 I welcome members to the ninth meeting in 2015 of the Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee and, as usual, remind everyone to switch off mobile phones as they affect the broadcasting system. The first item today for the committee to agree to take agenda item 5 in private. This item is the consideration of a complaint against a cross-party group. The members agree to take this in private. The second item today is for the committee to take evidence on its inquiry into the election of committee conveners. We have today with us what I might reasonably describe as two old lags from the Parliament who have both been ministers, committee conveners and members, and, therefore, hopefully, have some good things to say to us, Hugh Henry and Michael Russell. Thank you very much for coming and giving up your time to help us in our deliberations. The way I normally conduct this is to go straight to questions. At the end, I will provide an opportunity for each of you to, at short length, perhaps provide us with any further comments that you wish to make that have not otherwise been covered in the questioning. That seems to work for us quite well. I will kick off the questioning. Most of the question is fairly obvious. I feel free to expand on the answers beyond what might appear to be the remit of the question, because we genuinely want to try to tap into as much as possible. Let me start with saying that we have elected conveners, enhanced power sharing and accountability between members, the Parliament, the Scottish Government and the people who elect us, who want to start. I think that in theory you could argue that, whether it would do so in practice, is debatable. I had floated the idea of elected conveners in late 2010, and, as I said in my submission to convener, I have changed my mind. I am not so sure now. I still think that the principle is a sound one, but I am not sure that you could look at that change in isolation from other changes that this Parliament would need to make. My starting point for any debate is about enhancing strengthening Parliament, its status, its standing and its effectiveness. There is a different argument about Parliament from arguments about Government and the role of Government, and indeed there is a different argument about Parliament from party politics. I have always said of you that whatever job I had to do, I would try and do it as effectively as I could. On behalf of the First Minister that appointed me, I realised that it was a party political aspect, and I did that. When I became a convener of a committee, my first responsibility was then to Parliament and not to either the party or the Government. I have been a committee convener both under a Labour-led Government and under an SNP administration. My job is on behalf of Parliament and its two-parliament. I think that, without straining into a wider debate convener, there are issues about the number of committees that we have, about the size of our committees to be able to be effective and robust. I think that there are constraints in relation to the size of the Parliament that actually has some limitations, not just on the committees but on whether we elect our convener. I suppose that you could argue that there are debates to be had about whether the public audit committee should be the only committee in the Parliament that has a Government convener. Indeed, you might want to think out of the box and consider whether, irrespective of the political composition of the Parliament, whether certain committees might have a non-Government majority. Because without having a second chamber to hold the Government to account, I think that we need to find other ways of revising, checking, constraining and reconsidering. All of those things need to be considered. Finally, and I was just saying to George Adam on the way in, we should also reflect and realise that, in historical terms, we are still a relatively young Parliament, we are developing and still maturing. I think that we need more time to be able to develop robust approaches where, I am not saying that we want to ape and mimic Westminster but there we have a larger Parliament with a longer history where, in committee terms, the committees can develop a degree of independence from the Government of the day. All of that needs to come into the mix and it would probably be a mistake to look at one facet in isolation. I was particularly interested when you said that the Government shouldn't have majorities in the committee. When I was Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change Minister, my committee had two out of the seven Government members in the convener wasn't. That was quite interesting, I will merely say, but what could be made to work? Mr Russell? To go back to your original question, the answer is that I am very much in the sympathy with what Hugh has said, but I believe that elected conveners would be a good start to a process of change. They won't automatically have the results that you suggested they might have in your opening question. I think that they would have to be part of a wider process of reform. I am very much with James Mitchell in the oral evidence that he gave to you last month. I would like to quote it if I might, because I was very struck about it, because I think that it is exactly the position that I take on this. He says, I am not sure that it is an elastoplast, but it could conceivably be a catalyst, that is a question of elected conveners. It could contribute to a next stage. I don't think that it would undermine the next stage in any overall review. I would be very much in favour of a review. The Parliament has been pretty good at looking at itself periodically. It would be good if there was a major review in which the Parliament asked itself how it should go forward, particularly in the light of the increase in powers, but elective conveners would be a catalyst. It would be a good base on which to look for the broader question. I think that, undoubtedly, this Parliament will have increased powers of some sort within probably after 2016 in that election. It is inconceivable that the number of MSPs will increase. I just think that that debate is not going to take place and certainly not in a way that would result in an increased number of members. How do you cope with an increasing work with a committee system that is already somewhat strained? A committee system, as I said in my letter to you, convener, that I very much see now, having had the experience of it in the last six months, but not having been part of it since 2003, I very much see it under-resourced in the sense of having an equity of arms when you come to things like legislation and amending legislation. There needs to be a reorganisation and review of the committee system, the way in which the Parliament functions, to put the committee system back at the heart of that process. Hugh and I would be pretty much agreed on that. The question is where do you start and how do you get it moving. It seems to me that if you reject this one, then you are still costing around for the first step. If you accept this as the first step and it can be made to work, I do not think that the issue of the number of MSPs is particularly germane and I thought that Alan Beath's approach to that was quite helpful. Then if you can get this in place, it should be the first step of a wider review which this committee and the entire Parliament should be engaged in. Can I just go back to Hugh Henry then, partly in the light of what Mike Russell has said? You have changed your mind and that is a perfectly respectable thing to do. Is part of what is moved due to a different position when you engage in the detail of how such a change would affect other things? In other words, is it that you have changed your mind about whether it might be a good idea or not, or is it that when you look at the detail of how it might work that you are confronted with some difficulties that I think it is fair to say to the committee in its discussion so far has been engaging with? No, I have not changed my mind about the principle. I still think, ultimately, that is something that we should consider that we should aspire to. It is more about the practicalities. For example, what would you do if you had a situation where a majority party decided that irrespective of it being or notwithstanding it being a private vote, took a decision at their group meeting and whipped members to back a certain person in an opposition party to be the convener? There could be a danger that a majority party could decide that, for example, if someone like Christine Grahame was a contender for justice committee and it was not the SNP who were in government, you could find the danger that a majority party would say, well, actually, do you know something? If we are anticipating a rough ride with controversial legislation, the last thing we want is a robust and effective convener and that danger would actually undermine Parliament if you were able to influence having a convener that was not necessarily the best, the most effective or the most robust. I suppose it then would bring you back to the debate that if you are going to consider an elected convener, then perhaps Government ministers shouldn't have a vote in the process because the function and purpose of the committees is to hold the Government of the day to account, particularly when it comes to legislation. Do you want to comment? Can I just say something in terms of what Hugh just said? It seems to me that if the criticism of elected conveners was that they could be influenced by the whips, then if that is the worst criticism of elected conveners, then it is no worse than the present situation because we know that the present situation is a creature of patronage. I am not criticising it, but it is a creature of patronage and decisions are made by political parties. If that is possibly the worst thing that could happen, then we need to look to see if there are any opportunities and advantages. I think there are several that you can have, particularly in the development of a leadership role from people who may not wish to see their career in any other way. Christine Grahame became a convener. We shouldn't use an example. You said somebody like Christine Grahame, there's nobody like Christine Grahame. She became a convener in the existing system. She's been a convener for all but two years of the life of this Parliament. People who have a different approach to this, perhaps a more radical approach to this, can emerge through the present system. Perhaps we can get more of them to emerge, but we could also develop a type of leadership that is loyal to, as you said, the Parliament itself and the way in which the Parliament can develop. Can I just take my... Can I just say... That's precisely what I want to say. Let's speak through the chair and... Sure. By all means respond to each other, but... Yeah. The point that Michael Mates makes about we would be no worse off than where we are just now isn't entirely correct because what we have at the moment is the political parties through their own internal system deciding who they think would be the best person for that job, whether from an opposition perspective or from a Government perspective. It would be entirely different if the majority party were able to determine, for example, in the present circumstances who the Labour convener was or who the Conservative convener was or who the... I don't know if the Liberal Democrats have anyone, but who conveners of other parties were rather than their own party so the moment opposition parties will pick people who they think will do an effective job in holding the Government to account that's different from the majority party deciding which of the opposition politicians they want to choose to hold Government to account. So there is a slight difference. Are you attempting, Mr Henry, to lead us to the idea that where we are to have elected conveners there should be an element required in the process of cross-party support for the appointment of the convener? Is that where you're taking us? But not necessarily to the extent that would allow a single party to effectively veto the appointment of the convener? That could be one way of doing it. I've already suggested that if you were to do that then another way might be to ensure that Government ministers don't have a vote. But the problem is that you then start to get in to the scenario that you presented. You start to get into fairly cumbersome procedural issues that might obviate the secret ballot that has been suggested. So it's not necessarily an easy thing to do. Patricia. Good morning. Henry Henry mentioned that perhaps if I understood him correctly that ministers shouldn't take part in the voting for conveners. At Westminster our understanding is that ministers or rather whose departments are scrutinised by a committee do not take part in the election of the convener for that particular committee. Of course our system is quite different because our ministerial departments do not reflect absolutely the remits of the committee because you could have a minister who answered if you like or was scrutinised by three or four committees possibly which would make the system quite complicated potentially or would you just exclude ministers altogether from the election of conveners? It's not my starting point as a preferred method if the committee were to look at that of Parliament or to look at it then I would suggest that perhaps all ministers should be excluded because we are actually and I come back to the point I made earlier on we have a relatively small Parliament and that then distorts that the balance quite easily and the point that Patricia Ferguson rightly makes is the cross cutting nature of some of the ministerial portfolios would mean that you couldn't have a precise identification with just one committee? I think it's perfectly possible to devise a set of rules for this election as it's possible to devise a set of rules for any election you don't fail to have elections because the rules are complicated you have the rules that suit the election and I think there is a strong argument for excluding ministers in these circumstances that you're quite right than the Westminster situation that's different it is a voluntary convention as I understand it at Westminster, it's not part of the rule but there is a convention that ministers don't I think it's perfectly feasible here to simply say ministers would not get a vote given the number of ministers involved that doesn't take a huge number I have 16 to 18 takes out of 100 if you take the presiding officer out of 128 that would give you a pool of about 110 votes and I think that's perfectly feasible I wasn't finished I'm not quite finished and what about parliamentary liaison officers for example who clearly do a job on behalf of government but who are technically back benchars but clearly have the interests of the minister for whom they work very much at the forefront of their minds I always found that my parliamentary liaison officer had my interests at heart because they are not paid and they're formally not paid you have to draw a line somewhere my own view is that they should be allowed to vote there will be members who have all sorts of affiliations if somebody was married to a minister would you not have them vote I think that you've got to draw a line somewhere but ministers certainly I think probably should be excluded but that's a debate to be had the other debate is once you've done this you would want to look at smaller and fewer committees I'm pretty sure because you're not going to be electing 15 or 20 people you're probably because of the nature of the parliament the fact that I think the other thing we can learn from Westminster is that sitting on a single committee and building expertise as part of that committee is much preferable to circumstances in which people sit on two or three committees and I think we have stretched people too thinly so I think we have to look at that The parliamentary liaison officer's point I think it's an interesting one because notwithstanding that they aren't paid as Michael Russell has said they nevertheless have a Government loyalty and responsibility and are privy to decisions that the other MSPs wouldn't be so yeah I do think that there is a potential conflict that they are that would need to be considered Can I just say as convener I suspect there would be no parliamentary liaison officers at the time of the initial election in any event we'd only be in by-elections, Gil Just back to the point that Hugh Henry made I listened very carefully to the prospect of a party using their votes because of the majority to appoint a particular convener that might be to someone else's advantage conversely if the Government ministers were not allowed to vote and since this is such a small parliament that you would actually in the numbers right now you would shift that majority on to another party because they would have a majority because of the small numbers how do you overcome this because the one democratic thing that you can see about this parliament it's elected by the people by a system that's more democratic so if you're going to exclude folk you're just shifting one if the principle that you state and I listened very carefully to I think it's a strong one but you would just shift it to another bloc wouldn't you there is that danger but I also think that it comes back to the issue about the difference between Government and Parliament and to whom you're responsible and where the primacy of your responsibility and loyalties lie so the remaining non-Government MSPs irrespective of party if you accept the principle that there should be direct elections by MSPs for convener then would be forced to look at their responsibility to Parliament rather than to Government now it's actually not an argument I'm advancing because I'm not the one that's making the proposition but at least in those circumstances you would hope that as the Parliament matures and develops that the remaining MSPs would see that their responsibility for at least that function is to Parliament and not to party but again in a small Parliament there is a potential problem I've actually seen this demonstrated in this Parliament on one occasion and it's perhaps illustrative just to remember that in the election of a by-election for a deputy presiding officer where there were two respected candidates but one of them undoubtedly had the backing of the Government of the day that person was not elected and they were not elected because there was a secret ballot that took place and the Parliament made a decision and I seem to remember that it wanted another candidate once you have a secret ballot then the power of the whips in this matter if there were to be the power of the whips established and I think it's unlikely the power of whips very much evaporates as long as you can't identify who you voted for then you can vote for who you want I think the Parliament has shown itself when it's had the opportunity to do this to be very thoughtful about what it thinks is best for the Parliament and I don't think this would be any different Dave Thomson Thank you convener Good morning gentlemen I find this very interesting and I just want to touch on a point that Mike Russell made because I think it's very valid and relevant in relation to the discussion about election of conveners and that is the number of committees and the size of committees and so on I think it is important that that be looked at and I was very interested to read the Presiding Officer's speech recently about that very subject and reducing the number of committees and the issue of MSPs being stretched that's been a problem for some considerable time it doesn't help us to run this Parliament it doesn't help us to have good debates it doesn't help us to run committees well and I think if we're I mean it may well be Yes well I have to set the scene I think convener otherwise the members don't know why I'm asking what I'm asking and it goes back to the point although Mike believes that there's no chance at all of more MSPs I think it's a nettle that this Parliament's going to have to grasp and it would help us deal with committees it would help us to deal with business I think there will be an opportunity when the number of MPs reduces as it will because the bill will be reintroduced so we'll go down to 50 and I think a modest increase in the number of MSPs at that time because of the reduction in MPs and also because of the new powers would be a very very sensible thing for us to do that then helps us to cope with some of the other difficulties I think some of those difficulties would go if we had more members so well I just wonder what the members' views are on that point I think the likely I mean I can understand where Mr Thompson is coming from but I think the likelihood of there being any increase in numbers is remote to a vanishing point I just don't think that that will take place the only argument that might bear scrutiny on that outside this building would be the argument of a transfer to another system of proportional representation actually to probably a single transferable vote if you did that in order to get manageable sizes of constituencies, multi-member constituencies if there were to be that then you would probably have to increase the number of MSPs I was a member of the the Arbathnut Commission on Boundaries and Voting Systems so that's why I have that arcane bit of knowledge and I think the number then becomes 200 to make that work I don't think that's going to happen certainly not in my lifetime but beyond it so assuming we have 129 members how do we make the best use of those 129 members and to make things practical for them and effective for them I mean, Hugh and I have both been ministers we know the information resource that ministers can draw on when you go to a committee particularly if you're proposing legislation the convener knows this too you go well armed you have a great deal of information the fact that you are absolutely steeped in the work of your department you see vast volumes of paper every single day you know this subject or you should know this subject inside out you really need to resource a committee in each individual member of the committee dealing with that minister in the same sort of way you have to give them the opportunity to get really immersed in their subject and I don't believe if you stretch members the opportunity I also don't believe with the best will in the world that it's not a criticism of the Parliament that the present resourcing of the committees that the Parliament is able to do allows that to happen I mean, you have to add for example in the legislative process you would have to add some very sophisticated legal advice to the committees about the technicalities of legislation in order to let them compete on anything like a level playing field with ministers when they come with legislation where you go into the absolute detail of that legislation so I think we need to resource those committees better I think we need to reduce the number of committees I don't think we need to mirror exactly each ministerial portfolio they change all the time we've just seen another set of changes last year so perhaps broadly based subject committees with a limited membership every member of the Parliament being on one of those and those committees with the resource of the Parliament being built up and developed would I think give a higher level of scrutiny and I think the development of people who chair those committees who are elected by the Parliament to chair those committees as a cadre of chairs within the Parliament and incidentally in an opening remark you said that we'd both been committee chairs I've never been a committee chair I aspire of course to that height but I've never been a committee chair in those circumstances I think you will have a better functioning Parliament it will take some working for it's not easy it'll take some working for it's not easy and I think the academics who gave evidence were right I think this Parliament was in advance of that process when it started and I think it's now a little bit behind it and it needs to get in front of it again and the new powers and these changes could make that happen Can you repeat that comment? We bring your briefing down Just a quick point convener what would Mr Russell's view be on that point that if you ask all the committee conveners The workload of committees, they would argue, is massive and they can't cope with it at present. How would fewer committees deal with that point? The two is, I think, one should take a very long, careful look at that workload, some of which is imposed upon it by government and perhaps we could deal with that in a different way. Secondly, if a committee, each member, was a member of only one committee, then those committees, some of those, would meet more regularly. I mean that your committee monegwch eich bod, twys o mynitch? Rwy'n ddweud i lleidyddol i'ch ddweud. mae'n ddweud i lleidydd i lleidydd trwm oeg. Footbondiwn y ddweud o ddweud at gyfraith honno i'ch ddweud y pataen gwag yma yng Nghymru. Mae'n ddweud ei fforddau bobl maenai i'ch ddweud fel ddydd hyn, yn darparu y cynnag o ddweud ac wedi gael eich ddweud ar gond determinedol eu cofnodau ddweud yn ddweud o ddweud, mae'n ddweud. Felly ei bod yn digwydd i mor eich ei clwmysysgwyl, er mwyn dweud o'i gwneud eich cyw Granny Aeulus i gynnali gyda eich wneud. Felly ei wedi r оказad iawn i gael ein gwyllgor ar hyn o'i gwyllgor i gael eu reifasol eich gwaith. Felly mae'n fwyllgor i gael eu cyffin, ac mae'n ei edrych i gael eu gwneud cael ei gwneud. ond mae nifer dweud o gyrfaen hwnnw i ddoffb gyda'r cyfnodau. Rwy'n ei ddweud o'r gwrthod. Rwy'n ei ddweud o'r gwrthod. Ysaf, Henry. Rwy'n ei ddweud o'r gwrthod, Dave Thomson. Rhyn i'n ei ddweud o ddangos ni'n gweithio i'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud, rwyf i'n mynd i'w ddweud o'r prosbectau, a'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud. Rwy'n credu'r ysgolwg, rwy'n credu'r prosiect o'r rydwm yn cymdeithasol yn 4,5 ysgolwg a'r ysgolwg yn cymdeithasol. Rwy'n credu'r ysgolwg, rwy'n credu'r ysgolwg, rwy'n credu'r ysgolwg, rwy'n credu'r ysgolwg a'r ysgolwg yn ystafod o'r rydwm yn nesaf o gyflwyno'r cymdeithasol yn y flwyddyn. Rwy'n credu'r prosiect o ysgolwg yn cymdeithasol yn cymdeithasol i'r byw. Rwy'n credu'r ysgolwg o'r cymdeithasol yn cymdeithasol yn cymdeithasol yn y parlymu yn 1999, mae'r cymdeithasol yn gweithio a I was a committee convener, and I was also a member for a time of the health committee. As members will know, the health committee is a busy committee that looks at very detailed issues. You are dealing with a range of organisations and people who are immersed in their profession, who have knowledge and expertise of which none of us could aspire to about those specific topics. To try to conven and be responsible for a committee and, at the same time, play a full role in a major subject committee, trying to not just hold the Government to account but also try to do justice to the aspirations and views of public participants in the committee process, it is very difficult. I think that there is a disservice to the committee system, so I agree entirely with that view. Just before I have been petitioned in Hugh Henry correctly referred to timings and committees and the fact that we cannot overlap with Parliament, we are under the caution that respect today. Let us step the pace up a little bit to a concise expression of questions and answers. Thank you, convener. At this point it is not germane to the subject that we are discussing today, but we have ranged a little bit already in our questioning. I accept entirely the arguments that colleagues are making about the resourcing of committees and the resourcing of members and the number of committees, but I wonder whether witnesses have been at pains to point out that there is, shall we say, less than an equality of arms between a minister coming to committee in terms of resource and the committee itself. Would that not be an argument for Government of whatever complexion? I do speak from some experience of that myself, being more open and sharing more with the committees in the first instance, so that there is less of a need for some of the processes that we have to go through. I have to say that my own experience of that has been not only a willingness to share, but in recent months, for example, dealing with both Eileen McLeod and Marco Beagie on the Committee on Parliament Bill they have been very willing to share. I do not recognise the lack of willingness to share, but they cannot do a brain dump of everything that they know about their subject. It is important that the committee develops its own knowledge and expertise in order to be able to hold Government to account, and, as Hugh Wrightley has said, to contribute to a debate that is often dominated by professionals who have worked in that area all their lives. It is quite daunting for a minister, let alone a member of committee, to find yourself trying to question, hold and discuss things with people who know immeasurably more about a subject. It is not possible for members to develop that knowledge, but it would be easier for them to try if they were not trying to do it in two or three different areas. I agree. I do not think that it is necessarily about an unwillingness to share. It is about the volume of information that you have access to and the staff who are able to marshal that into appropriate functions and sections. You have people who, as a minister, say, I would like you to go and do this, this and this, and it will be there and they have read and they have helped you to prepare lines. Whereas, if you are sitting as a committee member and I know that this is both a convener and an ordinary committee member, you have your own limited constituency resource, often overburdened by casework, then you have a limited parliamentary resource, and I do not mean that in a disrespectful way. I am an expert, a very good one, but nevertheless a very limited one that cannot devote its attention to the specific things that you want to pursue and to be able to research that for you with the same turnaround that a ministerial team could do. It is, as Patricia Ferguson described, that it is an unequal process. At stage 3 on climate change act, I required two people to carry my briefing down to the front bench. It was nearly two feet high. Those of us who have been ministers absolutely recognise what is being said. I agree entirely, but it was just important to get that on the record. Let us try to break into a mild canter, Gil. It follows on quite nicely to the points that you were raising. Would elected conveners enhance committee scrutiny of the Scottish Government? How would that work? How does that increase just after what you both said? Will I have shot that down in flames already? I would say that elected conveners would not necessarily enhance that process. I think that more effective committees, better resource committees and I agree with Michael again that a smaller number of committees able to specialise would all be able to do that. It might well be that the convener has referred to in his experience between 2007 and 11, it might have taken out the balance on the committees as well. I think that there is a whole range of things. It is not necessarily the election of the convener that would enable Parliament and its committees to do that. I would just go back and quote James Mitchell again. The last line of what he said in evidence to you would be a good base on which to look at the broader question. I think that it is an opportunity to move forward, but it is not the complete answer. Without it, I do not think that we will be moving forward at all. If the intention in what the Presiding Officer has been asking is to raise the profile of the conveners and their authority, and in these small committees that we work on, what actually happens to the rest of the committee? Where does their authority, does that diminish if authority is given to conveners? Conversely, what happens to the rest of the members? My argument has always been, and Michael is right that this debate should be seen as part of a package, but my argument has always been about making the committees more effective, because the committees have a very specific job to do on behalf of Parliament. It is about making the Parliament more effective because the committees that we always regard as almost being the cutting edge of the Parliament. It was where we were going to be different from the Westminster system. We had the aspirations of the pre-legislative scrutiny. We had aspirations for post-legislative reflection, which, frankly, we have never really been able to do. We do not have a second chamber to do that. In a sense, the starting point has got to be how do we help our committees to do their job on behalf of Parliament and the public? The funny thing is that, when we talk to constituents, they recognise that they have a Scottish Government, a First Minister, and they know that, but they actually think that Parliament is responsible for much of what the Government does. They expect us to be able to have a direct influence on things that never come near Parliament. Those of us who have been ministers know that there will be ministerial decisions that are taken that do not need the consent of Parliament, and yet the public out there thinks that, in some way, members sitting round committee tables are actually challenging and holding those Government ministers to account. They sometimes conflate Government and Parliament and my view very strongly is that, for this Parliament to be effective, we need strong committees. I come back to resourcing, I come back to size. I also come back to making sure that the committees have the opportunity to concentrate on the things that are important. You can describe the situation as having four key players in it. You have the player of our constituents, the people of Scotland, the people of each constituency who elect us, who are essentially our bosses. They are the most important part of it. There are three other players in it, too. There are the parties that are players. There is the Parliament that is a player and there is the Government that is a player. It is making sure that the balance between all of those is the right balance. This is not new. Burke was writing about this 200 years ago and looking at the balance between the players. It is probably the man who first identified these players and talked about the balance that they should have. In the present circumstances, just where we are in the Scottish Parliament at the moment, it is necessary to strengthen one of those players. That is the Parliament. That is necessary because the Parliament is getting more powers. The Parliament has 15 years experience, 16 years experience under its belt. It can look at experience elsewhere and say, could we do things better. It spread itself a little bit too thinly in terms of the committee system, and that is probably slightly diminishing its effectiveness. I see this reform as part of a process of strengthening the Parliament. The individuals involved who would be elected as conveners would have a mandate from the Parliament, so that would strengthen their action, but the committees would be refreshed by that mandate, too. I did not far from diminishing them. I think that it would strengthen them because there would be an acknowledgement across the Parliament that the Parliament itself had a role. Each individual member of the Parliament had a role in selecting those conveners and deciding how the Parliament went forward with those committees. That strengthens the role of all of us. As individuals, we do not influence that at the present moment. We do not tend to influence what committees we sit on. We can volunteer, but sometimes we are told, no, no, no, you are going somewhere else. I think that it would strengthen the Parliament. If you look at those four players, when you accept our responsibility is to those who have elected us and to the people of Scotland, the balance between those other players, between party, between Parliament and between government needs constantly to be reviewed and adjusted. On this occasion, I think that there are a number of actions that need to be taken, but you need to start somewhere. This is on the table. This is a start that can be made and then we can build on that start. Can I just ask—I think that a brief answer will suffice—if conveners are elected, have they enhanced tenure? In other words, it is more difficult to get rid of them. Therefore, they are stronger as a result of that. Indeed, it is not unpotable, but it strengthens the Parliament as a whole. That is not just the individual. It is arguable. Do not let it get bogged down, Margaret. Thank you and good morning. Sir Alan B, the former House of Commons chair, told us committee that the election of committee chairs in the Commons had enhanced the authority of chairs and has given the committees a greater degree of independence. Do you believe that, if we were to elect conveners, that would have the same impact in this Government? I thought Alan B's evidence was very convincing. I read it through and thought that it was convincing and strong. Particularly because the ability of the House of Commons to change is perhaps not as great as the ability of this Parliament to change. It is harder for an older institution to change. It took them quite a long time to do so. If you look at some of the older parliaments, I remember paying a visit to the Canadian Parliament where they had not introduced electronic voting. They talked about it for, I think, 20 years, but they had not actually got round to doing it. The House of Commons had talked about committee reform for 15 years before it actually got round to doing it, but it seems to have helped them. It is one of the things that could help us to move forward. We should be mindful of what others do. The evidence there is interesting and good. The written evidence that the academics gave you also gave you some interesting pointers to elsewhere where other systems have been tried. The point was made that, in the United States Senate, the convenership of committees laid by seniority. I think that the Senate once had a senator who was 100, so presumably he had to chair every committee. I think that once they had gone away from that and decided to go through things differently, they felt and the evidence showed that the work of those committees improved. I think that the balance of this evidence across all the places that have done this reform is that it works for them. I see no reason why it should not work here. I do think that the House of Commons is a very different institution. I come back to the point that I made earlier on. It is much larger. It is more mature. As Michael Russell said, it took as long to reflect on that change almost as our Parliament has been in existence. Yes, undoubtedly, there are things that we need to reflect on and we need to learn. As we mature, we need to develop and respond in different ways. I think that part of the changing culture, maybe not changing culture, but part of the culture that is different to Westminster is that it is not just the committee convener or chair that has that different approach and attitude. I also think that the committee members have a contribution to that and you actually see quite robust reports coming out from some of the Westminster committees. As indeed you have done in the Scottish Parliament, I think that it would be wrong to see that change purely being based on the election of the convener. Both of us have argued that there are many other things that also need to be looked at and that need to be changed in order to make the committees more effective. I think that we are agreed as well. As indeed I suspect, some of the committee members would agree that it is important for Parliament for the committees to be able to do their job properly. Thank you for that. Mike Russell mentioned, given an example of when an election at the Deputy Presiding Officer, for example, he used, did not actually elect the one that was expected to be elected. I think that you are talking about 2011. No, you are not. Much earlier, 2009. For my experience, electing a convener or a Presiding Officer or whatever, when you are just new in Parliament and there was such a huge turnover of MSPs in 2011, for example, you did not actually know the individuals or their performance rates at that time. If we were then asked to elect a convener at the outset of an administration, how effective would that be if there were a lot of new members? How would they know the actual individuals and who? Will they turn probably to their parties for some advice on that? They may turn to wise colleagues who know the runners and riders and take their advice, but I do not really think that that is a major objection. In every franchise, there will be some people who are well versed in who the candidates are and what they are and others who know nothing about them. I think that the reality is that the institution arranges how it arranges what opportunity it gives, presumably each candidate would want to be able to say a word or two as happens in the election of a Presiding Officer. You could say that the election of a Presiding Officer would be flawed in exactly the same way, because when you were elected, you presumably did not know any of the candidates particularly well, but each of the candidates, somebody speaks for them. Do they not? Am I right in remembering this or do they not? You do not think so. That must be for First Minister. I think that it is perfectly possible to arrange a way in which you will get to know the candidates, but there will always be new members who do not know and they will no doubt listen. There will be people who are perhaps elected as independents who have no circle of friends or colleagues. I will have to make a judgment from what they have heard. Do you not think that if we were to have elected conveners, we should also then have elected committee members to have a truly independent committees? It is a distinct possibility. I cannot see a great argument against it. We have to start somewhere. Maybe we have started with the elected conveners, but a different system of elected committee members. I mean, he raised in his first answer the question of whether pure de honte, which we use at the present moment, or pure-ish de honte, which simply allocates to conveners according to the votes that the parties have, should be changed in some way to mirror the fact that there is one committee that requires to be convened by somebody who is not from the Government Party. Maybe we should look at that. That is part of the changes, but I think that the point that the committee makes about the selection of committee members, the principle would ultimately be the same. The convener, let us not get ourselves, does have an enhanced responsibility and role, but equally, for such a committee, we have to be able to do that. We have to be able to do that. Equally, for strong committees, you would hope that there would ultimately be competition of people aspiring to be on those committees. If you were to accept that principle, then I suppose there is an argument for saying that the members would be chosen in that way as well. That is where I think all the problems start to come in, the ones that are raised earlier on. I think that we will allow this to go for about 20 to 25 minutes further just to guide people in their contributions. Gil? I think that we have already answered this question. You do not need to ask it again, then, Gil? I could give a quick answer, but we have had a coalition Government, we have had a minority Government, now we have a majority Government. Is there any significance to that in regards to this? Does it make any difference? I think that the convener actually suggested that there may have been a difference in his experience as a minister dealing with a committee that did not have a Government majority, but at that time I was on the other side of the fence. I think that, yes, there can be differences. It would be foolish to suggest that there wasn't. In the way that committees operate, not necessarily in whether or not there should be the election of a convener. I saw in that point of principle the election of a convener, just on that one point. I do not think that you should bring in reforms solely because of the political circumstances of the moment they can change. I think that this is something that can work in all those circumstances, and I think that that is why I would support it. I think that you did say that on the other hand. Thank you, convener. How can we make it more likely that the best candidates selected are not necessarily the party's preferred candidate? Is it more difficult to achieve this in our small legislator? Obviously, when you elect them, you elect them by secret ballot. Would you therefore reduce the number of people on the committees? Not necessarily reduce the number of people on committees because I think that both of us have argued that there should be fewer committees. In some cases there may be an argument for having larger committees depending on the specific function of that committee. I would not want to be prescriptive about the size of the committees. How would you get the best person elected? That is the $64,000 question. You might get the best person elected, but you might not. There might be games played, but I do not think that you can give any guarantees any more than you can give guarantees with the present system. All I would say is that in terms of the opposition parties, they will probably try to pick the people that they think can do the best job in holding the Government to account. The Government parties will look at it, I presume, from a slightly different perspective, and they will look at people who, as yet, have not been chosen to be ministers but might have a contribution to make for the future. I would anticipate that Government and non-Government decisions will be slightly different at the moment, but how do you get the best person chosen? The argument that you might not have the best person is probably an argument against democracy rather than against elected conveners. I think that you take your chance on that and see what happens. In terms of the wider issue, I think that the reality is that the election is always preferable to appointment. I think that, if that is the principle, it guides politicians and they do not go far wrong. Thank you very much. David. Two or three points here. I wonder what the members think about how conveners should be nominated, should it be restricted to their own party, should there be the possibility of other parties being able to nominate, should there be cross-party support or only support from the particular parties themselves, and how should we remove a convener that we are unhappy about? What would you suggest about that? Those are all matters that would require work by this committee where the principle accepted. At the risk of being glib, you would respond to each of them. In terms of the removal of conveners, you need to have a procedure whereby that can be done, either by the whole Parliament or initiated by a committee, probably by the whole Parliament, and I see absolutely nothing wrong with that. In terms of nomination, certainly, as you know, David, Mr Thomson, in the SNP, people can nominate themselves to be candidates. I do not think that there is much harm with that system. When it comes to you and says that you would make an extremely good convener of such-and-such a committee, you can say, well, I do not think that it is much of an idea or I think that it is an idea, then you can put yourself forward. I think that there is a need to make sure that there are candidates for each position. That is always quite difficult to do, but if you were only to have a single candidate for one position, it could either be because they are an outstanding candidate or because something is going on, so I think that you need to have some checks and balances. If you are done, you can draw up an acceptable group of rules pretty quickly to make it happen. I think that the whole Parliament should be involved in that process, possibly with the exception of ministers. If you have decided to go down this route, then yes, as Michael Russell has said, you need to look at the rules and the way with all to remove conveners. I think that you would need to put in safeguards, because, while you would want the committee in the Parliament to be able to remove either an ineffective convener or someone who has behaved inappropriately, equally you would need to give that convener some protection, that if that convener was doing his or her job properly and in doing so offended perhaps the Government of the day or the majority party of the day, then you would need to be sure that that convener couldn't be removed on a political whim. So it's not just to make it easier to get rid of someone that's also about protecting someone who's doing their job effectively. Should different parties be able to nominate, well, if you accept the haunt principle that we continue, if that's how we do it, on the basis of certain parties having access to convenerships in a certain number of committees and through that process being able to identify and agree which committees those are, then if you do move to election of conveners, then as long as the convener is representative of the party that's nominated for that committee, then to be honest I'm not sure that you should restrict the nomination to just people from that party as long as whoever is nominated is from that particular party, so although I don't agree with it, if you are going to go down that route then I think you would just throw the nominations open. It distracts me, I'm not at all sure what the procedure is for getting rid of a committee convener at the present moment. I mean, I think there probably isn't one. You know, is there a procedure for getting rid of a committee convener? Take the advice. I think the reality probably is that this has not happened. It's difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would happen. In fact, I can think of one circumstance and Patricia Ferguson and I will be dredging our memories again but I can think of one circumstance where the party attempted to remove a member from a committee and it resulted in that member leaving that party and staying on the committee. So, it does happen. From those points, things like voting systems and all that will need to be considered, but just to get the member's panelist's views on this, if this is a good start and if we go down this road, given that what you've said about a wider range of issues that really I think are all linked in terms of if we're really going to have an impact, how important is it that we do follow through with the other issues because there will be a temptation that once we go through this and all the complications, we'll have to discuss voting systems, getting rid of conveners, all the rest of it, quite a bit of work, that it'll just stop at that and that will not do the job. I mean, how important is it that we try to build in our report on this the need for the further work that then needs to take place? That will be your decision, but I've made it clear in my evidence. I think that this is the start of a process. It would be, I think, welcome to see in your report an acceptance it was a start, the process setting what you thought was a timetable for that process and how that process would be carried through. I actually think, convener, that this is probably the least important of the changes that need to take place. I do think that some of the issues that Steve Thomson identifies, we as a Parliament should be looking at just now anyway and who knows in the fullness of time we might have to return to the election of conveners, but I think that there are far more important things that need to be addressed at the moment. We've just checked the detail and an absolute majority on the motion of a member of the committee can remove a committee convener, which is quite interesting because, of course, although Parliament elect ministers and can pass votes of no confidence, it has no mechanism by which they can be removed from office, apart from removing them from office in Parliament. In terms of Hugh Henry's point about protection, then I would have thought that elected conveners would be far better protected because I can't imagine that they would be removed except by a motion of the Parliament as opposed to a motion of the committee. That means that four people in this committee could remove a convener. I think that better protection would come from a motion in Parliament. George? Thank you, convener. Good morning. Hugh Henry has hinted at this idea and I think that Mike Russell agreed, which is very unusual. Should we go down this road, should the parties continue to allocate conveners in the present system or should there be any other rules about party allocation of convenerships? I think that the Parliament needs to have a debate about how, once its committee is to operate and what the allocation of political responsibilities should be. I floated an idea that the Parliament might want to look at whether committees other than the Public Audit Committee should have a convener that is a non-government from a non-government party or should you have committees, certain committees where the majority on that committee is a non-government majority in order to make sure that we compensate for the lack of a second chamber, if you like. If you do not do that, then I suppose that the present system is as effective as any other if you are going to allocate the committee responsibilities on the basis of party size. The election of a Government is part of the process of a contract with the voters in which that Government has made certain commitments that it then wants to carry through. Therefore, it has a mandate to do those things. If you constructed a committee system that made that difficult or impossible to do, then I think that you would be working against that general democratic rule. The idea that you would allocate the convenerships by the haunt system to recognise the balance of the Parliament in order to carry through the will of the electorate seems to be a sound one, and that is why it is there. The Parliament committees reflect the balance that the voters have chosen in the election. However, there is already one exception, and that is because, quite rightly, in terms of financial and audit matters, there should be another voice that should scrutinise it, because that is a scrutiny committee. As part of the process, it is worth having a debate, are there any other committees in a new committee structure that might require that difference of view? However, I would be careful about trying to construct a system that goes against what voters have chosen. The haunt system attempts, in terms of the convenership of the committees, to reflect the balance of the parties in the Parliament. It tries to reflect what the voters have done. We should be careful about against saying that. The process is working reasonably well. I think that we have come to the end of our formal questioning. Let me now, as promised, give you each the opportunity to sum up or draw to our attention any matters that you think would be of interest to us in the broader reform of committees, albeit our research here is focused on the elected committee. Mr Russell, first? You had a constructive discussion of that, because it is not a discrete issue. Although your inquiry is into that discrete issue, it has opened up the need for a wider reform of which not only Hugh Henry and I are in agreement, quite a number of people in the Parliament agreement, we need to make some changes. Over the next few months the best time to make those changes is in anticipation of the election of a new Parliament, because then they can come into effect at the start of that new Parliament. In order to do it during a parliamentary session. I would have hoped that the committee would be committed to that process of reform. Whether it is committed to elected conveners is another matter. I go back to the point that I started with. I think that James Mitchell is right about this. This is the start of a process. You have to start somewhere. I think that it shows willing. It does not stop you doing other things. It might just actually drive you forward to do other things. I would certainly like to see your report committed to a longer process that results in necessary changes for the start of the Parliament that will be elected a year from now. Mr Henry. I agree with Michael Russell that what we need to consider is that wider reform. I think that it would be a mistake if we simply focused on this one issue, which as I said earlier on I do not think necessarily is the most important one. I am up for change. I have been arguing for change for a number of years and I think that it is in the interests of this Parliament to have a debate about change. I thank you both very much for giving you the time and being good quality interaction with the committee. You have done what good panels do. You have left us with more questions than we had at the outset, which is a pretty good place to start. Thank you once again for giving you the time. Thank you. Colleagues, the third item on our agenda is for the committee to approve its annual report. The committee is required to produce a report each year on the Standing Order rule 12.9. You have a draft report in front of you. Do members have any comments that they wish to make in relation to the report? I know, I know. You know me so well, convener. I am very content with the report as it stands, but I just wondered at paragraph 5 we obviously published our report about lobbying and that has gone to the Government and the Government is thinking about that, but I just wondered whether we are going to have a debate on that. I know that there was one at the beginning, but I just wondered whether we would have it on that report at any time. Do we have the debate after the report? We are masters of our own destiny in this regard, but I think the position that we are now in, we are really waiting for a formal response from the Government. We have not yet had that. We have had an indication that it is not arriving as promptly as it sometimes does, because it is preparing to legislate on the matter. I think that the next step is to see what our response is to the Government's plans. We could clearly decide that that is the legislation that the Government will consult on its proposals. We, of course, have in essence done pre-legislative scrutiny, except we have not seen the legislation. We are probably expecting to see something from the Government certainly before recess, and I think that the indications are rather sooner than that. I think that the next step is to wait for that to happen. I am in the hands of the committee. That is my understanding. In the normal course of events, we prepare more since the Government get the comments than we have a debate at some point. I know, as a member, that there was a debate at the beginning of the process, but before the Government comes with its ideas in the form of legislation, it might just be a good idea to have Parliament reflect on what the committee is saying about all of that. I am not desperate to do that. Without giving you false certainty, I think that the response from the Government will be on a timescale for what it brings before recess. I am in your hands on that matter, but that is where we should certainly go. Of course, we are going to provide the Bureau of Grays to be the committee that will take any legislation that is brought forward through. I would be astonished if it was any other committee, but it is not our call. All right. Is there anything else that anyone wishes to deal with on this? No. Right. Okay. So you are contempt for the report to be submitted in the form that is before us in draft. That is helpful. I am looking at time and I am quite anxious that agenda item 5, which we need to consider in a very precise and formal way, that we do deal with that today. So I am going to propose that we take the code of conduct at our next meeting. Is everyone content with that? Right. Okay. That is helpful. In that case, I move the meeting into private session. Thank you.