 Chapter 17 A History of California, the Spanish Period. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 17 The Spanish Occupation of Alta, California. When Galvez set out from Mexico City on April 9, 1768, his immediate object was that of founding the Department of San Blas. On January 11, 1768, Vice Roy Croy, at Galvez's suggestion, had issued an instruction for the establishment of a settlement at San Blas, stating that it was deemed indispensable after Sonora and the rest of the frontier should have been pacified to found a port for the advantage of boats employed on similar expeditions or in commerce with Sonora and also for the preservation and advancement of the Californias. In other words, San Blas was to be the base of supplies in New Spain for the region of the proposed Comandancy General. It seems highly probable that Galvez himself was already planning, as one phase of this project, an immediate occupation of Monterey and Alta, California, based on the port of San Blas. Since this bears directly on the causes of the expeditions of 1769, the evidence is worth reviewing. The devious routes by which the Vesitador was accustomed to proceed to his real aims should be borne in mind in considering this matter. It is usually stated that the Spanish court at Madrid received reports about Russian aggression in the Pacific Northwest and sent orders to meet them by the occupation of Alta, California. Wherefore, the expeditions of 1769 were made. This view contains only a smattering of the truth. It is evident from Galvez's correspondence of 1768 that he and Croy had discussed the advisability of an immediate expedition to Monterey long before any word came from Spain about the Russian activities. In December 1767, Galvez is reported by one of his secretaries to have been ardently at work on plans for a department at San Blas, and already to have charged a certain Manuel Rivera with the duty of establishing a port there. All this a month before Croy's instruction. The prominent place of Alta, California in the plan for the new common to see general has already been alluded to, and one of the projects of that plan called for an immediate dispatch of vessels to occupy and colonize Monterey. This is only one of many evidences of the direction of Galvez's interest toward the northern port. He had come to New Spain at a time when a number of works calling attention to the desires of other powers to gain a footing in the California's were being published in Europe, and the Vesitador seems to have been acquainted with this literature. On April 22nd, 1768, Galvez reached Guadalajara, remaining in that city until May 4th. In referring to his stay in Guadalajara, the audencia said that he had spoken of his plans for exploring the California's. It was not until May 5th, after he had left that city, that Galvez received the mail from Croy telling of Russian explorations in the Americas. Footnote. Galvez's relations with the audensity of Guadalajara furnished another interesting instance of the methods of this strange man. The report of the audencia to the king, dated May 18th, 1768, was most laudatory of the Vesitador and his projects of government and conquest in the northwest. Looking underneath the surface, one finds the following illuminating facts bearing upon the preparation of this report. Immediately after Galvez's own departure from Guadalajara, one of his secretaries appeared before the audencia and asked that body to write to the king, approving all of Galvez's measures and especially congratulating the royal government on the fact that Galvez himself had been chosen to execute them. The audensity did as requested, but one of the members of that body, Ramon Gonzales Vesera, had been opposed to this action. He accordingly wrote to the king, reporting what had happened and stating that he had signed his own name to the document of May 18th under protest. There is no direct evidence that Galvez had suggested the action of a secretary. The Vesitador was too crafty for that. But it is of record that Gonzales was made to feel Galvez's disapproval. He was soon suspended from his position on the charge that he had needlessly absented himself from meetings of the audencia. In footnote. The Spanish minister to Russia had written to the royal government in Madrid late in 1767 that the Russian Empress was preparing expeditions for fresh attempts to establish communications between eastern Siberia and the Pacific coasts of the Americas. On January 23, 1768, the Marquees de Grimaldi, the Spanish minister of state, wrote to the viceroy about the rumors of Russian activities, saying that news had been received that the Russians had actually made a landing in North America, though at what degree of latitude it was not known, and had had a battle with the Indians in which they had suffered a loss of three hundred Russian dead. After remarking that the Russians might be endeavoring to extend their commerce to those coasts, Grimaldi went on as follows. The king has ordered me to inform your excellency of all that has just been set forth, so that you may make it known to the man appointed governor of California, giving him instructions about the vigilance and care that he ought to exercise in order to observe such attempts as the Russians may make there, frustrating them if possible, and giving notice of everything promptly to your excellency so that you may report it to his majesty." This letter, it will be observed, did not order an expedition to Monterey, but it was sufficient to give an active man all the authority that he needed, especially if it is true that he had already determined to make such an expedition. Croy's letter of April 20 to Galvez is not at hand, but at a later date, in his instruction of 1771 to his successor, he had the following to say of this letter. I thought that invasion would be made by the Russians by way of the famous port of Monterey, and transmitted the order of the court to the Vesitador, bidding him to make an expedition by sea toward the threatened port. The Vesitador, be thinking himself of the difficulties of a maritime expedition, and being desirous of exploring the province, sent two expeditions, one by sea and the other by land." From this, it appears that Croy was far from ordering the occupation of Alta California, which Galvez in fact carried out. Perhaps because he and himself intended to do very much more than the instructions called for, Galvez reserved the answer to Croy for more than two weeks. In the meantime, he reached Samblas on May 13, and on the 16th called the junta to discuss the expeditions to Monterey. Not until May 20 did he write to Croy of his plans. The letter follows. In fulfillment of his majesty's order, communicated to you on January 23 by the Marques de Grimaldi concerning repeated attempts which the Russians have made to open communication with North America, and in consequence also of what you commanded in your letter of April 30, in closing a copy of the above mentioned order, and recalling to mind the many conversations and reflections which we have previously had concerning the supreme importance and utility of taking possession of the Port of Monterey and establishing a procedural there, I am obeying your order to take such measures as I deem fitting for reaching that place by land or sea. As you leave to me discretion for the fulfillment of this order, it has seemed to me both fitting and necessary that I should inform you from here of the resolution which it was thought proper to take in this weighty matter." Thus cleverly did Galvez associate Croy with the enterprise. Before Croy could have had time to reply to him, the Vesitador embarked on May 24 for Baja California. In any event, the viceroy was heartily in favor of the project, and so too was the government in Madrid as soon as it was apprised of the matter. It remains to say that the Department of San Blas, from its very inception, served primarily as a supply depot for the Californias, and its relations to Sonora were by comparison rather slight. Doubtless Galvez had intended from the first that it should turn out that way. The Russian emergency was merely an incident in the long chain of foreign aggressions, real or imaginary, which had for nearly two centuries been the principal and the continuing cause of Spanish frontier advance, and the reported encroachments on this occasion were not more dangerous than those of other times. The true cause for the occupation of Alta California, which soon followed in 1769, was the permanent, not the immediate, foreign danger, together with the appearance of a man who, for all his faults, was endowed with the energy and administrative capacity that the enterprise required. The story of Galvez's activities in Baja California may be quickly reviewed or passed over in silence. Leaving San Blas on May 24th, 1768, he was driven back and forth by storms, and it was not until July 5th, 40 days later that he was able to set foot in the peninsula. Thus again were the difficulties of the short voyage across the Gulf demonstrated. For nearly 10 months thereafter, he remained in Baja California, reorganizing the government in the missions and preparing the expeditions to San Diego and Monterey. He had expected to find vast stores of wealth in the peninsula, for he shared the general belief at the times that the Jesuits had tried to conceal its resources in gold, silver, and pearls. No doubt, he soon disabused himself with this belief for, now that the pearl fields had failed to yield so richly as in the past, there was very little readymade or easily acquired wealth to be had in Baja California. Indeed, the settlements were in a wretched state. The military commissaries who succeeded the Jesuits had mismanaged the mission estates, epidemics had swept away hundreds of Indians, there was a revolt of the Indians in the south, and all in all there was a situation of dire economic distress. It is said that the total population of the peninsula had sunk to fewer than 8,000 souls. Nevertheless, Galvez was not discouraged. If he said little henceforth about the wealth of Baja California, he many times emphasized the strategic importance of both that territory and all to California. His experience must have confirmed him all the more in his original belief, however, that Sonora was the true center from which all the lines of advance to the northwest should radiate. The peninsula was not and could not be made to become a suitable storehouse for the advantage of Alta California. Indeed, Galvez had only visited Baja California, so he said at a later time, in order to occupy himself pending the advancement or the conclusion of the campaign in Sonora. As for the expeditions to Alta California, he threw himself into them with all possible vigor, drawing also upon the leading officials in Baja California to take part in them. Gaspar de Portola, governor of the province, was slated for the command, and Father Uniparo Sara, who had only recently arrived to take over the former Jesuit missions, was appointed president of the new missions to be founded in Alta California. Indeed, Father Sara was named without any prior inquiry as to whether the post would be acceptable and without any chance to refuse. The whole plan met with his enthusiastic approval, however, though his superiors at the College of San Fernando vigorously opposed it, yielding only because they could not do otherwise. But, though Portola and Sara ably seconded the Vesitador in his efforts, it is to Galvez who had conceived the idea of the expeditions in the first place, that the chief credit is due for organizing them and starting them on their way. Arrangements were made for two expeditions by land and two by sea. Boats for the latter were procured by taking over the San Carlos and the San Antonio, otherwise Principe, which had been built to facilitate transport for the Sonora War. Livestock, provisions, and needed utensils were levied upon the missions of the peninsula. Indeed, all that they could spare and in some cases more than that was taken. To increase the military forces, orders were sent to Colonel Elizondo and Sonora, bidding him detach a company of 25 Catalan soldiers for service in Alta California. In November, 1768, these men reached the peninsula under the command of Lieutenant Pedro Fagas, later to become one of the greatest of the Spanish governors of Alta California. The San Carlos reached La Paz in December, but it had been so badly beaten by storms that it was already in a leaky condition. It was necessary to unload and careen the boat and then to load it again. Galvez superintended these tasks in person and often gave a hand in the actual labor of lading, thus greatly inspirating the men. On January 9th, 1769, the tiny little craft, for it was a ship of about 200 tons birthing at last set sail. In all, there were 62 men aboard, including Vicente Vila, the commander, Fagas and his Catalan's, and the engineer and diarist Miguel Constanzo. Among the others were two blacksmiths and a baker for the proposed settlements. Also, a quantity of church ornaments, agricultural tools, provisions, and seeds were carried. Galvez, on the Concepción, accompanied the San Carlos as far as Cape San Lucas. There, he saw the San Carlos double the cape and strike for the North. Galvez now gave his attention to the San Antonio. Upon its arrival at Cape San Lucas on January 25th, it was thought best to unload it and careen it, just as had been done in the case of the San Carlos. Not until February 15th did the San Antonio get underway. In addition to crew and cargo, some blacksmiths and carpenters were taken along. Juan Perez, a native of Mallorca and a former master of the Manila Galleon, was in command. He was now to be, for several years, the principal maritime figure in the annals of Alta California. The total number of those on board has not been recorded. Turning to the land expeditions, Galvez sent out a first detachment under Captain Fernando de Rivera y Moncada, who had been in Baja California for more than a decade and was later to become a governor of the Northern Province. With him went 25 soldiers, three militares and 42 Christian Indians, who it was believed might prove useful, both as interpreters and as assistants in converting the natives of the North, besides performing the drudgery of the expedition. Father Juan Crespe, a native of Mallorca, intimate friend of Sara, and one of the more notable of the Franciscans in Alta California in ensuing years, was also with Rivera. Gathering nearly 400 domestic animals from the missions as he went along, besides implements and provisions, Rivera made his way to Santa Maria de Los Angeles, then the most northerly mission. Finding insufficient pasture for his animals, he moved on to Velikota, situated in 30 degrees, about 150 miles due south of San Diego. From this point, he started for Alta California on March 24th. Meanwhile, the second land expedition under Governor Portala had departed from Loretto on March 9th. As eventually made up, his party included Father Sara, Sergeant Jose Francisco de Ortega, nine or 10 soldiers, two servants of Portala and Sara and 44 Baja California natives. Sara made the journey under difficulties, being troubled with an ulcer in his foot and leg, but he declined to be left behind. On May 14th, they founded the mission of San Fernando de Velikota, having reached that place the same day. On the 15th, Portala set out over Rivera's route to San Diego. One further expedition was sent beyond the four originally planned. This went out on the San Jose, which had been built especially for voyages to the Northwest Coast. Nevertheless, like its predecessors, it had to be overhauled and repaired when it reached the peninsula in February. In May, the San Jose carried the Vecitador across to Sonora, once it returned to Loretto and sailed for San Diego on June 16th. According to one account, the ship was never heard from again. According to another, it was so badly damaged by storms that it returned to San Blas for repairs at length that departed for the North from Cape San Lucas in May 1770. In either case, the boat was lost with all on board. How many there were remains unknown. A volume of fascinating narrative might well be written about the experiences of the Argonauts of 1769. Here, unfortunately, it is impossible to give way to this very natural desire. The San Antonio, though it had started more than a month later than the San Carlos, was the first to reach San Diego, dropping anchor at that port on April 11th after a voyage of 55 days. All on board, except the two friars, were sick or disabled, but no lives had been lost. 18 days later, the San Carlos arrived on April 29th for a voyage which a modern steamer would make in several days. The San Carlos had taken no fewer than 110 days. Everybody on board was sick, and 24 of the crew, all but two of them, had died of the scurvy. On May 14th, Rivera's party got in. He had required 51 days and a march of some 400 miles to come from Veliketa. Some of the Indians had died and a number of others had deserted. Occasionally, the natives along the route had shown a disposition to resist or annoy the party, but the noise of gunpowder provided a quick remedy for this source of trouble. The lack of water and a feed for the animals was a much more serious difficulty. Port de la's march almost duplicated Rivera's, but on the whole was easier since he was not burdened with the care of so many domestic animals. On the 1st of July, his party reached San Diego having been on the road 48 days from Veliketa. Port de la's says some of the Indians had died, but no other lives were lost. Only 12 of his 44 Indians reached San Diego, however. The rest had died or deserted. Thus were the expeditions reunited at San Diego, but many of the individuals who had started from Baja California were no longer included. Counting the men on the ill-fated San Jose, perhaps something fewer than 300 men had made up the original expeditions, about half of whom reached Alta California. A fourth of all who started had lost their lives. Such was the toll to the perils of land and sea. The situation at San Diego was one which might have discouraged a less stout-hearted soldier than Governor Port de la. Many were sick. Indeed, of those who had come by sea, hardly any were well. This might have been faced with more equanimity were it not that provisions were running low. Nevertheless, as one historian has put it, quote, the governor at once applied himself to preparations for continuing the journey to Monterey. For discouraging as the situation was at San Diego rendezvous, he did not by any means justify the abandonment of the enterprise at that point. Port de la was a true soldier in spirit, as well as in training. In his view, nothing excused him from the performance of duty so long as there was a possibility of discharging it, end quote. It was therefore decided that the San Antonio should return for supplies and to report the success thus far attained. Only eight sailors of the 28 who had made the Northward voyage on that ship were able to go to sea. With this scant crew, Perez left for the South on July 9th. It was also arranged that the San Carlos should sail for Monterey as soon as there should be enough sailors in help to man it. Port de la himself was to go overland through an utterly unknown country to Monterey. On July 14th, he started, accompanied by Costanzo, Fagas, and six of his Catalan soldiers who alone of the 25 were able to march. Captain Rivera and Sergeant Ortega with 26 soldiers, Fathers Crespi and Gomez, seven militias, 15 Baja California Indians, and two servants of Port de la and Rivera, or a company of 63 in all. The account of their long and terrible march and indeed of all the experiences of the expeditions is well set forth in a brief narrative by Port de la. This was written several years later in September 1773 by the hand of Juan Manuel de Viniegra, a former secretary of Galvez who set it down as a statement of Port de la in a conversation with an unnamed friend, presumably Viniegra. Quote, while I was passing my friend through the missions established by the Jesuits to that one on the frontier named Santa Maria, we experienced no hardships worth mentioning, neither I nor my companions. For in addition to the fact that we took from the precede of vegetables and delicacies in exchange for the lamentations of the settlers, we were fortunate enough to be able to sleep under roofs and make the march with some comfort. In consideration of the great deserts into which I was going and of the Russian hunger with which I foresaw we were going to contend, I was obliged to seize everything I saw as I passed through these poor missions, leaving them to my keen regret as scantily provided for as I knew the three Southern ones had been left in consequence of the orders given by the Vecita door for dispatching the packet boats, San Carlos and San Antonio to the port of Monterey. Thus equipped, I began my march to the bay named San Diego in company with 30 soldiers with the Presidio and many Indian auxiliaries. But friend, in a few days we saw with extreme regret that our food was gone with no source of supplies and left we should turn back. As a result, some of the Indians died and the rest of them deserted from natural necessity. So I was left alone with the curiosors. Without stopping the march, we went on lamenting now to the mountains to kill geese and rabbits, and now to the beach for clams and small fish, and then in search of water, which we did not find for three or four days, the animals going twice that long without drinking as we ourselves did sometimes. Overcoming these and other innumerable hardships, natural results of such unhappy fortune, we arrived at the port of San Diego, the spot at which the expeditionaries by land and by sea were to meet in accordance with the instructions of the Vecita door in Aral to recount to one another the great events which had happened to us and the discoveries incident to our journeys. The members of the sea expedition limited their account to the statement that the San Carlos had been 110 days and her consort 59 days in sailing 150 leagues because the headwinds from the North and Northwest are lords of those coasts throughout the year. Being attacked by scurvy, 34 persons died on the two vessels and they saw nothing on their voyage, save some islands so bare and terrible that they could not look at them without horror. In the face of these unfavorable reports and of the similar one which we gave to them, I called the council of the officers and it was resolved by them that the packet boat San Antonio should return to the port of San Blas for provisions and men. Then, leaving the San Carlos in San Diego with two men and the missionary, the sick being placed under a hut of poles which I had erected, I gathered the small portion of food which had not been spoiled in the ships and went on by land to Monterey with that small company of persons or rather say skeletons who had been spared by scurvy, hunger and thirst. We reached Monterey after struggling 38 days against the greatest hardships and difficulties for aside from the fact that there was an all-at-ungracious country through which we passed after leaving the frontier, no object to greet either the hand or the eye save rocks, brushwood and rugged mountains covered with snow. We were also without food and did not know where we were for although the signs whereby we were to recognize the port were the same as those set down by General Sebastiano Biscayno and his log, the fact is that, without being able to guess the reason, we were all under hallucination and no one dared assert openly that the port was indeed Monterey. In this confusion and distress, friend, not under compulsion from the Russians but from keen hunger, which was wearing us out, we decided to return to San Diego for the purpose of recuperating our strength by means of the provisions which we judged would soon arrive there on the San Antonio. In order that we might not die meanwhile, I ordered that at the end of each day's march, one of the weak old mules which carried our baggage and ourselves should be killed, the flesh we roasted or half fried in a fire made in a hole in the ground. The mule being thus prepared without a grain of salt or other seasoning for we had none, we shut our eyes and fell to on that scaly mule, what misery, like hungry lions. We ate 12 in as many days, obtaining from them perforce all our sustenance and all our appetite, all our delectation. At last we entered San Diego smelling frightfully of mules. The Reverend Father President said to me, as he welcomed me, you come from Rome without having seen the Pope, alluding to the fact that we had not found the port of Monterey. We remained at San Diego nine months waiting on the San Antonio, subsisting for that long period on geese and the fish and other food which the Indians brought us in exchange for clothing. Some of the soldiers were left with barely enough clothing to cover their backs, having given up the rest to avoid perishing from want. We planted a small quantity of corn in the best soil, but although it grew well, the birds ate the best of it while it was yet soft, leaving us all disappointed in bereft of the hope we had cherished of eating the grain which our own hands had sown. After nine months our troubles were somewhat lessened by the arrival of the packet boat San Antonio. Four, although nearly the entire crew had died of scurvy, we got very particular consolation out of the corn, flour and rice which it brought. The captain of the vessel represented to me the impossibility of continuing his voyage on account of the loss of man and the bad condition of his vessel. But he nevertheless set sail with provisions from Monterey, leaving at San Diego what was necessary for the missionary and the eight soldiers who remained as an escort. With the 16 remaining fusiliers and presidial soldiers, I began the second journey to the Sat Four Monterey. On this occasion, determining without mistake that we had found the port which Sebastian Viscaino drew in detail in his log, we set up our camp, the San Antonio dropping anchor eight days later. I was not ignorant of the fact that the king of Spain had for centuries been owner and legitimate lord of those lands, but friend, as article eight of the instructions of the Facetator General gave me to understand to the contrary, I repeated the formalities of taking legal possession which were therein ordered. In fulfillment of other orders, I proceeded to erect a fort to occupy and defend the port from the atrocities of the Russians who were about to invade us as was to be inferred from the terms of the instructions. Indeed, owing to the indefatigable zeal of the engineer Don Miguel Costanzo, we completed within 30 days the Royal Fortress which was built of poles and earth. It was equipped with some small cannon and manned with 20 men, including the missionary for whom we built a house as well out of the same material as the port. The mission received the glorious name of our August sovereign, and the other two missions situated at moderate distances were called San Fernando and San Buena Ventura. Being desirous of complying with all of the orders of the Facetator General, I went also to reconnoiter the port of San Francisco, 60 leagues distance. I did not linger there, nor did I see anything worthy of description there, save only a labyrinth of bays and channels which inundate the territory. Having returned to Monterey, I soon embarked for San Blas on the coast of New Spain where, happily, I shortly arrived, for on the return voyage one travels as fast as Sancho Ponzo would have liked. You must be weary, friend, of listening to all the plagues which I encountered on my journey, but believe me also when I say that the unhappy Spaniards whom I left in those new settlements are present enduring the same discomforts. I reported them all to the viceroy in the Facetator General in official and confidential letters. Without reserve, I explained to them that it was impossible to send aid to Monterey by sea and still more so by land unless it was proposed to sacrifice thousands of men and huge sums of money. Proofs of this fact are in the story of the packet boat San Jose, which, having left San Blas three years ago to carry us provisions, has not yet appeared, nor has any newsman had ever, doubtless because all of her crew were attacked with scruvy and no one was left to steer the ship away from disaster. I make into my conversation, finally, by replying to the questions which you asked at the beginning. The natives of California are so gentle that we never had to defend ourselves. The minds of gold and silver and other rich products foretold to us in advance advices we never saw nor found, as our first care was to hunt for meat to keep from starving. Even if Monterey is at last fairly well fortified and California should, through any extravagant desire, be coveted by the Russians, there are still many other ports which, being undefended by troops or fortifications, could not oppose them and where they may freely establish themselves if they desire. Farewell, friend, your affectionate portala, end quote. It only remains to comment upon and elaborate certain portions of this story, passing over some of the minor details in which it varied a little from the facts. Portala and his men reached the mouth of the Salinas River on the bay of Monterey on September 30th, 1769. They were in some doubt as to whether they might already have passed the wonderful port described by Viscaino and, besides, provisions were scarce and 17 men were unfit for active duty. Nevertheless, said Constanso, quote. All the officers voted unanimously that the journey be continued as this was the only course that remained, for we hoped to find, through the grace of God, the much desired port of Monterey and in it the packet San Jose, which might relieve our needs. And if God willed it that in the search for Monterey we should all perish, we would have performed our duty towards God and man, cooperating to the death for the success of the undertaking upon which we had been sent, unquote. Here surely was no weakness. It was at this time, therefore, and not later, as one might have inferred from Portala's narrative, that the journey up the San Francisco Peninsula was made. On October 31st, they saw the Gulf of Faleronis to the Northwest and noting some white cliffs and an opening between them into what, in fact, is Bolinas Bay, believed that they were looking upon Drake's Bay, called by them the Bay of San Francisco. The next day, Sergeant Ortega, who all along had commanded the scouts in the vanguard, was sent out with orders to reach Drake's Bay if possible. Almost certainly, Ortega and his men, on this day, November 1st, 1769, reached the Golden Gate and saw part of the Great Bay of San Francisco as it was eventually called within. Later, Ortega was sent up the eastern shore of the bay and may have reached Alameda Creek. In the light of past dreams of Anyan, it is at first thought surprising that the discovery was received with so little enthusiasm. Indeed, it occasioned bitter disappointment. Two things must be remembered, however. The men were sick and starving and they had been sent out not to find the Strait of Anyan but the Port of Monterey. This clearly was not Monterey. Indeed, it might be Drake's Bay, in which case, as all now agreed, they had passed the port discovered by this Cayeno. They were dispirited too because the hope on which they had sustained themselves that they would find the San Jose was now gone for there were no signs of that vessel. Port de la was particularly unimpressed. After Ortega and his men had made known the vast reaches of the Great Bay, Port de la was able to write in his diary that they had found nothing. And to the soldierly Port de la, this was a literal truth, for they had seen nothing of the thing which he had been ordered to find, the Port of Monterey. On November 11th, therefore, the return march was begun. More than 10 weeks later, on January 24th, 1770, they approached San Diego, wondering if they would find anything left of the settlement there. That day they staggered into camp, rejoiced that their comrades were still alive. Some had died of scurvy, however, and not one of them had escaped having the disease. Furthermore, the Indians had been troublesome and on August 15th had rushed the camp. It had been necessary to kill several of them. Worst of all, the San Jose had not put in appearance at all and the San Antonio had not yet returned. The situation as regard supplies was therefore serious. Many a man in Port de la's place would have felt justified in abandoning Alta California at this point. But this gallant officer thought only of his orders. He had been required to occupy the Northern Territory and meant to hold it until the last moment compatible with the safety of his forces. It was resolved to send Rivera back to the peninsula for supplies in order to make it possible to hold this port longer, according to Port de la. This he did, said Constanzo, writing at a later time, lest he should incur such discredit as would result from his abandonment of San Diego. The situation was a little less than desperate, however, and the fortunate appearance of the San Antonio on March 23rd may very well have averted an early abandonment. Footnote. A legend has sprung up, having its origin in Paolo's Vida, published in 1787, that Port de la would have abandoned Alta California but for the pleadings of Sarah. Eventually, it is said, that Port de la set a date beyond which he would not remain. The day before this ultimate date, the San Antonio was cited, though it did not get into port until four days later. This story is unsupported by a shred of contemporary evidence. The facts are reviewed in Chapman, the founding of Spanish California, 98 to 101. One further fact should be noted. Rivera was sent to Baja California for supplies so that Port de la and his men might continue to hold this port, San Diego, longer. Rivera departed on February 10th. It had taken Port de la 48 days, merely to come with a light party from Veliketa to San Diego. How was Rivera to go far to the south of Veliketa, gather supplies and return to San Diego with a heavy mule train in 38 days? It seems likely that Palo's story was an unmerited slander on Port de la, told with a view to the exaltation of Sarah. As for Rivera, he got back to San Diego in July with 80 mule loads of provisions and a small herd of cattle. Under the circumstances, this was making good time, all that could have been expected. Into footnote. The arrival of the San Antonio changed the face of matters. Port de la now decided to go north again in search of Monterey. The San Antonio was dispatched to the north on April 16th and Port de la started by land the next day. The governor was the first to arrive. On May 24th, he came to the rendezvous agreed upon in Monterey Bay. Satisfied now that this, after all, was the so-called good port discovered by Vizcaino. Perez came in a week later with the San Antonio. On June 3rd, 1770, the Presidio and Mission of Monterey were formally inaugurated. Port de la's task was now done. He had been ordered to return to New Spain as soon as the beginning of the settlements had been made, turning over command to Fagas. Accordingly, on July 9th, Port de la, accompanied by Constanzo, sailed with Perez on the San Antonio, landing at Samblas on the 1st of August. Shortly afterwards, he was promoted to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy and in 1776 was made Colonel and Governor of Puebla, New Spain. Taking possession of his government in 1777, he remained at that post until 1784 when he was succeeded by Jacobo de Ogarte and ordered to return to Spain. Then, in his 61st year, Port de la passes off the scene so far as present records go. Perez and Constanzo had hastened to Mexico City from Samblas with Port de la's dispatches. Arriving there on August 10th, 1770, they brought news of the success of Galvez's enterprise. For a year and a half, little if anything had been heard from it, and the reports which now came in must have been particularly agreeable in the light of Galvez's unsatisfactory record, as matters turned out, in Sonora. Bells were rung, flags displayed, and a special high mass was celebrated. Altacalifornia had been occupied and the fame of Galvez was secure. Footnote. In addition to the standard authorities and the already cited works of Priestley and Chapman, the translations of original narratives and diaries in the first two volumes of the publications of the Academy of Pacific Coast History are worthy of special mention among the materials for this chapter. In the footnote. End of chapter 17. Chapter 18. A history of California, the Spanish period. This libravox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 18. The pacification of Sonora. The strategic center in Galvez's plans, even for the settlements in Altacalifornia, was the province of Sonora, near the frontiers of which the future capital of the common-dancy general was designed to be placed. That province had been reduced to sad straits as a result of nearly 20 years of continuous war. The population had seriously declined. For example, Primaria Alta, which had had 1,315 civilized inhabitants in 1763, fell away to 178 in 1769. Even southern Sonora had been affected. Prior to the Pima Revolt of 1751, there had been 57 settled branches in the Ostomuri district. Two decades later, there were only four. In the rest of Sonora, over 40 mining settlements had been deserted, and but two out of a prior number of 125 ranches still had white inhabitants. The presence of the Jesuits in the province had not served to check disorder after the suppression of the Pima Revolt. Indeed, the constant bickerings between them and the other white elements only increased the evil of the times, especially since the missionaries had now lost all control over the Indians. It was therefore an advantage to the province when they were supplanted by the Franciscans of the Colleges of Queretro and Jalisco. The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 took place without warning in Sonora, as elsewhere, with the result that it was not until 1768 that their successors arrived. The Queretro and Friars took over Primaria and the Haliscans received the rest of Sonora while Sinaloa was put in charge of the secular clergy. Henceforth, the religious were to exercise only spiritual jurisdiction. The Friars were not satisfied with this arrangement, but at any rate, whether due to the change or not, there was a cessation, for a while, of revolts by Christianized Indians. It remained to deal with the hostile tribes of the unconverted and to introduce the settlers who should maintain permanent peace. Galvez had entertained the highest hopes of the outcome of Elizondo's campaign. That officer and his army of more than a thousand men were expected in short time to pacify Sonora and then pass on to Nueva Vizcaya to deal with the Apaches. In other words, a successful military campaign was to be the indispensable preliminary to the inauguration of Galvez's project of the common Nancy General. Julian de Ariaga, the enlightened secretary of the Indies in Spain and the King were among those who were not sanguine at the success of Galvez's plan and the event proved that they were right. Footnote. Julian de Ariaga, secretary of the Indies from 1750 or 1751 to 1776 is one of the figures in the background of California history who has yet to receive the attention that has due his achievements. Spain's great 18th century spurt in the Northwestward conquest came during his rule and the decline followed immediately upon his death in 1776. In footnote. Elisondo reached Weimus on March 10th, 1768 and soon afterward made an attack on the Indian enemies, Ceres and Pimas in that vicinity. The latter fled to the mountain fastnesses of the Cerro Prieto, where it was impossible to pursue them, though a 10 day search was made. In June, the Spaniards attacked the Cerro Prieto from three sides, but the Indians eluded them. The same thing happened when another attempt was made in October and then again in November. Royal orders of November and December called for a cessation of these expensive campaigns and for the use of conciliatory methods, but Croy and Galvez were too deeply committed to draw back and found an excuse to allow the war to go on. The Spaniards were nothing if not persistent for they assaulted the Cerro Prieto for a fifth time in February, but without result. After a year's campaign, virtually nothing had been accomplished. As late as February, 1769, while he was still in Baja California, Galvez was giving orders for a war of extermination against the rebellious Indians. But by the time of his arrival in Sonora in May, he had learned of the royal orders and decided to try the effects of an offer of amnesty. A period of 40 days from May 8th was given in which the Indians might surrender and it was intimated that they would suffer dire consequences after that date if they neglected the opportunity. The 40 days passed, but few Indians accepted the edict and 10 more days were added and later another 25, but the Indians remained hostile. Galvez had, meanwhile, been attending with more or less success to some of the minor projects in preparation for the Coma Dancy General. What he might have done if he had retained his health can only be conjectured. It is more than likely that he would have found a way to overcome obstacles just as he had in sending out the Alta California expeditions and would have brought about an advance to the Gila and Colorado rivers and the establishment of communications with Monterey. If that is so, it is well for the ultimate possessor of California, the United States, that Galvez fell desperately ill. Early in June he began to develop fever and chills and he was not wholly well again until after he had left the frontier. Before he was at his worst, however, he directed several other attacks against the Indians, one of them in October being another fruitless assault on the Cerro Prieto. This was Galvez's last effort as a general in the field, for he now became incapacitated through ill health. Galvez's first serious illness occurred in August. Believing that he was about to die, he wrote to Croy on the 22nd, reiterating his feelings of personal friendship for the viceroy and commending his subordinate officers to the latter's attention. Yet the greater part of his letter concerned the expeditions to Alta California. It is at least interesting that what Galvez expected to be his dying request was a plea to Croy to protect the new establishments of San Diego and Monterey. He soon recovered, but periodically broke down and at last in the middle of October his mind gave way altogether. From that time until the end of the following March he was rarely in sound mental condition. His faithful secretaries, Arguello, Armona, Azanza, Beleña, and Viniegre, tried to conceal the nature of his disease, but it was noise to broad in spite of them. Temporarily, too, the affairs of Sonora received a setback for nobody but Galvez had authority to execute certain decisions, and he was no longer able to do so. In this emergency, three of the secretaries, Arguello, Azanza, and Viniegre, felt it incumbent upon them to inform the viceroy that Galvez had met with civil death. There can be no doubt that they were acting for the best interests of the service in doing this, and that they were personally devoted to the vestidor. Thus, in contemporary letters to one another, there are the most sincere expressions of sorrow over the condition of their dearly beloved father and illustrious chief, who seemed to have lost that which in other times had caused wonder in all who had consulted him, or, in the somewhat plainer words of Armona, is beautiful reason. Nevertheless, when the vestidor was restored to health, he turned vindictively upon his former devoted friends and companions, to whose care he undoubtedly owed his life, because they had reported his illness to the viceroy who had, in turn, mentioned it in his correspondence with the court. The three secretaries were deprived of their employment and thrown into prison, where they were visited by another of the vestidor secretaries who demanded that they retract their statements about Galvez's loss of reason. For several years they were made thus unjustly to suffer. It is perhaps poetic justice that Galvez's ungenerous act should have rebounded upon himself, for in their endeavors to clear themselves, the secretaries furnished indisputable proofs of Galvez's malady. One of the secretaries, Ozanza, made his formal entry as viceroy, 30 years later, in the very town where Galvez had imprisoned him. While the vicetador was bereft of reason, he exhibited a most extraordinary megalomania. This appears from the account of Viniegra, who supplied it in response to commands of the higher authorities, quote, saying nothing, as he put it, about those incidents that may offend the ears and that are not needed to prove the nature of his misfortune, unquote. Referring to Galvez's first burst of insanity in October 1769, Viniegra says, quote, on this day, with all clearness, he displayed the solemn upsetting of his understanding, calling to Sergeant Major Don Matias de Armona at two o'clock in the morning to tell him that Don Francisco de Assis, St. Francis, had just brought him some papers by which he had learned of the ignorance of the officers in the war that was being waged against the Indian enemies. As for the Indians, he was going to destroy them in three days for merely by bringing 600 apes from Guatemala, dressing them as soldiers and making them run around the Cerro Prieto, he would easily cause the enemies within a distance of many leagues to flee. After this ridiculous sally, he came out of his room and went to the barracks where there were nearly a thousand men. He shook hands with them and asked them to be his comrades and friends, inviting them to share in the treasure of the expedition. And in fact, he gave a verbal order at the treasury to give every soldier as much money as he should ask for. And this was done in some cases when it was found necessary to suspend this measure immediately for the house of the treasurer had transformed itself into that of a grand jubilee, jubileo plenísimo. We went to dinner and in the space of two hours he said 2,000 mad things in the presence of many officers of rank in their dependence. Among other things, he said that if anyone should make comment upon his measures, he would put his head at the feet and burn it on a pyre without accepting Colonel Don Domingo Elizondo, who was present from this preposterous design. He asserted that our Lord the King had already ordered the removal from the guía de Forasteros, Guide for Strangers, the entry about the Supreme Council of the Cámara Chamber of the Indies, putting this clause in place of all that respectable body, Council and Cámara of the Indies, the Vesitador General of New Spain, end quote. On another occasion, says Viniegra, quote, he called himself and held himself to be the King of Prussia, Charles XII of Sweden, the Protector of the House of Bourbon, a Councilor of State, Deputy of the Admiral of Spain, an immortal, and, though it seemed impossible, Saint Joseph, the venerable Palafox, and what is more than all, the Eternal Father and an infinity of other persons with whose character at every moment he invested himself, wishing to perform the functions corresponding to them, even to the celebrating of the final judgment by means of the divine word, end quote. Among other things that Viniegra details, we find Galva's making a cast, mestizo, Governor of Sonora, and investing him with the staff of office. He made Teodoro, Decroy, nephew of the Marquez Decroy, Viceroy of New Spain, and Armona, Commandant General of the New Commandancy. He wrote reams of orders and decrees, according to the solicitations of anybody who asked for them. He ordered heads cut off, including that of the Viceroy. He planned a canal from Mexico City to Weymus for ships of deep drop. He gave decorations, titles of nobility, bishoprics, and even empires with a lavish hand. He set fire to his room and burned his clothing, and then appeared naked in the window to preach to the Indians, assuring them that he was the emperor Montezuma, and that the Christian faith contained only two articles, belief in Our Lady of Guadalupe, and in Montezuma. And he wrote numerous papers, one of which he signed in his own hand, quote, Jose de Galvas, insane for this unhappy world, pray God for him that he may be happy in the next, unquote. It is small wonder that the projects of the Vesitador were not greatly furthered by his own presence in Sonora. Indeed, many things were delayed or left undone, for, sane or crazy, Galvas was still Vesitador and deputy of the Viceroy, and his signed documents were a difficult factor for his subordinates to get around. Toward the end of March, Galvas was able to leave Sonora for Mexico. He went by way of Chihuahua, which he reached on March 30th, 1770, and got to Mexico City late in May or early in June. Meanwhile, events were occurring on the frontier, which in fact tended toward doing away with the obstacles to an advance to the Gila and Colorado and beyond them to Monterey. One of these was the inspection of the frontier procedures by the Marques de Rubí. The Spanish authorities had frequently in the past shown that they understood the necessity of dealing with the frontier as a whole, as witnessed the already cited memorial of the Marques de Altamira in 1751, for warfare in one province inevitably involved the others. The secretary of the Indies, Julián de Areaga, seems to have reached this conclusion when he sent Rubí to the frontier to inspect the entire system of the procedios. Rubí was commissioned in 1765 and took up his work in January, 1766. In the next two years, he traversed the frontier from Texas to Sonora, even visiting the New Mexico salient. In his report of April 10th, 1768, he recommended the forming of a line of 17 procedios from Sonora to Texas. At the same time, seven other procedios and two provincial companies then in existence were to be dropped. This became a governmental program during the next eight years, arousing great hopes for a forthcoming pacification of the frontier. Though these hopes were destined to be vain, they encouraged the authorities to take action looking toward the long delayed Northwestward conquests. Furthermore, much real work was accomplished after 1771 to establish the system recommended by Rubí. The number of procedios on the line was cut down to 15, but certain others off the line, including two in Southern Sonora, though it was intended to dispense with them as soon as possible, were to be retained at least temporarily. By an appointment of December 4th, 1772, Hugo O'Connor became commandant inspector of the frontier provinces to establish the line. Subject only to the viceroy, he ruled there during the next four years and did creditable work in reducing the ills from which those provinces suffered. Following Galvez's incapacity from illness in October 1769, Elisondo again took charge of the campaign in Sonora. He at once instituted methods that were to serve the purpose to much better effect than the general attacks had done. Dividing his troops into small detachments, he caused them to wage an incessant guerrilla warfare against the Indians so that they had no time to search for food or gain sufficient rest. By gifts and cajolery too, other groups were persuaded to lay down their arms. All had submitted by May 1771. At last the war for the time being was over. The original plan for a descent upon Nueva Vizcaya was abandoned and in the fall of 1771, Elisondo and most of his men returned to Mexico. One obstacle to the advance to the Gila and Colorado now seems to have been diminished if not removed. Coincident with the termination of the military campaign, an event occurred which served better than bullets to make for peace. While pursuing a band of Indians in 1771, a detachment of Elisondo's army discovered the rich gold plasters of Cieneguia near Altar. Vast quantities of gold were found near the surface. There was an immediate rush to the scene and within a few months of the discovery over 2,000 men had reached there. Unlike the Arizona mine of other days, Cieneguia continued to yield richly for a decade and other mines in the neighborhood were worked to the end of the century and later. At about the same time, mines were discovered in other parts of Sonora. Huerta on the Yaki River was particularly rich. Between 1772 and 1776, it was the most flourishing place in the province. Indeed, the revenues of Cienguia and Huerta at this time were sufficient between them to support the entire province. Even the Indian infested Primaria district had been able to yield a profit of 77,277 pesos in 1770 before the discovery of the Cienguia mines, footnote. The value of the peso and cash was 50 cents. The purchasing power, however, was surely double that much as measured by present day standards at the very least in footnote. The troubles of Sonora as regard Indian wars, especially on the part of the Apaches, were not at an end, but from this time forth, there was a sufficiently great civilized population to ward off actual dangers, if not the fear of them. Meanwhile, important action had been taken directly affecting the discovery of a route from Sonora to Monterey. The Franciscans were eager to make a good showing in Primaria-Alta, to which they had succeeded in 1768, following the expulsion of the Jesuits. Therefore, there was a renewal of northward explorations and of projects for converting the Indians of the Heala, and even those as far away as Moki. Preeminent among the Geredarian friars of Primaria-Alta was a man whose achievements should be written large in history of exploration, Father Francisco Garces. Although the principal object in his journeys of exploration was the saving of souls, for in him, an apostolic zeal burned with an ardor comparable with that of his great predecessors in the Franciscan order. His results were of vast importance from the standpoint of plans for frontier advance. Garces took up his ministry in San Javier del Bac in June 1768. In August he started on the first of his tours of exploration, going through Papagaria, in the extreme northwest of Sonora, to the Heala. In 1769 he seems to have made an unimportant tour as chaplain. In 1770 he went forth again, between October 19th and November 2, from Bac to and along the Heala. On this journey he traveled among the Pimas of the Heala and the Opas, both of whom gave him a friendly reception. He reported that the Pimas were particularly worthy and were clamorous for the missionaries that he had promised when he visited them in 1768. They were far from being a savage people, had good fields of wheat and maize, and knew of God. The Opas were a much ruder, if equally kindly people. This exploration added fresh evidence of the accessibility of Alta California from Sonora, for the Pimas were much excited over accounts of people seen in the West the previous year. These they described in such a way that Garcesse realized they were referring to the soldiers of the 1769 expeditions to Alta California. A much more important journey was made by Garcesse from August to October 1771, and the information that he gained had great influence on the opinion of the junta, which eventually recommended Anza's first expedition. This journey to, more than any other, helped to determine the route of the subsequent expeditions. The details of the diary as to Garcesse's route might well have been very confusing to the junta, due to the fact that Garcesse mistook the Colorado for the Heala. In reality he went through Papagaria to the Heala, reaching it just above its junction with the Colorado, whether he was desirous of going. He went on past the junction of the rivers without realizing he had done so, and then traveled west and south along the Colorado, thinking he was on the Heala, and would in that way reach the junction. He crossed the Colorado, believing that he was crossing the Heala, and came upon a vast lagoon which he took to be the Colorado. He returned to the Colorado and ascended almost to the junction again without realizing how near he was to the place that he sawed. Then he returned through Papagaria. During his wanderings he visited and named many of the villages west of the Colorado, and reached the very canyon by which Anza's expedition was to make its way through the mountains. He had also journeyed west to the Heala Mountains in Papagaria, being the first known explorer to take that route, along which he later guided Anza. Of the obstacles impeding in advance in 1752, all but the Apaches and the disorders of the eastern provinces seemed now to have been cleared away. The Apaches, indeed, threatened the best of the routes to the northwest, from Tu-Bak to the Heala and down that river to the Colorado, but it was hoped that a new line of presidios would soon take care of them. There were minor uprisings in Sonora, too, after the end of El Asondo's campaign, but though at times in the next decade the situation seemed very bad, it never again got out of hand. If a desire for northwestward conquest still remained, and if capable leaders could be found, this seemed to be the moment when the much planned forward movement should take place. The desire for an advance had long existed, and now that Alta California had been occupied in a precarious and unsubstantial way, it was imperative that an overland route should be found. Fortunately, too, the right sort of leaders were at hand. One of them was the already mentioned pioneer explorer Father Garces. Another was the captain of the presidio of Tu-Bak, Juan Batista de Anza, under whose command the route to Monterey was to be discovered and utilized. In the background there was a third figure, greater than either, greater even than the Vesitador and certainly a more noble character. This was the man who, in 1771, succeeded Croy as viceroy, Antonio Maria Buccarelli e Arsua. In Buccarelli the struggling province in the far northwest was to find the greatest hero who has ever appeared in the field of California history. Footnote. This chapter is based principally on the already cited works of Priestley and Chapman. End of footnote. End of chapter 18. Chapter 19. A history of California, the Spanish period. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 19. The precarious footing of the early settlements in Alta California. The most vital period in the history of Alta California was that which embraced the years 1773 to 1776, when Buccarelli, the great viceroy, was taking those measures which put the struggling colonies of the North permanently on their feet. Next in importance, after these, came the periods from 1769 to 1773 and 1776 to 1781. It is the purpose of this chapter to deal with the earliest of these three periods or more particularly with the events of the years 1770 to 1773. Not so much in order to chronicle local happenings as to provide a setting for the activities of the viceroy who between 1773 and 1776 was to take the steps which saved the enterprise begun by Galvez. As already stated, Pedro Faguez succeeded to the authority of Porto La in Alta California following the latter's departure in July 1770. Strictly speaking, neither one had a right to be called governor while the expeditions were in Alta California. Don Gaspar had been succeeded in 1769 by Matias de Armona so that he could give his undivided attention to the conquest in the North. On Armona's departure from Baja California in 1770, Felipe Berry, arriving in 1771, became governor and he was succeeded in 1774 by Felipe de Neve who took possession in 1775. These men had little more influence in the North, however, than for example the governors of Sonora. It would be absurd to include Armona, Berry and Neve prior to his actual rule in the new establishments in the list of Alta California governors and yet omit Porto La, 1769 to 1770, Faguez, 1770 to 1774, and Rivera, 1774 to 1777. To all intents and purposes, the last three named were governors reporting directly to the viceroy and depending on their theoretical superior at Loreto only in the most shadowy way. They are therefore referred to as governors in the present work. In 1777, the titular ruler of the two Californias took up his residence in Monterey. Some difficulties arose in Alta California at the outset due to the fact that Faguez's powers were not precisely defined. Father Cera, president of the missions, insisted that Faguez had nothing to do with the activities of the friars, save for a restricted authority over the five or six soldiers constituting the guard of each mission. In other words, he contended that Faguez was in the position of a procedural commander and nothing more. Faguez, on the other hand, held that he had succeeded to the powers which had actually been exercised by Port de la and in particular that he should have something to say about the time and place for founding new missions. He was responsible for the defense and provisioning in the missions and as his means were limited, felt that any step which affected his duties in these respects must have his sanction. As neither Faguez nor Cera was of a yielding disposition, there soon developed a lack of harmony between them which, by 1772, assumed the proportions of a break. A further difficulty arose, though less serious than the other, as a result of Rivera's jealousy of Faguez. When Rivera returned from the peninsula in July 1770, he was not pleased to hear that Port de la had turned over his authority to Faguez instead of to him. Though he had been ordered to march to Monterey, he remained at San Diego. Early in 1772 he returned to New Spain. Thus, the struggling province had to suffer from a want of wholehearted cooperation. The difficulty was felt less in Alta California where both Faguez and Cera were sincerely doing the best they could than it was in Mexico City where decisions had to be made on the basis of conflicting reports. Meanwhile, Faguez had his way in Alta California. A much more vital problem was that of the defense of the province, which was inextricably involved with its spiritual conquest. Throughout a territory some 400 miles or more in extent, from San Diego to Monterey, there were in 1770 only 43 soldiers. Three years later this number had increased to 61. Over against this insignificant force, there was an incalculable number of Indians reaching far into the thousands. Moreover, they were not at all kindly disposed to the Spanish occupation. Indeed, thousands of them were distinctly opposed to it and only submitted because of their wholesome respect for Spanish weapons. There were several conflicts in these early years. Some took place between Villacota and San Diego on the route up the peninsula. And in 1770 there had been an affair at San Diego. Another fight occurred at San Gabriel in 1771 shortly after the founding of a mission there. The immediate cause of the last named outbreak illustrates the difficulties arising from the presence of the soldiery even though nothing could have been accomplished without them. The soldiers who were rough illiterate half-breeds, none of whom had brought a wife to Alta California, aimed too frequently at an undue familiarity with Indian women. Occasionally they would pretend to go hunting, but it was not the beasts of the field but rather the native women they sought. These sometimes they would lasso as a preliminary step in a not too gentle wooing. Some such thing took place at San Gabriel where the wife of the chieftain suffered. The angry husband shot an arrow at the guilty soldier who stopped it with a shield. In the fracas which followed the Indian chief was killed. His head was cut off by the Spaniards and set up on a pole as a warning to the Indians of the neighborhood. Despite the failure of justice represented by this event, it is said that the chief's own son was the first to present himself for baptism at the mission. In few of the missionary conquests attempted by the Spaniards in the New World were they for so long a time unsuccessful in winning converts as in Alta, California. The first year passed at San Diego without a single baptism. Indeed, there is no clear record of any before 1771. The mission of San Carlos Borromeo at Monterey, which was dedicated on June 3rd, 1770, witnessed its first baptism on December 26th. A year later the mission was moved a few miles south to Carmelo, but not for several years did it meet with much success. San Antonio and San Gabriel founded in 1771 and San Luis Obispo dating from 1772 encountered almost identical experiences. The Indians in the vicinity of the northern missions were less hostile than those of the south. Indeed, they were at times friendly but the Spaniards had very little in the way of material gifts in these early years with which to attract them. As for spiritual arguments, these made no impression whatsoever. The father superior of the College of San Fernando in Mexico, Rafael Virger, correctly represented the situation in various of his memorials of 1771. The missions of Alta, California hardly merited the name of mission he held. He had objected to their being founded by the missionaries of his college, but had been compelled to assent because Galvez desired it. He freely predicted that the missions would fail. Galvez would get the credit for having founded them, but the blame for their failure would be cast upon the Fernandine friars. Virger was somewhat nettle at the enthusiasm of Father Sera, expressing himself to the effect that it was necessary to moderate somewhat his ardent zeal. Late in the year 1771, Virger began at length to believe that success in Alta, California was possible, but pointed out that it was not safe to count too strongly on the docility of the Indians, for a sudden revolt could bring everything down in ruin. At the end of 1773, in the fifth year of the occupation, the state of the missions was still unsatisfactory, as will appear from the accompanying table. These slender results in such a populous field seem even more insignificant when analyzed. Total baptisms 491, total living 462, total marriages 62. Most of the converts thus far were children, so it was not possible to count on the Indian men to protect and further the work of the missionaries. The 62 marriages probably represented the total number of adult converts, which meant that an average of five or six a year at a mission had been obtained, though the three southern missions in fact had few or no adult neophytes. The situation was well illustrated by the case of the mission of San Luis Obispo. The Indians there were very numerous and were friendly to the Spaniards, but not a single adult convert had been obtained. The friars ascribed this to the abundance of food which the natives were able to procure, wherefore the Spaniards found it difficult to attract them to the mission. The principal causes of the backwardness of the missions were the same as those which affected the whole province. Lack of sufficient provisions, goods and effects, domestic animals, soldiers, and above all, lack of an adequate supply route from New Spain. The Spaniards in Alta California occupied a position resembling that of the Robinson Caruso of literature. They were set down in a land that was rich in potentialities, but lacking in the immediate requirements of civilized life. The problem of success, however, was distinctly an immediate matter for the least upset in supplying the province might result in undoing all that had been accomplished despite the brilliant prospects of a somewhat distant future. Naturally, the matter of food supply was vital to success. The dire straits of the expeditionaries at San Diego in 1769 to 1770 have already been chronicled. A similar situation developed in 1772. The supply ships were late in coming and when they did reach San Diego, it was found impossible to get them to Monterey. No doubt, because there were not enough sailors left alive or free of the scurvy to man them. Meanwhile, the missionaries in their desire to attract the Indians had been more liberal with gifts of food than the stock of supplies warranted. As a result, famine appeared for the second time in the history of the province. Serious disaster was averted by Governor Foggas, who engaged in the most celebrated bear hunt in the history of Alta California. For several days, he hunted in the neighborhood of what is now San Luis Obispo and supplied the northern settlements with meat, which kept them alive until a pack train could be sent up from San Diego. This incident was influential in the selection of San Luis Obispo as a site for the mission, which was established there shortly afterward in that same year. San Luis Obispo had proved its ability to provide food in an emergency, and the Indians were grateful for the killing of the bears. The question arises, why didn't the Spaniards raise crops and thus avert the danger of starvation? The answer is that they did the best they could. Such seed as they could get, they planted. But it was a rare chance when they got back anything more than their seed. They were not acquainted with farming and knew nothing of the actual possibilities or needs of the soil in this new land. At the end of 1773, San Gabriel was the only place in the province which even so much as gave promise of an eventual agricultural wealth. The growth of rich crops was one of those factors which inevitably belonged to the future. In the matter of manufactured articles, Alta California was, of course, altogether dependent on outside help for everything from a plow or a smithy's forge down to a piece of ribbon or a nail. Indeed, for many things that were all but vital to its existence, the province had to look beyond Mexico to Spain. For example, Sarah reported in 1773 that the only forge and only smith in Alta California were at Monterey, and in any event there was very little iron to work with. He also asked for two carpenters, one for the north and the other for the south. The need for domestic animals was twofold, to serve as food and as beasts of burden. About 500 had been taken from Baja California at the outset. A number had died on the march north from the peninsula, but enough remained to furnish Alta California with an element which it needed in order to survive and also give some hope for an eventual increase. The situation in these early years was at all times critical, however. This was due not only to the insufficient numbers of the animals, but also to the lack of animals for breeding purposes. Except for the milk that they gave, the animals were little used for food as they were too precious to be killed. But the colonists were almost often wholly dependent upon milk to keep themselves alive. Nevertheless, the need for pack animals received great emphasis. To mention only one important use of this character, a great many animals were required to carry a year's supplies from San Diego or Monterey to the three inland missions. Minor difficulties encountered were the theft of horses and cattle by Spanish deserters and the fondness of the unconverted Indians for meat, an appetite which they were want to indulge at the expense of the Spanish flocks. By the close of the year 1773, what with cows, sheep, goats, pigs, asses, bears, colts, horses, and mules, there were only 616 animals at the five missions and probably not very many besides in the keeping of the procedural garrisons of San Diego and Monterey. The situation was one which demanded remedy. The soldiers, on account of their bad conduct with the native women, were in a major, a handicap to mission work, but none more insistently than the friars themselves recognized the necessity for their presence. The still more important element for the future of the province was, if it could be obtained, that of permanent settlers. The total Spanish population in 1773 was made up of 61 soldiers, 11 friars, and an occasional mechanic temporarily in the province in the service of the government. There were no white laborers, no doctors, and most important of all, no women. Six soldiers had married native women, but the rest were without wives or else had left them in New Spain. Furthermore, the soldiers longed to escape this irksome service in a land which was so totally lacking in the things they enjoyed, and they frequently deserted. Invariably, however, they returned to camp, for death awaited them away from the supplies which came each year to San Diego and Monterey. The founding of missions was delayed because there were not soldiers enough to guard them. Thus, San Buena Ventura, at Preside Ventura, which the Spaniards had hoped to establish among the first, was postponed until 1782. Similarly, San Francisco and Santa Clara were delayed until 1776 and 1777. The founding of the two last-name missions was most insistently desired by the friars, the governor, and the viceroy during these years, but Fagas deemed it unwise to attempt it with the scant forces under his command. In November 1770, on his own initiative, he had tried to reach the old port of San Francisco, Drake's Bay, behind Point Reyes, by going around the great estuary, as he termed it, of what is today the Bay of San Francisco. He may have reached a point in the Berkeley Hills just north of the present university campus. Since his scouts reported that the estuary seemed to extend for an indefinite distance, Fagas turned his back because of his, quote, anxiety for the camp, the cultivation of the land, and the raising of the stock, end quote. In March 1772, he made a more ambitious attempt, accompanied by Father Crespi, 12 soldiers, a militia, and an Indian. He had orders to explore the port of San Francisco and establish a mission there, so as to secure that port from foreign occupation. Going up the eastern shore of the Bay region, Fagas and his men came at length to the San Joaquin River, and also saw the Sacramento from a point of vantage. Having reached the vicinity of Antioch, they felt obliged to give up their appointed task, for they lacked boats with which to cross the rivers and did not have enough supplies for such a long journey as now appeared necessary. So they cut through the mountains by way of the San Ramon, Amador, and Sun-Oil valleys, and found their way back to Monterey. No further attempt was made for some time to reach the port which Drake and Rodriguez Sermaino had visited, but attention gradually directed itself toward the infinitely superior estuary of San Francisco, which was soon to appropriate an exclusive right to the name formerly enjoyed by the more northerly port. In any event, the mission had to wait. The backward state of the Alta California settlements would not have been so serious if there had been an adequate supply route to the province. The direct sea route from San Blas continued to be as difficult as before. Thus the San Antonio in 1771 required 68 days for the voyage to San Diego and there were few aboard ship who escaped the scruvy. The problems in connection with the supply ships will be taken up more fully in a later chapter. For the present, it may suffice to say that the ships were too small and frail and the perils of the sea too great for families of colonists or herds of domestic animals to be set out in them. Indeed, such a plan seems never so much as to have been considered. The short voyage across the stormy gulf to Baja California was only slightly less difficult. Writing in August 1771, Father Berger said that five boats had already been lost that year in attempting to reach the peninsula. A sixth left San Blas on February 2nd and did not reach Laredo until August 23rd, having meanwhile been blown nearly to Panama. Baja California was, if anything, less able than ever to supply the provisions needed in Alta California. The peninsula had not recovered from the material setback it suffered at the time the Jesuits were expelled and, besides, it had already been stripped of more than it could well afford to make a beginning of the settlements in Alta California. Moreover, aside from the problem of the voyage across the gulf, Baja California was not even suitable as a route to San Diego and Monterey. This was most clearly set forth by Father Sera in 1773. On being informed that a suggestion had been made to do away with the supply ships and make use of mule trains to carry provisions and effects up the peninsula to Alta California, he pointed out that it would take 1,500 mules and 100 mule tiers and it would be impossible for such a number of animals to find food and drink on the desolate route to San Diego. There were not enough mules in both California's for this project, even if it had been possible. For three years, attempts had been made to supply the grave deficiency in this type of animal by shipping a number from the mainland provinces of New Spain, but these endeavors had met with no success. The situation in Alta California, therefore, was bad with hardly a single relieving feature. As late as February 1773, Buccarelli wrote to Ariaga that he might expect an early abandonment of the province. This eventuality most certainly would have developed if it had not been for the activities of the viceroy himself. Indeed, it was just at the moment when his pessimism was at its greatest that his measures for the northern province began to have effect. Obviously, the only escape for Alta California lay in the discovery of a better route over which the elements of permanence, families of settlers and domestic animals might come. Those acquainted with the problems of Alta California began more and more to point this out. Father Virger said that the only alternative to sending agricultural and pastoral laborers to Alta California would be to transport provisions from Sonora and he recommended that steps be taken to increase the number of pack animals in the new establishments so that they might be utilized for that purpose. Furthermore, he consented very easily to a surrender of the Baja California missions field to the Dominicans, provided the Franciscans of San Fernando should be accorded the right to develop a route from Sonora. Sarah, Baloo, and others held virtually the same views, though some Sarah included for a time favored the idea of a route from New Mexico. The engineer Costanzo, who had been in Alta California with Port de la, explained more clearly than anybody else the various factors in Alta California's problem of a supply route, alluding to the insufficiency of the direct sea route and the route up the peninsula and pointing out that the settlers and supplies which Alta California needed might well be sent from Sonora. Much the same views were expressed by Jose de Areche, the skull of the Audencia of Mexico. The project of a supply route from Sonora appealed to him, also because it might lessen the burden of expense which the government was undergoing on behalf of Alta California. The matter of expense was indeed one which attracted the attention of the royal government. From January 1768 to the end of 1773, over 570,000 pesos had been expended on behalf of the Californias and Samblas, of which Alta California had accounted for more than 250,000. The salt mines of Samblas earned 25,000 pesos a year, which was the sole return on the government's investment. Thus, there had been a net expenditure of 75,000 pesos a year. But this was not all. In addition, there was the cost of the goods sent from Mexico City, the contributions of the Pious Fund, and the application of the resources confiscated from the Jesuit missions of the peninsula, the figures for which are not at hand. This manifests the strategic importance attached by Spain to her possession of the Californias. For that country was not accustomed to spend money on unprofitable projects. On this very account, however, the government would have welcomed a means of escape from at least a part of its heavy expenditures. Therefore, the higher officials of the vice royalty turned hopefully to the idea of a new route to save Alta California from foreign occupation. End of chapter 19.