simple and not the acquisition of any advantage Aristotle it is true holds not without reason that in deliberative speeches we may often begin with a reference either to ourselves or to our opponent borrowing this practice from forensic oratory and sometimes producing the impression that the subject is of greater or less importance than it actually is on the other hand he thinks that in demonstrative oratory the exordium may be treated with the utmost freedom since it is sometimes drawn from irrelevant material as for example in isocrates praise of Helen or from something akin to the subject as for instance in the panagyricus of the same author when he complains that more honor is given to physical than to moral excellence or as gorgeous in the speech delivered at the Olympic Games praises the founders of the great national games Salist seems to have imitated these authors in his jigger-thin war and in the introduction to his cattle line which has no connection with his narrative but it is time for me to return to deliberative oratory in which even when we introduce an exordium we must content ourselves with a brief prelude which may amount to no more than a mere heading as regards the statement of fact this is never required in speeches on private subjects at least as regards the subject on which an opinion has to be given because everyone is acquainted with the question at issue statements as to external matters which are relevant to the discussion may however frequently be introduced in addressing public assemblies it will often be necessary to set forth the order of the points which have to be treated as regards appeals to the emotions these are especially necessary in deliberative oratory anger has frequently to be excited or assuaged and the minds of the audience have to be swayed to fear, ambition, hatred, reconciliation at times again it is necessary to awaken pity whether it is required for instance to urge that relief should be sent to a besieged city or we are engaged in deploring the overthrow of an allied state but what really carries weight in deliberative speeches is the authority of the speaker for he who would have all men trust his judgment as to what is expedient and honorable should both possess and be regarded as possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character in forensic speeches the orator may according to the generally received opinion indulge his passion to some extent but all will agree that the advice given by a speaker should be in keeping with his moral character the majority of Greek writers have held that this kind of oratory is entirely concerned with addressing public assemblies and have restricted it to politics even Cicero himself deals chiefly with this department consequently those who propose to offer advice upon peace, war, troops, public works or revenue must thoroughly acquaint themselves with two things the resources of the state and the character of its people so that the method employed in tendering their advice may be based at once on political realities and the nature of their hearers this type of oratory seems to be to offer a more varied field for eloquence both those who ask for advice and the answers given to them may easily present the greatest diversity consequently there are three points which must be specially born in mind in advice or dissuasion first the nature of the subject under discussion secondly the nature of those who are engaged in the discussion and thirdly the nature of the speaker who offers them advice as to the subject under discussion its practicability is either certain or uncertain in the latter case this will be the chief if not the only point for consideration for it will often happen that we shall assert first that something ought not to be done even if it can be done and secondly that it cannot be done now when the question turns on such points as to whether the isthmus can be cut through the pontine marshes drained or a harbor constructed at Ostia or whether Alexander is likely to find land beyond the ocean we make use of conjecture but even in connection with things that are undoubtedly feasible there may at times be room for conjecture as for instance in question seems as whether Rome is ever likely to conquer Carthage whether Hannibal will return to Africa if Scipio transports his army thither or whether the Semnites are likely to keep faith if the Romans lay down their arms there are some things too which we may believe to be both feasible and likely to be carried into effect but at another time or place or in another way when there is no scope for conjecture our attention will be fixed on other points in the first place advice will be asked either on account of the actual thing on which the orator is required to express his views or on account of other causes which affect it from without it is on the actual thing that the senate for instance debates when it discusses such questions as whether it is to vote pay for the troops in this case material is simple to this however may be added reasons for taking action or the reverse as for example if the senate should discuss whether it should deliver the Fabii to the goals when the latter threaten war or Gaius Caesar should deliberate whether he should persist in the invasion of Germany when his soldiers on all sides are making their wills these deliberative themes are of a two fold nature in the first case the reason for deliberation is the Gaelic threat of war but there may still be a further question as to whether even without such a threat of war they should surrender those who contrary to the law of nations took part in a battle when they had been sent out as ambassadors and killed the king with whom they had received instructions to treat in the second case Caesar would doubtless never deliberate on the question at all but for the perturbation shown by his soldiers but there is still room for inquiry whether quite apart from this occurrence it would be wise to penetrate into Germany but it must be remembered that we shall always speak first on that subject which is capable of discussion quite apart from the consequences some have held that the three main considerations in any advisory speech are honor, expediency and necessity I can find no place for the last for however great the violence that may threaten us it may be necessary for us to suffer something but we are not compelled to do anything whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things the question will be one of expediency for example if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and owing to the failure of food and water supplies discusses surrender to the enemy and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity the words otherwise we shall perish must needs be added consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves for death is a possible alternative and as a matter of fact the second times did not surrender nor did those who were surrounded on the raft of opetergium it follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honor but it will be urged if a man would beget children he's under the necessity of taking a wife certainly but he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife it appears to me therefore where necessity exists there is no room for deliberation any more than where it is clear that a thing is not feasible for deliberation is always concerned with questions where some doubt exists those therefore are wiser who make the third consideration for deliberative oratory to be or possibility as we translated the translation may seem clumsy but the only word available that all these considerations need not necessarily obtrude themselves in every case is too obvious to need explanation most writers however say that there are more than three but the further considerations which they would add are really but species of the three general considerations just mentioned for right, justice, piety equity and mercy we translate Togemeron with any other virtues that anyone may be pleased to add all come under the heading of that which is honorable on the other hand if the question be whether a thing is easy great, pleasant or free from danger it comes under questions of expediency such topics arise from some contradiction for example a thing is expedient or trivial or unpleasant or dangerous some however hold that at times deliberation is concerned solely with the question whether a thing is pleasant as for instance when discussion arises as to whether a theater should be built or games instituted but in my opinion you will never find any men such as slave to luxury as not to consider anything but pleasure when he delivers an advisory speech for there must needs be something on every occasion that takes precedence of pleasure in proposing the erection of a theater the orator will consider the advantages to be derived from relaxation from toil and the unbecoming and undesirable struggle for places which will arise if there is no proper accommodation religion too has its place in the discussion for we shall describe the theater as a kind of temple for the solemnization of a sacred feast often again we shall urge that honor must come before expediency as for instance when we advise the men of opetergium not to surrender to the enemy even though refusal to do so means certain death at times on the other hand we prefer expediency to honor as when we advise the arming of slaves in the punic war even in this case we must not openly admit that such a course is dishonorable we can point out that all men are free by nature and composed of the same elements while the slaves in question may perhaps be sprung from some ancient and noble stock and in the former case when the danger is so evident we may add other arguments such as that they would perish even more cruelly if they surrendered should the enemy fail to keep faith or Caesar a more probable supposition prove victorious but in such a conflict of principles it is usual to modify the names which we give them for expediency is often ruled out by those who assert not merely that honor comes before expediency but that nothing can be expedient that is not honorable while others say that what we call honor is vanity ambition and folly as contemptible in substance as it is fair in sound nor is expediency compared nearly with inexpediency at times we have to choose between two advantageous courses after comparison of their respective advantages the problem may be still more complicated as for instance when Pompeii deliberated to go to Partia, Africa or Egypt in such a case the inquiry is not which of the two courses is better or worse but which of three or more on the other hand in deliberative oratory there will never be any doubt about circumstances holy in our favor for there can clearly be no doubt about points against which there is nothing to be said consequently as a rule all deliberative speeches are based simply on comparison and we must consider what we shall gain and by what means that it may be possible to form an estimate whether there is more advantage in the aims we pursue or greater discipline advantage in the means we employ to that end a question of expediency may also be concerned with time for example it is expedient but not now or with place it is expedient but not here or with particular persons it is expedient but not for us or not as against these or with our method of action it is expedient but not thus or with degree it is expedient but not to this extent but we have still more often to consider personality with reference to what is becoming and we must consider our own as well as that of those before whom the question is laid consequently though examples are of the greatest value in deliberative speeches because reference to historical parallels is the quickest method of securing ascent it matters a great deal whose authority is adduced and to whom it is commended for the minds of those who deliberate on any subject differ from one another and our audience may be of two kinds for those who ask us for advice are either single individuals or a number and in both cases the factors may be different for when advice is asked by a number of persons it makes a considerable difference whether they are the senate or the people the citizens of Rome or Fidene Greeks or barbarians and in the case of single individuals whether we are urgent Cato or Gaius Marius to stand for office whether it is the elder Scipio or Fabius who is deliberating on his plan of campaign further sex, rank and age must be taken into account though it is character that will make the chief difference it is an easy task to recommend an honorable course to honorable men but if we are attempting to keep men of bad character to the paths of virtue we must take care not to seem to upgrade a way of life unlike our own the minds of such an audience are not to be moved by discoursing on the nature of virtue put by praise by appeals to popular opinion and if such vanities are of no avail by demonstration of the advantage that will accrue from such a policy or more effectively perhaps by pointing out the appalling consequences that will follow the opposite policy for quite apart from the fact that the minds of unprincipled men are easily swayed by terror I am not sure that most men's minds are not more easily influenced by fear of evil than by hope of good for they find it easier to understand what is evil than what is good sometimes we urge good men to adopt a somewhat unseemly course while we advise men of poor character to take a course into which the object is the advantage of those who seek our advice I realize the thought that will immediately occur to my reader do you then teach that this should be done or think it right Cicero might clear me from blaming the matter for he writes to Brutus in the following terms after setting forth a number of things that might honorably be urged on Caesar should I be a good man to advise this? no for the end of him who gives advice is the advantage of the man to whom he gives it but, you say your advice is right certainly, but there is not always room for what is right in giving advice however, this is a somewhat abstract question and does not concern deliberative oratory alone I shall therefore reserve it for my 12th and concluding book for my part, I would not have anything done dishonorably but for the meantime let us regard these questions as at least belonging to the rhetorical exercises of the schools for knowledge of evil is necessary to enable us the better to defend what is right for the present I will only say that if anyone is going to urge a dishonorable course on an honorable man he should remember not to urge it as being dishonorable and should avoid the practice of certain declaimers who urge sex despompayas to piracy just because it is dishonorable and cruel even when we address bad men we should gloss over what is unsightly for there is no man so evil as to wish to seem so thus Salas makes Cataline speak as one who is driven to crime not by wickedness but by indignation and Various makes Atreus say my wrongs are past all speech and such shall be the deeds they force me to how much more has this pretence of honor to be kept up by those who have a real regard for their own good name therefore when we advise Cicero to beg Antonius for mercy or even to burn the Philippics if Antonius promises to spare him on that condition we shall not emphasize the love of life in our advice for if that passion has any force with him it will have it nonetheless if we are silent but we shall exhort him to save himself in the interest of the state for he needs some such reason as that to preserve him from feeling shame at entreating such a one as Anthony again if we urge Gaius Caesar to accept the crown we shall ensure that the state is doomed to destruction unless controlled by a monarchy for the sole aim of the men who is deliberating about committing a criminal act is to make his act appear as little wicked as possible it also makes a great deal of difference who it is that is offering the advice for if his past has been illustrious or if his distinguished birth or age or fortune excite interpretations care must be taken that his words are not unworthy of him if on the other hand he has none of these advantages he will have to adopt a humbler tone for what is regarded as liberty in some is called license in others some receive sufficient support from their personal authority while others find that the force of reason itself is scarce sufficient to enable them to maintain their position consequently I regard impersonation as the most difficult of tasks imposed as it is in addition to the other work involved by a deliberative theme for the same speaker has on one occasion to impersonate Caesar on another Cicero or Cato but it is a most useful exercise because it demands a double effort and is also of the greatest use to future poets and historians while for orators of course it is absolutely necessary for there are many speeches composed by Greek and Latin orators for others to deliver the words of which had to be adapted to suit the position and character of those for whom they were written do you suppose that Cicero thought in the same way or assumed the same character when he wrote for Pais and when he wrote for Titus Ampius and the rest did he not rather bear in mind the fortune, rank and achievements of each single individual and represent the character of all to whom he gave a voice so that though they spoke better than they could by nature they still might seem to speak in their own persons for a speech which is out of keeping with the man who delivers it is just as faulty as the speech which fails to suit the subject to which it should conform it is for this reason that Lysius is regarded as having shown the highest art in the speeches which he wrote for uneducated persons on account of their extraordinary realism in the case of the claimers indeed it is of the first importance that they should consider what best suits each character for they play the role of advocates in their declamations as a rule they impersonate sons parents, rich men old men, gentle or harsh temper, misers superstitious persons, cowards and mockers so that hardly even comic actors have to assume more numerous roles in their performances on the stage than these in their declamations all these roles may be regarded as forming part of impersonation which I have included under deliberative themes from which it differs nearly in that it involves the assumption of a role it is sometimes introduced even with controversial themes which are drawn from history and involve the appearance of definite historical characters as pleaders I am aware also that historical and poetical themes are often set for the sake of practice such a crime speech to Achilles or Sulla's address to the people on his resignation of the dictatorship but these will fall under one or other of the three classes into which I have divided causes for and treaty, statement and argument with other themes already mentioned are all of frequent occurrence in forensic deliberative or demonstrative subjects according as circumstances demand and we often introduce fictitious speeches of historical persons whom we select ourselves Cicero for instance in the Procainio makes both Epius Seacus and her brother Claudius address Claudia the former rebuking her for her immorality the latter exhorting her there too in scholastic declamations the fictitious themes for deliberative speeches are often not unlike those of controversial speeches and are a compromise between the two forms as for instance when the theme set is a discussion in the presence of Gaius Caesar of the punishment to be meted out to Theodotus for it consists of accusation and defense both of them peculiar to forensic oratory but the topic of expediency also enters into the case in such questions as whether it was to Caesar's that Pompeius should be slain whether the execution of Theodotus would involve the risk of a war with the king of Egypt whether such a war would be highly inopportune at such a critical moment would prove dangerous and be certain to last a long time there's also a question of honor does it befit Caesar to avenge Pompeius death or is it to be feared that an admission that Pompeius did not deserve death will injure the cause of the Caesarean party it may be noted that discussions of such a kind may well occur in actual cases declaimers have however often being guilty of an error as regards deliberative themes which has involved a series of consequences they have considered deliberative themes to be different and absolutely opposed to forensic themes for they have always affected abrupt openings an impetuous style and a generous embellishment as they call it in their language and have been especially careful to make shorter notes for deliberative than for forensic themes for my part while I realize that deliberative themes do not require an exordium for reasons which I have already stated I do not however understand why they should open in such a wild and exclamatory manner when a man is asked to express his opinion on any subject he does not if he is sane begin to shriek but endeavors as far as possible to win the ascent of the man who is considering the question by a courteous and natural opening why I ask in view of the fact that deliberations require moderation above all else should the speaker on such themes indulge in a torrential style of eloquence kept at one high level of violence I acknowledge that in controversial speeches the tone is often lowered in the exordium the statement of facts and the argument and that if you subtract these three portions the remainder is more or less of the deliberative type of speech but what remains must likewise be of a more even flow avoiding all violence and fury with regards to magnificence of language deliberative declaimers should have voice training after it more than others but it comes to them more naturally for there is a preference among those who invent such themes for selecting great personages such as kings, princes senators and peoples while the theme itself is generally on a grander scale consequently since the words are suited to the theme they acquire additional splendor from the magnificence of the matter in actual deliberations the case is different and consequently Theophrastus laid it down that in the deliberative class of oratory the language should as far as possible be free from all affectation in stating this view he followed the authority of his instructor although as a rule he's not afraid to differ from him for Aristotle held that the demonstrative type of oratory was the best suited for writing and that the next best was forensic oratory his reason for this view was that the first type is entirely concerned with this play while the second requires art which will even be employed to deceive the audience if expedience should so demand whereas advice requires only truth and prudence I agree with this view as regards demonstrative oratory in fact all writers are agreed on this point but as regards forensic and deliberative themes I think that the style must be suited to the requirements of the subject which has to be treated for I noticed that the Philippics of Demosthenes are preeminent for the same merits as his forensic speeches and that the opinions expressed by Cicero before the senate or the people are as remarkable for the splendor of their eloquence as the speeches which he delivered in accusing or defending persons before the courts and yet Cicero says of deliberative oratory that the whole speech should be simple and dignified and should derive its ornament rather from the sentiments expressed than the actual words as regards the use of examples practically all authorities are with good reason agreed that there is no subject to which they are better suited since as a rule history seems to repeat itself and the experience of the past is a valuable support to reason brevity and copiousness are determined not so much by the nature as by the compass of the subject for just as in deliberations the question is generally less complicated so in forensic cases it is often of less importance anyone who is content to read not merely speeches but history as well in preference to growing gray over the notebooks of the rhetoricians will realize the truth of what I say for in the historians the speeches delivered to the people and the opinions expressed in the senate often provide examples of advice and dissuasion he will find an avoidance of abrupt openings in deliberative speeches and will note that the forensic style is often the more impatuous of the two while in both cases the words are suited to the matter and forensic speeches are often shorter than deliberative nor will he find in them those faults into which some of our declaimers fall namely a coarse abuse of those who hold opposite opinions in a general tendency to speak in such a way as to make it seem that the speaker's views are in opposition to those of the persons who ask his advice consequently their aim seems to be invective rather than persuasion I would have my younger readers realize that these words are penned for their special benefit that they may not desire to adopt a different style in their exercises from that in which they will be required to speak and may not be hampered by having to unlearn what they have acquired for the rest if they are ever summoned to take part in the counsels of their friends or to speak their opinions in the senate or advise the emperor on some point on which he may consult them they will learn from practice what they cannot perhaps put to the credit of the schools End of book 3 chapter 8