 My first speaker would be Alexander Dinkin, President of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Yime Moe, Academician Dinkin, and his institute does this forecast for 20 years, which is pretty accurate and one which I think first time was issued five years ago, was it? Yeah, that was a very intriguing, interesting and correct prediction of many things which happened after. So the floor is yours Alexander, and my next speaker will be Michel Fouchet. Igor, thank you and thank you, Jury, for having me here. I have some doubts about the title of our workshop because nobody knows what would be the global architecture in 20 years. So if somebody explain me how it would look, easily for me would be to talk about Russia. Let me start with the point that Russia is rather complicated story. This is not the country for the beginners, and for those who have different views, I recommend to revisit Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Solzhenitsyn and so on, and you would understand what I'm talking about. For example, we still do not know the exact number of our casualties during the Second World War. During Stalin, it was stated to be 7 million, in Khrushchev times 20, in Gorbachev 27. This February, during parliamentary hearings, the figure of 42 million were raised. And it was based on the secret archives of the State Planning Committee, so 42 million. And of course, those history is produced a very high, very elevated threat perception in the country. And these characteristics, I guess, were important. And those who do not understand this threat perception, those persons hardly could be considered like an expert in Russian question. This August, Dr. Henry Kissinger raised an interesting question. He asks, is it the wisest course to pressure Russia? And if necessary, to punish it until it accepts Western views of its internal and global order, where would this policy lead to? In my perception, the answer is rather simple. It would bring this policy to a new bipolarity. On the one hand, it's supposed to be Russia, China, other BRICS members, CTO members, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the other side, it would be US, NATO, Japan, Australia, et cetera. And of course, the recent sanctions against three completely different countries like DPRK, like Iran and Russia, they pushed the wall towards this frightening to my knowledge scenario. The first conclusion out of this scenario, if it happened, I believe that in this case in 10, 15 years, RIMIMBI could became the new clearing currency for the whole globe. So arrogance and ignorance when we talk about Russia is not helpful. For example, 44th President of the United States believed that sanctions would tear apart our economy. As you may see, that doesn't happen. RIMIMBI adjusted to the new price structures and demonstrated moderate growth this year. It would be approximately 2 percent, despite that according some government experts assessment, the sanctions damaged our economy by 1 percent of GDP annually. CPI reached the historical minimum since 1992. Under sentiment domestic demand recovery and construction activity ahead of the World Cup should keep supporting investments as well. Several years ago, the hydrocarbon expert generated two-thirds of our federal budget. Currently it shares slightly above one-third. Grain crop production also reached its maximum and the country would become number one in the grain expert this year. Compare this with shameful mass-scale grain import from Canada and the United States in the time of the Soviet Union. Let me show some figures trying to find the answer of where, suppose, Russia to be. This is our long-term outlook. We produce it every five years. On the left, you may see the previous one, and my grid picture is on the cover. I believe that this picture expressed very well the nature of the job of those who look ahead. The gentleman looking at the egg and painting the bird. This is how I could describe the work of those who try to predict the future. On the right side is our recent outlook. It's not yet translated into English. It will be translated early next year. There is a picture of a Japanese painter, Morimoto, who revisited the Magritte's picture. It became more complicated. This is our assessments of the population growth and global GDP growth. You may easily find out that the Russia's economic growth in the current patterns would be lower than the global economic growth. This is the first observation. Here you may find some approaches to this new bipolarity. On the left, this is G7. On the right, there is a bit artificially produced the new G7. You may see that economic might of those two groups is approximately the same. This rather old figure is for the year 2015. Here you may see our outlook about GDP per capita. The Russia is in blue and it's climbing up closer to the European Union figures. The China is supposed to be ahead of the average GDP per capita in the world. Of course, the United States would be ahead. The final picture which I would like to show you is that our assessment about the crude oil demand peak. It's over the OECD countries out there on a horizontal left side red curve. Russia is still growing, but we predict that this climax of the crude oil demand would be something after 2035. Currently everybody in Russia understood that and we are working in some structural changes in the economy. If nothing would happen and Russia would continue with the growth of average 2% a year, what does it mean in, let's say, global era? Today we are on the sixth position in PPP terms and if the growth would not be higher in year 2035 we could find ourselves on the seventh place just behind Brazil. In real exchange rate, it means that Russia could slide down from current tenths place in the world GDP to 15th position right after Mexico. And those two countries, Brazil and Mexico, I believe they are our real competitors in many senses in the sense of institutional quality, regulation efficiency, and structural reforms. To overcome this inertia trend, currently Alexei Kudrin and group of experts are working on the comprehensive program of structural modernization and institutional buildup for sustainable and more competitive economic growth. The desirable GDP growth rate is 4% annually, but this is not the target. And the biggest departure from previous reform programs, which we have a lot in the past, is that this is not just the economic exercise in the field of economy, this is more comprehensive set of road maps in legal sphere, in education, foreign affairs, defense policy, culture, etc. And appropriate parts and blocks of this strategy debated in each respective ministry or agency including Ministry of Defense. And this iteration process is continued now and as you may easily guess there are certain resistance to those mostly liberal ideas of the authoritarian modernization. If that strategy would be accepted it could diminish the uncertainty about the future economic policy. And uncertainty in my perception is one of the major current Russia risk. Other economic risks, which that strategy geared to diminish are weak property rights protection, investment climate and corruption. But by the way, the recent World Bank doing business assessment for next year it puts Russia on the 35th position, it's five steps up and just five years ago in 2012 we were on the 124th position. So it's substantial skyrocketing of the entrepreneurial climate domestically. Talking about let's say foreign policy suggestions by Mr. Kudrin, is the diminishing confrontation with the West including easing tensions around Ukraine is the narrative of the foreign policy part of this program. So as history teaches, demise of empire almost always brings tectonic shifts in the world order and it also leaves long lasting territorial conflicts. Look at the Kashmir conflict which is continued for 70 years after the British departure and gave us two nuclear states. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Sykes-Picot legacy largely feed the current blood events in the Middle East. The dismantling of Yugoslavia and notably Kosovo provide another example. Similarly, I believe that Stalin's crucial borders drawn inside the Soviet Union according to short term political experience have left many territorial mines. And it is curious that there are so many foreign supporters of Stalin's crucial legacy in the West. In 2007 and the Munich Security Conference Putin warned that the period of Russia's retreat and of the West exploding the troubles of the post-communism transformation to sideline and marginalize Russia is over. A reaction unfortunately was simplistic. It was portrayed as an effort to launch a new Cold War. The following year at the NATO summit in Bucharest he declared that the fast track for Georgia and Ukraine or the third wave of NATO enlargement unacceptable for Russia and if it happens he called to fasten belts. This time France and Germany insisted on cancelling MIP. But spirit of it prevailed unfortunately especially among new NATO members. In the West there were no politicians with enough imagination to escape conventional wisdom. And this time a mirror image of the Caribbean crisis was already visible. And this idea of supplying weapons, lethal weapons to Ukraine I guess one of very dangerous step in those direction. So I don't know what would be the world order in 20 years. I guess that much courage and imagination is needed for choosing the road not traveled before. And without the new mode of dealing with each other and communication with each other it would be impossible to find a bit more promising growth. Thank you. Thank you very much Alexander. It resonates with what Mr. David Toglu just said. We need some kind of a new system of security, international cooperation and so on and so forth. And if I understand you correctly there is new biopolarity in the world, future and present and new biopolarity inside Russia, progressives versus conservatives. Which is very interesting thing to watch.