 I'm the transition dean for the New School focused on climate and sustainability and I was asking to give you a super quick overview. I know we're all eager to get to the main event here. The two organizations, the Precourt Institute for Energy and the Stanford Natural Gas Initiative that are really key in launching the hydrogen initiative will both be key founding components of the New School focused on climate and sustainability. This is Stanford's first new school in over 70 years and it's resulted from an inclusive long-range planning process. At every stage of the long-range planning process, students especially, also faculty, staff, and our external friends and stakeholders have called for Stanford to have an entity of scale focused on climate, energy, and sustainability. We have therefore designed a school that's designed to have both the powers of institutes which are the powers to foster interdisciplinary communities like the one that's gathered here today for the hydrogen initiative and work closely with external stakeholders and the traditional powers of schools which are to hire faculty, admit students, set curricula, and grant degrees. So we hope that this entity of scale will be able to have a major impact on the urgent issues of climate and sustainability that are facing our world today. Let me turn to the Precourt Institute's vision statement, sustainable, affordable, secure energy for all people. I think everyone who's here today in the hall and online knows that of the eight billion people in the world, a billion of us live without access to electricity. And another three billion cook their food using dirty carbon sources that contribute to four million early deaths per year. This is an urgent effort and Stanford has many efforts already underway to do research that's relevant to it in partnership with stakeholders. We need to not just double but quadruple and octuple those efforts. Let me give you a few examples. Professor Frank Woolick's program on energy and sustainable development analyzes economics and policy with a focus on developing economies. He has helped many countries design energy markets to meet their climate commitments. Professor Rishi Jain uses data analytics to assess energy efficiency and renewable energy opportunities to help retrofit existing urban housing and also new construction and he has a special focus on the large rural to urban settlements where more than 800 million people live. Places that people can live that are sustainable are incredibly important. And I just want to, it's not only faculty, it's also students, a project that's actually led by a postdoctoral scholar Michael McCalla is developing a solar power drying system that will help millions of farmers to dry produce like raisins, beans, figs and chilies to boost income that's now at a subsistence level. Doctors Jain and McCalla work very closely with local researchers and individual stakeholders to help put these inventions and technologies into practice as quickly as possible. The sustainability and affordability are key drivers of the energy transition but so is security and security will be a significant topic I think in today's fireside chat. Let's see, where is Arun? The speaker will be interviewed on the interplay between the energy and climate challenges the world faces in global geopolitics. So we will shortly be joined on the Zoom screen. It will be my pleasure to introduce that speaker, Dr. Condoleesa Rice. Dr. Rice is the Denning Professor in Global Business and the Economy at Stanford's Graduate School of Business. The Thomas and Barbara Stevenson Senior Fellow on Public Policy at the Hoover Institution as well as that institution's director and a professor of political science. From 2005 to 2009, Dr. Rice was the 66th U.S. Secretary of State, the first African-American woman to hold the post. She also was President George W. Bush's National Security Advisor from 2001 to 2005, the first woman to ever hold that position. Prior to that, Dr. Rice was Stanford's Provost from 1993 to 1999 and actually hired me as an assistant professor during that period. Thank you for that, Dr. Rice. She's the first female, first African-American and was the youngest Provost in Stanford's history. It's also my great pleasure to introduce Dr. Irwin Majamdar, who will interview Dr. Rice. Dr. Majamdar is the J. Precourt Provostial Chair, Professor at Stanford, a faculty member of the Department of Mechanical Engineering and former director of the Precourt Institute for Energy. From 2009 to 2012, Dr. Majamdar was the founding director of the U.S. Department of Energy's Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy. Today, he chairs the advisory board to the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Jennifer Grenholm. In addition, bringing things back to the beginning of my introductory remarks, Dr. Majamdar was the co-chair of the President's Committee on the Structure of the Sustainability Initiative that led to the decision for Stanford to form its first new school in 70 years focused on climate and sustainability. Please join me in giving a warm welcome to Dr. Rice and Majamdar. Let me just start by congratulating each way and the Precourt staff for putting this event. We have been waiting for two years for this, and we are all here. And Kandy, thank you so much for joining us. Let's just get right to it. Energy is always best discussed in the context of economy, security, and the environment. You started the Hoover meeting about two weeks back highlighting security, and you said we are living, and I'm going to maybe butcher it a little bit, but we are living in disturbing and difficult times. Given the art of history of global conflict, explain to us the importance and the implications of the current conflict in Europe and what it means to the United States and to the rest of the world. Well, thank you very much. And first of all, thanks to Cam. I'm glad I signed those assistant professor papers, Cam. It's been great for the university ever since. And Arul, thank you for inviting me. I'm sorry I can't be with you. I'm a little under the weather, so I didn't want to expose anyone, but I'm glad to join you virtually. Well, I think that when we look at our screens every day, our news screens every day, we see something that we really never expected, which is a breakdown of the law-based international order. We see a great power, literally, trying to absorb a smaller power, its neighbor, with military forces that look like they were charted in 1939. As a matter of fact, a friend of mine said, if you put those pictures in black and white, you would be looking at 1939. And I think, Arun, this is a kind of shock to the system, because we've had war, obviously. But nothing that looks of this scale, and certainly not with the avowed purpose on the part of the Russians of eradicating Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has told me, he's told many, that Ukraine is a made-up country, and that Ukraine is really a part of Russia. So this is something that we haven't seen since World War II, and it's sending shockwaves through the international system as countries try to find their footing in understanding how we could have gotten to this place. Thank you, Ghani. So a few weeks back, when I was talking to you actually, you talked me about this balance between the economy, security, and environment. Sorry, I'm looking this way because you're in my screen out here. One of the things that you explained to me was, when you think about the balance, one has to also frame it in timescales. We have a now, we have a mid-term issues, and we have long-term issues. So let's start by talking about now. Europe cannot turn off Russian oil and gas right away because the economies will be severely affected. People's homes will not have heating. And Russia is weaponizing energy to hold new hostage. What can and should the European Union and your broadly do now? What should the United States be doing on this issue? And what should the U.S. be worried about in terms of, if any, Russia-China partnership? Or do you think that this is more to it than what the news media actually tells us? Well, let me start with the balance that you talked about. It's almost like an equation where it all has to add up to a positive sum for any society. When we talk about economic growth, we talk about energy mix and environmental sustainability. And now, in large part, because of what has happened to us over these last few months, security has been more on the agenda. But I would say, Arun, that we should have been thinking about energy security quite a long time ago. You mentioned the European Union. It's been a period of almost 40 years since going all the way back to the Reagan administration. And every administration since tried to convince the Germans that pipelines that would make them dependent on Russian natural gas were ultimately going to be a bad idea. And instead, the dependency of Germany and to a certain extent Eastern Europe continue to grow and grow and grow. And so now we're living with the consequences of that as the shock has come quite suddenly. And we now have a near-term issue that really should have been a medium-term issue. If we had looked at this ahead, we would have said, do you really want to be dependent on Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia for your energy supply? And I think the answer to that had we known of what we know now would have been no. But we are where we are. And so let me take the short term first. Obviously, if the Europeans particularly, and Germany is the core of this, because Germany is the most dependent. If Germany and Europe is going to lessen its dependence on Russian gas and indeed Russian oil, it really got to do three things. The first is in the short term, find diversified sources of supply. And this is not easy because the Saudi Arabia is not stepping up to have more production. Iran brings its own problems, of course, because of the nuclear weapons issues with Iran. And the United States is an expensive source, particularly of gas, because we are so far away and we haven't invested really in LNG terminals and in pipeline structure. So finding diversified sources of oil is going to be number one. And oil and gas, diversified sources of energy, that's the near term problem. I think you will see considerable pressure on the Biden administration to roll back some of the decisions that had been made that make it harder for there to be actual oil and gas production. It's not so much that if you had those leases, it would help today. But you know, too, a room that signals are important to the oil and gas industry. And the signals have been that hydrocarbons were going to be looked upon with disfavor. Now, my view is, in the short term, since we're going to be dependent on hydrocarbons, since we want to lessen the dependence on Russian oil and natural gas, I would rather those sources come from the North American platform than from less secure places. And so I think we need to rethink that. But when you get to the medium term, we do want to begin the transition. We don't want to sacrifice the transition to a lower carbon, ultimately, zero carbon industry, support for industry. And so we should be asking ourselves, what can we do in the medium term that would actually help us to make that transition? And I think you know a room that I am, like many people, the late George Schultz, Jim Baker, and some other prominent people from the other side of the aisle, favor a price on carbon because a price on carbon in the medium term would help us with the problem that we've had that when the price of oil is a certain level, you don't get the investment in renewables, you don't get the investment in alternative sources of energy. So I would suggest in the medium term, we're going to have to do something to give greater research and development funding to give better signals to the oil and gas industry. And I think the best way to do that from a government point of view is a price on carbon. And then the final point is that then hopefully you've made a transition to an energy efficient but environmentally sensitive energy mix. And there I hope we will have looked at all sources, including, by the way, nuclear, which I think gets undervalued in this whole picture, but nuclear is also a medium and long term. You can't really do much on the nuclear front in the short term. In the short term, it's got to be about where do you get your hydrocarbons? And I would say North America is best. So, Connie, let's turn around this way. So, Connie, let's talk about the price on carbon. As you know, things are not easy to get done in Washington. What would you be advising both the Biden administration and members of Congress on getting things done, especially on the price on carbon, to send that signal that you want to decarbonize and actually, and many of the industries being part of the solution now? The problem is that this isn't a great time to talk about a price on carbon because of what Americans are seeing at the pump, what you're seeing in terms of inflation, the fact that we are essentially isolating a major producer of oil and gas in Russia at this particular point in time. So it's not the most propitious time to talk about a price on carbon. But as you know, Arun, some of the economists who talked about this, people like the late George Schultz, people like former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson. These are people who believe in a market-based economy. They don't believe in heavy regulation from the government. But the idea is that if you could put it in a larger context, perhaps talking about it as a medium-term solution. All right, we aren't going to do it today, but could we start putting things in place so that when we get through this immediate security crisis, we could talk about a greater balance in how we are going to look to the energy future. I think that's probably the way to do it. Now, one danger in Washington is whenever you say something is medium to long term, it sometimes doesn't get done. You know that because you've been in Washington. It's all too easy to say, oh yeah, we'll do that in the long term. But I do think that it isn't going to fly right now for a host of reasons. But if we could again begin the conversation, if we could again begin to structure what it would look like, people who are free market folks really would rather see it be a revenue neutral carbon price so that if you collect it, gains from it, it wouldn't sort of just flow back into the budget and again increase spending. So there's a lot of planning and work and I think forums like this and forums that you and I are part of should be looking to the medium term to see how we could structure one when the time is right. This is to the audience. We'll open it up for questions in a few minutes. Let me ask you a little bit about the COP agreements, the COP meetings, etc. You had, you know, in publicly talked about the COP 21, the Paris Agreement as one of the highlights of international diplomacy amongst all the other bad news that we get. We had COP 26 where major nations made commitments for net zero emissions economy in 2050, 2060, 2070. We have now more than 60% of the Fortune 500 companies that have climate commitments. So, you know, this kind of alignment of major nations, major corporations, academia, I mean, this is unique in history. I don't think this is unprecedented. So, should we be celebrating, which I think a lot of people want to, but do you see clear pathways and outlines and should we be concerned about lack of real action and should we be raising the bar? What is your opinion on that? Well, let me contrast three international efforts. There was Kyoto, which set unrealistic targets and essentially no one lived up to them. I think the only countries to actually meet their targets were some small countries and Germany, which bet it, by the way, because they were shutting down industry in East Germany. And so it made it easier to meet it. So I think setting unrealistic targets is not the way to go. What I liked about Paris was that it really did allow on a national basis countries to deal with the energy mix issues that we've just been talking about. So that it's economic growth, energy mix and environmental sustainability. And we know that that's going to look different for every country. So for instance, the French get almost 80 percent of their generating power from nuclear. Germany has shut down its nuclear power. When you look at countries like India, for instance, now huge developing country, there are just certain things that you cannot expect the Indians to carry through on, if it starts to constrain economic growth. So what I liked about Paris is that these plans were sort of built from the ground up, so to speak. And countries made national commitments that I actually think would have been easier to keep. I'm worried about COP26 is perhaps being as aspiration fine, but is it too ambitious for reality, for the goals that were stated, for the obligations that were undertaken, can we really get to those kinds of numbers from where we are now? And so I'm concerned that we'll again get frustration if we're not careful by sending unrealistic numbers. I think it's very easy sometimes for countries to sign on to things and then not to carry them out. So I'm a little worried about COP26. Let me ask you. I mean, what you're saying is we have been on a carbon diet for about 150 years or so. Carbon, carbon, yes. And now everyone's telling us to go on a diet without the carbon. And as I can assure you, diets often don't work. That's what you're... Is that a different way to phrase it? So we should not put targets? That's a fair way to say it. We may have an aspiration for a certain diet. The question is when push comes to shovel, we carry it through. And I'm concerned that there hasn't been enough attention given to what the transition has to look like, how we're going to make the transition. Again, I was talking with some folks in Washington just recently, Arun. And they're very worried because with the first subject that we had, with what's going on in Russia, it's almost as if people have lost sight now of these medium and long-term goals. Because, oh my goodness, we're about to take one of the major oil and gas producers out of the equation. We're going to have to substitute it. What does that mean then for our goals? So I like very much this idea of thinking of it in phases and not getting too ambitious that we simply frustrate ourselves. Let me ask a little bit about the carbon price. And this is obviously a price of carbon. It's very important to help the fossil fuel industry turn itself and in a profitable way, become part of the solution. We are also seeing other aspects, and I'd like to get your opinion on this, as our own Adam Brandt has found through airborne measurements and also there are satellite measurements now on the fugitive emissions. Adam found 9% of emissions, fugitive emissions, coming out of the natural gas supply chain in the Permian Basin, in the New Mexico part of the Permian Basin. And as we know, anything more than 3% or 4% is natural gas is worse than coal. So if you were to get a gathering of CEOs and board members of the oil and gas industry, what would you be asking of them? How can they be part of the solution? And what are the solutions that they can create that others cannot? Well, I do think that they are putting a good deal, at least the best of them, a lot into renewables and they're not just hydrocarbon industries any longer. I think they do want to contribute on that side. So through R&D to help fund and put forward those, I think a room what the oil and gas companies are looking for is certainty. I think that one of the problems that we've had is there's been a lot of whiplash. On the one hand, you're going to drill everything you possibly can with permits as fast as you possibly can, and then the next day you're not going to do any. And of course, I'm overstating the case, but I think that's how it feels if you're sitting in a boardroom for oil and gas companies. And so that's one of the reasons that I think if you have mechanisms that can produce some certainty, that's why I like the idea of a carbon price, because it can produce some certainty in a market-based way. I think we have to look for ways that they can have some certainty about where this is going. You might also say that some of the certainty could come from some of the phasing that we've been talking about. What are we talking about 20 years in which we really are going to have to be very dependent on the North American platform? Well, in the life of an oil and gas company, that's not very long, because many of these are 30 or 40-year investments. And so I would say we need to have a conversation, almost a track too, with oil and gas companies to begin to look at their time horizon, the time horizon that we want to meet or aspire to meet on the climate side, and start to see how they adjust. Rather than just having either yelling matches around it or even worse to my mind, everybody just sort of virtue signaling without a plan to get anything done, because I do think this issue of timelines, of who's timeline are we on and can we harmonize these timelines is really part of the issue. Terrific. Thank you, Kondi. And we'll open it up for questions. I don't know if anyone has any hands up. There's one out here. So, Kondi, the question is, okay, how do we, in terms of timeline, there is energy security needs right now, but you want to harmonize it with climate goals in Germany, for example, and how does Germany do that? Is that what your question is? What is the time frame? Is it two years? Is it three years? Is it 10 years or 15? Well, the Germans really believe that they can do this in a relatively short period of time. I'm actually not so sure. It depends. There are conversations, Francis, going on with Algeria. Algeria has significant gas fields that are lying fallow at this point. Mozambique has gas fields, but there's been lack of investment. And so I think there's a sense that they're probably going to have to do this in a really short time frame, 18 months, two years, as much as they possibly can. But the Germans also talk about conservation as part of it, that they will simply not be able to use as much energy as they have. And of course, they'd like to accelerate renewables, but that's probably not on the timeframe to help them with Russian oil and natural gas. And by the way, I think the one thing to recognize is that the Russian oil and gas industry now pretty isolated. I mean, people are buying discounted oil on the market and never underestimate the degree to which you will get a black market in Russian oil. We did, for Saddam Hussein's oil, it was a significant black market. So you will see some of that. But the core of the Russian oil and gas industry is going to be isolated for some time. One of the problems that the Russians have now is that since the majors, the VPs and the exons of the world have left, they don't have the technology to develop some of their very old oil fields up around Sakhalin, which need very sophisticated technology to develop them. So I think you're going to see the Russian oil and gas knocked out for quite some time. And that means that countries like Germany, kind of an interesting, just a country of Poland, you would have seen the stories over the weekend that the Russians have cut off oil, cut off gas to Poland and Bulgaria. And interestingly, the polls sort of just yawned about it because they had significant storage, their storage facilities about 80% for full. They'd already begun with the invasion in 2014 of Crimea to shift their sources. And so there is a model out there for how this could be done if you do it smartly. And I think you do want to do it as much as you can with climate goals in mind as well. I was in Poland and the Baltics in 2015 on behalf of the State Department, and I can assure you they were all planning for this invasion at some point. Yes, they knew it was coming. And yet I would say, I mean, one of the, the IEA report that just came out suggested that if people in Germany reduce the thermostat by one degree Celsius, they would reduce the gas consumption by 9%. Yes, yes. So this is very important from the energy efficiency point of view. Yes, and I think the Germans do want to look hard at the energy efficiency element. Sunita from the Department of Energy. Thank you. My question relates to manufacturing. And as we know with batteries and solar and, you know, the offshore manufacturing. So, and we're starting to see the same thing with hydrogen. So for electrolyzers, we have one gigawatt factory announced, but we're seeing announcements in other countries where deployments is increasing. So Europe, China, you know, two gigawatt factory was announced in Australia. So I guess my question is, and obviously if we have deployment and demand locally, that will help incentivize the domestic manufacturing and off takers making sure there are no stranded assets when it comes to hydrogen production and so forth. But my question is, if you have any perspectives on mechanisms, such as the Defense Production Act and, you know, other mechanisms where we could, you know, provide that, that guarantee Germany has the global hydrogen foundation contracts for difference auctions, but specifically mechanisms like the Defense Production Act or others that you have thoughts on would be great. Can you hear that? Okay, go ahead. No, I was just going to say the Defense Production Act, we put it in play a couple of times recently, as you know, around some of the COVID issues as well. And I think you have to be a little bit careful that we don't start to get essentially a kind of industrial planning function, because the Defense Production Act is actually quite, can be quite heavy handed. But certainly we should be looking at mechanisms that make sure that we make the most efficient use in manufacturing as we possibly can of these new alternatives. Of course, the manufacturing is only a part of the issue, and transportation is really the largest problem that we and others will have. But sure, I think to look at all the mechanisms, I would just be careful, the Defense Production Act can be quite heavy handed. And I think people will start to wonder if we're sliding toward industrial policy. That's another question, and if you could announce your name and your affiliation, that would be great. Yeah, this is Chris Redlich. I'm on the Hoover ward. Yeah, hi, Chris. Hello, Connie, how are you? Sorry, we can't have lunch. My question is a little bit longer term thing, is you eliminate hydrocarbons as a producer of energy. What does that do to the geopolitical stability, given Russian's concentration in the Middle East concentration, and to some degree Africa's concentration in oil production? I would look forward, Chris, to the day that I don't think you'll eliminate hydrocarbons, but to the day that you were less dependent on them, because I will just give you an experience from being Secretary. Oil went to $147 a barrel when I was Secretary. And nothing warps diplomacy like oil $147 a barrel. It allowed Hugo Chavez to buy elections in Latin America. It allowed the Iranians to prove their economy against sanctions, so that we had a much harder time on the nuclear front, and of course the Middle East, which is always up and down. And so the smarter countries of the Middle East, by the way, are beginning to think about diversification, because they can sort of read the handwriting on the wall. For all of its problems, and the regime in Saudi Arabia has many, many problems, one of the things that that regime has tried to do is to begin to diversify the economy, similarly with the UAE. So there are some Middle Eastern countries that are reading the handwriting on the wall. The Russians, frankly, didn't read the handwriting on the wall. That is still an oil and gas cartel. Some 65% of Russia's exports are in oil, gas, and minerals. And so they are, they're going to be trapped. But if I could get to the place that I could take the oil card, so to speak, out of the hands of some of these regimes that are not afraid to use it for purposes that are very much against our national interest, I would do it in a second, because the United States will address, will adjust. Yes, we will have to make internal adjustments for places like the coal-producing parts of the country. But the U.S. has an economy that will adjust. The smarter countries of the Middle East are trying to make that adjustment ahead of time. But there are going to be some who are going to be trapped in that world. And I would be very happy not to have to deal with the oil card. Ever again. Maybe I could just follow up on the question with not the geopolitics of oil and gas, but the geopolitics of nuclear. As we are now seeing, I mean, we have the former Secretary of Energy out here, Steve Chu, when Fukushima happened and Germany completely got off nuclear and or decided to get off nuclear. And now we've seen some rethinking, even in California, government use them. Isn't rethinking not shutting down Diablo Canyon? I don't know whether that'll happen or not. So if you are to be in the nuclear... I mean, clearly, nuclear has to be part of the solution for decarbonization. It's not just nuclear electricity, nuclear heat. It's very important. And if that's the case, what should the United States do, not only to be in the international game of nuclear, but also to get people in countries like Germany and others to rethink along those lines? Well, the first thing we have to do, Arun, is to get our house in order domestically on nuclear. A house is not really in order domestically on nuclear. Going back to the kind of even folklore around Three Mile Island, questions of storage and so forth, we haven't been particularly good at stability in our own nuclear industry. And so I think it is something that we ought to be looking at and then helping others. By the way, I don't think it was Fukushima that pulled the Germans off. The Germans had been talking for a long time about getting out of nuclear. We'd had many conversations with the Germans about this. And I think Fukushima was a little bit of an excuse, frankly. But now everybody recognizes that you're going to have to have other sources. And nuclear could come... If you make the investment and you get the infrastructure, nuclear is proven. You're not dealing with sources of energy that may not be proven and that we have to wait for this and that to take place. And so I think it is a very big part, but I think it's going to start with the United States showing that we ourselves are prepared to use nuclear. And how would you change the sentiments on nuclear? Because there's a lot of public sentiment. That's a major issue. And there's a lot of misinformation about nuclear as well. And so maybe part of it is educational, just getting people to understand better. We get these things in our mind like Three Mile Island. And I'm sure you've heard it. The old joke is sometimes when you get a piece of fruit that looks too big, well, it must have come from Three Mile Island. So it's still sort of there in our national folklore. But there's no reason that nuclear can't be safe. One of the problems is getting somebody other than Nevada to store it. Every time we talk to any other state, it's kind of not in my neighborhood. So that's a hard problem, but I think it's one we've got to resolve. Questions from the audience? If you could just announce who you are in your affiliation. Yeah, Nico, welcome to the California Fuel Support Partnership. This is more of a general question and maybe a high level, the same level as that Mr. Rice is thinking on. How or what would you recommend to industry partners that interact with federal government as well as state government to provide certainty of signals? You mentioned signals earlier and get the right message across. Because I suspect that there is some confusion there as well. Thank you. Yes, I think the confusion has been there for a long time. And as I said, the worst thing about it is that it seems to be never in a steady state. And as you know, particularly when you're talking about investment, these are long tail investments. I'm told by some people in the oil company world that some of the really large scale investments have not been made for seven or eight years because of uncertainty about the signals about what we intend to do about hydrocarbons. So I do think that the government needs to send stronger signals. I do think also we have another factor, which is not just the government, but it's the question of ESG in companies, in investment houses. Is there going to be a sense that hydrocarbons are disadvantaged in investment houses and the like? And so if in fact we're going to get this next 15, 20 years right, it's going to require some very deep conversations with not just the government, but also with the private sector about what it is we're trying to do. I think I've been thinking in time frames if we could lay out something that looks like a longer term plan where we know what we're going to do in the short term and what's required there, where we know what we're going to do in the medium term and what's required there, and then can look to a longer term where we try to start to meet some of the targets of the cops and the like. I think everybody would have a better basis on which to invest, but right now it's just whiplash with every administration. Condi, if you don't mind, let me take it international, let's go back to the whole word. As you know, most of the population growth is going to be in emerging economies in Asia and mostly in Africa. They have a chance to leapfrog into a energy system that is cleaner and more modern. What would you be, if you were the Secretary of State now, what would you be going out and talking to them about in terms of how do you convince them that that's the right way to go and what should they be looking for? There's a lot of demand for finance. How should we be thinking about that? Well, we certainly ought to be thinking about it as a part of our large foreign assistance packages. There are some governments in places like Africa that actually have come to the United States and said, we want to make an energy leap. We have something called the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which does these compacts with countries where they get large amounts of money for specific kinds of proposals that have been worked together with labor unions and with farmers and the like. So one can imagine using some of our foreign assistance to really solicit from countries ideas of how we can help them make the leap. Secondly, I think that you can never make it any kind of energy, reconstitution of energy supply. You can never make it an enemy of economic growth. Economic growth is always going to be first in the minds of these countries. And so it's why I've always thought there are three E's, economic growth, energy mix, and environmental sustainability. And if you can get countries to think of them together. One idea that I tried to put forward, but it never got anywhere, was to have all energy, all climate, anything that might help any technologies that might help on the climate actually be tariff-free. I think if you could do something like that, it would send a very strong signal that this is something that we care about in our foreign assistance packages as well. And that is something, I don't have much hope anymore for the World Trade Organization, which I think is going to die a very slow death as everybody talks more about reliable and trusted supply chains and so forth. I don't see any big World Trade Organization agreements coming out. But I can imagine something like an agreement that these technologies would be tariff-free. And I think that would help quite a lot. And it'd be an important signal. Is that some kind of a revisiting of the Marshall Plan again for clean energy transition? Yes, something like that. But again, we've made a few other things tariff-free for health reasons. I think this would be something, like I said, it didn't get to first base when I was secretary. But maybe it would be time to try it again. Any other questions? If not, I've got one final question for you, Condi. This goes back to what Cam mentioned at the end of her introduction about the new school. And we have a new school in over 70 years. You have been a provost out here. You've lived most of your academic life. In fact, all your academic life here at Stanford. Tell us, give us your advice on how one should think about the new school. And when you talk to students and post-docs and undergraduate graduate students, what do you see and what would your advice be to them? Well, the first and most important thing for any school, in fact for any academic institution, academic unit within the institution, is to be absolutely dedicated to research that is transparent in its assumptions, that uses data, and that let the data take you where they take you. So you've got to establish a reputation for not being a school of advocacy, but for being a school that is really looking for the best answers. I don't mean that students and faculty can't advocate. Of course they can. But it has to be the first principle in the school that you're going to look at a broad range of possibilities. People are going to be led to do the research that they wish to do. And that we're going to be prepared to ask difficult and uneasy questions about issues of sustainability. We've been going through some of them today. How do you think about energy security? How do you think about nuclear? How do you think about the developing world? So asking hard questions has got to be built into the fabric of the school. The other point that I would make is focus on people. Get the very best students and the very best faculty. Give them resources and see what happens. I don't believe that top down planning of what a research agenda is going to look like will ever work in a university. And what is more, we know that you don't get the very best ideas that way. Those ideas have to come up from the faculty, from the students. And I'm not worried about it because I know Cam and I know Steve and I know others. And they're not central planners. But to the degree that anybody ever suggests central planning for the mission of the sustainability school, I would say run, run fast. Well, on that high note, thank you so much, Condi, for joining us. And let's give Condi Rice a big round of applause.